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ABSTRACT
Evidence from eyewitnesses is often the starting point for police investigations and it is 
estimated that it plays an important role in one quarter of all contested Crown Court 
cases. However, the memory is a fragile and malleable instrument which can produce 
unreliable yet convincing evidence. Because mistaken witnesses can be both honest and 
compelling, the risk of wrongful conviction in eyewitness identification cases is high, as 
is illustrated in a number of famous miscarriages of justice. This thesis assesses the 
sufficiency of the protections offered to defendants in cases involving eyewitness 
identification by examining psychological research on memory, police procedures for the 
collection of evidence from eyewitnesses, and judicial discretion to exclude unreliable 
evidence found in R v Turnbull and section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. 
In interview, startling levels of guessing were reported by witnesses attending 
identification procedures; and suspects were largely unaware of their rights. Current 
identification procedures are time-consuming and inefficient; and psychological research 
offers some guidance but few answers, precluding the usefulness of expert evidence. The 
thesis concludes that an increase in specialised identification officers, reform of 
procedures to allow for greater use of video identification, guidelines on the exercise of 
discretion under s.78, and judicial education regarding the importance of using a 
comprehensive Turnbull direction are required before an adequate level of procedural 
and evidential protection against erroneous identification can be offered to suspects.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION 
IDENTIFICATION PARADES AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
Introduction
This thesis assesses the current system of collection and presentation of identification evidence 
by evaluating the successes and failures of police procedures, the use of psychological research 
findings, and evidential safeguards in contested cases. Wide-ranging changes in the methods 
used to collect eyewitness evidence are proposed to increase the efficiency and reliability of 
police procedures. As over 70 per cent of Crown Court cases proceed on a plea of guilty, 1 only 
a minority of defendants will be afforded the protections of the Turnbull 2 guidelines and 
section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE"). Ensuring that issues of 
reliability and fairness are assessed at the pre-trial stage is therefore of prime importance.
It is estimated that eyewitness identification evidence plays an important role in one quarter of 
contested Crown Court cases and is a less important part of the evidence in a further 20 to 25 
per cent of cases. 3 Although advances in the use of scientific identification techniques such as 
DNA profiling may lead to the conclusion that eyewitness identification would have 
diminished in importance, identification evidence is still widely thought to be a principal cause 
of miscarriages of justice. 4 Unfortunately, protections against the admission of unreliable 
evidence are inconsistently applied. The provisions governing police procedures on
1 The figure is much higher in magistrates' courts, which deal with over 93 per cent of criminal cases: 
Zander, M., and Henderson, P., The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Crown Court Study Research 
Study No. 19 (1993 London:HMSO), 2.
2 [1976] 3 All E.R. 549.
3 According to Zander and Henderson's 1993 Crown Court Study, op.cit., 92.
4 See, for example, Rattner, A., "Convicted but innocent: Wrongful conviction and the criminal justice 
system" (1988) 12 Law and Human Behavior 283. The increased use of CCTV in city centres may result in less 
reliance upon individual eyewitnesses, or at least support for their identifications, for offences which are 
commonly committed in public, such as street robbery. This is dependant upon high quality video equipment 
being available. There has been no systematic study of the difference CCTV may have made, but the more 
traditional store and bank cameras do not offer a high enough quality tape to allow for confirmation of an 
eyewitness' identification. This was evidence by the continued use of bank employees as live eyewitnesses in 
two cases during the empirical study as reported in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.
identification in England and Wales are some of the best in the world,5 but their successful 
application is reliant upon adequate training of officers involved at all stages of the process. 
Specialist identification officers in the studies for this thesis followed the provisions carefully, 
but those involved as witness officers or as temporary identification officers breached the Code 
of Practice, often unwittingly. The importance of reliable identification procedures cannot be 
overemphasised, because once identification evidence reaches court, there is no coherent 
approach to the exercise of the general discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence 
under section 78 of PACE, nor is there a Turnbull warning to the jury in almost half the cases 
where identification is an important issue. 6 This thesis investigates why eyewitness 
identification is unreliable, the sufficiency of the procedures in place to combat that 
unreliability, and suggests some reform of procedural and evidential processes in eyewitness 
identification cases. A main objective of the thesis is to assess the level of protection from 
mistaken identification and wrongful conviction which is offered by the current criminal justice 
process. In order to carry out this assessment, the psychology behind witness identification as 
well as law and legal practice are examined.
The thesis concentrates on the interplay between psychology and legal practice. In particular it 
concentrates on two questions: firstly, whether psychological research is used to best effect in 
gaining reliable eyewitness identification evidence and protecting suspects from 
misidentification; and second whether the legal safeguards in place act to adequately protect 
suspects from mistaken identification. To this end, a discussion of current safeguards is 
followed in Chapter 8 by an examination of the role expert witnesses may be able to play in 
ensuring that suspects are given adequate protection from unreliable identification evidence. 
The empirical work in the thesis directly approaches these research questions by assessing the 
safeguards offered by Code of Practice D and the impact of psychological research on police 
practice.
5 Many other countries have no comparable provisions: Wagenaar, W., van Koppen, P., and Crombag, 
H., Anchored Narratives: The Psychology- of Criminal Evidence (1993, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf), 
138.
The thesis has as its main focus the live identification parade, which is viewed as the most 
reliable form of identification and is the most common identification procedure used by the 
police in England and Wales. 7 The law in this thesis is as stated on 30th June 1999.
A Substantial Cause of Wrongful Conviction?
Miscarriages of justice due to misidentification began to be a cause of concern in the early 
1900s due to several high profile cases. The most notable cases were those of Oscar Slater in 
Scotland and Adolf Beck in England. Oscar Slater was convicted of murder in 1909, after 
twelve witnesses testified that they had seen him loitering outside the tenement which contained 
the victim's apartment. Two witnesses also claimed to have seen Slater leaving the apartment 
itself. All of these witnesses identified him after only fleeting glimpses of a man in the vicinity 
of the apartment. 8 Slater was not released from prison until 1928, after serving nineteen years.9
In 1895, Adolf Beck was identified in the street by a woman who reported him to a nearby 
police officer as the confidence trickster who had obtained money and jewellery by false 
pretences from her. Beck was positively identified by ten out of 22 women, and only one 
woman said that he was not the man. Twenty two years earlier, William Augustus Wyatt, 
known also as John Smith, was convicted on similar charges. Smith and Beck resembled each 
other, and police officers were convinced that Beck was Smith. Corroboration of the 
identifications of Beck was obtained from a handwriting expert, who announced that writings 
by Smith and Beck were in the same hand. Beck was convicted and sentenced to seven years 
penal servitude, and was released on licence in 1901. In 1904 several women had complained
6 Zander and Henderson (1993), op.cit, 93.
7 In assessing the use of identification parades, video, group and informal identifications, as well as 
confrontations, are examined. The importance of the use of photofit, identikit and photographs is acknowledged. 
However, the thesis concentrates on procedures used once a suspect has become "known" to the police, at which 
point photofit, identikit and photographs are not used. The general discussion regarding eyewitness reliability 
and the use of both Turnbull warnings and expert evidence is relevant to the use of all methods of identification.
8 Such identifications today would be subject to a judicial warning of care to the jury under Turnbull 
[1976] 3 All E.R. 549, which requires a cautionary direction to be given wherever the prosecution case rests 
wholly or substantially on the issue of eyewitness identification.
9 For a detailed account of the Slater case and appeal, see W. Roughead (ed.), The Trial of Oscar Slater 
(1950, Edinburgh: William Hodge).
to the police about deceptions following the same pattern as those in 1877 and 1895, and a 
covert street identification, in effect a confrontation, was arranged by the police. Five women 
testified against Beck in court and he was convicted once more. The judge, however, was not 
satisfied that Beck was Smith and deferred sentence. In the meantime, Smith was caught red- 
handed and Beck was released and pardoned for both convictions. 10
A Committee of Inquiry was held to look into the Beck case, because "the fact that an innocent 
man could be not once only, but twice convicted, ... naturally created grave misgivings in the 
public mind as to the nature and workings of our system of criminal justice". 1 ' This committee 
concluded that: 12
"Evidence as to identity based on personal impression, however bona fide, is 
perhaps of all classes of evidence the least to be relied upon, and therefore, 
unless supported by other facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury."
As a result of cases such as Slater and Beck, concern as to the safety of convictions based on 
eyewitness testimony grew, and provisions to reduce wrongful convictions were gradually 
developed. However, breaches of police procedures were subject only to adverse comment by 
the judge and practice continued to vary between police forces.
Public attention turned to eyewitness identification again in the 1970s, with the cases of Luke 
Dougherry and Laszlo Virag. 13 These prompted such an outcry that the government assembled 
a Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Lord Devlin. The Committee was given a broad brief and
10 Proof that the women who had identified Beck were mistaken was later revealed, when it was confirmed 
that the fact that Beck could not be Smith was on record, because Smith was circumcised but Beck was not. For 
a more detailed description of the Beck case, see John Henderson "A Question of Identity" (1989) Journal of the 
Law Society of Scotland, 292.
11 Committee of Inquiry into the case of Mr. Adolf Beck Cmnd 2315, (1904), (vii).
12 Ibid., (vii)
13 The outcry continued through the 1970s and early 1980s: see, for example, Main, P., Mistaken Identity 
(1976 London: Quartet); Cole and Pringle Can You Positively Identify This Man? (1974, London: Deutsch); 
Brandon, R., and Davies, C., Wrongful Imprisonment (1973 London: Alien and Unwin); Kennedy, L., A 
Presumption of Innocence: The Amazing Case of Patrick Meehan (1976 London: Gollancz); Foot, P., Who 
Killed Hanratty? (1971, London: Jonathan Cape). Debate about the guilt or innocence still rages, with DNA 
evidence being tested in 1998 accompanied by an application to exhume Hanratty's body: "Hanratty evidence 
hidden by police" The Independent March 30 1999, 7; "Innocent as charged" The Daily Telegraph November 15 
1997, 3.
proceeded to evaluate all aspects of eyewitness identification. It reported in 1976, concluding 
that: 14
"In cases which depend wholly or mainly on eyewitness evidence of 
identification there is a special risk of wrong conviction. It arises because the 
value of such evidence is exceptionally difficult to assess; the witness who has 
sincerely convinced himself and whose sincerity carries conviction is not 
infrequently mistaken."
The Devlin Report was swiftly followed by the Court of Appeal's decision in Turnbull, which 
provided for safeguards in eyewitness identification cases.
The current safeguards offered to suspects are threefold: firstly, a Code of Practice governs 
police procedure for the collection of eyewitness identification evidence. The Code outlines 
best practice for all formal procedures and also governs when an informal identification 
procedure may be embarked upon. Second, cases which go to a contested trial and which 
depend wholly or substantially upon eyewitness identification are subject to a judicial warning 
commonly referred to as the Turnbull warning. This allows for the withdrawal of identification 
cases from the jury and, where a case is left before the jury, it stipulates that jurors should be 
warned about the dangers of relying on eyewitness identification. Third, the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 a general discretion to exclude evidence in section 78. These 
safeguards are discussed in chapters three and seven of this thesis.
The fragility of memory continues to contribute to misidentifications even with the safeguards 
of PACE and Turnbull. A cursory look through newspapers or Law Reports allows an insight 
into the care which should be taken before convicting in cases where eyewitness identification 
is the main evidence, especially where those cases are suspect-driven. 15 Rattner estimates that, 
in the United States, 52 per cent of wrongful convictions have eyewitness identification at their
14 Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on Evidence 
of Identification in Criminal Cases (1976 London:HMSO), at para. 8.1.
15 See "Man cleared of five attacks" Birmingham Evening Mail November 28 1998, 20; "Bus-stop sex 
attacker is jailed for fifteen years" Birmingham Post February 27 1999, 5; "Five minute talk in police car 
doomed Stephen Lawrence murder trial" Sunday Mirror March 22 1998, 9; "Injustice for all" The Guardian 
January 4 1999, 8; "Case raises issue of vulnerability" The Guardian November 12 1993, 25.
root. 16 It is unknown what the impact of misidentification is in the United Kingdom, but the 
study of eyewitnesses conducted for this thesis suggests that a disturbingly high number of 
them guess when presented with an identification test. On average, less than half of all 
witnesses make positive identifications. When a good proportion of those who do make a 
positive identification of the suspect are guessing, the reliability of eyewitness evidence must be 
questioned. Coupled with the fact that eyewitnesses can be confidently and honestly mistaken, 
the potential for wrongful conviction is evident. Regular review of the processes for collecting 
and presenting eyewitness evidence is required in order to minimise the harm caused by 
mistaken identification.
Evaluating Identification Evidence and Procedures
In its 1993 Report, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice spoke of the compromise that 
has to be struck between crime control and due process values, so that "the risks of the 
innocent being convicted and the guilty being acquitted are as low as human fallibility 
allows". 17 There are references to the need to strike a reasonable balance between the 
protection of suspects' rights and allowing the police the freedom to do their job throughout the 
Report, leaving the reader with the impression that if we could find this rather mystical balance, 
then all would be well. 18 Less is said in the Report about how to create a balance, or assess 
whether the balance achieved is serving the public well. 19
More attractive than a simple attempt at balancing is Ash worth's call for a move to a principled 
approach. This involves prioritising rights and allowing deviation from them only where there 
is some reasoned justification. In cases involving eyewitness identification evidence, the logical 
starting point is the integrity principle, which "states that the agents of law enforcement should
16 Rattner (1988), op.cit.
17 The Royal Commision on Criminal Justice Report ("The Runciman Report") (1993 London:HMSO) 
Cmnd 2263, 2.
18 See, for example, comments on pages 8 and 9: Ibid. See also the references to "compromise" in 
Sanders, A., and Young, R., CriminalJustice (1994 London: Butterworths), 417
19 This in itself creates further problems: for example, which sector of the public should the balance 
satisfy?; and what competing rights and interests should be taken into account?
not use, and the courts should not condone, methods of investigating crime that involve 
breaches of the rules".20 This promotes fairness to defendants and a moral consistency from the 
State: in responding to law-breaking the State should follow its own laws and rules. The 
integrity of the system is upheld, in my opinion, by both disciplining the police for serious or 
deliberate breaches of the rules (by exclusion of evidence as well as by internal disciplinary 
procedures) and by protecting the defendant from prejudice. Ashworth terms these the 
disciplinary and protective principles.21
The Runciman Report also made the point, trite though it is, that the maintenance of law and 
order is dependent on public goodwill,22 because otherwise the police would be unable to do 
their job and the system would lack the support necessary to uphold the law in a democratic 
society. If we are to believe psychological research which shows that procedural fairness is 
more important to most people than whether a conviction or acquittal results from a 
prosecution,23 the need for public goodwill could be served by adopting principles which 
promote fairness and the protection of suspects' rights. Furthermore, it is only by protecting 
the rights of suspects and excluding evidence which results in unfairness that the criminal 
process can retain (or regain) integrity.24 Fair procedures are particularly necessary for the 
collection of reliable evidence in eyewitness identification cases, because memories are 
malleable and can be distorted by the use of improper questioning techniques or identification 
procedures.
At this point it could be tempting to advocate for the courts to place no reliance on identification 
evidence, but its importance in criminal prosecutions does not allow such a position without
20 Ashworth, A., The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (1994 Oxford: Clarendon), 32; see also 
Zuckerman, A.A.S., The Principles of Criminal Evidence (1989, Oxford: Clarendon)
21 Ashworth (1994), op.cit., 302; and Ashworth, A., "Excluding evidence as protecting rights" [1977]
Criminal Law Review 723. Although Ashworth criticises the largely symbolic impact of the disciplinary
principle, it is submitted that impact will be gained from public condemnation of improper practices. The
protective principle, of which he is an advocate, works well in cases where there is actual prejudice caused, but
potentially allows evidence to be admitted in cases where there has been a substantial or bad faith breach, which
would send dangerous signals to the police and would surely undermine the integrity of the system.
" The Runciman Report, op.cit., 7.
:? Tyler, T.R., Why People Obey the Law ( 1990 New Haven: Yale University Press), 101.
24 See Choo, A., Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings ( 1993, Oxford: Clarendon).
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losing the goodwill of the public and compromising fairness to victims. Moving away from an 
absolute right of protection could therefore be justified on the grounds that evidence should be 
allowed where the breach causes little or no prejudice to an individual or to the aims of the 
process. Rather than excluding all evidence of identification, fairness can be promoted by 
insisting that procedural rules are followed and that an identification is supported by other 
evidence. Whilst the Turnbull guidelines look for supporting evidence, they allow the trial 
judge to admit unsupported identification evidence where it is of "good" quality. Assessments 
of quality need to be well informed by both psychological research and past errors before a fair 
decision can be made. Breaches of Code D should result in the exclusion of evidence where 
they result in prejudice to the defendant, or constitute a significant or bad faith deviation from 
the rules. This thesis broadly advocates the use of the integrity principle, combining aspects of 
the protective and disciplinary principles to arrive at a strict test for the exclusion of evidence. 
In cases where there is a breach Code of Practice D, it is only where the breach is minor, 
caused in good faith, and does not result in significant disadvantage to the defendant that 
evidence should be admitted. In order to protect the rights of defendants, judges should be 
educated about the factors affecting eyewitness reliability and should be encouraged to give a 
Turnbull warning in all cases where eyewitness identification is a significant part of the 
prosecution case. This thesis evaluates the protections offered to suspects against wrongful 
conviction based on misidentification and whether these protections could be enhanced by the 
greater use of psychological research. The thesis therefore questions whether the level of 
protection offered by the safeguards is high enough to uphold the integrity of the criminal 
justice process.
Synopsis
It has been said that eyewitness identification is a form of suspect-driven search,25 whereby the 
suspect is the starting point for the investigation and subsequent evidence gathering. Although 
this view is rather simplistic, it does reflect the problem inherent in cases of wrongful
:5 Wagenaar et.al. (1993), op.cit., 134.
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conviction based on misidentification: in constructing a case against a particular suspect, only 
evidence tending to show the guilt of that suspect may be assigned any importance by the 
police, leading to evidence in the suspect's favour being disregarded. In order to minimise the 
dangers of the suspect-driven approach to investigations, it is important that the basis of the 
original identification is sound. As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, there is little the 
system can do about a lack of reliability due to the prejudices or physical attributes of the 
witness, nor that due to the circumstances of the offence, but it can address the effect of 
procedures on reliability. The chapter asks whether psychological findings are being utilised to 
a sufficient extent, and whether psychology can aid in the task of offering protection from 
misidentification. The psychological research findings discussed in chapter two offer 
suggestions regarding appropriate procedures and, although the "real life" usefulness of the 
research must be questioned, some valuable lessons can be learned.
Chapter three examines Code of Practice D, which governs the conduct of identification 
parades in England and Wales. The Code contains detailed procedural guidelines for the police 
both when a suspect is known and when they have yet to determine his or her identity. In 
assessing whether the Code furthers the protective and integrity principles, chapter three asks 
when the protections of the Code are available and whether the availability is broad enough. In 
Annexes to the main provisions, identification officers are taken through their duties step by 
step and, providing that the provisions are not breached, the chapter concludes that the Code 
offers considerable protection to suspects. However, the empirical studies conducted for this 
thesis, discussed in chapters four, five and six, revealed a lack of education amongst non- 
specialist police staff which contributed to breaches of the Code. The studies also highlight the 
inefficiencies in the current system, and some suggestions are made for procedural reform to 
increase efficiency without creating a reduction in the reliability of evidence. Each of the three 
empirical chapters illustrate the way law, legal practice and psychology inter-relate in practice 
and highlight areas where, because protections from misidentification are lacking , the integrity 
of the criminal justice process is undermined.
It could be said that identification cases are unique in that they tend to relegate the actus reus 
and mens rea of an offence to secondary considerations. For example, where a defendant 
disputes evidence of identity, it would be rare to offer evidence that he or she did not intend to 
commit the act. Because identification evidence can become "the cornerstone in the construction 
of proof',26 supporting evidence is needed to protect defendants from wrongful conviction. 
Psychological research shows that the memory is unreliable, and the law has incorporated that 
knowledge, illustrated by a number of celebrated miscarriages of justice, into a judicial 
warning, the "Turnbull warning". The warning is designed to offer protection from erroneous 
identification whilst allowing for the admission of what is often very important evidence to the 
prosecution. The Turnbull direction requires the judge to withdraw a case from the jury where 
poor quality eyewitness identification is unsupported by other evidence. However, the 
assessment of "good quality" is largely subjective and is reliant on the judge's knowledge about 
memory processes. Chapter seven of the thesis examines whether the Turnbull direction to the 
jury offers the protection it purports to and examines the difficulties involved in giving 
protection via a warning in practice, in particular the issues surrounding the concepts of 
"quality" and "supporting evidence". The use of results from psychological research in 
assessing the quality of identification evidence could be further enhanced, an issue which is 
built upon in chapter eight, which examines the role of psychology in informing the Court 
about the dangers of relying upon eyewitness identification. One option is to allow 
psychologists to give expert evidence in cases involving eyewitness identification. The chapter 
assesses the legal rules governing expert evidence and the viability and usefulness of expert 
psychological witnesses in eyewitness identification cases, in order to answer the question of 
whether more could be done to utilise psychology in the task of protecting suspects and 
thereby upholding the integrity of the criminal justice process.
Chapter nine concludes on whether the protections offered in Code of Practice D, PACE 
section 78 and the Turnbull warning are adequate, and whether they act to uphold the integrity 
principle. Protection offered by greater utilisation of psychological findings could act to further
-6 Wagenaar et.al. (1993), op.cit., 119.
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the protective principle both at the time of identification procedures and at the stage where a 
case progresses to a contested trial. Reform of the methods of collecting eyewitness 
identification evidence and the means of protecting defendants from mistaken identification are 
proposed in order to strengthen the integrity of the criminal justice process.
1 1
PART ONE: COLLECTING EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE
1 2
CHAPTER TWO
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the scientific basis of our understanding of the eyewitness 
identification process. Its objective is to assess, with reference to the available psychological 
literature, the relationship between the theory and practice of identification procedures. Whilst it 
is impossible directly to observe the mind, cognitive psychology has some generally accepted 
theory on the functions of memory, based on observation of how people behave. This theory 
can be seen to have influenced some practices within the criminal justice field. For example, the 
pre-trial and trial procedures discussed in later chapters have their basis, to some extent, in
psychological theory on memory processes. The Turnbull 1 guidelines refer to a distinction 
between a "good" and a "bad" identification, reliant on such factors as visibility and viewing 
time. Whilst it may be argued that these are merely common-sense provisions, their
significance has been highlighted and confirmed in experiments conducted by psychologists. 2 
Many of the provisions of Code of Practice D also have their roots in the findings of social 
psychology. These include the provision in Annex A:12(i), whereby witnesses should be 
prevented from discussing the case; and Annex A: 14, which provides that witnesses should be 
told that the offender may or may not be present on the identification parade. These provisions 
are designed to prevent cross-pollinisation of memory and pressure to choose respectively.
Both issues have been the subject of much psychological experimentation, 3 and they highlight 
the potential of the role psychology may be able to play in furthering the principle of protection
1 [1976] 3 All ER 549.
: For a review of the literature in the area, see Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, S.D., Mistaken Identification
(1995, Cambridge University Press), chapters six and seven.
3 For example, Warnick, D.H., and Sanders, G.S., "The effects of group discussion on eyewitness
accuracy" (1980) 10 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 249-259, and Malpass R.S., and Devine, P.O.,
"Eyewitness Identification: Lineup instructions and the absence of the offender" (198 la), 66 Journal of Applied
Psychology 482-489 .
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of suspects from unfair procedures. Actual adherence to the protective principle through pre- 
trial procedural rules is discussed in chapter three.
The discussion in this chapter focuses initially on the generally accepted psychological theories 
concerned with the way the memory works. These theories give an insight into the physical 
process at work when someone witnesses a crime. The memory process is split into three main 
stages: acquisition, where an event is originally observed or information is taken in; retention, 
where the memory is stored; and retrieval, where memory is recalled. Some of the problems 
encountered in forming and recalling accurate memories are discussed. The chapter also 
explores the experimentation conducted on the problems and processes involved with the use of 
memory by witnesses to crime. Psychologists have identified a number of variables which may 
affect witness accuracy at each stage. The variables which can affect a person's memory can be 
split into two basic categories: system variables and estimator variables. The former are the 
more important for the purpose of this thesis because they are open to manipulation by the 
police and other criminal justice professionals. Any reliable conclusions gained from 
psychological research on systems variables could effect change in identification procedures. 
Unlike system variables, estimator variables are not open to manipulation and the chapter poses 
the question whether knowledge about them could assist those conducting identification 
procedures, even though they are powerless to effect any change.
The second part of the chapter examines the role of system variables in greater detail, with 
specific reference to the problems involved in conducting eyewitness identification procedures. 
Psychologists have addressed these problems by conducting experiments to determine the 
fairest method with which to test the memory of an eyewitness. The conclusions drawn from 
such experiments, and their applicability to the criminal justice process, are discussed. 
Although theory on memory processes is generally accepted within psychology and has strong 
support from years of experimental research, there are some areas of research on eyewitness 
identification which are open to greater debate. The usefulness of psychological research to 
criminal justice is limited by the use of the experimental method. Whether the results gained
1 4
from experiments can be extrapolated to real cases and individual witnesses is questionable. 
The experiments discussed in this chapter illustrate general trends rather than definite answers, 
which can help to inform legal professionals but cannot tell us whether an individual witness is 
accurate in their identification. The limitations of psychological research are discussed in the 
final section of this chapter.
Psychological Theory on Memory Processes
Any discussion of the relationship between legal procedure and psychological findings in the 
area of eyewitness identification must begin with a basic examination of the theories 
underpinning all individual experiments conducted. When a witness is asked to form a photo- 
fit, identify from photographs or view a suspect on an identification parade, group, video or 
confrontation, that witness's memory for events and faces is tested. Indeed, Clifford and Bull 
are of the opinion that "when a person is asked to identify someone he or she is being asked to
do something that the normal human being was not created to do".4 In order to understand the 
processes which influence the accuracy of eyewitnesses to crime, a pre-requisite knowledge of 
how the memory generally works is needed. As a discussion of memory processes could span
a whole thesis in itself, the examination in this chapter is necessarily brief,5 but does serve to 
provide a backdrop to the more specific experimentation on eyewitness identification.
The first thing to note about memory is that it is not a static process. Information is not taken 
into memory as a recording which will only fade and not change. According to cognitive
psychology, the human memory is active, selective and constructive at all stages. 6 For
example, in the retention stage there is a great danger that the memory will become
contaminated by what is termed "post-event information", whereby new or contradictory
4 Clifford, B.R., and Bull,R., The Psychology of Person Identification (1978, Boston: Routledge and 
Kegan), 16.
5 For a more detailed discussion of memory processes, see Gruneberg, M.M., and Morris, P.E., Applied 
Problems in Memory (1979, London: Academic Press), Neisser, U., Memorv Observed (1982, San 
Fransisco:W.H.Freeman) and Davies, G., Ellis, H.D., and Shepherd, J., (eds) Perceiving atid Remembering 
Faces (1981, London: Academic Press). General memory processes, and their relationship to eyewitness 
identification, are discussed here. The finer points of facial recognition, such as facial mapping and perceptual 
gestalt, are not examined (see Clifford and Bull (1978), op.cit.).
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information is given.7 Whilst the human memory is not passive in any instance, the difficulties 
in encoding an accurate memory are multiplied where the human face is involved. This is 
because "faces are complex, multidimensional and...are plastic rather than rigid in form...We
have not one face but a thousand different faces." 8 It is common for people to fail to recognise 
someone they know, or to mistake one person for another. When these factors are taken into 
account, it is easy to see why human memory cannot be trusted, least of all in the courtroom. 
The malleability and lack of reliability involved in the processes of memory underline the need 
to ensure that there are adequate safeguards incorporated into law and legal practice . It is only 
by providing protection from misidentification and convictions based on mistaken identification 
that the integrity of the criminal justice process can be furthered. Without safeguards, ideally 
developed with the aid of psychological knowledge, there is the danger of widespread reliance 
upon what is inherently unreliable evidence: a situation which offers little chance of maintaining 
procedural integrity.
As outlined in the introduction, it is usual for psychologists to divide the memory process into 
three main stages: the acquisition, retention and retrieval stages. When police officers gather 
eyewitness testimony, they test the retrieval stage of a particular witness's memory by
requesting verbal recollection, which is usually followed by a visual recognition test. 9 
Emphasis on the retrieval stage of memory does not mean that the two earlier stages should be 
ignored, as any failure to retrieve accurate information can be caused by events at any stage. 
For example, the witness may not have perceived the event accurately, or may forget important 
details between the time of the event and its recollection. Each of the three stages of memory 
will be examined below.
6 See, for example, Crowder, R.G., Principles of Learning and Memory ( 1976, New Jersey: Erlbaum).
7 Eyewitness exposure to new material through questioning and discussion is examined later in this 
chapter.
8 Ellis, H.D., Introduction to Davies, Ellis and Shepherd, (eds) op.cit., 2.
9 There is some debate as to whether face identification memory differs from other visual memory. For a 
brief review of some of the arguments in mis field, see Clifford and Bull (1978), op.cit., 35ff and Loftus, E.F., 
and Ketcham, K., "The Malleability of Eyewitness Accounts" in Lloyd-Bostock, S., and Clifford, B., Evaluating 
Witness Evidence (1983, London: Wiley and Sons), 159 - 172, at 166.
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(i) Acquisition and Perception
The acquisition stage of the memory process, where data is encoded into the memory, is clearly 
vital. Without accurate encoding, any memory retained and retrieved will be unreliable. The 
perception stage does not involve a true recording of events, but an interpretation of 
information based upon an individual's beliefs, prejudices and experiences. The memory will 
strive to incorporate information into the existing scheme of knowledge and beliefs, so that 
there is no inconsistency between the perception of the current event and what an individual has 
already incorporated into her value system about people and things. As Loftus states, "we store 
in memory not the environmental input itself, nor even a copy or a partial copy, but the
interpretation that we gave to the input when we experienced it." 1 °
Morris similarly concludes that "the memory system stores the results of our making sense of
our experiences rather than the experiences themselves." 1 1 The memory can therefore make 
sense of an event, deciding which items of information will be stored and the manner in which 
they are encoded. In terms of the criminal justice process, the selective and constructive nature 
of perception does not indicate reliable witness testimony. However, it does go some way to 
explaining why witnesses to the same offence will often produce completely different 
statements and descriptions.
In basic terms, before witnesses can be expected to recall the details of an offence or the 
description of an offender, the event must have occurred within their perceptual range. For 
example, they must have seen the offence take place or the offender running from the scene. As 
a criminal offence is a very complex incident, then even where it is within the perceptual range 
of witnesses, decisions will be made about which aspects of visual stimulus to concentrate on. 
Not all witnesses attend to the same aspects, and this is why statements to the police may vary 
greatly. Witnesses may not encode the information which would be of the most use to police 
officers investigating the offence in question, simply because they had not paid attention to the
10 Loftus, E.F., Eyewitness Testimony (1979, Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 11
11 In Gruneberg and Morris (1979), op.cit., chapter 2, 30.
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parts of the event in which the police are interested. We cannot encode what we do not pay 
attention to, as where a witness focuses on a weapon rather than the appearance of the offender
holding it. 12
The example of weapon focus is only one in a body of knowledge built up by psychologists. 
Most factors affecting encoding could be categorised as estimator variables, in that there is no 
way of altering them in a real event. Experimentation on such factors can still offer useful 
insights into the theory of how people perceive events and encode that perception into memory. 
The factors affecting perception can themselves be split into two categories: those which 
concern the event, and those which stem from witness themselves.
(a) Event factors
Event factors are part of the incident itself. They have been found to affect the ability of 
witnesses to recall accurate information. Courts in England and Wales have recognised the 
influence of event factors on memory accuracy, as illustrated by the Turnbull direction in 
eyewitness identification cases. The most obvious event factor is exposure time: how long the 
witness had to view the offender. Indeed, the Turnbull guidelines have been criticised for 
becoming a direction on the issue of exposure time alone. 13 It seems to be a matter of common- 
sense that the longer witnesses observe an incident or an offender, the more accurate will be 
their perception. This has been confirmed by psychological research, such as that by Laughery
et al. 14 , which conclude that the longer a witness has to view a face, the greater the chance that 
it will be accurately perceived and recognised later. In warning jurors of the danger in 
convicting where identification evidence is based on a "fleeting glance", the courts have gone as
12 See Loftus, E.F., Loftus, G.R., and Messo, J., "Some facts about "weapon focus".' 1 (1987), 11 Law 
and Human Behavior, 55-62 and Maass, A., and Kohnken, G., "Eyewitness Identification: Simulating the 
"weapon effect"." (1989) 13 Law and Human Behavior 397-409.
13 See, for example, Walker, M, and Brittain, B., Identification Evidence - Practices and Malpractices - A 
Report by JAIL, (1978, London: JAIL).
14 Laughery, K.R., Alexander, J.F., and Lane, A.B., "Recognition of human faces: Effects of target 
exposure time, target position and type of photograph." (1971) 59 Journal of Applied Psychology', 490-496. The 
experiment tested the number of times various features were mentioned by subjects after the viewing of slides of 
human faces. Some subjects viewed slides for two and a half seconds each, others for eight seconds each. Those
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far as it is logical to go on this issue. To exclude such evidence would bar potentially accurate 
eyewitnesses from testifying, as the experiments conducted highlight a general trend and cannot 
predict that an individual witness is mistaken, or that inaccuracy begins where the exposure 
time is below a certain level. Too many other factors combine in the equation determining 
accuracy or inaccuracy for a low exposure time to be a definite bar to a correct identification.
If it can be assumed that the accuracy of a witness could be affected by the duration of an 
incident, then certain types of offence will result in more accurate witnesses than others. For 
example, witnesses to a street robbery would be less likely successfully to perceive and encode 
events than witnesses to an offence which involved extensive and close proximity, such as a 
kidnapping. However, the process is not quite so simple, and the duration of an event is not the 
only factor which affects the probable accuracy of memory. Some effects are a matter of 
common sense. For example, we all know that the greater the number of times we pay attention 
to something, the more likely we are to remember it. This forms the basis of rote learning of 
certain information in our school years. In terms of all events and information we wish to
remember accurately, as Morris states:' 5
"It is easier to remember sense than nonsense. It is easier to remember a 
coherent story, the construction, elements and interconnections of which we 
understand than it is to learn apparently disconnected items...The main activities 
of the cognitive system are directed to making sense of and dealing with the 
ongoing interactions between the individual and the world."
It is therefore easier for an accurate recollection to be stored out of information which already 
makes sense to us through our past experience, rather than that which is alien to us, as it can be 
easily stored in one drawer of the filing cabinet of our memory. Items may be lost if they
cannot be easily categorised or if there is no thread linking bits of information together. 16
subjects who had viewed slides for a longer period were more accurate in choosing the target slide out of a later 
slide "photo-array".
15 In Gruneberg and Morris (1979), op.cit., 29.
16 The difficulties of remembering isolated or nonsense pieces of information has been addressed by the 
techniques involved in mnemonics, where strategies are employed to add meaning, cues and organisation to the 
information in question. These are the techniques used by performers in the media who parade their superior 
powers of memory. For a discussion of mnemonists and other strange feats of memory see Neisser, U., (1982),
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There will, inevitably, be details which are lost where the event is complex and not all 
information can be encoded. This is going to be the case for witnesses to a criminal offence. 
Some details will be more memorable to a witness than others. As perception is a selective 
process, the more memorable details will be given most attention. The following statement
sums up how the selection process of memory works for general events: 17
"The extraordinary, colourful, novel, unusual, and interesting scenes attract our 
attention and hold our interest, both attention and interest being important aids to 
memory. The opposite of this principle is inversely true - routine, commonplace 
and insignificant circumstances are rarely remembered as specific incidents."
Psychologists have termed those items of information which catch the attention as the most 
salient details, where "a salient detail is one that has a high probability of being spontaneously
mentioned by individuals who witness a particular event." 18 In identification in criminal cases, 
these details will normally form the basis for any later identification by an eyewitness. The 
more salient the detail, the more likely it is to be accurately recalled at a later date. The salient 
details for an eyewitness should be the appearance and actions of the offender, if any accurate
identification is to be made.' 9
A number of experiments have been conducted on the relationship between the ability of 
eyewitnesses to recall details of a crime and the accuracy of their identifications. Recognition is 
thought to be easier than recall,20 as different triggers are used within the mind, and recognition 
does not rely on the verbal descriptive skill of an eyewitness. The experiments were conducted 
out of a concern that an eyewitness may be discredited because she fails to recall peripheral 
details in court. Any details which do not involve the appearance and actions of the perpetrator 
of an offence are peripheral in an eyewitness identification case. It is natural that a jury will
op.cit., Part VII, especially the chapters by Luria, A.R., "The Mind of a Mnemonist", 382-390 and
Gummerman, K., and Gray, C.R., "An Uncommon Case of Visual Memory", 405-412.
17 Gardner, D., "The perception and memory of witnessses" (1933) 18 Cornell Law Quarterly , 391-409,
394.
18 See Loftus (1979), op.cit., 25.
19 Whilst the appearance of the offender is seen as an objectively salient detail, the saliency of such details 
to individual witnesses is subject to their own biases and prior experiences. Not all witnesses will perceive and 
encode objectively salient details. For example, the study by Laughery et al. (1971), op.cit., found that, of all 
facial features, the eyes were mentioned most commonly. The eyes could therefore be classed as a salient detail. 
However, not all witnesses would spontaneously mention die eyes when describing the person in question.
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consider a witness less accurate in her ability to identify the offender where there is poor recall 
of other aspects of the crime. However, a number of studies have concluded that the reverse of
this natural assumption is true.2 1 Because the memory is selective at the perception stage and 
we cannot successfully encode all information, a witness who has concentrated on the offender 
will have a less accurate memory of other details connected with the offence but will be more 
likely to make an accurate identification than someone who has attended only to the peripheral 
details. This is counter-intuitive, as the natural response to eyewitnesses who have poor recall 
of the surrounding details of an incident is to doubt their accuracy in identifying the offender. 
Of course, the natural assumption will sometimes be correct, and the witness may have poor 
recollection altogether. The research gives no indication of how to separate inaccurate and 
accurate witnesses where peripheral details are poorly recollected, and it would be dangerous to 
rely on the results in any reform of practice or procedure either at investigation or trial stage.
Conversely, witnesses who have impressive memory for peripheral detail when cross- 
examined may be less likely to be correct in their recognition of the offender than it is common 
to assume. In concentrating on peripheral details, they may have missed salient details about the
offender's appearance. General confidence22 and accuracy for what happened at the time of the 
crime will make a jury believe that the witnesses are also correct in their identification of the
accused. For example, Cutler, Penrod and Martens23 conducted a study where they found that 
memory for peripheral detail correlated with the tendency to make a choice on an identification 
task, but was inversely correlated with the accuracy of the identification made. They concluded 
that those witnesses who had good memory for peripheral detail were more likely to make a
20 Recognition is also thought to add more detail to a verbal description: see Luus, E., and Wells, G., 
"Eyewitness identification and the selection of distractors for lineups" (1991) 15 Law and Human Behavior 43.
21 Wells, G., and Leippe, M.R., "How do triers of fact infer the accuracy of eyewitness identifications?
Using memory for peripheral detail can be misleading." (1981) 66 Journal of Applied Psychology 682. Wells
and Leippe found that subjects who performed well on an identification task performed poorly on an 11 point
test of memory for peripheral details, and that the reverse also operated: subjects who performed well on the
peripheral memory test performed poorly on the identification task.
" The effect of the confidence of witnesses and the question of the existence of a confidence-accuracy
relationship are discussed later in this chapter.
:J Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., and Martens, T.K., "The reliability of eyewitness identifications: The role
of system and estimator variables." (1987a), 11 Law and Human Behavior, 223-258.
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choice when faced with an identification task but were less likely to be accurate than their 
counterparts who had poor peripheral memory.
Psychological research results are interesting and informative, but offer no solution to the 
problem of how we separate the witnesses who are accurate overall from those who are 
accurate only on peripheral details. When faced with witnesses who recall the details of an 
offence well, it may be that they are simply very good eyewitnesses and have good recall and 
recognition skills. It is also impossible to stand our instinctive conclusions completely on their 
head and decide that witnesses who have poor memories for the minor details of an incident are 
more likely to be accurate in their identification of the offender than those who have good recall 
of minor points. However, the experiments on peripheral detail do indicate that we should not 
assume that good memory for minor details always means a greater likelihood of identification 
accuracy.
The salient , or central, details of an incident may not be perceived or encoded where the 
material witnessed is violent in nature. The differences in ability to perceive violent and non- 
violent events have been the subject of many psychological experiments. Other factors which
may affect accuracy at any later identification procedure include the seriousness of the crime,24 
"weapon-focus", and the level of stress encountered by the witness when viewing the incident.
Although stress is often categorised as a witness factor,25 it is so entwined with the reaction to 
event factors that it will be included in the discussion in this section.
24 The term "crime seriousness" can be interpreted in a number of ways for the purposes of psychological 
research on witness memory. Whilst it is being allied to the violence or danger involved in an offence here, it 
can also be used to mean the personal stake the witness has in the crime (for example, whether they are a victim 
or a bystander), which does not appear to affect the accuracy of later identifications, as in experiments by Hosch, 
H.M., and Cooper, S.D., "Victimization as a determinant of eyewitness accuracy" (1982) 67 Journal of Applied 
Psychology , 649-652 and Hosch, H.M., Leippe, M.R., Marchioni, P.M., and Cooper, D.S., "Victimization, 
self-monitoring, and eyewitness identification" (1984) 69 Journal of Applied Psychology 280-288; or the 
monetary value of property stolen or damaged, where a correlation between expense of item and accuracy was 
found in an experiment by Leippe, M.R., Wells, G.L., and Ostrom, T.M., "Crime seriousness as a determinant 
of accuracy in eyewitness identification" (1978) 63 Journal of Applied Psychology', 345-351.
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Emotional stress, often termed "arousal" by psychologists, is a factor which has not only 
interested psychologists conducting experiments in the field of witnesses to crime, but also
those concerned with general memory theory. However, 26
"Adequate laboratory research on the effects of such stress is lacking because of 
obvious ethical constraints. Despite the importance of knowledge in this area, 
one cannot simulate violent crimes and pose a threat to the well-being of naive 
experimental subjects."
It is with a great caution that we accept the results of psychological experimentation on the
effect of stress upon the memory, especially in eyewitness identification cases.27 Because there 
are ethical and practical problems in recreating a violent event, research subjects will not feel 
comparable stress levels to those witnessing actual events. This takes away much of the 
applicability of research results to the criminal process. The area is also one of great debate, and 
there is little consensus on the effects of stress or the levels needed to create an adverse effect 
on identification accuracy.
Within the criminal justice process, it is generally expected that witnesses to violent crimes will 
experience a higher level of emotional arousal than those who view a non-violent crime. 
However, the question of the effect this has on the ability of witnesses to perceive details of the
incident does not lead to an easy common-sense solution. 28 One of the earliest psychological 
experiments to highlight the differences in accuracy found between witnesses to violent and 
non-violent events was that by Clifford and Scott in 1978.29 They concluded that there was 
greater difficulty in recalling events where subjects had viewed a violent incident. Although the
25 For example in Loftus (1979) op.cit., although texts such as Cutler and Penrod (1995) , op.cit. view 
stress as an event factor. The likelihood is that the effect of stress, although part of the event, will have varying 
effects on witnesses and crosses over both categories.
26 Cutler and Penrod (1995), op.cit.,103. It is interesting to note experiments conducted before the onset 
of these ethical concerns, such as Berkun, M.M., Bialek, H.M., Kern, R.P., and Yagi, K., "Experimental 
studies of psychological stress in man" (1962) 76 Psychological Monographs 534, where army recruits were 
subjected to high levels of stress by being told that they were accidentally being shelled with live ammunition.
27 The general problems of extrapolating experimental results to actual situations are discussed later in 
this chapter.
28 There appears to be a legal tradition of believing that high levels of stress will lead to improved 
eyewitness memory. This is presumably based in the idea that a startling event will be easier to remember than a 
more mundane one, see Deffenbacher, K.A., "The influence of arousal on reliability of testimony", in Lloyd- 
Bostock and Clifford (eds) (1983), op.cit, 235-255.
29 Clifford, B.R., and Scott, J., "Individual and siruational factors in eyewitness testimony" 63 Journal of 
Applied Psychology 352-359.
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experiment was concerned with recall (in the form of a questionnaire) rather than recognition,
it demonstrated a general trend which has often been confirmed. 30 It is probable that any 
difficulties encountered by witnesses to violent crime are due to the increased stress levels
which accompany being in the proximity of violence. Clifford and Scott concluded that : 3 '
"A single emotional or arousing aspect of an event has a repressing effect that 
generalises to the whole event, shown by the fact that recall of both physical 
actions and physical descriptions were poorer for the violent film than for the 
non-violent film despite the fact that the physical descriptions of the targets were 
identical in both films."
So, according to Clifford and Scott, any part of an incident which is violent can affect the 
perceptual skills of a witness for the incident as a whole.
One aspect of an event which would undoubtedly qualify as "emotional and arousing" would 
be where the offender has a weapon. Psychologists have found that the selective process of 
perception tends to operate to attract attention to the weapon above any other detail. There are 
two forces at work to disrupt the encoding of a crime where there is a weapon involved: the 
increased stress to the witness and more attention given to the weapon than the offender. 
Psychologists have also video-recorded the eye movements of viewers of a series of slides, and
found that they focused more on the weapon than on anything else. 32 Where this occurs in 
eyewitness identification cases less attention to the appearance of the offender could mean an
unreliable identification. Many psychologists have supported the theory of weapon-focus,33 
andameta-analytic34 report by Steblay35 of 19 separate studies conducted on the issue found
30 Examples are Sanders, G.S., and Warnick, D.H., "Some conditions maximising eyewitness accuracy: A 
learning memory model" (1980) 8 Journal of Criminal Justice 395-403; and Clifford, B.R., and Hollin, C.R., 
"Effects of the type of incident and the number of perpetrators on eyewitness memory" (1981) 66 Journal of 
Applied Psychology 364-370. There are some experiments which do not confirm Clifford and Scott's findings: 
see, for example, Cutler, Penrod and Martens (1987a), op.cit.
31 Clifford and Scott (1978), op.cit., 356
32 Loftus, Loftus and Messo (1987), op.cit.
33 For example, see Cutler, Penrod and Martens (1987a) op.cit., Kramer, T.H., Buckhout, R., and 
Eugenic, P., "Weapon focus, arousal, and eyewitness memory: Attention must be paid" (1990), 14 Law aid 
Human Behavior 167-184; Tooley, V., Brigham, J.C., Maass, A., and Bothwell, R.K., "Facial recognition: 
Weapon effect and attentional focus" (1987) \Uournal of Applied Social Psychology 845-859; and Maass and 
Kohnken (1989), op.cit.
34 On the use of meta-analysis in social science research, see Rosenthal, R., Mcta-analytic procedures for 
social research (1991, Beverley Hills: Sage).
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that there was a significant effect on identification accuracy where a weapon was viewed by 
eyewitnesses.
These experiments suggest that witnesses to violent crimes, and those who experience weapon- 
focus, suffer a decline in perceptual skill. These experiments are based upon the idea that the 
stress level of witnesses will rise where an event is violent or, in the case of focus upon a 
weapon, contains the threat of violence. Witnesses experiencing greater levels of stress will 
theoretically have less ability to perceive and encode the information in front of them. This may 
be due to a narrowing of the attention, as displayed in weapon-focus experiments. According to 
this theory, the witness who is under extreme stress will focus on a small number of details to 
the exclusion of others.36
Therefore, where witnesses experience a decline in perceptual ability when under stress, the 
suggestion is that it is the stress itself that is responsible. Does emotional arousal necessarily 
impair memory process at the perception stage? The general theory accepted by many 
psychologists when considering the effect stress may have on the perception of an event goes
back to 1908.37 The principle is contained in the Yerkes-Dodson law,38 which states that a 
moderate level of stress, or arousal, is the optimum at which successfully to perceive and 
encode information. At its most basic level, the Yerkes-Dodson law represents an inverted U
shaped curve,39 where low levels of arousal produce low attentiveness, and a moderate level 
heightens perception and attention to the task at hand. When stress or arousal levels become 
high, there is usually a resulting decline in ability to perceive accurately. However, different
35 Steblay, N.M., "A meta-analytic review of the weapon focus effect" (1992) 16 Law and Human 
Behavior 413-424.
36 See, for example, Easterbrook, J.A., "The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organisation of 
behaviour" (1959), 66 Psychology Review 183-201. According to Jones, D.M., "Stress and Memory" in 
Gruneberg and Morris (1979) op.cit., 185-214, stress tends both to narrow the breadth and disrupt the stability of 
attention.
37 In terms of the relationship of stress and eyewitness accuracy, one of the first articles to promote the 
idea that higher levels of arousal affected accuracy was by Hutchins, R., and Slesinger, D., "Some observations 
on the law of evidence: spontaneous exclamations" (1928) 28 Columbia Law Review 432.
38 The law was actually developed as a result of experimentation on mice: see Yerkes, R.M., and Dodson, 
J.D., "The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit formation" (1908) IS Journal of Comparative arid 
Neurological Psychology 459-482, but human beings are taken to react to extreme stress in a similar fashion.
25
tasks have different levels at which the moderate arousal becomes "optimum", so that 
perception and attentiveness are at their highest. The effect that extreme stress has varies
between tasks. As Loftus points out, 40
"A simple, well-learned habit would be much less susceptible to disruption by 
emotional arousal than a more complex response that depends upon the 
integration of several thought processes. In a moment of intense fear a person 
would probably still be able to spell his name, but his ability to play a good 
game of chess would be seriously impaired."
If Loftus is correct, then the use of memory to encode a complex event such as a criminal 
offence would be expected to be highly susceptible to disruption by emotional arousal. It has 
been shown that the process of perceiving and encoding information is in itself very
complex.4!
The Yerkes-Dodson law therefore leads to the conclusion that moderate levels of stress can 
actually enhance the potential accuracy of eyewitnesses by improving their perceptual skills. 
However, where this level of stress becomes high, the opposite is true. Deffenbacher allied 
seemingly conflicting pieces of research in 1983 by suggesting that the studies which found
that stress increased accuracy were working with moderate levels of arousal,42 whereas those
which found an adverse effect on accuracy were working with high levels.43 The experiments 
could all be found to fit on the Yerkes-Dodson curve. It should be noted, however, that there 
is not universal agreement that the Yerkes-Dodson law can be applied to the specific area of
39 See Hebb, D.O., "Drives and the conceptual nervous system" (1955) 62 Psychology Review 243-254.
40 Loftus (1979), op. cit., 33.
41 See Deffenbacher (1983),op.cit., figure 13.1, which illustrates how performance is affected by arousal 
and by the complexity of the task. Optimal performance is lower for more complex tasks.
42 Such as Leippe, Wells and Ostrom (1978), op.cit.; Deffenbacher, K.A., Brown, E.L., and Sturgill, W., 
"Some predictors of eyewitness memory accuracy" in Gruneberg, M.M., Morris, P.E., and Sykes, R.N., (eds) 
Practical Aspects of Memory (1978, Academic Press), 219-226; and Sussman, E.D., and Sugarman, R.C., 
"The effect of certain distractions on identification by witnesses", in Zavala, A., Paley, J.J., and Gallati, R.R.J., 
(eds) Personal Appearance Identification (1972, Illinois: Charles Thomas).
43 See Clifford and Hollin (1981), op.cit.; Buckhout, R., Alper, A., Chern, S., Silverberg, G., and 
Slomovits, M., "Determinants of eyewitness performance on a lineup" (1974) 4 Bulletin of (he Psychonomic 
Society 191-192; and Siegel, J.M., and Loftus, E.F., "Impact of anxiety and life stress upon eyewitness 
testimony" (1978) 12 Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 479-480.
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eyewitness identification. Some critics argue that the research on the effect of stress on 
eyewitnesses does not support firm conclusions.44
Even if the Yerkes-Dodson law does apply to witnesses to crime, then the decision as to 
whether a witness's memory has been enhanced or curtailed is bound to be a complicated one. 
In the absence of further psychological research, it is difficult to assess the level of emotional 
arousal in any given situation and for any given witness. The effect of a stressful situation 
would depend on the arousal level of a witness before the crime occurred. It would be difficult 
for an experiment to be conducted which could control the level of stress actually felt by a 
witness. This is because the effect on perception is not only due to situational variables but also 
to the individual reaction to stress of each witness. The former can be manipulated in 
experiments; the latter cannot. The situations in which the optimum level for accurate perception 
is passed are therefore difficult to predict. In view of these difficulties it is too simplistic an 
approach to state that all witnesses to a violent event will encounter a reduced perceptual ability.
However, Deffenbacher does generalize along these lines, stating that:45
"The arousal levels engendered by crimes of violence, homicides, rapes, 
assaults, armed robberies, are almost invariably going to be greater than the 
Yerkes-Dodson optimum, given the reasonably high complexity of the task 
expected of eyewitnesses."
In other words, crimes of violence are likely to interfere with successful encoding of 
information. The question remains as to how to define the terms "violence" and "high 
emotional arousal" for the purposes of assessing whether the perception of an event has been 
interfered with by the stress involved in witnessing it.
It has been shown that psychologists encounter difficulties in controlling experimental variables 
which are entirely personal. These difficulties indicate that our ability accurately to perceive and
44 A discussion on whether a firm conclusion can be drawn about the effect of stress on eyewitnesses can 
be found in McCloskey, ML, Egeth, H., and McKenna, J., "The experimental psychologist in court: The ethics 
of expert testimony" (1986) 10 Law and Human Behavior 1-13.
45 Deffenbacher (1983), op.cit., 247. Following these arguments, the most accurate encoding will occur at 
the optimum level of the Yerkes-Dodson curve for that particular task. See also Deffenbacher, K.A., "A 
maturing of research on the behavior of eyewitnesses" (1991) 5 Applied Cognitive Psychology 377-402; and
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encode information is highly individual. This is so even though certain variables, such as the 
duration of an event or the violence involved, may affect most people's ability. Acknowledging 
the individual nature of memory, psychologists have identified a number of variables pertaining 
to the witness herself which may affect accurate perception.
Witness factors
As already noted, the emotional arousal involved in a situation varies in its effect on each 
individual's perceptual skills. In this section, the biases and expectations of witnesses will be
discussed.46 These are important because they may affect both what we perceive and our 
interpretation of that perception. According to Loftus, we interpret an event by calling upon: (1) 
portions of the initial input, ie. the event itself; (2) ideas from our store of general knowledge; 
and (3) inferences. In affecting our perception of events, our expectations serve to help the 
memory to fill in the gaps left by the selective process. In this way, memory is constructive as 
well as selective at the perception stage. Where memory is constructed by a witness to a crime, 
past experience and expectations can have a profound effect on the accuracy of any later 
statement or identification.
In her text on eyewitness testimony, Loftus identifies four different sorts of expectations that 
will affect perception: cultural expectations or stereotypes, expectations from past experience,
personal prejudices,47 and momentary or temporary expectations. She states that "when any of 
these are present, they can distort perception; the perceptual material that enters stored memory
will accordingly be distorted in a manner consistent with the expectation."48 In other words, 
we tend to see and hear what we expect to see and hear.
Christiaanson, S., "Emotional stress and eyewitness memory: A critical review" (1992), 112 Psychological 
Bulletin. 284-309.
46 Individual or witness factors also include, for example, age and sex.
47 See also Shoemaker, D.J., South, D.R., and Lowe, J., "Facial stereotypes of deviants and judgments of 
guilt or innocence" (1973), 51 Social Forces 427-433.
48 Loftus (1979), op.cit., 37.
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Let us take the example of cultural expectations. As the name implies, the expectation operates 
where there is a stereotype held about certain cultural groups. These stereotypes tend to be held 
by a large number of the population and are often inaccurate. The classic illustration of cultural
stereotypes, and their influence on our perception of events, was conducted in 1947.49 Its 
subject matter may be almost fifty years old, but it remains as relevant today. The experiment 
illustrated the cultural expectation that black males were more likely to commit violent offences, 
a stereotype which has attracted recent media attention with regard to street robbery. A picture 
was given to one subject which depicted a number of people on an underground train. Two of 
these people were standing, a black man and a white man. The white man was holding a razor 
blade. Reporting was based on the children's game of "Chinese Whispers", with information 
relayed from the original subject through six other people. In over half of the experiments, the 
black man was finally reported to be holding the razor blade. This was in line with a widely 
held cultural expectation that black people were more likely to act aggressively and that white 
people are more likely to be the helpless victims.
It is likely that our expectations, experience and biases will be at work throughout the different 
stages of the memory process. Not only will the stereotypes we hold affect our perception of 
events, but we may also fill in areas of doubt by recourse to our expectations. In terms of 
retrieval, it is possible that we recall events as we expect them to be, or recognise someone who
fits into our stereotype of an offender. 50 Our use of stereotypes is one way in which our 
memory can increase the amount and rate of processed information. There is a huge amount of 
information being processed, and a suitable file is needed for each item of information. It is 
more efficient for the memory to process information according to past experience and available
categorisation than it is for it to produce new categories. It is probably the case that 5 '
"Most people file away some stereotypes on the basis of which they make 
perceptual judgements; such stereotypes not only fit in with prejudices but they 
are also tools for making decisions more efficiently."
1)9 Allport, G., and Postman, L., The Psychology of Rumor (1947, New York: Henry Holt and Co.).
50 See Bull, R., and Clifford, B., "Eyewitness memory" in Gruneberg and Morris (1979), op.cit., 155-
160.
51 Buckhout, R., "Eyewitness testimony" (1974), 231 Scientific American , 23-31, 24.
29
The drawback, in terms of eyewitness identification, is that increased efficiency may be paid 
for with inaccuracy. An inaccurate identification may not be recognised as such and could result 
in wrongful conviction.
When considering the effect of expectations and biases on the ability of a witness successfully 
to perceive and encode an event, personal prejudices must also be considered. An important 
area in eyewitness identification research is that of own-race bias. The conclusion drawn is that
people find it easier to recognise people of their own race than those of other races. 52 Indeed, it
is established that own-race bias does occur. 53 As early as 1914,54 the problems of correctly 
identifying members of other races were noted. The cross-race effect also appears to affect
white people more than members of other ethnic backgrounds. 55 An influential article by 
Brigham and Barkowitz in 1978 summarised the assumptions about identifications of other
races as follows: 56
(1) There is an own-race bias in the accuracy of eyewitness identification.
52 See the studies by Malpass, R.S., and Kravitz, J., "Recognition for faces of own and other race" (1969) 
13 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 330-334; and Luce, T., "Blacks, whites and yellows: they all 
look alike to me" (1974) 8 Psychology Today 107-108. A vast number of experiments have been conducted on 
the issue of cross-racial identification: see, for example, Billig, M., and Milner, D., "A spade is a spade in the 
eyes of the law" (1976) 2 Psychology Today 13-15; Barkowitz, P., and Brigham, J.C., "Recognition of faces: 
Own-race bias, incentive and time delay" (1982) 12 Journal of Applied Psychology 255-268; Brigham, J.C., 
Maass, A., Snyder, L.D., and Spaulding, K., "Accuracy of eyewitness identifications in a field setting" (1982) 
42 Journal of personality and Social Psychology 673-680; Hosch, H.M., and Platz, S.J., "Self-monitoring and 
eyewitness accuracy" (1984) 10 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 289-292; and Brigham, J.C., and 
Ready, D.J., "Own-race bias in lineup construction" (1985) 9 Law and Human Behavior 415-424. 
53 Although the form that own-race bias takes is questioned in a critique of studies by Lindsay, R.C.L., 
and Wells, G.L., "What do we really know about cross-race identification?" in Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford 
(1983), op.cit., chapter 12, 219-234, the authors concede that race probably has some impact on identification 
accuracy. The nature of that impact is unclear. The clearest conclusion drawn from their review of the literature 
as at 1983 was that white witnesses viewing white faces produced the highest level of accuracy (at 223). Lindsay 
and Wells criticise the lack of solid theoretical explanation and the inconsistent data on cross-race identifications. 
In support of the existence of own-race bias, see meta-analytic studies by Shapiro, P.N., and Penrod, S.D., 
"Meta-analysis of facial identification studies" (1986) IOQ Psychological Bulletin 139-156; and Bothwell, R.K., 
Brigham, J.C., and Malpass, R.S., "Cross-racial identification" (1989) 15 Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 19-25.
54 Feingold, G., "The influence of environment on identification of persons and things" (1914) 5 Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology 39-51. Further discussion of own-race bias can be found in Wall, P.M., 
Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases (1965, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas).
55 According to a meta-analysis by Anthony, T., Cooper, C., and Mullen, B., "Cross-racial facial 
identification: A social cognitive integration" (1992) 18 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 296-301.
56 Brigham, J.C., and Barkowitz, P., "Do 'they all look alike"? The effect of race, sex, experience and 
attitudes on the ability to recognise faces" (1978) 8 Journal of Applied Psychology* 306-318, 308.
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(2) Highly prejudiced persons will be less accurate in their cross-racial 
identifications than more egalitarian persons will be.
(3)People who have had more experience with members of another race will be 
more accurate in their cross-racial identifications than will persons who have 
had fewer cross-racial experiences.
The first assumption has already been commented upon. The second may appear to be a matter
of common-sense,57 but it has not been supported by psychological experimentation. The 
general consensus is that the third assumption is not true either. However, there is limited 
evidence that training in familiarity produces an improvement in ability to recognise members of
different races. 58 The majority of empirical evidence, however, fails to support the notion that 
greater experience leads to greater success in recognizing people from other ethnic
backgrounds.59
There has been no explanation as to why own-race bias is present in recognition tests or as to
how the phenomenon operates. 60 One persuasive theory is that when witnesses view someone, 
they concentrate on the aspects of that person's face which are distinctive. Where the subject is 
someone of a different race, then it may be that witnesses concentrate on a distinctive feature
which is common to a majority of that race, such as colour of skin, and not to their own.6 ] 
Therefore, whilst cross-race identification is often seen as a retrieval problem, its roots could 
well lie in the acquisition stage of the memory process.
57 It would be fair to assume that a prejudiced person would be so blinded by that prejudice that they 
would not be able to pay as much attention to perceiving and encoding the features of a member of a different 
race as would someone who held few or no prejudices. It would also be logical to expect that those with 
experience of people from other ethnic backgrounds would have a greater ability to recognise people of other 
races than those with little experience. These were commonly held opinions which have largely been overturned 
by the work of Brigham and Barkowitz (1978), ibid. See Feingold (1914), op.cit.; and Wall (1965), op.cit.
58 See Elliott, E., Wills, E., and Goldstein, A., "The effect of discrimination training on the recognition 
of white and oriental faces (1973) 2 Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 71-73; and Malpass, R.S., Lavigueur, 
H., and Weldon, D., "Verbal and visual training in face recognition" (1973) 14 Perception and Psychophysics 
285, who suggest that there may be reduction or elimination of own-race bias after a training programme. 
Brigham, J.C., and Malpass, R.S., "The role of experience and contact in the recognition of own and other 
faces" (1985)41 Journal of Social Issues 139-155 argue that it is not the amount of contact with members of 
other races which is important, but the quality of that contact.
59 For example, see Luce (1974), op.cit.; and Cross, J., Cross, J., and Daly, J., "Sex, race, age and beauty 
as factors in recognition effaces" (1971) 10 Perceptual Psychophysics 393-396.
60 There is also inconsistency regarding findings as to the form in which own-race bias works. Some 
experiments have shown a complete crossover, with all races affected, others an incomplete or one way 
crossover, with only certain races affected. For a discussion of the implications of these inconsistencies, sec 
Brigham and Barkowitz (1978), op.cit.; and Lindsay and Wells (1983), op.cit.
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This discussion of event and witness factors has illustrated the problems which can be 
encountered at the acquisition stage of the memory process. Some of the factors discussed, 
such as own-race bias, are specific in their relevance to eyewitness identification. Others, such 
as the duration of an incident and the saliency of details, are also relevant to other aspects of the 
criminal justice process, but especially to cases where witnesses are involved. It has been 
shown that all of these factors may influence witness accuracy. However, we do not know 
which factors affect which witnesses, or to what extent. This is largely dependent on the 
individual witness. So, the variables affecting accurate perception can only indicate general 
trends which have been shown to apply to a significant number of witnesses.
Even where the information required has been successfully encoded by a witness, it may be 
that the memory of the event, after interpretation, is incomplete on recall. It could be that only 
part of the information was interpreted or that some of the information initially stored has been 
lost in the time between perception and recall. In terms of visual tests for witnesses, this latter
problem is likely to be quite common.62 The retention stage of memory is, therefore, fraught 
with its own difficulties.
(ii) Retention: Forgetting and Post-Event Information
The time between an event and recollection of it is very important, especially where the witness 
is being relied upon to identify the perpetrator of a criminal offence. Once material has been 
encoded in memory, memory for that material will not remain intact. As well as the possibility 
of memory fading over time, changes can take place. In this way, memory for events continues 
to be constructive at the retention stage.
61 See Loftus (1979), op.cit., 136ff.
62 On loss of memory over time, see Loftus , E.F., Miller, D.G., and Bums, H.J., "Semantic integration 
of verbal information into a visual memory" (1978) 4 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning 
and Memory 19-31.
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Common-sense suggests that memory fades over time.63 As new information is introduced, 
older information can be pushed further away and details forgotten. Most people have 
experienced a fading of memory for facts, faces or events. If the common-sense assumption 
that memory fades over time is correct, then the implications for accurate eyewitness 
identifications are serious. There is often a delay of several weeks between a request for an
identification parade and its taking place.64 The time period could be considerably longer where 
the investigation has been lengthy or where the identification procedure is postponed. If 
memory fades gradually in this time, then the likelihood is that witness accuracy will also be in 
decline.
One of the earliest experiments which illustrated loss of memory over time was that by
Ebbinghaus in 1885. 65 As a result of his work, he produced a "forgetting curve", which 
illustrated the rate at which memory was lost. According to Ebbinghaus, there is an immediate 
rapid loss of memory for details after an event (perhaps due to inaccurate or selective 
encoding). After this immediate loss, memory continues to decline over time, but at a more 
gradual rate. However, since early experiments such as that by Ebbinghaus were conducted, 
the forgetting curve has been shown to be far from the simple process it was first believed to 
be. It is now thought that not all memories fade away at the same rate or in the same way.
Forgetting varies with how the memory was encoded and the type of material involved.66
The variable rate of forgetting in relation to the type of material encoded leads to the question of 
how forgetting works in eyewitness identification cases. The average time after which the 
memory fades to absolute unreliability could aid prosecution agencies in their decisions as to 
whether to hold an identification test. In addition, judges could incorporate a more definite
63 For example, Wall (1965), op.cit.
64 See chapters four, five and six of this thesis on the waiting times to book a procedure in Birmingham's 
Identification Suite.
65 Ebbinghaus, H.E., Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology (1964 New York, Dover), 
reprinted from 1885 edition. Ebbinghaus used himself as subject, learning and releaming lists of syllables.
66 Clifford and Bull (1978), op.cit., 23.
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direction to the jury in the Turnbulf 1 guidelines regarding the effect of retention time on 
eyewitness accuracy. In attempting to find indications of the process of forgetting by 
eyewitnesses there have been several experiments relating to recognition memory. These
experiments test whether eyewitness recognition68 accuracy declines in relation to the amount 
of time between the offence and the identification test. In other words, does accurate retrieval of
memory in the form of recognition decline in the same way as does retrieval by recall?69
Research on the effect of the length of retention interval on recognition of faces has produced 
mixed results. Some studies have found that there is no significant decline in accurate
recognition rates,70 whereas others report declines with longer delays.71 A review of the 
studies suggests that there is a relationship between length of retention and decline in 
recognition accuracy, but that the decline is not as great as it is for recall memory. Many of 
these studies used pictorial recognition tests. Whilst these offer an insight into the effect of time 
delay on recognition ability, the subjects usually know that they will be expected to recognise a 
"target" figure.
Perhaps more relevant, then, are staged incidents, where experimental subjects often do not 
expect the event to happen and where the "target" is live. The recognition tests given to subjects 
are sometimes similar to identification parades, and sometimes take the form of a photographic 
lineup. These more accurately approximate the real tests given to eyewitnesses because the
67 [ 1976] 3 All ER 549.
68 As opposed to recall accuracy. In terms of eyewitness reports, or verbal statements on appearance, a 
decrease in accuracy as a function of time are well documented (see Loftus (1979), op.cit., 54). However, 
recognition is generally thought to yield better results than recall, as it is a comparison and reminder process, 
where the memory has cues to work from. A feeling of familiarity is expressed in recognition tests (see Clifford 
and Bull, (1978), op.cit., 22.) The different ways in which recognition and recall work led to questions about the 
effects of retention intervals on recognition.
69 For a discussion of the effect of very long delays before identification is attempted, see the interesting 
account in Wagenaar, W., Identifying Ivan (1988, Hertfordshire: Harvester WheaLsheaf).
70 Chance, J., Goldstein, A., and McBride, L., "Differential experience and recognition memory for faces" 
(1975) 97 Journal of Social Psychology 243-253, for example, where recognition rates after 48 hours showed no 
significant decline from the rate of accurate recognitions made immediately.
71 See, for example, Deffenbacher, K., Carr, T.H., and Leu, J., "Memory for words, pictures and faces: 
Retroactive interference, forgetting and reminiscence" (1981), 7 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
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facial expressions and clothing of the target person are often changed. An example of a staged
incident was conducted by Egan et al.,72 where, although the number of positive identifications 
did not change, the number of misidentifications increased as retention interval increased. By
contrast, Shepherd73 conducted four experiments using a number of different time delays 
which resulted in his conclusion that the rate of correct identifications was not affected by 
delays of four months and less but that accuracy declined significantly after four months. 
However, the number of misidentifications in Shepherd's study remained fairly constant. To 
complicate matters further, other studies have found that correct identifications (or "hit rates")
decrease and false alarms increase after delays.74 For example, Krafka and Penrod75 found 
that even small time differences (between two and twenty-four hours) could result in substantial 
increases in misidentification and significant decreases in correct identifications. Similar results 
were obtained by Davies, Ellis and Shepherd using relatively short time delays of 48 hours to
three weeks.76
The studies conducted on the effect of the length of retention interval in eyewitness cases, 
therefore, appear to support no firm conclusions. However, it could be that the difference lies
in long and short time delays. 77 A meta-analysis by Shapiro and Penrod,78 which included the
Learning and Memory 299-305; and Shepherd, J., and Ellis, H.D., "The effect of attractiveness on recognition
memory for faces" (1973) 86 American Journal of Psychology 627-633.
72 Egan, D., Pittner, M., and Goldstein, A., "Eyewitness identification: Photographs v. live models"
(1977) 1 Law and Human Behavior 199-206. Subjects were recalled after delays of two days, 21 days or 56 days
and they viewed either a photographic or a live parade. The percentage of subjects who misidentified increased
from 48 per cent at two days, to 62 per cent at 21 days and to 93 percent at 56 days.
73 Shepherd, J.W., "Identification after long delays" in Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford (eds) (1983), op.cit.,
173-187.
74 In a study conducted by Malpass, R.S., and Devine, P.O., "Guided memory in eyewitness 
identification" (1981b) 66 Journal of Applied Psychology 343-350, it was found that identification accuracy 
decreased after five months, both in terms of number of correct identifications and number of misidentifications 
made.
75 Krafka, C., and Penrod, S., "Reinstatement of context in a field experiment on eyewitness 
identification" (1985) 49 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58-69.
76 Davies, G.M., Ellis, H.D., and Shepherd, J., "Face recognition accuracy as a function of mode of 
representation" (1978) 63 Journal of Applied Psychology 180-187. Overall accuracy declined in the group who 
experienced a longer time delay.
77 This could explain the results of some studies which reported a slight enhancement of accuracy after 
very short delays. One theory is that a very short time delay allows for the encoding of material into memory. 
See Milner, B., "Visual recognition and recall after right temporal lobe excision in man" (1968) 6 
Neuropsychologia 191-209, who increased the time from immediate to 90 seconds; and Wallace, G., Coltheart,
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length of retention interval, grouped the studies in terms of the length of delay they had used. 79 
It was found that longer delays did indeed lead to fewer correct identifications and more false
identifications.80 The conclusion to be drawn from psychological research is that current 
evidence points to there being a decline in recognition accuracy where information is retained 
for long periods before it is retrieved. Evidence therefore appears to uphold, with some 
qualifications, the common-sense assumption shared by many within (and outside) the legal
profession. 81 However, further research is needed to assess whether waiting periods for 
eyewitnesses within the criminal justice process are detrimental to accurate identification rates.
Once psychologists had established that the memory does indeed fade over time, different rates 
of forgetting did not present the only challenge. Establishing why we forget events and details 
was also seen to be important. There has been extensive research conducted on theories of
forgetting. This research will not be examined in detail here. 82 None of the theories can 
completely explain the process, but they do illustrate different types of forgetting. These
include the passive decay theory;83 distortion of memory;84 interference theory,85 whereby
M., and Forster, K., "Reminiscence in recognition memory for faces" (1970) 18 Psychonomic Science 335-336, 
who increased memory performance test time from immediate to 45 seconds. The phenomenon is termed 
"reminiscence".
78 Shapiro and Penrod (1986), op.cit. As well as analysing studies which manipulated retention interval, 
Shapiro and Penrod looked at all studies in the meta-analysis, including those which did not directly manipulate 
retention interval. It was found that retention interval was an important determinant of correct identifications, but 
not with regard to false identifications.
79 But even if psychologists assert that there are different effects for long and short time delays, it is 
difficult to draw an arbitrary line as to what is classed "long" and what is classed "short".
80 Longer retention intervals were found to lead to 51 per cent correct identifications as against 61 per 
cent, and false identifications increased with a longer retention interval from 24 per cent to 32 per cent.
81 See, for example, Woocher, F.D., "Did your eyes deceive you? Expert psychological testimony on the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification" (1977) 29 Stanford Law Review 969-1030.
82 But see Clifford and Bull (1978), op.cit., chapter 2; and various chapters in Neisser (1982), op.cit., Part 
IV.
83 Brown, J., "Some tests of the decay theory of immediate memory" (1958) 10 Quarterly Journal of 
Experiemental Psychology 12-21. This theory has not received much support, because it does not explain how 
we can forget something, only to recall it at a later date.
84 See Thomdyke, P., "The role of inferences in discourse comprehension" (1976) 15 Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behaviour 437-446. Systematic distortion is at work where a witness repeats a mistake, 
becoming convinced that the mistake is part of the original memory. The witness's own recall is remembered 
rather than the original memory itself: Mandler, J., and Parker, R., "Memory for descriptive and spatial 
information in complex pictures" (1976) 2 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memorv 
38-48.
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similar memories cannot be distinguished from each other; and motivated forgetting, where a 
witness represses painful or anxiety-related memories. Retrieval failure, discussed in the 
following section of this chapter, may also manifest itself in forgetting. Some of the theories 
advanced to explain why we forget, or perceive our memory to have faded over time, form the 
basis of eyewitness research on other aspects of memory change during the retention period. 
The most important body of research, in terms of identification tests, is based on the distortion 
and interference theories. Where a memory is distorted or interfered with, a witness may 
become less accurate whilst remaining convincing. The effect of post-event information again 
illustrates the active nature of the retention stage of memory.
Psychologists have concluded that post-event information can come in a number of forms, and 
can effect a manifested change in an eyewitness's memory for the original event. For example, 
where witnesses discuss the appearance or actions of an offender there is a danger of "cross- 
pollinisation", whereby they influence each other's memory. Other forms of post-event 
information include inferences gained from questioning, and guesses made which are 
subsequently confirmed. In both cases, the exposure to new information about an incident can 
radically affect memory of it. Before examining in more detail how post-event information can
affect witnesses, 8 6 it is important to note that new information is not necessarily detrimental to 
accuracy, but can enhance memory. The danger lies in the fact that it can also distort or change 
memory altogether.
85 Postman, L., "A pragmatic view of organisation theory", in Tulving, E., and Donaldson, W., (eds) 
Organisation of Memory (1972, New York: Academic Press). Unconscious transference, discussed later in this 
chapter, can be explained by the use of interference theory. Familiar faces can be displaced by memory from one 
situation to another.
86 On the effect of post-event information, see Bekerian, D.A., and Bowers, J.M., "Eyewitness testimony: 
Were we misled?" (1983) 9 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 139-145; 
Gibling, F., and Davies, G., "Reinstatement of context following exposure to post-event information" (1988) 
79 British Journal of Psychology' ; McCloskey, M., and Zaragoza, M., "Misleading post-event information and 
memory for events: Arguments and evidence against memory impairment hypotheses" (1985) 114 Journal of 
experimental Psychology: General 1-16; Okamoto, S., and Sugahara, Y., "Effects of post-event information on 
eyewitness testimony" (1986) 28 Japanese Psychological Research 196-201; and Hall, D.F., Loftus, E.P., and 
Tousignant, J.P., "Postevent information and changes in recollection for a natural event", in Wells, G., and 
Loftus, E.F., (eds) Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (1984, Cambridge University Press).
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Where memory of a detail is correct, mentioning that detail to a witness may enhance their
memory of it. Loftus87 illustrated this by asking two groups of subjects about the speed of a 
car involved in a filmed accident. One group's question mentioned a stop sign. When subjects 
were recalling events later, 53 percent of those asked about the stop sign reported that they had 
seen it. Only 35 per cent of the subjects to whom the stop sign was not mentioned reported 
seeing it. The implication of this experiment is that recall for a particular detail can be enhanced 
where it is mentioned in questioning. However, actual crime situations cannot be controlled in 
the way experiments are. One question raised by the Loftus experiment was that if subjects can 
be helped to remember a sign which was present at the time of the incident, can they be 
prompted to "remember" one which was not? In other words, can memories be created by post- 
event information? If so, cross-pollinisation and unskilled questioning could contribute to the 
creation of inaccurate but confident witnesses.
It appears that where new information conflicts with the original memory, there are a number of 
possible effects on what is subsequently recalled. 88 For example, it may be that a witness will
make a compromise between their earlier memory and the post-event information. 89 This will 
usually happen where the new information concerns something which is already encoded in 
memory. In the case of eyewitnesses, an example would be the colour of someone's hair or 
eyes. However, it is not so easy to compromise where the information given post-event did not
exist originally. 90 In such cases, it is more likely that a witness will either reject the new 
information completely, retaining their original memory, or completely replace the original
87 Loftus, E.F., "Leading questions and the eyewitness report" (1975) 7 Cognitive Psychology 560-572. 
The experiment consisted of a film of a car accident, after which subjects were asked ten questions. 
88 See Loftus, E.F., and Hoffman, H., "Misinformation and memory: The creation of new memories" 
(1989) 118 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 100-104.
89 See Loftus, E.F., "Shifting human color memory" (1977) 5 Memory and Cognition 696-699.
90 An example of the effect the introduction of new details has on memory for an event can be seen in 
Loftus, Miller and Bums (1978), op.cit., where subjects were asked about a roadway stop sign or yield sign. 
Some subjects were asked about the sign they had actually seen in slides earlier. Others had not seen the sign 
they were asked about, and so were being given misleading information. When shown pairs of slides again, less 
than half of those who had been given misleading information correctly recognised the sign seen before. This 
was below the accuracy expected of a person who was merely guessing. By contrast, those given consistent 
information recognised the correct sign in 75 per cent of cases.
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memory with the new information. By simply mentioning an object or a detail of an event, the 
likelihood of later recall is enhanced.9 1
The malleability of memory at the retention stage has implications in criminal cases where 
police officers take witness statements. During questioning, any new information given, even
unwittingly, may result in a witness recalling a slightly different memory to that encoded.92 
Where officers have a suspect in mind when taking a statement, it is possible that they will 
tailor questions to fit that particular suspect. Therefore, police may, in the process of obtaining
information, also impart it. 93 The great danger is that, where the new information is 
incorporated, it becomes a crucial element in the prosecution case.
Where witnesses discuss the case, there will be a similar danger that new, and not necessarily
accurate, memories will be formed. 94 This is the case whether memory is compromised or 
replaced. Code of Practice D, Annex A: 12 guards against discussion of the offence between 
witnesses attending an identification procedure, although it is impossible to prevent discussions 
between witnesses outside of the police station, especially where witnesses are close friends or 
relations. Police procedure can therefore do little to prevent post-event information affecting the 
memories of some witnesses to crime.
91 On resistance to misleading information, see Greene, E., Flynn, M.S., and Loftus, E.F., "Inducing 
resistance to misleading information" (1982) 21 Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 207-219.
92 Misinformation is more likely to be taken on board by a witness where the source is authoritative, such 
as a police officer: see Dodd, D.H., and Bradshaw, J.M., "Leading questions and memory: Pragmatic constraints" 
(1980) 19 Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 695-704. On communicator expertise, see Smith, 
V.L., and Ellsworth, P.C., "The social psychology of eyewitness accuracy: Misleading questions and 
communicator expertise" (1987) 72 Journal of Applied Psychology 292-300.
93 The information given does not have to be verbal, but can also be given implicitly, as where a police 
officer inadvertently directs attention to the suspect when a witness is viewing an identification parade. This is 
one reason for the limitation on the number of people who can be present in the identification corridor.
94 Loftus, E.F., and Greene, E., "Warning: Even memory for faces can be contagious" (1980) 4 Law and 
Human Behavior 323-334; on group discussion see Wamick and Sanders (1980), op.cit.; and Hollin, C.R., and 
Clifford, B.R., "Eyewitness testimony: The effects of discussion on recall accuracy and agreement" (1983) 13 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 234-244.
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However, the memory appears to be more susceptible to change or compromise where the
details are not central to the incident in question.95 It has already been noted that the salient 
details of an event are the ones which will be spontaneously mentioned by a witness. Peripheral 
details do not command the same attention and time for encoding at the perception stage of the 
memory process. So mistakes on peripheral details do not mean less accuracy on salient ones. 
That the central, important aspects of memory for an event are more difficult to change suggests 
that many eyewitnesses retain their original memory of the offender even where they are given 
misleading information. This is because the offender's appearance and actions are central to the 
memories of most witnesses to crime. There is danger, however, where witnesses have not 
focused their attention on the offender. The results of research on weapon focus, discussed 
above, suggest that not all eyewitnesses concentrate their attention and perception on the 
perpetrators of the crime. In addition, some witnesses do not realise that a crime is taking place, 
for example in deception cases involving bogus callers, and it is unlikely that full attention 
would be paid to the offender in such a case. These witnesses would be at most risk of being 
influenced by post-event information, because the offender was a peripheral detail in their 
memory for events.
Post-event information can also come from witnesses themselves. In interviews with witnesses 
at Birmingham Identification Suite, the most striking finding was that many of the witnesses
making a choice were guessing.96 Psychological experimentation shows that, where a witness 
guesses at the identity of a suspect, a dangerous process can result. This is because guessing 
will occur where the witness is uncertain. The guess acts to fill in the gaps in a witness's 
memory. If a witness retrieves the information later, the guess may become incorporated into
memory, resulting in the guess being mistaken for a real memory. 97
95 See Loftus (1979), op.cit., 63.
96 See Chapter five of this thesis.
97 This also appears to be the case where a witness identifies from a police photograph. The appearance of 
the person in the photograph overtakes the original memory of the perpetrator. Thus, witnesses are being tested 
more on their recognition of the person in the mugshot than the offender (Brown, E., Deffenbacher, K., and 
Sturgill, W., "Memory for faces and the circumstances of the encounter" (1977) 62 Journal of Applied 
Psychology 311-318; Doob, A.N., and Kirschenbaum, H.M., "Bias in police lineups: Partial remembering" 
(1973) 1 Journal of Police Science and Administration 287-293; and Gorenstein, G.W., and Ellsworth. P.,
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This process explains why a number of the witnesses interviewed in Birmingham were 
uncertain at the time of their guess, but reported feeling very confident a few minutes later. The 
confidence increase probably occurs because "a witness is now 'seeing' an item that she herself
has constructed in memory."98 However, memory theory is unlikely to offer a full explanation 
for guessing and subsequent growing confidence, and the phenomenon must also be a result of 
societal pressures. It is likely that one reason for guessing is that the witness is concerned to do 
well. An identification procedure takes time and money to set up and witnesses do not want to 
fail. Where witnesses are the victims of offences, they will also be anxious for the offender to 
be convicted. A positive identification is one step on the road to successful prosecution. The 
knowledge that the police suspect is present on the identification parade will also increase the 
likelihood of guessing. Where the guess is confirmed by the police, witnesses understandably 
become more confident in their own accuracy. Buckhout noted the growing certainty of
eyewitnesses in his research cases, noting that reports got"
"more complete and less ambiguous as the witness moves from the initial police 
report...to testimony at the trial. The process of filling in...can lead to unreliable 
recognition testing: the witness may adjust his memory to fit the available 
suspects or pictures...he may be unaware he is distorting or reconstructing his 
memory. In his very effort to be conscientious he may fabricate parts of his 
recall to make a chaotic memory seem more plausible to the people asking 
questions."
Whilst psychologists are not in dispute over the existence of post-event factors and their effect 
on accuracy of retrieval, there is no consensus as to how it works. It is not known whether the
original memory is transformed, or whether it remains, 100 obscured but not replaced by new
"Effect of choosing an incorrect photograph on a later identification by an eyewitness" (1980) 65 Journal of 
Applied Psychology 616-622). This is not a problem where they are one and the same, but is where they are 
not: Brigham, J.C., and Cairns, D.L., "The effect of mugshot inspections on eyewitness identification accuracy" 
(1988) 18 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1394-1410, found that the interference on identification 
accuracy by prior exposure to mugshots was largely dependent on the decision made by a witness at the mugshot 
stage. Decisions made about mugshots were reaffirmed in a later recognition test. This implies that a false 
identification will lead to a further misidentification on a parade. Code of Practice D2.15 (viii) provides that 
suspects are told when a witness has previously been shown photographs, photofit, identikit or similar pictures.
98 Loftus (1979), op.cit., 82.
99 Buckhout, R., "Eyewitness Testimony" in Neisser (1982), op.cit., 116-125, 120.
100 As Sigmund Freud believed. He described "lost" memories as fish resting in the bottom of a very deep 
pond, inaccessible and part of the unconscious. Those representing adults who suddenly realise that they were 
abused in childhood adhere to Freud's viewpoint. The reports by those claiming that they were abused are often 
detailed and vivid (see Lindsay, S., and Read, J., "Psychotherapy and memories of childhood sexual abuse: A 
cognitive perspective" (1994) 8 Applied Cognitive Psychology 281-338). It has been suggested (Loftus, E.F.,
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versions. 101 There has been much dispute over whether original memories co-exist with new 
ones, or whether there is an irrevocable alteration. For the purposes of eyewitness 
identification, however, the most important finding is that the retention stage of memory is not 
passive, and that a number of post-event factors may alter any retrieval of memory that is 
attempted. The final stage of the memory process, where information is recalled, also has its
dangers. 102
(in) Retrieval
The retrieval stage of memory is where the success of the perception and retention stages is 
tested. In simple terms, there are two main types of retrieval: recall and recognition. During 
recall, there is an attempt to retell what was seen or heard. Typically, recall is categorised as 
retrieval of information without any external help, such as where a witness is asked to provide
a description. 103 This is also termed a narrative or free report. However, it is usual for police 
officers, when taking a statement from a witness, to ask specific questions, such as "how tall 
was the offender?" or "what was the colour of the offender's hair?". In this way, specific 
pieces of information can be gained. This is termed "cued recall" (or controlled narrative), 
because cues are used to trigger retrieval of information. An example of the cued recall method
is where a photo-fit or identikit is constructed. 1 ° 4 Comparisons between eye shapes, noses and 
other facial features can be made. Further, each feature is considered, which may not happen
"The reality of repressed memories" (1993) 48 American Psychologist 518) that these memories are a result of 
post-event information, given by therapists and enhanced by patients.
101 If the original memory remains, but is unavailable, it is possible that techniques such as hypnosis 
could reveal the true memory. Yarmey, A.D., and Yarmey, A.L., "Relaxation-hypnotic enhanced memory and 
photographic lineup identification" (1993) 2 Expert Evidence 115, showed through relaxation-hypnotic enhanced 
memory that the effect of a slightly altered memory can radically affect identification choices.
102 See Lofrus, E.F., and Ketcham, K., "The malleability of eyewitness accounts" in Lloyd-Bostock and 
Clifford (eds) (1983), op.cit, 159-173, for a general discussion on the malleable nature of memory.
103 See Clifford and Bull (1978), op.cit., 19.
IW For a detailed discussion of face recall by means of facial composite systems such as Identikit and 
computer based systems such as EFIT, see Shepherd, J.W., and Ellis, H.D., "Face recall: Methods and 
Problems", in Sporer, S.L., Malpass, R.S., and Kohnken, G., (eds) Psychological Issues in Eyewitness 
Identification (1996 Lawrence Erlbaum), 87-116.
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where there is free recall. This is because the witness will probably have paid more attention to 
some aspects of the offender's appearance than others. The situation is similar where 
alternatives are given, such as "did the offender have fair or dark hair?", known as 
interrogatory reporting. Where there is a cue, the memory has to trigger details which may not
be the most salient to the witness. 1 ° 5 Finally, in cognitive interviews witnesses are encouraged 
to remember by placing themselves back in the context of the original incident. This form of 
cued recall has been heralded as a more efficient and accurate form of questioning. 106
In contrast to recall, recognition occurs where there is a re-representation of the original 
material. A witness simply has to express a feeling of familiarity when confronted with the
identification test. 107 It is the recognition process which is utilised in all live identification 
procedures under Code of Practice D and in the showing of photographs. It is generally
accepted that most people find it easier to recognise than to recall, 1 ° 8 because the cues given are 
so strong. The main drawback to recognition tests is that, where there is only partial 
overlapping between a witness's memory of the offender and the suspect in front of her, the 
likelihood of a misidentification is increased where the overlapping details are ones which are
salient to the witness. 109 In addition, accurate recall does not necessarily make for accurate 
recognition, because it is thought that verbal and visual information, although affected by the
same witness and event factors, 110 are encoded in different ways. The advantages and pitfalls 
of the use of different types of retrieval methods could direct police officers to the most efficient 
method of gaining reliable witness testimony.
105 There has been increasing interest by psychologists in the use of hypnosis as an aid to accurate recall, 
although it has not gained much popularity or support: see Yarmey and Yarmey (1993),op.cit, and Orne, M.T., 
Soskis, D.A., Dinges, D.F., and Ome, E.G., "Hypnotically induced testimony" in Wells, G.L., and Lofrus, 
E.F., Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (1984 Cambridge University Press), 171.
106 Geiselman and Fisher have conducted a number of experiments comparing the cognitive interview 
technique with other methods of questioning, and have consistently found that cognitive interviewing offers 
enhanced recall: see Fisher, R.P., and Geiselman, R.E. (1992), Memory Enhancing Techniques for Investigative 
Interviewing: The Cognitive Interview (Springfield: Thomas).
107 Clifford and Bull (1978), op.cit., 22.
108 For example, see Brown, Deffenbacher and Srurgill (1977), op.cit.
109 A number of commentators have called for the original description of an offender to be the basis upon 
which volunteers or photographs are chosen for an identification procedure, rather than the appearance of the 
suspect, as discussed later in this chapter.
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Clifford and Bull state that "recognition gives better memory performance than cued recall, and
cued recall gives better performance than uncued recall." 1 ll It is certainly the case that, where 
cues are given, information extracted from memory is fuller. In terms of amount of 
information, Clifford and Bull are correct to state that uncued recall is the least effective type of 
retrieval method to use. But where cues are used to enhance retrieval, there is a danger that the 
memory will be altered by suggestion from those cues. Uncued recall could be the most 
accurate form of retrieval, although sparse in detail. When police officers are questioning a 
witness to a crime, they cannot choose between a factually complete statement and a factually 
accurate one. For a successful investigation and prosecution, the ideal is to have an abundance 
of accurate information. A combination of methods of questioning could yield the best results. 
For example, Loftus recommends the use of free reporting, where no cues are given, followed 
up by more specific questioning, such as cued recall or interrogatory reporting. There would
then be spontaneous information padded out by directed questions. 1 ' 2 Proponents of cognitive 
interviewing argue that it offers the best form of questioning, and comprises the best 
combination of methods. 113
Various factors which may interfere with accurate retrieval were discussed above with regard to 
the acquisition and retention stages of the memory process. The retrieval stage itself may also
result in contamination or change of a witness's memory. l ' 4 The best method of extracting
110 See Davies, G.M., "Forensic face recall: The role of visual and verbal information", in Lloyd-Bostock 
and Clifford (eds) (1983), op.cit., 103-124.
111 (1978), op.cit., 23.
112 (1979), op.cit., 92. See also Penrod, S., Loftus, E.F., and Winkler, J., "The reliability of eyewitness 
testimony: A psychological perspective", in Kerr, N.L. and Bray, R.M., (eds) The Psychology of the Courtroom 
(1982, New York: Academic Press), 119-168.
113 The cognitive interview is discussed further later in this chapter.
114 An example of this is the "unconscious transference effect", where a person seen in one situation is 
confused with or recalled as a person seen in another situation. This is a particular problem where the suspect 
was a bystander to the offence, or where presence at the scene of the crime is admitted by the suspect but 
involvement is not. Whilst the issue is not discussed in detail here, it is likely to present a problem in only a 
small number of cases: see Loftus, E.F., "Unconscious transference" (1976) 2 Law and Psychology Review 93- 
98; Read, J.D., "Understanding bystander misidentifications: The role of familiarity and contextual knowledge" 
in Ross, D.F., Read, J.D., and Toglia, M.P., (eds) Adult Eyewitness Testimony (1994 Cambridge University 
Press), 56-79; Ross, D.F., Ceci, S.J., Dunning, D., and Toglia, M.P., "Unconscious transference and lineup 
identification: Toward a memory blending approach" in Ross, Read and Toglia (eds) (1994), ibid., 80-100; Read,
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details from memory is therefore an issue of prime importance. Police officers need to be aware 
that they can influence the details a witness remembers and then reconfirms. For example, it 
has been shown that small changes in the wording of questions during recall can dramatically
alter someone's memory. 115 One of the most famous experiments illustrating the point was 
conducted by Loftus and Zanni in 1975. 116 A film of a car accident was shown, after which 
viewers were asked either "did you see a broken headlight?" or "did you see the broken 
headlight?". There was no broken headlight. The hypothesis was that the use of "the" 
presupposed the existence of the broken headlight and would result in a higher number of
respondents claiming that they had indeed seen the headlight. 117 This proved to be the case, 
with twenty per cent saying they had seen a broken headlight as against six per cent who had
been asked whether a broken headlight had been seen. ] 1 8 This experiment illustrates how easy 
it is to change the report a witness gives about an event.
The fragility of the memory even at the retrieval stage means that police officers should be 
careful when taking statements from witnesses, because they could, albeit inadvertently, 
influence the content of them. Statements could then be used to aid in the apprehension of a
suspect, the organisation of an identification procedure,' 19 or even publicized in newspapers 
and on radio and television. It is difficult enough for witnesses to describe someone's face,
J.D., Tollestrup, P., Hammersley, R., McFadzen, E., and Christensen, A., "The unconscious transference 
effect: Are innocent bystanders ever misidentified?" (1990) 4 Applied Cognitive Psychology 3-31.
115 See Loftus, E.F., and Palmer, J., "Reconstruction of an automobile destruction: An example of the 
interaction between language and memory" (1974) 13 Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 585-589, 
where speed estimates of a car involved in a collision varied with the wording of the question asked. For 
example, the use of the word "smashed" generated far higher speed estimates than did "bumped".
116 Loftus, E.F., and Zanni, G., "Eyewitness testimony: The influence of the wording of a question" 
(1975) ^Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 86-88.
117 In court, this would be seen as a leading question. Where police conduct an interview, the situation is 
very different to that in the courtroom. Minor word changes could be made unintentionally, but could alter a 
witness's memory of events for the rest of the prosecution process. For example, appearance cues by police 
where they have a suspect in mind could subtly alter memory for the offender, which could be translated into the 
identification made at a parade. The identification would then be re-confirmed at later stages.
118 In Experiment II. Those in the group who were asked about a broken headlight were also far more 
likely than those who were questioned about the broken headlight to admit that they did not know whether they 
had seen it or not. The suggestion that the broken headlight existed seemed to lead more people to guess. 
Similar reluctance not to guess is shown in Chapter 5, regarding witnesses viewing identification procedures.
119 The original description by a witness of an offender now has to be kept, and a copy given to the suspect 
at identification procedures in England and Wales under Code of Practice D2.0.
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since our vocabulary for the task is rather limited. 120 Influential questioning could serve to 
confuse matters further. 12l
(a] Confidence
Where a witness is influenced by the type of questioning they are subjected to, there are 
implications for the rest of the case. Not only will the altered information be remembered as 
being the original memory, but the confidence in the accuracy of that memory is likely to be 
enhanced. That a witness will increase in confidence with every confirmation and reiteration 
was noted with respect to post-event information. The same principle is at work in the retrieval 
stage of memory. For example, where a witness is asked a leading question, that information
may become part of her memory for the original event. 122 Any confirmation of this at 
subsequent retrieval exercises, such as an identification parade, will result in the witness 
becoming more confident that her memory for that detail is correct. A confident witness is
likely to be very persuasive in court. 123 Yet the piece of information could have originated 
from a police officer who had the appearance of a certain suspect in mind when questioning the
120 See Sporer, S.L., "Psychological aspects of person descriptions" in Sporer, Malpass and Kohnken (eds) 
(1996), op.cit., 53-86, who discusses the difficulties involved in witnesses providing verbal descriptions and 
also the reader of that description reconstructing a visual image. Faces are best encoded holistically, whereas a 
verbal description requires a piecemeal approach for each individual feature.
121 On the issue of question order, see Morris, V., and Morris, P.E., "The influence of question order on 
eyewitness accuracy" (1985) 76 British Journal of Psychology 365-371; and on question repetition Poole, D., 
and White, L., "Effects of question repetition on the eyewitness testimony of children and adults" (1991) 27 
Developmental Psychology 975-986. Where the person asking the questions is biased, contamination of 
memory is very likely to be a problem: for example see Smith, J., Pleban, R., and Schaffer, D., "Effects of 
interrogator bias and a police trait questionnaire on the accuracy of eyewitness identification" (1982) 116 Journal 
of Social Psychology 19-26. As with post-event information, the status of the person asking questions will 
affect how they are answered: see Smith and Ellsworth (1987), op.cit.; and Marshall, J., Law and Psychology in 
Conflict (1966, New York: Anchor Books).
122 See Ryan, R.H., and Geiselman, R.E., "Effects of biased information on the relationship between 
eyewitness confidence and accuracy" (1991) 29 Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 7-9.
123 See Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., and Stuve, T.E., "Juror decision-making in eyewitness identification 
cases" (1988) 12 Law and Human Behavior 41-55; and Lindsay, R.C.L., Wells, G.L., and Rumpel, C.M., "Can 
people detect eyewitness accuracy within and across situations?" (1981) 66 Journal of Applied Psychology^ 79- 
89. Wells, G.L., Lindsay, R.C.L., and Ferguson, T.J., "Accuracy, confidence and juror perceptions in 
eyewitness identification" (1979) 64 Journal of Applied Psychology 440-448, found that mock jurors were more 
likely to believe that an eyewitness was accurate where they were confident. Ascribing confidence accounted for 
50 per cent of the variance in mock-jurors assessments of eyewitness accuracy.
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witness. 124 The witness may be mistaken, but unaware of it. Leippe describes the process 
succinctly: 125
"Eyewitnesses might not recognise that subtle social stimuli, such as leading 
questions from a police interrogator, may have distorted their memory for the 
transgressor's face...eyewitnesses might not be cognizant of social 
variables...that bolster their confidence but do not improve accuracy of 
memory...if people are unaware of whether, and to what extent there have been 
internally produced alterations of their memory, they should be poor judges of 
the accuracy of their recollections if indeed such alterations occurred."
Where witnesses identify someone from photographs, it is also likely that they will identify the 
same person at a later identification parade. The new image will be the one which they later 
recognise. It is for this reason that the showing of photographs is restricted: a subsequent 
identification parade will only confirm that witnesses can recognise in the flesh someone they 
have seen in a photograph. Yet such witnesses are likely to be very confident in their own 
accuracy. This suggests that confident witnesses are not necessarily accurate. It is also possible 
that accurate witnesses may not be convincing when they are hesitant. The question of a 
confidence-accuracy relationship is therefore of great importance to the way eyewitnesses are 
viewed in a criminal court.
Unfortunately, psychological experimentation has not provided any definite answer to whether 
confidence and accuracy are indeed related. The common-sense answer would be that the more 
accurate witnesses are, the more confident they will be. However, the discussion on post-event 
information and contamination through prior retrieval tasks shows that witnesses may think that 
they are accurate when in fact they are not. Their confidence level may therefore be high 
notwithstanding the fact that they are mistaken. This is borne out in the results of experiments 
on confidence and accuracy. Many of the experiments are laboratory based, and often deal with 
recall rather than recognition. Most relevant to an assessment of whether confidence and
124 As with post-event information, distortion of memory during questioning will be largely dependent on 
the individual witness and the saliency of the detail in the original memory trace.
125 Leippe, M.R., "Effects of integrative memorial and cognitive processes in the correspondence of 
eyewitness accuracy and confidence" (1980) 4 Law and Human Behavior 261-274, 264.
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accuracy are related in eyewitness identification tests, rather than statements, are those studies 
which ask subjects to view an identification parade. 126
Some experiments show a fairly strong confidence-accuracy relationship where, the more
accurate witnesses are, the higher their confidence in their testimony. 127 For example, in 
Lipton's study, subjects were asked questions about a film and then were asked to rate their
confidence in their own accuracy. A strong confidence-accuracy relationship resulted. 128 Other 
studies, such as Clifford and Scott in their 1978 consideration of the effect of the violence of an 
event, find no confidence-accuracy relationship at all. The danger of information after the event 
distorting the memory trace of witnesses has been illustrated in those studies which actually 
find an inverse relationship between confidence and accuracy, so that the more confident
witnesses were, the less likely they were to be correct. 129 Buckhout et al. found that witnesses 
with a higher tendency to choose from an identification parade or photo-array were more 
confident in their ability. Subjects were shown two identification parades, one with and one 
without the target person. Subjects who chose someone from both of the parades tended to be 
very confident. This led Buckhout et al. to the conclusion that "high confidence signals a
witness who is too quick to stereotype, to please the authorities and identify someone." 1 30
Is there a confidence-accuracy relationship? The general consensus amongst psychologists 
appears to be that there may be a low correlation. For example, Wells and Murray found that 
eyewitness confidence accounted for less than ten per cent of the variance in eyewitness
126 See Luus, C.A.E., and Wells, G.L., "The malleability of eyewitness confidence: Co-witness and 
perseverence effects" (1994) 79 Journal of 'Applied Psychology 714-723.
127 See Brigham, J., "Perspectives on the impact of lineup composition, race and witness confidence on 
identification accuracy" (1980) 4 Law and Human Behavior 315-322.
128 Lipton, J., "On the psychology of eyewitness testimony" (1977) 62 Journal of Applied psychology 90- 
95. The confidence-accuracy relationship was categorised by r=+0.44.
129 Lofhis, Miller and Burns (1978), op.cit.
130 Buckhout, R., Alper, A., Chern, S., Silverberg, G., and Slomovits, M., "Determinants of eyewitness 
performance on a lineup" (1974) 4 Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 191-192, 192. There were 13.5 per cent 
positive identifications, 13.5 per cent impeached identifications (where the subject picked the suspect but then 
impeached their identification by making another choice), 40.3 per cent mistaken identifications, and 19.2 per 
cent nonidentifications.
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identification accuracy. 131 Similarly, a meta-analysis by Bothwell et al. 132 found an average 
correlation of .25. This indicates that highly confident witnesses are only slightly more likely to 
be correct than those witnesses who are less confident. In addition, confidence can be affected
by certain variables, 133 and this could alter the nature of any confidence-accuracy relationship. 
Luus and Wells, in their review of literature on eyewitness confidence, concluded: 1 34
"Eyewitnesses' statements of confidence in their identifications might be only 
partly determined by how similar the identified person is to their memories of 
the culprit...in many cases, a statement of confidence could derive from social 
influences as well as individual differences across witnesses.. 11
It is clear that confidence can be affected by factors at all stages of the memory process. Where 
an identification has been made by a witness which is confirmed by the police, then confidence 
will rise. This does not mean that accuracy is guaranteed or enhanced. Confidence is poor as a 
predictor of accuracy. The psychological experimentation on memory processes leads to the 
conclusion that more emphasis should be placed on factors affecting accuracy at the encoding 
stage of memory and less on the outward confidence of a witness.
From the psychological theory and experimentation on the retrieval stage of memory, it is 
possible to gain an idea of the malleability of memory even as it is used for recall or 
recognition. The problems of all of the stages of memory are in part insurmountable, as they 
are based in the event or the witness herself. However, techniques have been developed by 
psychologists, some of which are in use in the criminal justice process on a regular basis,
131 Wells, G.L., and Murray, D.M., "Eyewitness confidence", in Wells and Loftus (eds) (1984), op.cit., 
155-170.
132 Bothwell, R.K., Deffenbacher, K.A., and Brigham, J.C., "Correlation of eyewitness accuracy and 
confidence: Optimality hypothesis revisited" (1987) 72 Journal of Applied Psychology 691-695.
133 These variables will not be discussed in any detail here, but see Leippe (1980), op.cit.; Deffenbacher, 
K., "Eyewitness accuracy and confidence: Can we infer anything about their relationship?" (1980) 4 Law and 
Human Behavior 243-260; and Narby, D.J., Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, S.D., "The effects of witness, target and 
situational factors on eyewitness identifications" in Sporer, Malpass and Kohnken (eds) (1996), op.cit., 23-52.
134 Luus, C.A.E., and Wells, G.L., "Eyewitness identification confidence" in Ross, Read and Toglia (eds) 
(1994) op.cit., 348-361, 359. The influences which can affect confidence include the quality of the encoding 
conditions, often termed the "optimality hypothesis": Deffenbacher (1980) op.cit.; Bothwell, Deffenbacher and 
Brigham (1987) op.cit; and factors which affect confidence but not accuracy, or vice versa: Leippe (1980) op.cit.; 
and Wells, G.L., Ferguson, T.J., and Lindsay, R.C.L., "The tractability of eyewitness confidence and its 
implications for triers of fact" (1981) 66 Journal of Applied Psychology 688-696. For example, post-event 
information may affect accuracy but will not affect confidence. However, making a decision will probably affect 
confidence without affecting accuracy. A good general overview is contained in Wells and Murray (1984), op.cit.
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which aim to enhance memory. It is hoped that by enhancing memory, fuller and more accurate 
accounts will be retrieved from memory stores.
fb) Memory enhancement13 5
Over eighty years ago, Gustave Feingold posed the following question:' 36
"Does the feeling of familiarity or strangeness which is aroused by the general 
environment so colour consciousness with its own particular tone as to make a 
new item appear familiar in the one case, and a previously experienced item 
appear strange in the other?"
Psychological theory indicates that the ability to remember information is greatly influenced by 
the relationship between the storage of the information and the context in which it is retrieved. 
Where retrieval is attempted in the same context as the original event, the result will be better 
than where the environmental context is changed. Despite early moves by Feingold into the 
area, more general interest in context as an aid to enhancing memory is fairly recent. Because of 
its relative youth as an area of study, using context in interviews is still developing. The basic 
idea is that the more elements held in common between the stored memory of an event and the 
environment in which it is recalled, the more successful the retrieval. Malpass cites the example 
of facial recognition where the offender had worn a disguise, "the fewer facial elements in 
common between the original observation and the subsequent request for identification, the less
likely a correct identification will occur." 137 A contrast has been gained where additional 
information has been given to subjects, in a sort of reversal of the use of disguise. For 
example, Cutler and Penrod gave additional cues to some subjects and not to others. Those
receiving additional cues made more correct identifications and fewer incorrect ones. 138 Cues
135 See Davies, G., and Thompson, D., (eds) Memory in Context, Context in Memory (1988, Chichester: 
Wiley) on the use of context to enhance memory.
136 (1914), op.cit., 43.
137 Malpass, R.S., "Enhancing eyewitness memory", in Sporer, Malpass and Kohnken (eds) (1996) op.cit., 
177-204, 181. Disguise has been used to illustrate the fragility of memory where facial features are changed. 
Recognition ability can be affected quite dramatically: see Bruce,V., "Changing faces: Visual and non-visual 
coding processes in face recognition" (1982) 73 British Journal of Psychology 105-116; and Sanders, G.S., 
"Effects of context cues on eyewitness identification responses" (1984) 14 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 
386-397.
138 Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, S., "Context reinstatement and eyewitness identification" in Davies and 
Thomson (eds) (1988) op.cit. The use of cues also increased recognition accuracy in Cutler, Penrod and Martens' 
(1987b) experiment, especially where members of the parade were very similar to each other: Cutler, B.L.,
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are thought to work because different elements of an event are linked together, so that a 
reminder of one element can lead to enhanced recollection of others.
Studies show that the effect of context is not restricted to the appearance of an offender. The 
most obvious change in environmental context where any eyewitness is given a recognition 
test, be it the showing of photographs, a video or a live identification procedure, is that of
physical setting. 139 Although in 1914 Feingold recommended that eyewitnesses and suspects 
should go back to the scene of the crime to attempt an identification, such an absolute context 
reinstatement is hardly practicable. However, reinstatement of context in some measure has
been shown to work. 140 As physical context reinstatement will often be impossible, other 
approaches have to be used.
Malpass and Devine tested the applicability of reinstatement through interview. They termed
this "guided memory" interview, 141 which involves reminding witnesses of an event and 
asking them to visualise its taking place. The key to the experiment was that visualisation of the 
original event was attempted so that it was reinstated in the mind of the witness. The result was 
that sixty per cent of witnesses who had undergone a guided memory interview made a correct 
identification, as opposed to forty per cent who had no such interview. Similar results have
been gained in other studies, such as Krafka and Penrod's 142 experiment with convenience 
store clerks. Half of the clerks were exposed to context reinstatement, whilst the other half 
were not. Where there had been context reinstatement, 55 per cent correct identifications were
made, as opposed to 29 percent where there was no context manipulation. 143 From studies
Penrod, S.D., and Martens, T.K., "Improving the reliability of eyewitness identifications: Putting context into 
context" (1987) 72 Journal of Applied Psychology 629-637.
139 For the general effect of change of physical context, see Davies.G., and Milne, A., "Recognizing faces 
in and out of context" (1982) 2 Current Psychological Research 235-246.
140 See Malpass and Devine (198la), op.cit.; and Brigham, Maass, Snyder and Spalding (1982), op.cit.
141 Malpass, R.S., and Devine, P.O., "Guided memory in eyewitness identification" (1981b) 66 Joiinml of 
Applied Psychology 343-350.
142 Krafka, C., and Penrod, S.D., "Reinstatement of context in a field experiment on eyewitness 
identification" (1985) 49 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58-69.
143 Krafka and Penrod also used blank (or target-absent) parades. Context reinstatement did not have an 
effect on identification errors.
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such as those by Malpass and Devine and Krafka and Penrod, it appears that context 
reinstatement can serve to increase the likelihood of a correct identification without
simultaneously increasing the rate of false identifications. 144 Shapiro and Penrod undertook a 
meta-analysis of context reinstatement research, and found that substantial increases in
recognition ability resulted from manipulation of contextual cues. 145 It may even be that a 
guided interview technique can offset the effect of misleading post-event information. 146
The visualisation of context, as in guided memory interviews, is also used in cognitive 
interviewing, as constructed by Geiselman and Fisher. The cognitive interview is becoming an 
increasingly popular technique in the criminal justice process. Four general methods are used in 
cognitive interviewing: the circumstances are reconstructed in the interviewee's mind; the 
witness is asked to report everything they remember; events are recalled in a different order, 
either back to front or starting with the aspect which made the greatest impression; and 
witnesses are told to try to recall the event from a different perspective, for example imagining
what other people saw. 147 These methods remain the basis of the technique, although
refinements have been made by looking to the social dynamics of the interview.' 4 8 Whilst the 
cognitive interview undoubtedly serves to increase recall, its effect on recognition accuracy
appears rather limited. 149 Because of this, cognitive interviewing will probably serve to 
improve accuracy and detail in witness statements, but will not greatly improve performance on 
recognition tests such as the identification parade.
144 Some studies give only limited support for the use of context reinstatement: for example Cutler, B.L., 
Penrod, S.D., O'Rourke, T.E., and Martens, T.K., "Unconfounding the effects of contextual cues on eyewitness 
identification accuracy" (1986) 1 Social Behaviour 113-134.
145 Shapiro and Penrod (1986), op.cit.
146 See Gibling and Davies (1988), op.cit.
147 See Fisher, R.P., McCauley, M.R., and Geiselman, R.E., "Improving eyewitness testimony with the 
cognitive interview" in Ross, Read and Toglia (eds) (1994) op.cit., 245-269, 250.
148 Discussions of the refinement of the technique can be found in Fisher, R.P., Geiselman, R.E., 
Raymond, D.S., Jurkevich, L.M., and Warhaftig, M.L., "Enhancing enhanced eyewitness memory: Refining the 
cognitive interview" (1987) 15 Journal of Police Science and Administration 291-297; and in Fisher, McCauley 
and Geiselman (1994), ibid.
149 Fisher, McCauley and Geiselman (1994), ibid., 261. According to the authors, it is thought that the 
cognitive interview provides access only to verbal information, rather than pictorial information. As such, the 
cognitive interview technique appears to be rather limited with regard to eyewitnesses to crime, being useful 
only at the stage where a verbal description is given.
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In general, reinstating context and using context cues have the greatest effect where memory for 
the main element of the event is poor. By contrast, where memory for the main element is clear
and complete, context cues will not serve to enhance memory to any great degree. 150 In terms 
of eyewitness identification, this suggests that where a witness is fairly clear on the appearance 
of the original offender, there will be no advantage to be gained by the use of context cues. The 
witness will not enhance her recognition ability through using context cues unless there has 
been some other factor at work, such as weapon focus, which prevents clear memory for the
appearance of the offender. 151 However, where memory is poor (for instance where there has 
been a long retention interval or where the original viewing time was short), the greater the 
number of context cues, the more likely it is that the memory for an event will be activated, 
working along associations and links. Correct recollection and recognition may therefore be 
enhanced.
It has been shown that much of the general theory and experimentation on the way the memory 
works is relevant to the specific case of eyewitness testimony. In wishing to expand the level of 
knowledge about the process of eyewitness identification, a wide range of research has been 
conducted about identification procedures. These suggest that it is not only the limitations of 
memory and information processing which may be at fault when eyewitnesses are inaccurate. 
The methods employed by the criminal justice process to extract information from eyewitnesses 
can also exacerbate the problem. For example, a witness statement recalling events and 
descriptions is often followed by a recognition test, because verbal recall descriptions do not 
usually give sufficient information to say whether or not the suspect is the offender. 
Recognition tests therefore serve to uncover information from memory that was not available in
recall. 152 But recognition may also create inaccuracies in eyewitness evidence. At the heart of
150 Krafka and Penrod (1985), ibid.
151 This was illustrated by Cutler and Penrod (1988) op.cit., where enriched information was most effective 
in instances where the target had been disguised or had had a weapon, so that encoding of appearance was 
disrupted.
152 Wells, G.L., Seelau, E.P., Rydell, S.M., and Luus, C.A.E., "Recommendations for properly conductcxi 
eyewitness identification tasks", in Ross, Read and Toglia (eds) (1994) op.cit., 223-244, 225.
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the psychological findings discussed below is the desire to minimise the likelihood of mistaken 
identifications and maximise correct identifications.
Psychological Experimentation on Identification Procedures
In this section, the results of experiments on the dangers and best practice of identification 
techniques are reviewed. Many of the experiments attempt to yield forensically relevant results. 
In examining the body of literature on identification procedures, a number of main areas have
been chosen, and these tend to focus on identification parades and "system variables". 153 
System variables are those variables which are open to manipulation by those involved in the
identification procedure. 154 Some of the factors contained in the broad band of "estimator 
variables" were discussed above. These are variables which are not open to manipulation, such 
as stress, weapon focus, the type of incident viewed.
At the basis of psychological experimentation on identification procedures is the assumption 
that an identification should have the following characteristics: ] 55
1. It must be based on the contents of the witness' memory of the initial 
observation of the offence.
2. Accidental similarities between the attributes of the offender and the suspect 
must not be allowed to determine whether an identification will be made.
3. Information about the identity of the police suspect or the choice favoured by 
others must not be available to the witness.
4. Influences on the witness to make or not make an identification must be 
minimized.
Experimental manipulation attempts to present the best way to achieve these characteristics in a 
real life setting. Where the characteristics are not present, the risk of mistaken identification is 
increased.
153 As with the discussion of memory theory above, the available body of literature is so broad that an 
examination of all possible areas would result in a thesis of its own. It is therefore proposed to explore a 
representative sample of the work on the most forensically relevant aspects of psychological experimentation on 
identification procedures.
154 See Wells, G.L., "Applied eyewitness testimony research: System variables and estimator variables"
(1978) 36 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1546-1557; and Cutler, Penrod and Martens (1987a)
op.cit.
155 Koehnken, G., Malpass, R.S., and Wogalter, M.S., "Forensic application of lineup research" in
Sporer, Malpass and Kohnken (eds) (1996)op.cit., 205-232, 207. Code of Practice D attempts to address some of
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Bearing the above characteristics in mind, it is thought that misidentifications will have at their
root one of three main causes. 156 Firstly, the witness may choose the suspect by chance, 
where any other parade member was as likely to be chosen. Second, a misidentification may 
result from any of the factors already discussed, such as post-event information or unconscious 
transference. The organiser of an identification procedure is most likely to be unaware that such 
factors are at work and would be powerless to alter their effect. Finally, misidentifications may 
occur where the system is at fault, so that the parade procedure or composition leads a witness 
to choose a suspect even where the suspect is not the offender. This examination concentrates 
on those experiments concerning identification procedures, because it is with regard to the 
conduct of procedures that the integrity principle can be furthered most. The integrity of the 
system will be improved by ensuring that officers follow the fairest practice possible. Offering 
a high level of protection to the suspect by incorporating the practices which, according to 
psychological theory, act to minimise the risk of misidentification also ensures that the integrity 
principle can be furthered in the area of eyewitness identification.
(i) Instructions and the use of relative judgment
One criticism of the use of identification parades is that they do no more than show that the
person chosen looks more like the offender than anyone else present. Many psychologists
believe that witnesses use a relative judgment process, 157 whereby they choose the parade 
member who most resembles their memory relative to the other parade members. Where the 
suspect is the offender, relative judgment will work well as a device to aid identification. 
However, if witnesses use relative judgment where the offender is not on the identification 
parade, then there is a risk that the innocent suspect could be identified. Where there are no 
breaches of Code of Practice D, such a suspect could then be wrongfully convicted. Relative
these issues, such as Annex A: 12, which, for example, prevents a witness seeing a suspect before the 
identification parade commences.
156 Koehnken, Malpass and Wogalter (1996), ibid., 208.
157 See Wells, G.L., "The psychology of lineup identifications" (1984) 14 Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology 89-103; and Luus, C.A.E., and Wells, G.L., "Eyewitness identification and the selection of 
distractors for lineups" (1991) 15 Law and Human Behavior 43-57.
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judgment is based on the saliency of the details encoded by witnesses. Where an innocent 
suspect shares salient features with an offender and other parade members do not, then it is 
likely that the suspect will be chosen. This is because, in comparison to everyone else on the 
parade, the suspect most resembles the offender. In other words, where relative judgment is at 
work, it is not the absolute similarity of the suspect to the offender which is important but the 
relative similarity of that suspect when compared with other parade members. If relative 
judgments are made, then a parade will not be fulfilling its proper function, where "a lineup
should be a test of the witness's memory, not a test of the witness's deductive reasoning." 158
The problem of chance errors being made by witnesses may also occur where they feel under 
pressure to choose if their memory for the offender is poor. Witnesses may not want to let the 
police down when effort has been made to organise an identification procedure. They may have 
a vested interest in obtaining a conviction (for example where they are the victims of the crime),
or believe that suspects are not asked to attend a parade unless they are guilty. 159 Where such 
pressures are at work, witnesses may view a no choice response as a failure and make a guess. 
It is most likely that they will trawl what memory they have of the offender and choose the
person who most resembles that memory. 160 When considering the pressures on 
eyewitnesses, Buckhout et al. stated that:
"our feeling is that the lineup itself, with its formality, its authority figures, and 
its potential for reinforcing the witness and the police for 'solving a case',
encourages identifications, mistaken or not." 16 '
One method of limiting relative judgments, which has been tested quite extensively by 
psychologists, is that of informing witnesses that it is acceptable to make a no choice decision. 
The easiest way to do this is to state that the offender may or may not be present on the parade.
This is part of current police procedure. 162 A biased instruction is one where witnesses are not
158 Luus and Wells (1991), ibid., 45.
159 This is sometimes termed the culprit -present fallacy, which makes a relative judgment more likely: see 
Wells, Seelau, Rydell and Luus (1994) op.cit.; Malpass and Devine (198la) op.cit.; and Wells (1984), op.cit.
160 See chapter 5 of this thesis, where witnesses interviewed in Birmingham Identification Suite were 
shown to have a tendency to guess, most often choosing between two or three individuals.
161 Buckhout, Alper, Chem, Silverberg and Slomovits (1974) op.cit, 192.
162 Code of Practice D, Annex A: 14.
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told that the suspect may not be present, thereby confirming any pressure to choose. The 
majority of experiments found that relative judgments are not eliminated when unbiased
instructions are given, 163 but that they are reduced where the offender is not present on the 
parade. 164 These experiments suggest that unbiased instructions reduce the rate of mistaken 
identifications, and that the provisions in Code D offer a valuable method of reducing the
pressure witnesses may feel to make an identification. 165
The problem of relative judgment can therefore be offset to some degree by careful instructions 
to witnesses before they view an identification procedure. In their search for explanations of the 
relative judgment effect, psychologists have also looked at system variables and their effect on 
identification procedures. The ways in which the construction of an identification parade or 
photo array vary have been found to affect the likelihood of mistaken identifications.
fit) A carrot in a bunch of bananas? ] 6 6
163 See Wells, G.L., "What do we know about eyewitness identification?" (1993) 48 American 
Psychologist 553-571.
164 One of the first experiments dealing with biased instructions was that by Malpass and Devine (198 la), 
op.cit. In the study, Malpass and Devine reasoned that biased instructions would be most detrimental where the 
suspect resembled, but was not the perpetrator. They staged a crime, an act of vandalism, in front of 350 
students. One hundred students were then split into four groups. One group saw a parade where the offender was 
present and they received biased instructions, a second group where the offender was present but with unbiased 
instructions. The other two groups viewed a parade where the offender was absent, one with biased and the other 
with unbiased instructions. Biased instructions increased positive identifications where the offender was present, 
but did not increase accuracy. The most striking result did indeed come from the offender-absent conditions, 
where 78% of those receiving biased instructions made a false-positive identification, as opposed to 33% of 
those receiving unbiased instructions.
165 For example, see Buckhout, R., Figueroa, D., and Hoff, E., "Eyewitness identification: Effects of 
suggestion and bias in identification from photographs" (1975) 6 Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 71-74; 
Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke and Martens (1986) op.cit.; Cutler, Penrod and Martens (1987a and 1987b) op.cit.; 
O'Rourke, T.E., Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., and Stuve, T.E., "The external validity of eyewitness identification 
research: Generalizing across subject populations" (1989) 13 Law and Human Behavior 385-395; and Wamick 
and Sanders (1980) op.cit.
Koehnken, G., and Maass,A., "Eyewitness testimony: False alarms on biased instructions?" (1988) 73 Journal 
of Applied Psychology 363-370 asked whether results from previous experiments were reliable, as all crimes 
were staged so that witnesses knew that they were not in a real-crime situation, making them less likely to be 
cautious. However, Koehnken and Maass's results can themselves be criticised (see Cutler and Penrod (1995) 
op.cit., chapter 8). Whilst the effects of biased instructions may to be greater for real than staged crimes, they are 
still an important factor in relative judgments leading to mistaken identifications: see Paley, B., and Geiselman, 
R.E., "The effects of alternative photospread instructions on suspect identification performance" (1989) 7 
American Journal of Forensic Psychology 3-13. For a summary of die results of the main studies on the effect 
of biased instructions in identification procedures, see Cutler and Penrod (1995) op.cit., Table 8.1, 122.
166 Foot, P., Who Killed Hanratty? (1971, London: Jonathan Cape), a reference by an eyewitness to James 
Hanratty on his identification parade.
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Psychologists have conducted many experiments which investigate ways of improving the ratio 
of accurate identifications to false identifications. This is usually referred to as increasing the 
"diagnosticity" of identification procedures. In England and Wales, for example, a parade is 
fair where the probability that a person who did not witness the crime will choose the suspect is 
one in nine. 167 This probability ratio would occur where all volunteers were sufficiently similar 
in appearance to the suspect.
According to the majority of studies, the key to an assessment of fairness is that parade 
members will be similar in appearance to the suspect and also to the description of the offender. 
Without such similarity, the parade would not be fair. This is where the functional and nominal
size of an identification parade become important. 168 For example, where a suspect is placed 
on a parade with eight other people, nine is the nominal size of the parade. 169 If the volunteers
are not sufficiently similar to the suspect, then experimental results 170 suggest that the suspect 
would be as well served by a smaller parade size. It is functional size which is the crucial 
factor. Increasing the number of volunteers who are unlike the suspect or the description would 
mean that they could be immediately rejected by someone who was not a witness to the 
offence. No purpose would be served because the extra volunteers would merely be filling in 
spaces without increasing the real, or functional, size. Where a parade has a good functional 
size (and so is fair), then mock 171 witnesses would make choices which were fairly evenly
167 Psychological litersture suggests that there should be at least five "distractors" or volunteers on every 
parade: Wells, Seelau, Rydell and Luus, op.cit.,229. Some researchers believe that five volunteers is the 
optimum number, and that an increased number above this are not effective in reducing the likelihood of an 
inaccurate identification: Luus and Wells (1991), op.cit.; Wells, G., and Lindsay, R., "On Estimating the 
Diagnosticity of Eyewitness Non-identifications", (1980) 88 Psychological Bulletin 776. There is potential in 
this finding for the Police service to save time and money by cutting the size of parades from nine to six. 
However, greater research on the topic would be needed before a change in procedure is warranted.
168 Whilst there is a wealth of literature on all aspects of diagnosticity of identification parades, the 
experimental literature on functional and nominal size is comparatively small.
169 Some experiments have shown that accurate identifications will mainly occur where the suspect is 
chosen from a large pool: for example Cutler, Penrod and Martens (1987b) op.cit.; and Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke 
and Martens (1986) op.cit.
170 For example, see Nosworthy, G.J., and Lindsay, R.C.L., "Does nominal lineup size matter?" (1990) 
75 Journal of Applied Psychology 358-361; Lindsay, R.C.L., and Wells, G.L., "What price justice? Exploring 
the relationship of lineup fairness to identification accuracy." (1980) 4 Law and Human Behavior 303-314; and 
Wells (1993) op.cit.
171 People who were not witnesses to the event but are asked to view the identification parade are termed 
mock-witnesses in the psychological literature.
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spread across the whole parade, because all parade members would be similar in appearance. 172
Whether or not this occurs is one way of assessing the functional size of any parade. 173 
However, it is unrealistic for psychologists to expect police officers to arrange a parade and 
then assemble non-witnesses to aid in an assessment of functional size. Bearing in mind the 
number of parades conducted every day, and the time consuming nature of arranging
identification procedures for all involved, 174 assessing functional size along the lines suggested 
by psychologists would be an almost impossible task.
However, a fair parade is of prime importance. 175 For example, a study by Lindsay and
Wells 176 illustrated how a suspect who was similar in appearance to the offender could easily 
be the victim of mistaken identification. In identification tests where the offender was absent, 
Lindsay and Wells substituted someone who was either similar to the rest of the parade or 
someone who stood out. Where there was a difference in appearance between the substitute and 
the other parade members, 70 per cent identified him. By contrast, 31 per cent identified the 
substitute when he was similar in appearance to other parade members. More recent studies 
have suggested that parades should not be constructed on the basis of the similarity of 
volunteers to the suspect alone, but that similarity to the original description of the witness
should also be considered. 177 There is some concern that matching volunteers to the suspect 
will create "clones" as there is no specification as to the extent to which volunteers should be
172 Parade members should be similar with regard to the important, or "salient" features remembered by the 
witness.
173 See Malpass, R.S., and Devine, P.O., "Measuring the fairness of eyewitness identification lineups" in 
Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford (eds) (1983) op.cit., 81-102; and Wells, G.L., Leippe, M.R., and Ostrom, T.M., 
"Guidelines for empirically assessing the fairness of a lineup" (1979) 3 Law and Human Behavior 285-293.
174 See chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis.
175 See Lindsay, R.C.L., "Biased lineups: Where do they come from?" in Ross, Read and Toglia (eds) 
(1994) op.cit., 182-200; Buckhout, R., Rabinowitz, M., Alfonso, V., Kanellis, D., and Anderson, J., 
"Empirical assessment of lineups: Getting down to cases" (1988) 12 Law and Human Behavior 323-331; Navon, 
D., "How critical is the accuracy of an eyewitness memory? Another look at the issue of lineup diagnosticity" 
(1990) 75 Journal of Applied Psychology 506-510; Wells, G.L., and Luus, C.A.E., "Police lineups as 
experiments: Social methodology as a framework for properly conducted lineups" (1990) 16 Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin 106-117; and Brigham, J.C., and Pfeifer, J.E., "Evaluating the fairness of lineups" 
(1994) in Ross, Read and Toglia (eds), op.cit., 201-222.
176 Lindsay and Wells (1980), op.cit.
177 See Wells and Luus (1990) op.cit.; and Luus and Wells (1991) op.cit.
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similar to the suspect. 178 It is submitted that this concern is a rather unrealistic one, given the 
problems in rinding volunteers of sufficient similarity for identification parades in the United 
Kingdom. 179 There is a more realistic concern that any features witnesses did not recall when 
giving their descriptions will be shared by a number of volunteers, and it is those very features 
which are likely to trigger recognition at the identification parade. 180 This would make the 
witnesses' task much more difficult. However, the main problem with the "match to 
description" method of constructing identification parades is that the suspect may not be similar 
to the description given by witnesses. Any identification parade which followed match to 
description guidelines would be unfair to the suspect, who would stand out from all other 
parade members. It has been suggested that the best alternative is to construct an identification 
parade where the volunteers are both similar to the features of the suspect and the description 
given by the witness. Where the suspect is unlike the description, the volunteers should be
chosen for similarity to the suspect.' 8 ] This appears to achieve nothing better than the method 
currently employed, and would certainly involve practical difficulties for police officers charged 
with finding volunteers for an identification parade. 182
(iii) Are fairness and accuracy affected by identification test methods?
As well as looking at the size and potential bias involved in the construction of an identification
parade, psychologists have explored increasing diagnosticity through the use of alternative
178 In matching volunteers to the witness' description of the offender, there is a finite number of features. 
The "matching" stops when all features mentioned in the description have been considered.
179 In observing well over one hundred identification parades in the West Midlands, the author did not come 
across one where the volunteers could have been described as anything close to "clones" of the suspect.
180 An identification parade is designed to provide witnesses with "triggers", in the hope that they may 
recognise features which were not recalled when describing the offender. If the volunteers are chosen for 
similarity to the suspect, rather than the original description, the witnesses' task will be made more difficult, 
because several volunteers may share the features not recalled at the time of the description.
181 Mayer, C., "Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Based on Pre-trial Photographic 
Arrays", (1994) 13 Pace Law Review 815. See also Koehnken, Malpass and Wogalter (1996), op.cit., 215; and 
Doob,A.N., and Kirschenbaum, H.M., "Bias in police lineups: Partial remembering" (1973) 1 Journal of Police 
Science and Administration 287-293.
182 It is unclear when a suspect could be said to be dissimilar to a description. The police would have to 
decide when a suspect is sufficiently dissimilar to description to warrant matching volunteers to the appearance 
of the suspect. Deciding on cut-off points and considering two sets of criteria for similarity of volunteers would 
put extra pressure on police officers who already find difficulty in constructing fair identification parades. This 
would be compounded where there was more than one witness and they had given descriptions which differed 
greatly. Different parades would need to be constructed for each witness, making for a lengthy and expensive 
process. Use of video libraries for identification procedures would offset these concerns to some degree: see the 
discussion in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
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methods of testing eyewitness recognition accuracy. Although the use of instructions which 
allow witnesses to feel comfortable making no choice have been shown to reduce the use of 
relative judgment where the suspect is not the offender, no instructions could ever completely 
eliminate the effect, because witnesses will understandably assume that police officers would 
not take the trouble to organise an identification procedure unless they are sure that the offender 
is present. Even without any bias on the part of the police, the assumption that the offender is 
on the parade will lead to an increased tendency to guess.
Psychologists have approached the relative judgment problem from a number of angles. As 
well as examining the effect of instructions on witnesses' choosing patterns, they have 
explored alternative methods of presentation from the traditional identification parade. One 
method, used widely as an experimental technique, is what is known as a "blank" parade,
where the suspect is not present.' 8 3 The theory is that, where witnesses use relative judgment 
and have poor memory for the appearance of the offender, they will choose someone from the 
blank parade. This will be evidence that they will be more likely to choose falsely, at random, 
from any parade where the suspect is present. It seems likely, then, that the use of blank 
parades allows for some kind of assessment of the reliability of witnesses who positively
identified the suspect. 184 The procedure works well on an experimental level. However, its 
implementation into police procedure would create more problems than it would solve. For 
example, if the blank parade was routinely shown as a first parade to witnesses, it would soon 
be common knowledge and any benefit would be eroded. The use of blank parades would also 
result in even more time consuming identification procedures, because two parades, not one, 
would have to be organised. The implications of running two parades are widespread: police 
officers would have to find twice as many volunteers, where finding enough for one parade is
183 See Wells (1984) op.cit., where the blank parade procedure was tested. Where the suspect was absent in 
both the first and second parades, witnesses who chose from the first parade were twice as likely to choose from 
the second parade than were witnesses who made no choice on the first test (55.6 per cent:23.3 per cent). Where 
a blank parade was followed by a parade where the suspect was present, 33 per cent of witnesses who had 
mistakenly identified from die blank parade correctly identified the suspect at the later one. This was much lower 
than die 60% who made a correct identification where Uiey had earlier made no choice.
184 Lefcourt, G., "The blank lineup: An aid to the defense" (1978) 14 Criminal Law Bulletin 428-432 
outlines the advantages for defence counsel were blank parades in use.
6 1
often a hard task; all volunteers would still have to be paid, increasing the expense of running 
an identification procedure; the stress and anxiety witnesses often suffer would be 
unnecessarily increased; and because more time would be taken for each parade, waiting times 
for a parade to be scheduled would be increased.
In recognition of the practical problems involved in the use of blank parades, psychologists 
have considered alternative methods of presentation. Some have called for the use of two 
modes of representation, so that more than one of the senses was used, such as sight and
sound. 185 The proposal which has gained most support, however, is that of the sequential
parade, 186 where parade members are shown to witnesses one by one rather than in a 
simultaneous line. Witnesses are not told how many people or photographs they will see, and 
so relative judgment is reduced. Each member of the parade must be considered by witnesses 
on the spot, so that no comparisons are made. Once witnesses pass over a parade member, they 
cannot go back after a comparison with the people they are shown later in the parade.
Studies show that the sequential presentation of an identification parade reduces the number of 
false identifications made where the suspect is absent, but does not affect the correct 
identification rate of witnesses where the suspect is present. For example, in Lindsay and 
Wells' study in 1985, the number of correct identifications made where the suspect was present 
did not differ greatly between the simultaneous (58 per cent) and sequential (50 per cent) 
parades, but significant differences resulted where the suspect was absent on the parade. Where 
witnesses viewed the suspect-absent parade simultaneously, 48 per cent incorrectly identified 
the suspect's replacement. Where viewing was sequential, only 17 per cent identified the
suspect's replacement. These results, confirmed in follow-up studies, 187 suggest that relative 
judgment is greatly reduced where parade members are presented sequentially.
185 Melara, R.D., DeWitt-Rickards, T.S., and O'Brien, T.P., "Enhancing lineup identification accuracy: 
Two codes are better than one" (1989) 74 Journal of Applied Psychology 706-713.
186 As proposed by Lindsay, R.C.L., and Wells, G.L., "Improving eyewitness identification from lineups: 
Simultaneous versus sequential lineup presentation" (1985) 1Q Journal of Applied Psychology 556-564.
187 For example, Lindsay, R.C.L., Lea, J.A., and Fulford, J.A., "Sequential lineup presentation: Technique 
matters" (1991) 76 Journal of Applied Psychology 741-745; Lindsay, R.C.L., Lea, J.A., Nosworthy, G.J.,
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That witness are ignorant of the size of the parade is an important factor in sequential 
presentation, because otherwise they may have a tendency to choose close to being shown the 
last parade member, knowing that they are running out of choices. However, if witnesses were 
not told how many people would be in the parade, then there would be no standard police 
procedure regarding parade size. Whilst it has been shown that the nominal size of a parade is 
unimportant if the functional size is low, regulation of police practice is imperative in the 
interests of fairness to suspects.
Whilst this thesis concentrates on the role of identification parades, many of the experiments 
already reviewed (such as that by Lindsay and Wells on sequential presentation), use 
photoarrays (where a number of photographs are presented to witnesses) rather than live 
parades. As well as manipulating the medium of the identification parade, there has also been
some work on which is the better medium: live or photographic. 188 In Dent and Gray's
study 189 for example, using full length colour slides or a live parade significantly affected how 
often witnesses made a choice. They found that there was a significantly higher rate of correct 
identifications made with the slides. Dent and Gray concluded that the live parade inhibits 
witnesses from making a choice because they feel apprehensive when confronted with the 
offender. Egan, Pittner and Goldstein also found that more identifications were made when
using photographs, but that they were more likely to be incorrect. 190 The restriction of the use
Fulford, J.A., Hector, J., LeVan, V., and Seabrook,C., "Biased lineups: Sequential presentation reduces the 
problem" (1991) Journal of Applied Psychology 796; and Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, S.D., "Improving the 
reliability of eyewitness identification: Lineup construction and presentation" (1988b) 73 Journal of Applied 
Psychology 281-290. For a comparison of mean results from several studies, see Cutler and Penrod (1995) 
op.cit., Table 8.3, 134.
188 Many studies have compared different modes of representation: for example, Davies, G.M., Ellis, H.D., 
and Shepherd, J., "Face recognition accuracy as a function of mode of representation" (1978) 63 Journal of 
Applied Psychology 180-187, looked at the results yielded by line drawings and photographs. They found that 
photographs were significantly more effective in recognition tests than line drawings, which in turn were more 
effective than outlines. These results were used by Davies, Ellis and Shepherd in their recommendations for the 
development of computer-based face reconstruction systems. Psychologists have also investigated the usefulness 
and reliability of other identification test media. For example, the same researchers tested the efficiency of Photo- 
fit. They found that witnesses' ability to construct a good likeness was very limited.
189 Dent, H., and Gray, F., "Identification on Parade" (1975) 1 New Behaviour 366-369.
190 As did Hilgendorf and Irving's (1978) study (Hilgendorf, E.F., and Irving, B.L., " False positive 
identification" (1978) 18 Medicine, Science and the Law 255-262) whose findings were consistent with Dent and
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of photographs was recommended, especially where they preceded a live parade, stating 
that: 191
"The photographic identification procedure...has to be employed with extreme 
caution because its use can set the stage for a series of interlocking errors 
beginning with a witness who is 'positive1 that the face in the mug book is the 
culprit followed by another 'positive1 identification of a live person. Since the 
first judgment has some error associated with it, the second judgment may well 
be nothing more than a confirmation of the mug book identification."
Most of the experiments discussed in this section were conducted before the PACE Codes of 
Practice were implemented. Therefore, the experimental results hold for a time when there was 
no standard police procedure, and where live parades almost always involved a witness being 
in the same room as the suspect. One-way screens are now used in most police forces in 
England and Wales, and they can reduce the apprehension that witnesses presented with a live 
parade may feel. In addition, more recent studies have shown less of a disparity in the 
reliability of different identification methods. For example, Cutler et al., in a review of recent
literature, found that:' 92
"there is no reason to believe that live lineups, videotaped lineups, or 
photoarrays produce substantial differences in identification 
performance...given the apparent comparability of live lineups and photoarrays, 
it is not worth the trouble and expense to use live lineups."
Videotaped parades have also been the subject of much interest in recent years. 193 Whilst 
Cutler et al. concluded that these do not have any advantage over live representation of parade 
members, it may be that further research is warranted. The studies conducted so far have used 
basic equipment and technicians who are unskilled. It is possible that future experiments will 
find that there is increased accuracy when using videotaped lineups. This is simply because 
sophisticated equipment offers a chance to manipulate parades in a way that cannot be achieved 
when they are live. Slow motion movement, pausing on a specific frame, or blowing up
Gray's ideas. Hilgendorf and Irving concluded that more false positive identifications arose where photographs 
were used, and recommended the restriction of their use.
191 Egan, Pittner and Goldstein (1977) op.cit., 205.
192 Cutler, B.L., Berman, G.L., Penrod, S., and Fisher, R.P., "Conceptual, practical and empirical issues 
associated with eyewitness identification test media" in Ross, Read and Toglia (1994) op.cit, 163-181, 181. It 
should be noted that a photoarray alone is different from showing photographs followed by an identification 
parade. A photoarray is a single identification test comparable to a live parade. Where photographs are followed 
by a live parade, the problem of compounding any errors remains: see Code D2.15(viii) and Annex D.
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particular features on screen could all add to the image given to a witness. Video-libraries are 
cheaper and simpler than live parades, easing the difficulty in finding suitable volunteers. In 
addition, whilst stress has been reduced with the introduction of one-way screens, some
witnesses are still very nervous about the prospect of meeting the offender face to face. 194 A 
video- taped parade could solve this problem.
Psychological experiments suggest that there are ways in which the identification process could 
be improved. They also highlight the fact that mistaken identifications will not necessarily occur 
simply because the witness has a poor memory of the offender. The way in which a procedure 
is run can also affect the accuracy of any identification made.
Are Experimental Findings Forensicallv Relevant?
Although psychological research has offered much to law in the area of eyewitness 
identification, the findings should not be accepted without entering into a consideration of the 
limitations of psychological research, such as the predominance of laboratory type 
experimentation and the impracticality of some suggestions by psychologists. It may be that the 
concentration of psychological experimentation in laboratory and simulation studies could bar 
its acceptance as expert evidence in a criminal trial, or as a reform option in police procedure. 
There are a number of problems involved in attempting to extrapolate from psychological 
studies to "real-life" situations. For example, ethical standards will prevent any absolute re- 
creation of a violent criminal offence. The justification for risking the traumatisation of 
witnesses, in order to gain experimental results, would be hard to find.
It has been illustrated in this chapter that psychology has expanded knowledge of the way in 
which the memory works and how the procedural system of parades can affect the reliability of
193 Examples can be found in Cutler, B.L., and Fisher, R.P., "Live lineups, video-taped lineups, and phot 
arrays" (1990) 3 Forensic Reports 439-448; and Cutler, B.L., Fisher, R.P., and Chicvara, C.L., "Eyewitness 
identification from live versus videotaped lineups" (1989) 2 Forensic Reports 93-106.
194 See chapter 5 of this thesis.
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eyewitness identification. But it is arguable that gaining knowledge is not enough: it should be 
able to aid fairness within the criminal justice process, or at least be applicable in a "real world" 
situation. If the results of psychological experimentation can do neither of these things, then its 
practical use is very slight indeed. The question posed here is whether knowledge gained from 
psychological experiments can ever serve a practical legal purpose, and if so, how.
It has been said that "society has nowhere else to turn for guidance and direction than to the 
social sciences in general and psychology in particular". 195 Whilst this claim exaggerates the 
importance of psychology to criminal justice, much of the experimentation carried out in 
psychology has relevance to a field of law, and has the potential for practical application. As 
Lloyd-Bostock states, 196
"[R]esearch in perception and memory applies to questions about the reliability 
of witnesses; research in decision-making to sentencing; physiological 
psychology to lie detection; child psychology to cases involving children; and 
social psychology to courtroom processes, legal skills, and the questioning of 
witnesses and suspects."
However, there are a number of barriers standing in the way of true practicality, some of which 
are simply due to the differing natures of law and psychology as disciplines. It will be argued 
that they start from isolated perspectives and often have very different aims in mind. This 
prevents true understanding and may be a bar to using psychological information most 
effectively.
One of the barriers to practical application of psychological research in legal settings is that of 
the experimental method. A function of the method is to isolate particular variables and test 
them to the exclusion of any other factors. This allows the psychologist to gain knowledge of 
the effect of a small number of variables and to gain confidence that a particular variable does a 
particular thing in a defined setting. Whilst it is useful for lawyers to know that, for example, 
stress may have an effect on eyewitness accuracy following the Yerkes-Dodson curve, this 
alone does not help the court to decide on the accuracy of a particular eyewitness. Too many 
other factors, such as the identification procedure, the retention interval, the effect of any post-
195 Deese, J., Psychology* as Science and Art (1972, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York), 107.
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event information, and the witness' innate level of ability also play their part in determining 
accuracy. The point is that psychological experiments can tell us that a particular factor 
increases or decreases likely accuracy in isolation, but the combination of factors are often too 
complex to reach a definite conclusion. In addition, there are instances where psychology does 
not give a firm conclusion on even a single, isolated variable. An example here would be the 
existence of a confidence-accuracy relationship in eyewitness cases.
The limitation of the experimental method 197 illustrates the differing aims of psychology and 
law. The law needs a complete picture for each individual case, or at least a strong indication of 
the effect of certain factors when they appear in a particular combination. The indication could 
then be weighed with other evidence, bearing in mind the differing abilities of recognition we 
all have. This would leave a fairly high degree of uncertainty, but would probably be enough to 
warrant the label of "helpfulness" for the jury. In contrast to the law's requirement of certainty, 
psychologists can accept a trend as being statistically significant and require no more. Much 
experimentation is completed to further psychological theory on perception or cognition, and 
knowledge of the effect of one variable can add much to theory. To apply experimental results 
to individual and complex cases involves speculation, because it is likely that the particular 
combination of factors has never been tested in the laboratory or in a field setting. If the number 
of factors commonly present in actual criminal cases were used for experimental purposes, then 
little could be ascertained about the effect of each individual factor. Years of experimentation 
would be needed in order to build up a knowledge base of how each variable reacts with 
others. And even then, the unknown of individual ability in eyewitness identification tasks 
would still be an issue.
A useful illustration of these difficulties is offered by Rabbitt, 198 who describes reaction-time 
experiments. These at first seemed simple, involving finger flexions in response to single
196 Lloyd-Bostock,S., Law in Practice (1988, London: British Psychological Society and Routledge ), 140.
197 For a discussion of the inappropriateness of the experimental method for psychology, and its 
limitations, see King, M., Psychology In and Out of Court (1986, Oxford: Pergamon), pp. 21-25 and 28-44.
198 Rabbitt, P., "Applying Human Experimental Psychology to Legal Questions about Evidence", in S. 
Lloyd-Bostock, Psychology' in Legal Contexts (1981, London: Macmillan), chapter 1.
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signals. However, work began in the area over 100 years ago and has uncovered a number of 
contradictions in human behaviour. Variables affect reaction times when tested singly, some 
have marked affect when in particular combinations, and others only independently of other 
variables. This work highlights the complexity of any human behaviour, even that which we 
think is simple or based on "common-sense" foundations, 199
"Faced with similar complexities in all the experimental tasks which they use, 
psychologists have adopted the standard scientific strategy of exploring the 
effects of changes in only one variable at a time, holding all others constant, 
proceeding eventually to test the effects of joint changes in two or more 
variables...The natural reaction of competent academic psychologists faced with 
a complex applied problem is to look for ways of restricting the focus of the 
investigation."
The needs of psychology and law can therefore be seen to be quite different: psychologists 
attempt to narrow down their field of enquiry, obtaining data which is relatively simple for 
them to apply to other experimentation and to current theory. However, lawyers need answers 
to questions about behaviour in complex situations, and data from experiments on one or two 
variables does little to aid in the search. To the contrary, the use of such experimental results 
could do harm: the simultaneous effect of changes in many variables could be completely 
different to the effect of each of the variables when investigated singly or in simple 
combinations. The danger lies in an expert witness offering confident and compelling evidence 
which is in fact misinformed or contains an inflated view of the ability to apply experimental 
results to real life situations. This danger, which stems from the differences between the two 
disciplines, lies at the heart of judicial reluctance to admit evidence of experimental results in 
fields such as memory, perception and cognition.
Despite the differing needs of psychology and law as disciplines, those conducting eyewitness 
identification research often do so because they feel that their work may200
"contribute to the solution of the practical problems of obtaining accurate 
criminal identifications, to assist legal fact-finders in evaluating eyewitness 
testimony, and to assist lawmakers in formulating procedures for developing 
valid eyewitness evidence."
199 Ibid., 5.
:o° Malpass, R.S., and Devine, P.O., "Realism and Eyewitness Identification Research", (1981 c) 4 Law 
and Human Behavior , 347. See also Konecni, V.J., and Ebbesen, E.B., "Courtroom Testimony by 
Psychologists on Eyewitness Identification Issues: Critical Notes and Reflections", (1986) 10 Law and Human 
Behavior 117-126 on the problems in enhancing the external validity of experimental results.
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This desire to help is, however, hampered by the use of the experimental method and also by 
the necessity to allow those taking part in experiments to know that the offence they witness is 
not real. This makes for identifications made without the pressure witnesses to real offences 
have on them: there will be no consequences for the "offender" or the witness as a result of an 
experimental identification parade or photo array. Many of the experiments which form the 
basis of psychological theory and recommendations on eyewitness identification did not 
involve subjects viewing a realistic crime occurring. Clifford has noted that "the assumed 
impotence of psychology in eyewitness cases stems not from a paucity of research but rather 
from a surfeit of inappropriate research".201
Because of the lack of realism of one degree or another, it is unsurprising that criminal justice 
professionals have viewed the results of experimentation with caution. In the words of Malpass 
and Devine, researchers in the area of eyewitness identification "have a deserved credibility 
problem".202 Although a greater number of experiments dealing with realistic events have been 
conducted since the time of Malpass and Devine's concern in 1981, the broad criticism that, 203
"Although we may have a great deal to say that is of relevance to the criminal 
justice system, the empirical base of our contribution is derived from studies that 
appear to only remotely reflect the conditions experienced by witnesses to actual 
criminal events",
continues to hold true. If experiments were truly realistic, then the control needed to gain 
reliable results would be lost. Ultimately, psychologists cannot reconstruct real criminal 
offences in their quest for knowledge and study.204 Experimental results offer useful insights 
into the workings of the human memory, but will never be able to give law definitive answers
201 Clifford, B., "Eyewitness Testimony: The Bridging of a Credibility Gap", in D.P. Farrington, K. 
Hawkins and S.M. Lloyd-Bostock (eds.) Psychology, Law and Legal Processes (1979, Macmillan , London), 
167-183, at 167.
202 Malpass and Devine, (1981c), op.cit., 348.
203 Ibid.
204 Yuille and Cutshall did manage to use a real crime to see whether experimental results were reliable. 
They interviewed twenty-one witnesses to a shooting and had access to police interview transcripts. Higher 
levels of accuracy were found than in experiments, but the incident was certainly unsual. Some useful points 
were noted, such as poor memory for peripheral detail showing no relationship with inaccuracy on salient 
details. Those with poor peripheral memory could still be accurate on important aspects of the case. See Yuille, 
J.C., and Cutshall, J.L., "A Case Study of Eyewitness Memory of a Crime", (1986) 71 Journal of Applied 
Psychology 291-301.
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on the reliability of individual eyewitnesses. 205
Despite the limitations of research findings, and the assertion of the Devlin Report206 that, in 
the area of eyewitness research, 207
".. .a gap exists between academic research into the powers of the human mind 
and the practical requirements of courts of law and the stage seems not yet to 
have been reached at which the conclusions of psychological research are 
sufficiently widely accepted or tailored to the needs of the judicial process to 
become the basis for procedural change",
it can be seen that the criminal justice system has utilised some of the ideas found in 
psychological theory. For example, Code of Practice D, used for eyewitness identification 
procedures, illustrates that experiments recommending the use of unbiased instructions have 
been taken on board (Code D, Annex A: 14), and the use of the Turnbull208 warning has its 
roots in experimentation showing that eyewitnesses can be mistaken especially where the initial 
viewing was brief, or in poor lighting. Other areas of law can be seen to apply psychological 
findings also, such as the existence of evidential rules against leading questions. Although 
lawyers may claim that such provisions are common sense, or that the findings cannot replace 
common sense,209 Yarmey is persuasive in his argument that: 2I °
"Applications of psychological theories and findings have a tendency to be 
adopted in due time in spite of the law's lack of awareness or resistance to 
accept, to utilise, or even to credit psychology for its contributions. What one 
generation of lawyers prefer to understand as "common sense" often depends 
upon the theory and findings of the previous generation of investigators."
The language of psychology and law may differ, but they are both disciplines who strive to 
understand and evaluate human behaviour. With this common aim in mind, they should learn 
what they can from each other, and have respect for the differences between them. Psychology 
does have much to offer law, but law should proceed with caution and with the knowledge that 
psychological research results on eyewitness testimony are indicative, not definitive.
205 Some psychologists claim that the problem of realism and external validity has been overplayed: see 
Goodman, J., and Loftus, E.F., "Judgment and memory: The Role of Expert Psychological Testimony on 
Eyeywitness Accuracy", in Suedfeld and Tatlock Psychology and Social Policy ( 1992, Hemisphere), 267-282, 
at 276.
206 Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on Evidence 
of Identification in Criminal Cases (1976, London HMSO)
207 Ibid., p.76.
208 [1976] 3 All E.R. 549
209 Stone, M., Proof of Fact in Criminal Trials (1984, Edinburgh: W.Green), 28.
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Conclusion
What has emerged very strongly from this discussion of psychological research on
identification procedures is that there is an identification accuracy problem. Wells2 '' claims that 
there are three observations which prove that a problem does exist. Firstly, a large number of
experiments which use simulated or staged crimes2 ' 2 have yielded results which show a high
number of false identifications.2 ' 3 Secondly, in most cases, the false identifications in these 
experiments were compounded by the witnesses confidently believing that they were correct.
This manifests itself in the considerable confidence felt by witnesses in their decisions.214 
Since the experiments show that there is little correlation between confidence and accuracy, the 
widely-held assumption that a confident witness should be believed must be questioned. 
Thirdly, a number of wrongful convictions have resulted directly from mistaken identification.
j
In other words, actual cases uphold psychological findings.2 ' 5 Psychological theory posits that 
human memory is not a reliable tool. There are potential problems at all three main stages: 
acquisition, retention and retrieval. The nature of memory is not stable: rather it is active, 
selective, and malleable; open to new (and often distorting) information.
The malleability of memory is evident in eyewitness testimony, both in witness descriptions 
and in recognition tests. How an event is witnessed, the stress involved, and even how the 
information is retrieved, can affect the accuracy of eyewitness evidence. Understanding of how 
eyewitness memory works is limited, and the sufficiency of current methods of informing the 
jury of the danger of convicting on eyewitness evidence alone will be questioned in the Chapter
210 Yarmey, A.D., The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony (1979, New York: Free Press), 227.
211 Wells (1993), op.cit.
212 Staged and simulated crimes are thought to be forensically more relevant than pure laboratory based 
experiments involving recognition tests.
213 There are many examples, including Brigham, Maass, Snyder and Spaulding (1982) op.cit.; Cutler, 
Penrod and Martens (1987a and 1987b) op.cit.; Ellis, Shepherd and Davies (1980) op.cit.; Leippe, Wells and 
Ostrom (1979) op.cit.; Wells, G.L., Lindsay, R.C.L., and Ferguson, T.J., "Accuracy, confidence and juror 
perceptions in eyewitness identification" (1979) (A Journal of Applied Psychology 440-448; Lindsay and Wells 
(1985) op.cit.; Loftus and Greene (1980) op.cit.
2M See, for example, Wells, G.L., and Murray, D.M., "Eyewitness confidence" in Wells and Lofrus (eds) 
(1984) op.cit., 155-170.
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seven. The advantages and drawbacks of suggestions to aid parade diagnosticity have shown 
that not all psychological remedies will be practical in the criminal justice setting. Experimental 
results can be misleading and limited in scope. The extent to which experimental results may 
aid knowledge about the unreliability of eyewitness evidence will be the focus of an 
examination, in Chapter eight, of the potential advantages to the use of expert evidence in cases 
involving identification testimony. What the more general discussion in this chapter illustrates 
is that the integrity principle can be aided by an understanding of the dangers of eyewitness 
identification. In particular, such understanding enables furtherance of the protective principle 
by the introduction of fair procedures to guard against the dangers of misidentification and 
consequent wrongful conviction.
215 See texts such as Foot (1971) op.cit.; Cole, P., and Pringle, P., Can vou positively identify this man? 
(1974 London: Deutsch); andBrandon, R., and Davies, C., Wrongful Imprisonment (1973 London: Alien and 
Unwin).
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CHAPTER THREE
COLLECTING IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE: THE PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF IDENTIFICATION PARADES
Introduction
The development of identification procedures began at the rum of the twentieth century and 
they are still evolving today. Major changes have occurred along the way, with the 
introduction of national guidelines in 1925, 1969 and 1984. The most recent changes in 
police procedure took place in April 1995 with an amended Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act ("PACE") Code of Practice D. 1 Until the turn of the century, the question of 
identification attracted little attention or concern. Parades were informal affairs and there 
were no national guidelines for police forces to follow. Many forces had no internal 
guidelines and left the conduct of identification procedures entirely to the discretion of 
individual officers. The use of an identification parade to gain evidence against a suspect 
had been common for a number of years2 . The method was seen as superior to 
confrontation, where a witness views only the suspect and is asked "is this the man?"; and 
to dock identifications, when witnesses view the suspect for the first time in court. Obvious 
bias exists in the use of both confrontation and dock identification, in the former because 
witnesses are not tested in their ability to distinguish the offender from other people and in 
the latter because it is clear that the person standing in the dock is the accused.
1 There have been subsequent amendments to other parts of the Codes of Practice, but not to Code 
D.
2 According to the Devlin Report 1976, para. 1.10, the identification parade was then already "well 
over a century old", and invented by the police (the first record of an identification parade was in a Police 
Order of 1860) after judicial criticism of direct confrontations: Report to the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department of the Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (1976 London: 
HMSO).
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This chapter examines the provisions of Code D, focussing on areas of difficulty and 
contention, such as the right to an identification parade and when the Code applies. There 
has been extensive judicial debate about whether an identification parade needs to be held 
after an informal identification has taken place and about when a suspect becomes "known" 
for the purposes of Code D. Fair procedures are particularly important where the evidence 
being gathered is susceptible to distortion, as in eyewitness identification cases. It is with 
regard to pre-trial procedures that the protective and disciplinary principles become 
paramount. The procedural rules in place throughout Code D offer a structure for the courts 
at any later proceeding both to enforce the disciplinary principle where there has been a 
major and/or intentional breach of the Code, and to ensure that the protective principle 
operates to exclude evidence where even a well-intentioned or innocent breach results in 
unfairness for the accused. Officers must avoid giving both verbal and non-verbal cues to 
witnesses and should ensure protection of the suspect's right to a fair procedure at all 
times. The outcome of an identification parade can affect decisions relating to arrest and 
whether an investigation is advanced and this chapter discusses those issues, and outlines 
the requirements placed on the police by the Code. Observations of police procedures are 
contained in Chapter 6, and the exercise of discretion under s.78 PACE is examined in 
Chapter 7.
Early attempts to regulate identification procedures
The first attempt at formulating common police practice on identification parades was a 
Police Circular in 1905, following the Beck Committee inquiry. In this circular, the rules 
for identification parades used in the Metropolitan Police District were commended to all 
Chief Constables. 3 However, the Circular was unofficial, and the first official guidelines 
came in the form of a Home Office Circular in 1925. This Circular was in effect an
See Devlin Report 1976, Appendix A, 158.
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expansion of the 1905 rules which had attempted to standardise police practice, reflecting 
the growing concern about misidentification.
An example of this arose with the case of a Horse Guards Officer, Major Sheppard, who 
was arrested for burglary, resulting from evidence obtained at an identification parade 
arranged late at night and in a hurry. The ability of the police to provide suitable volunteers 
in such circumstances was in doubt. A Home Office Inquiry4 resulted from "the moral 
indignation at the summary treatment this officer received from the police", 5 concluding 
that other suspects besides Major Sheppard must have been similarly treated. Reforms 
contained in the 1925 Circular, slightly amended in 1926, resulted from the Sheppard 
inquiry and the 1929 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures considered and 
published the amended guidelines as an appendix to its Report. 6
The main provisions contained in the 1925 guidelines are still reflected in current 
procedural rules. It was seen as "desirable" that arrangements for the identification parade 
be made by an officer other than the officer in charge of the case7 and that witnesses should 
not see the suspect before the parade or be assisted by photographs or descriptions of the 
suspect. A further provision was that witnesses be shown the parade singly and not be 
allowed to communicate with others still waiting to make an identification. 8
4 See The Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry on the Arrest of Major R.O. Sheppard DSO, RAOC 
(Cmnd2497) 1925.
5 Cole, P., andPringle, P., Can You Positively Identify This Man? (1974, London: Deutsch), 
p.168.
6 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, Cmnd 3297 1929.
7 Code of Practice D2.2, which provides that no officer involved in the case may take part in the 
procedures, reflects the 1925 guideline. However, unlike the current practice, it was acceptable in 1925 for 
the officer in charge of the case to be present at the identification parade.
8 The same provisions are contained in Code of Practice D, Annex A 12(i) - (iv).
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Suspects themselves were given certain rights, such as having a solicitor present during the 
parade,9 to raise objections to the conduct of the identification procedure, 10 choosing his or 
her own position in the line11 and being able to change position after each witness left. 12 
Perhaps the provision in the 1925 guidelines which had the most influence on future 
procedure, however, was that the accused should be placed among persons who as far as 
possible were of the same height, age, general appearance and position in life. This is 
almost identical to the requirement contained in Code of Practice D13 , excepting the crucial 
omission of any stipulation as to the number of members required to make up an acceptable 
identification parade. Without such a requirement, the system was open to abuse.
The guidelines were not mandatory, and differences of practice between police forces 
developed. Individual forces could pick and choose which of the guidelines to follow, 
resulting in a lack both of consistent procedures 14 and adverse consequences where police 
officers ignored the provisions. Much scope was left for interference with identification 
parades. 15 It can be assumed that at that time many parades took place which today would 
be regarded as highly prejudicial to the suspect. The 1925 guidelines, although reviewed in 
1929, were not amended or reviewed further until 1969, when the next major move to 
regulate police practice was made by the government.
9 This provision is currently contained in the Notice to the Suspect, Code D2.15 (iii), and Code D, 
Annex A 1.
10 This guideline is also contained in the current Code of Practice D, at Annex A 10. 
1 ' See Code of Practice D, Annex All.
12 Ibid.
13 Annex A 8.
14 The failure of Circulars and guidelines to prevent variations between (and within) forces can be 
seen in other areas of criminal justice also. For example, guidelines on cautioning made little difference to 
variable police practices: see Evans, R., and Wilkinson, C., "Variations in police cautioning policy and 
practice in England and Wales" (1990) 29 Howard Journal of CriminalJustice 155.
15 For example, it was probable that witnesses were often unduly influenced in making their choice 
from an identification parade. Suspects may have stood out due to obvious differences in dress or general 
appearance. A further source of influence was that witnesses could be told who the suspect was verbally or 
by someone "accidentally" pointing him or her out.
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By the 1960s it was clear that the 1925 guidelines had not been effective in preventing 
wrongful convictions and as a result concern regarding misidentification grew. The 
practical consequence of the existing rules had faded over the years, and the police service 
had adapted them to foster convenient working practice. This inevitably involved some 
disregard of recommended procedure. In 1964, the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
conducted an inquiry into the workings of the court system 16 , including the issue of 
eyewitness identification. However, before the Committee reported, a further memorandum 
concerning the conduct of identification parades was issued by the Home Office in 1969. 
This recognised the unease felt by both those involved in the criminal justice process and 
the general public regarding the reliability of eyewitness evidence. The government 
attempted to create a greater impact by placing a requirement of fairness at the beginning of 
the memorandum, which stated that, 17
1. The object of an identification parade is to make sure that the ability of the 
witness to recognise the suspect has been fairly and adequately tested.
2. Identification parades should be fair, and should be seen to be fair. Every 
precaution should be taken to see that they are so, and, in particular, to 
exclude any suspicion of unfairness or risk of erroneous identification 
through the witnesses' attention being directed specially to the suspected 
person instead of equally to all the persons paraded. (My emphasis)
It is noteworthy that the Home Office, when drafting the Circular, was anxious that 
identification parades should be "seen to be fair". This reflected government concern 
regarding the public perception of identification parades.
The provisions improved on the requirement in the 1925 Circular that the suspect should be 
placed in a line of people who were, as far as possible, of the same age, height, general 
appearance and position in life by recommending the minimum acceptable number of
16 Criminal Law Revision Committee Eleventh Report, Evidence (General), 1972. Cmnd 4991.
17 Home Office Circular No. 9/1969, paras. 1 and 2. The Circular was first published in a Home 
Office Circular to the police and was later issued as a pamphlet. To achieve wider circulation, it was
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volunteers for a fair parade. It was stipulated that where there was a single suspect there 
should be eight volunteers 18 for each parade. This number increased to twelve where two 
suspects were to be paraded together. 19
Guidelines regulating the conduct of identification parades for multiple witnesses were also 
contained in the 1969 Circular, allowing the police to hold one parade for two suspects 
where they were similar in appearance. The Circular stipulated that, where there were more 
than two suspects attending in relation to the same offence, "an identification parade should 
not include more than two of the possible suspects"20 . This was an improvement upon the 
1925 rules, where no provision at all was made for parades involving multiple suspects. In 
1969 the Home Office appeared to acknowledge that parading more than two suspects at 
any one time was not only prejudicial to those suspects involved, but also failed to test 
witnesses' power of recognition. Taking the most extreme scenario, where all the members 
of an identification parade were suspects, a witness could" view a parade and any choice 
made would be a positive identification upon which the police would be able to act.21
Paragraph 12 of the memorandum also made a change to procedure regarding instructions 
to witnesses as reproduced below,
reprinted in Archbold, Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases, 38th Ed. (1973), paras. 1351- 
1353. The Devlin Report (1976) reproduced the Circular in Appendix A, 158.
18 Psychological research refers to the volunteers on an identification parade as "distractors" or "foils". 
However, police guidelines and judicial commentary usually refer to the use of "volunteers".
19 Home Office Circular No. 9/1969, para. 8. Two suspects could only be paraded together where 
they were similar in appearance. If they were not, or if there were more than two suspects, then separate 
parades were required. These provisions are closer to the current Code of Practice than were the 1925 
provisions. See Code D Annex A, para. 8.
20 Ibid., para. 9. The provisions of this paragraph correspond quite closely to those of Code of 
Practice D, Annex A, paras. 8 and 9.
21 This would involve negligible testing of a witness's memory. It is probable that this would be a 
good example of the "relative judgment process" (see Wells, G.L., "The psychology of lineup 
identifications" (1984) \4Journal of Applied Social Psychology 89) whereby a witness, rather than using 
an absolute standard, chooses the parade member who most resembles his or her memory of the offender 
compared with the other persons paraded. If the relative judgment process exists, the chances of 
misidentification increase, especially in a situation where an identification parade consists only of suspects.
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The witness should be asked whether the person he has come to identify is 
on the parade. He should be told that if he cannot make a positive 
identification he should say so.
This provision has continued as an important procedural rule,22 and is seen as an effective 
method of reducing the pressure witnesses may feel they are under to make a choice when 
they are in fact unsure. Witnesses are aware that there has been police time and effort 
expended in order to construct the identification parade, and may be influenced by police 
belief that the suspect is the offender. Psychologists conducting research in the area of 
eyewitness identification have emphasised the influence instructions given to witnesses 
may have on their propensity to choose.23
The 1969 Circular represented a long overdue update on police practice while attempting to 
increase the fairness, both real and perceived, of identification parades. A major problem 
with the 1925 provisions was that there had been no real incentive for police forces to 
follow the rules. In 1969, this difficulty was addressed by the inclusion of a warning that 
"failure to observe its provisions may well result in the judge, in his summing up to the 
jury, commenting on the reliability of the evidence obtained".24 Although the Circular 
publicised the power of the judge to discipline police for breach of its provisions, it did not 
provide a discretion to exclude evidence which had been unfairly obtained. The lack of any 
effective method of dissuading the police from carrying on with old practices proved to be a 
major problem in successfully implementing Home Office Circular 9/1969.
22 See Code D, Annex A, para. 14, which is very similar to the provision in paragraph 12 of the 
Home Office Circular 9/1969. However, the current Code of Practice provides for the identification officer 
inform the witness that the offender may or may not be present on the parade, a warning which is missing 
from the 1969 guidelines. This could be an important part of the formula, as it conveys to the witness that 
it is acceptable to make no identification. Theoretically, the pressure which is brought to bear on a witness 
should be reduced as should false identifications: see Malpass, R.S. and Devine, P.O., "Eyewitness 
identification: Lineup instructions and the absence of the offender" (1981) 66 Journal of Applied 
Psychology 482.
23 Kohnken, G., and Maass, A, "Eyewitness testimony: False alarms on biased instructions? (1988) 
73 Journal of Applied Psychology' 363 questioned the positive effects of instructions to witnesses.
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Because judges were given no specific discretion to exclude evidence obtained outside the 
provisions of the Circular,25 there was no strong incentive for the police to adhere to them. 
Judges could question the validity of evidence, but even this proved to be unusual, as the 
judiciary was accustomed to turning a blind eye to the use of unfair police practice to obtain 
eyewitness evidence.26 Because the rules of 1969 were not enforceable as law, the 
intention of government to give suspects rights via regulation of police practice did not 
become a reality. Had the modifications to recommended procedure been mandatory, major 
changes in the way identification evidence was obtained would have occurred. However, 
the lack of effective enforcement supported the status quo and miscarriages of justice 
began to come to light in the early 1970s.27 An in-depth examination of identification issues 
was long overdue, and the result of two wrongful convictions which came to light in 1974 
was the formation of a Departmental Committee chaired by Lord Devlin.28 When the 
Committee reported in 1976, it proposed a number of reforms designed to prevent further 
wrongful convictions.
The Devlin Report was particularly concerned with the convictions of two men, Luke 
Dougherty and Laszlo Virag, whose cases resulted in considerable public anxiety in
24 Contained in the preamble to the Circular.
25 It was, however, open to the defence to invite the judge to exclude evidence obtained from an unfair 
parade under a general discretion to exclude evidence prejudicial to the defence. Such an exclusion of 
evidence (as acknowledged by the Devlin Report at paragraph 5.43) was a rarity. Perhaps if the exclusion of 
unfairly obtained evidence had been included as a possible sanction in Circular 9/1969, the discretion would 
have been exercised more widely.
26 Hain, P., Mistaken Identity (1976, London: Quartet), 131.
27 In 1972 the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) published its Eleventh Report, 
acknowledging that "mistaken identification [is] by far the greatest cause of actual or possible wrong 
convictions" and that "there is also the difficulty that the identifying witness may very likely be obviously 
perfectly honest and his evidence is likely to seem entirely convincing".The CLRC proposed a statutory 
requirement of a judicial warning of care to the jury when considering convicting on the basis of disputed 
evidence of identification and discussed the issue of corroboration of eyewitness testimony, matters 
examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis. Despite far-reaching recommendations regarding the presentation of 
eyewitness evidence in court, the committee made few suggestions regarding police procedure in gathering 
that evidence: see Criminal Law Revision Committee Eleventh Report (Evidence) 1972, Cmnd. 4991.
28 The Devlin Report, op.cit., (1976).
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1974.29 In order to assess these cases, the Committee undertook a review of both the 
existing rules regarding the conduct of identification parades30 and a limited amount of the 
available psychological literature, concluding that "honest but mistaken identification by 
prosecution witnesses was the prime cause of the miscarriages of justice". 31
Although the Dougherty and Virag cases were the catalyst for the appointment of the Devlin 
Committee, a background of other mistaken identifications had contributed to public 
concern about eyewitness evidence. 32 Commentators acknowledged that the memorandum 
of 1969 could be effective if it contained mandatory provisions.33 As Cole and Pringle 
stated: 34
"The question is not really one of changing the 1969 memorandum in any 
radical fashion but of devising means of encouraging the police to follow 
it... The National Council for Civil Liberties has favoured a solution where 
the procedures are made statutory. Another way is for the courts to reject all 
identification evidence in cases where the procedures have been 
disregarded."
The responsibility placed on the Devlin Committee was to find solutions to the problems 
which had prompted the furore over identification evidence in 1974. In discharging this 
responsibility, the Committee examined procedure concerning identification at three stages:
29 In 1974 and 1975, a number of television programmes and newspaper articles documented the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification. A detailed discussion of the Virag and Dougherty cases can be 
found in chapters 2 and 3 of the Devlin Report.
30 The Devlin Committee also considered three other committee reports which referred to 
identification issues: Criminal Law Revision Committee Eleventh Report 1972 (Cmnd 4991); Second 
Report on Criminal Procedure in Scotland 1975 (Cmnd 6218), "The Thomson Report" and The Report 
No.2 Interim of the Law Commission Of Australia on Criminal Investigation, which was published 
towards the end of the Devlin Committee Inquiry.
31 The Devlin Report (1976), op.cit., para. 1.2
32 Some of these cases were documented by popular authors such as Ludovic Kennedy (A 
Presumption of Innocence (1976, London: Gollancz) on the case of Patrick Meehan, accused of robbery and 
murder in 1969) and Paul Foot (Who Killed Hanratty? (1971, London: Jonathan Cape) which was one of 
many books documenting the A6 murder in 1961, for which James Hanratty was hanged), thereby 
increasing the pressure on the government to take some kind of action.
33 For example Hain (1976), op.cit., and Cole and Pringle (1974), op.cit.
34 Cole and Pringle (1974), op.cit., 177. This text concerns the investigation of "The Bam Murder" 
of 1972, where witnesses were shown photographs of the suspect, George Ince, before an identification 
parade took place. Ince was acquitted, but the case was the subject of an internal police inquiry and attracted 
considerable media attention, causing problems for the government in the early 1970s.
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trial, pre-trial and post-trial, and appeared to be in agreement with commentators of the time 
in emphasising the importance of rules governing the conduct of identification parades. As 
the Committee put it: 35
"When the police arrest a man because he answers to the description of one 
who has been seen to commit the crime, they want to get a positive 
identification as soon as they can... A witness, once he has identified the 
suspect on a parade, is unlikely to be shaken at the trial. So the fair conduct 
of a parade has become a matter of great concern to the defence. Hence the 
necessity for rules."
Despite this promising start, the Devlin Report proved to be a disappointment to many of 
those who had pushed for reform. Few radical recommendations emerged from the 
Committee's deliberations. 36 The Committee put forward a number of recommendations 
concerning the treatment of identification evidence once a case got to court, but little 
regarding the pre-trial police procedure for conducting parades. Its aim was to improve the 
enforceability of procedures for conducting identification parades, rather than reforming 
their content. Whilst acknowledging that "the parade...is not a scientific test and cannot 
safely be treated as one",37 the Committee could find no real defect in identification 
procedures which substantially increased the risk of error38 and was convinced that 
identification parades were being operated under a system which was working well. 39 This 
reflected the prevailing opinion that the 1969 Circular needed to be refined but that, if it 
were adhered to by police officers, it would work well. The Committee's desire for a 
standard code was finally implemented in 1984, with the first edition of Code of Practice 
D. Code D contains the salient points of the 1969 Circular and requires a standard approach 
to the conduct of identification procedures for all of the police service.
35 Devlin Report, op.cit., para. 1.10.
36 The recommendations of the Devlin Committee are contained in chapter 8 of the Report.
37 The Devlin Report (1976), op.cit., para. 5.31
38 Ibid., para.8.2.
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Although the Committee recommended little change to existing working practices 
regarding identification parades, a number of proposals were made which are now included 
in Code of Practice D. For example, the Committee suggested that identification parades 
should be photographed, thereby allowing the court to decide whether the suspect stood out 
from the other members on the parade.40 Due to objections by the police that parade 
volunteers would balk at having their photograph taken by the police, the proposal did not 
become a Committee recommendation. Rather, it was suggested in paragraph 8.15 that 
tests be conducted to assess the practicality of such a rule and that, if these proved to be 
successful, it could then be implemented. So, in one of the few areas where new ground 
could have been broken, the Devlin Committee took the middle road. The question of 
photographing identification parades was a hotly debated issue until April 1995, when 
taking a photograph of each identification parade became standard police practice. 41 
Evidence from psychologists that witnesses may feel under pressure to make a positive 
identification was used as a basis for the Devlin Committee recommendation that the 
officer in charge of the parade should tell witnesses, immediately prior to viewing the 
parade, that the offender may or may not be present.42 The recommendation has become 
part of current procedure43 and gives witnesses reassurance if they cannot make a positive 
identification.
In attempting to ensure that a breach of the rules governing identification procedures should 
result in more than judicial comment, the Committee was faced with a choice: either a
40 At paragraphs 5.47 and 8.15. The recommendation of a black and white photograph in preference 
to a colour one seems strange: had James Hanratty's parade been photographed in black and white, could the 
jury have noticed that his hair "stood out like a carrot in a bunch of bananas"?
41 The amended Code of Practice D provides for the parade to be photographed or video recorded at 
D2.5 and Annex A19.
42 Devlin Report, op.cit., para.5.63 and para.8.16. The Committee was at pains to point out that the 
fears of psychologists were not borne out by the statistics, and it seems that the recommendation was a way 
of paying mere lip-service to psychological evidence. It is unclear how the Committee could be so certain 
about the validity of the findings of psychologists.
43 Code of Practice D, Annex A 14
83
breach should result in the automatic exclusion of identification evidence unless it could be 
proved that such a breach was immaterial; or the matter should be left to the discretion of 
the trial judge. It opted for the middle road: 44
"By concentrating upon the object of the rules as a whole rather than on the 
wording of any one of them we think that there can be avoided on the one 
hand too severe a rigidity and on the other too wide a discretion"
The Committee recommended that the rules be given the status of the Highway Code. Trial 
judges would therefore have to have regard to the rules but would not be confined by them. 
Trivial breaches would not preclude the admissibility of identification evidence if the object, 
namely to test a witness's ability to identify the suspect, had been fulfilled. Thus, the 
Devlin Committee placed the decision about the effect of breaches of the rules firmly in the 
hands of the judiciary.
The Devlin Report had limited effect. The Government's response was to issue a new 
Circular in 1978 which had exactly the same status as that of 1969, namely that45
"Failure to observe its provisions may well result in the judge, in his 
summing up to the jury, commenting on the evidence so obtained."
The Government had effectively ignored the main plank of the Devlin Committee 
recommendations. Whilst some reform was undertaken, such as telling the witnesses that 
the person they saw might not be on the parade46 , this was largely worthless when the 
major problem was adherence to the rules by police. A harsher sanction than judicial 
comment was required.
44 Devlin Report, op.cit., para. 5.86
45 "Identification Parades and the Use of Photographs for Identification", 1978, Circular 109/1978, 3.
46 Ibid., rule 18, p.6. The standard forms advocated in the Devlin Report were also recommended for 
use by police forces. Examples of these are the Notice to the Suspect and the record of the identification
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It can be seen that the law governing identification procedures has developed piecemeal 
throughout the 20th century, with change usually occurring only where public opinion 
demanded it. Even though the recommendations contained in the Devlin Report were 
modified, they have influenced the procedure in use today. They formed the first steps to a 
judicial warning to the jury in identification cases as well as a standard police Code of 
Practice. The status of rules governing identification parades was at last raised with the 
implementation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice D. 47 A 
breach of these rules could result in the exclusion of identification evidence under s.78 of 
PACE.
Code of Practice D
Code of Practice D governs all identification procedures conducted by the police service. 
However, as is the case with s.78 PACE and the Turnbull warning, many suspects will 
not be afforded the protection of PACE procedures because they are involved in a minor 
offence. For example, in Barnes v DPP 48 the defendant was charged with failing to supply 
a specimen for analysis. The only evidence offered at trial was a dock identification of the 
defendant by a police officer. It was held that dock identification was customary in the 
magistrates' court and that "if there had to be an identity parade in every case of disputed 
identity, the whole process of justice in a magistrates' court would be severely impaired". 
The judgment clearly derogates from the protective principle in favour of speed and 
financial expediency. Such derogations may well be justified in very minor cases, although 
care must be taken that the protections of Code D do not become exclusive to those charged 
with very serious offending.
parade, to be made available to the defence in all cases where proceedings were brought. Samples of the 
layout of these forms were included in the Circular at pages 11 to 19.
47 There were further recommendations to introduce a statutory scheme before this time, however. 
The 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure ("The Phillips Report") did not make any detailed 
proposals because of the Government intention to avoid reform in the area. However, the Committee did 
briefly recommend that, in line with their general approach, identification procedures should be subject to 
statutory control (p.69, paragraph 3.138).
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The provisions considered here are contained in Code D2 and Annexes A to E. The various 
annexes to Code D give procedural guidance to Identification Officers regarding the 
conduct of identification parades, group identifications, video identification, confrontation 
and the showing of photographs. PACE Codes of Practice are issued under s66 of PACE, 
and s67 governs the revision and issue of Codes of Practice by the Home Secretary. 
Although breach of the Codes may result in exclusion of evidence and disciplinary 
proceedings against the officer involved, s.67 provides protection for police officers from 
civil and criminal proceedings brought on the basis of the breach alone.
A parade is to be offered, where practicable, before any other method of identification 
procedure is considered. It is well established that a confrontation is only to be considered 
where all other options fail. 49 This reluctance to allow the use of confrontations as a 
method of obtaining identification evidence has been a common feature of the 
recommendations of various Committees and Circulars dealing with the issue of eyewitness 
identification.50 The primary importance of the identification parade is therefore beyond 
dispute. The hierarchy of procedures under Code D is provided by D2.1 and D2.3: 51
"2.1 In a case which involves disputed identification evidence, and where 
the identity of the suspect is known to the police and he is available, the 
methods of identification by witnesses which may be used are:
(a) a parade;
(b) a group identification;
(c) a video film;
(d) a confrontation.
48 The Times May 6 1991
49 Evidence gained from a confrontation is viewed by the courts as less reliable than that gained by 
other methods of identification. Examples of case law illustrating the preference for identification evidence 
gained by the use of a parade rather than a confrontation include Nagah [1991 ] Crim.L.R. 55 and Britton and 
Richards [1989] Crim.L.R. 144.
50 Such as the Devlin Report and the Home Office Circular 9/1969.
51 There has been some discussion recently of whether Code D covers voice identification procedures: 
see R v Hersey [1998] Crim.L.R. 281; and R v Gummerson and Steadman [1999] Crim.L.R. 680. 
Although it has been held that Code D has no application in voice identification cases, some provisions are 
necessary, and research on earwitness evidence should be utilised. In New Zealand, new procedures proposed 
by the Law Commission in the Evidence Code apply to both voice and visual identification.
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2.3 Wherever a suspect disputes an identification, an identification 
parade shall be held unless paragraphs 2.4 or 2.7 or 2.10 apply. A parade 
may also be held if the officer in charge of the investigation considers that it 
would be useful, and the suspect consents."
Paragraph 2.4 allows the use of other procedures where it is not practicable to hold a 
parade; paragraph 2.7 for a group identification where a parade cannot be held, and 
paragraph 2.10 for a video identification where a parade or group cannot be organised.
The identification parade has long been viewed as the best method of gaining reliable 
eyewitness identification, because the suspect can be seen in a real setting, amongst people 
who are similar in general appearance. Because it is live, witnesses can view the suspect in 
three dimensions, as opposed to the two dimensional images of photographs and video. 
The parade also allows witnesses to see the general build of the suspect, which the head 
and shoulders photographs in "mug books" cannot do. Finally, witnesses can sometimes 
be allowed to see parade members move or speak, allowing for the memory to be triggered 
by contextual cues. There is limited support for the pre-eminence of the identification 
parade from the findings of psychological research. It has been found in some studies that 
live procedures produce more reliable results than video or photographic representations.52 
However, a review of eyewitness identification experiments by Cutler, Herman, Penrod 
and Fisher found that the use of live, video or photographic procedures made very little 
difference to eyewitness accuracy: 53
"[TJhere is no reason to believe that live lineups, videotaped lineups or 
photo arrays produce substantial differences in identification 
performance.. .it is not worth the trouble and expense to use live lineups."
In light of these findings, the reliance on the identification parade as the most reliable form 
of identification procedure must be questioned. Witnesses are likely to be more comfortable
52 See Cutler, B.L., Fisher, R.P., and Chicvara, C.L., "Eyewitness identification from live versus 
videotaped lineups" (1989) 2 Forensic Reports 93; Egan, D., Pittner, M., and Goldstein, A.G., "Eyewitness 
identification: Photographs v. live models" (1977) 1 Law and Human Behavior 199.
53 Cutler, B.L., Herman, G.L., Penrod, S.D., and Fisher, R.P., "Conceptual, practical, and empirical 
issues associated with eyewitness identification test media" in D. Ross, J.D. Read and M.P. Toglia Adult
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identifying an offender when viewing a video than when facing a live parade, and the 
expense and time spent on live parades could be avoided. With advances in technology, 
videos can represent three dimensional moving images and the use of video libraries should 
be considered. This would reduce the problems in finding volunteers where the suspect is 
singular in appearance, would allow the police to arrange procedures quickly, and would 
be more convenient for witnesses. 54
(i) The Conduct of Identification Parades
Code of Practice D is detailed in its provisions for the conduct of identification procedures, 
including identification by body samples and by fingerprints. However, this thesis 
concentrates on identification by witnesses and so the provisions for other forms of 
identification are not discussed.
Identification procedures should be carried out by an identification officer, who is in 
uniform and of the rank of inspector or above. This reflects the importance of the decisions 
the identification officer has to make, such as when a parade is impracticable and when a 
group identification, video identification or confrontation should be held. The officer is also 
responsible for delivering the Notice to the Suspect and making a record of the parade.
The psychological experimentation discussed in chapter two is reflected in some aspects of 
Code D. For example, at Annex A: 14, the Code implements the psychological finding that 
the use of non-biased instructions may reduce the incidence of relative judgment s. Where 
the Code is followed properly by the officers conducting a live parade, such provisions 
accord well with the protective principle, as they potentially offer increased protection for 
suspects from witnesses who pose a risk for misidentification.
Eyewitness Testimony: Current Trends and Developments (1994: Cambridge University Press), 163, at
181.
5<1 The provision of video libraries instead of live parades is discussed further in Chapter 6.
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Annexes A,B,C and E contain detailed guidelines about the conduct of identification 
procedures. These include provisions for the suspect's solicitor to be present and fully 
informed; for the suspect to choose his or her own position in a line of "at least eight people 
(in addition to the suspect) who so far as possible resemble the suspect in age, height, 
general appearance and position in life";55 for the instructions to and treatment of witnesses; 
and for the documentation of the parade, group, video or confrontation. Annex D governs 
the showing of photographs, which should only be attempted where the identity of the 
suspect is not known to the police. 56 Nothing in Code D prevents video film or 
photographs of an incident being shown to the public at large to trace suspects, allowing 
for release of security videos and photographs on programmes such as Crimewatch.
Several cases have highlighted the potential problems encountered when an eyewitness is 
shown photographs.57 The practice was discussed at length by the Devlin Committee.58 It 
may be necessary for the police to show photographs to a witness when there is no known 
suspect for whom an identification parade can be held. However, if this is done and there is 
a subsequent identification parade, then by virtue of Code D2.15(viii) and Annex D 
paragraph 7, the identification officer must explain to the suspect that photographs have 
been shown to a particular witness. This is the case whether or not the witness identified 
the suspect from photographs shown. Disclosure of all information is necessary, because 
the defence may benefit from the knowledge that a witness attending an identification 
parade has previously chosen someone other than the suspect from a photographic file. 
Alternatively, if a witness had chosen the suspect from photographs, then any positive 
identification made at a parade would not prove that the witness was confirming that the
55 Code D, Annex A:8.
56 The annex governing the showing of photographs also covers photofit and identikit.
57 The procedures governing the showing of photographs, which should only be implemented where 
the identity of the suspect is not known (D2.18), are found in Annex D of Code of Practice D.
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suspect was the offender. Rather, it would merely illustrate confirmation that the suspect 
was the person seen in a photograph.59 In accordance with the recommendations of the 
Devlin Report60 , if one witness makes an identification from photographs, photofit, 
identikit or similar picture, then other witnesses should not be shown photographs at all but 
should attend a formal identification procedure. 61 This appears to be straightforward. 
However, there is a considerable risk of a breach of Code D where the identification officer 
is reliant upon the investigating officer for information. Assuming that witnesses will 
remember whether they have been shown photographs, the easiest route may be to ask 
them as well as the investigating officer. Early detection of any lack of information may 
serve to avoid a breach of the Code of Practice.
Code D also attempts to avoid the contamination of witnesses' memories by providing in 
Annex A: 12 that:
"The identification officer is responsible for ensuring that, before they 
attend the parade, witnesses are not able to... communicate with each other 
about the case or overhear a witness who has already seen the parade..."
Despite the requirement of "before they attend the parade", the provision can realistically 
only act to prevent witnesses discussing the case after they arrive at the police station to 
attend an identification procedure. There is nothing that can be done to prevent discussion 
before this time. Many eyewitnesses will have been victims or observers of the same 
offence as their family members, friends or colleagues. Because of this, there will be 
opportunities for witnesses to discuss the case outside of the police station and before any
58 The Devlin Report, op.cit., paragraphs 5.16-5.28.
59 It would, however, be difficult for the defence to argue this point in court, as any discussion would 
highlight to the jury that the defendant was on police photographic files and therefore had a criminal record. 
Similarly, where a witness identifies a suspect from a photograph and makes a subsequent positive 
identification at a parade, it is usually only the evidence from the identification parade which will be 
admissible. If an identification from photographs was admissible, it would indicate that a suspect had a 
criminal record: see Bleakley [1993] Crim.L.R. 203 for an example of the circumstances in which evidence 
from photographic identification will be admissible.
60 Devlin Report, op.cit., at para.8.8
61 Code of Practice D Annex A, paragraphs 5 and 6.
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identification procedure takes place. In other words, the damage could already be done long 
before witnesses arrive for an identification parade. As the time between the offence and the 
identification parade increases, there will be more opportunity for discussion. Where 
discussion takes place, the original memory may be lost completely, and replaced by a 
memory adjusted to fit with other eyewitnesses' perceptions of what happened and what 
the offender looked like. 62
Annex A: 12 is a provision which, whilst being the ultimate responsibility of the 
identification officer, is necessarily delegated to other police officers. 63 The officers with 
the responsibility for looking after the witnesses will often be unfamiliar with the 
provisions of Code D. 64 The result of this could be that there is cross-pollinisation of 
memory even where witnesses do not know each other. Even where witnesses claim that 
they have not discussed the case, if the witness officer leaves the room then there will be 
the danger that any identification evidence gained on that day will be excluded at a 
subsequent trial. It is probable that many investigations are threatened because of the 
ignorance of witness officers,65 but often a breach of Annex A: 12 will never come to light. 
After all, if the witnesses do not mention it, who will? There is obvious potential for the 
integrity of the criminal justice process to be undermined by poor adherence to Annex 
A: 12. Each time the provision is breached, there is the possibility that unfairness to the 
suspect will result, and yet may never be recorded or rectified in any later proceedings.
52 For a summary of research on retention intervals and forgetting, see Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, 
S.D., Mistaken Identification (1995 Cambridge University Press), 105-106.
63 The delegation to other officers must take place because the identification officer will be busy 
arranging the identification procedure and ensuring that the suspect receives the Notice to the Suspect 
(D2.15).
64 This is because the witness officers are rarely trained staff dedicated to the task of assisting with 
identification parades.
65 This observation is based on the my own studies in Birmingham, where there were a number of 
instances when police officers responsible for ensuring that Annex A: 12 was complied with left the room 
altogether, giving witnesses the opportunity to talk amongst themselves. Anecdotal evidence from the 
identification officer in Birmingham confirms that this is one of the most common problems encountered 
by identification suite staff.
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(ii) Recent changes to Code D
The most recent revision of Code D resulted in few fundamental changes to police 
procedure.66 However, two of the new provisions are particularly important and are long 
overdue. These concern the photographic recording of identification procedures67 and the 
recording of the first description made by the witness68 . These follow recommendations 
made by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice in 1993. 69 In addition, a new annex 
(Annex E) has been created to deal specifically with group identifications, which were 
previously dealt with under Annex A. The old versions of the Code merely provided that a 
group identification should be run, as far as possible, in exactly the same way as an 
identification parade. The lack of detail as to how this was to be achieved was clearly 
unsatisfactory.
The introduction of the requirement for a photograph or video recording to be taken of 
identification parades has been the subject of debate for a number of years. Until the 1995 
revision of Code D, photographs were taken only where the suspect was not legally 
represented and had no friend present at the identification procedure. A photographic record 
allows the jury or magistrate at any subsequent court proceedings to assess the fairness of 
the identification procedure for themselves. This is particularly important where it is 
claimed that the volunteers on an identification parade were not sufficiently similar in 
general appearance to the suspect and therefore that the parade was unfair. Of course, the 
provision will also be helpful to the prosecution. Where the identification parade consisted 
of a satisfactory line-up, any evidence resulting from it could only be increased in value.
66 Although there have been subsequent revisions of the Codes of Practice, the most recent being of 
Code A in March 1999, no revisions to Code D have been undertaken since 1995.
67 At D2.5
68 At D2.0, D2.I5(x), Annex A:2A, Annex B:8A, Annex C:2A, Annex D:1A and Annex E:l 1.
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D2.0, which provides that the police should make a record of the first description given by 
the witness, has also been the subject of much debate. 70 Whilst it is acknowledged that 
witnesses will often find it easier to recognise a suspect than to recall a description 
verbally71 , it is important to be able to compare the original description given by a witness 
with the actual appearance of a suspect. Where an identification parade is assembled on the 
basis of general appearance, a witness may recall certain features which the volunteers on 
the parade do not share with the suspect. The witness would be likely to choose a parade 
member who shares those features. This creates the danger of an unfair identification 
parade and regard to an original description could foresee and attend to the problem. This is 
because those recruiting volunteers would be able to refer to features which were 
particularly striking to the witness rather than merely recruiting on the basis of a description 
of the suspect. Psychological research also indicates that matching the volunteers on the 
parade to the original description given by the witness is a better method of constructing a 
parade than matching to the appearance of the suspect. 72 However, suspects may not match 
the description given by the witness and it is important to ensure that they do not stand out 
on the parade. The practical use of matching volunteers to the original description of the 
witness is therefore limited.
Under D2.0, the defence will also have access to the original description given by the 
witness before the identification procedure commences. This is important, as a legal 
representative will then be able to look at the witness 1 original description when helping the
69 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report ("The Runciman Report") (1993: London 
HMSO) Cmnd 2263, chapter 2, para. 10.
70 The idea was proposed by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in its llth Report, op.cit., at 
paragraph 196, and was discussed by the Devlin Committee at paragraphs 5.06-5.15. See also Heaton- 
Armstrong, A., "Identification: Descriptions of suspects" [1986] Criminal Law Review 215.
71 However, the method of questioning used may affect the reliability of verbal recall and any 
subsequent recognition. For example, see Loftus, E., Eyewitness Testimony (1979, Cambridge: Harvard), 
chapter5.
72 Luus, E., and Wells, G., "Eyewitness identification and the selection of distractors for lineups" 
(1991) 15 Law and Human Behavior 43; Mayer, C., "Due process challenges to eyewitness identification 
based on pre-trial photographic arrays" (1994) 13 Pace Law Revie\v 815.
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suspect to choose volunteers from the pool offered by the police. In this way, volunteers 
sharing some of the features mentioned in an original description of an offender may be 
chosen instead of those who merely look like the suspect.
(in) The Right to an Identification Parade and the Need for Consent 
In examining the effect of the provisions of Code D on eyewitness identification, it is 
important to consider when an identification parade should be held. Code D2.3 and D2.4 
offer some assistance in this consideration. Code D2.3 provides that:
"Whenever a suspect disputes an identification, an identification parade shall 
be held if the suspect consents... A parade may also be held if the officer in 
charge of the investigation considers that it would be useful, and the suspect 
consents."
The 1995 redrafting of the Codes of Practice73 saw a change in this provision, withdrawing 
the explicit right of the suspect to request an identification parade. 74 In most cases the right 
will remain implicitly, because if a parade is to be held whenever there is disputed 
identification evidence, then the suspect can request an identification parade by disputing 
identification evidence in the case. 75
Difficulties may occur in deciding when identification evidence is disputed. Where the 
police decide not to conduct a parade, defendants may argue that they should have the right 
to adduce identification evidence in their favour. It will be useful to the defence if they can
73 Effective from 10 April 1995.
74 This provision is discussed briefly below with regard to the case of Nagah (1991) 92 Cr App R 
344. As the provision was mandatory, where a suspect insisted on a parade the only valid ground for refusal 
was that it was impracticable to hold one. That was the case even where there had been a prior street (or 
chance) identification, as discussed below and in Brown [1991] Crim L.R. 368, or where recognition is 
claimed, for example in Conway [1990] Crim. L.R. 402. (For a discussion of the difference recognition 
evidence makes, see the provisions offered by Turnbull [1976] 3 All ER 549). However, the right to request 
a parade would not extend to the right to request any other form of identification procedure, such as a group 
identification or confrontation. The decision regarding the conduct of these types of identification procedure 
has always been at the discretion of the identification officer, see Joseph [1994] Crim L.R. 48. 
75 The entitlement of a suspect to an identification parade, where this is practicable, was evidenced in 
Alien [1995] Crim.L.R. 643, where the police had seen no need to conduct an identification parade, 
resulting in a breach of D2.3 which was admitted by the prosecution.
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show that a number of eyewitnesses failed to identify the accused. However, if the police 
have no obligation to run a parade, then the defence could have difficulties in securing the 
cooperation of witnesses. This will almost certainly be the situation where the witness is 
also the victim. It is usual that it is the police who will first approach a witness and a 
subsequent approach by defence counsel may be treated with suspicion. Furthermore, the 
police are the only agency with the resources to carry out evidentially admissible 
identification parades. Whilst the balance of resources is undeniably to the advantage of the 
prosecution, it is understandable that police funds would be reluctantly spent on aiding a 
defendant who insisted on staging an identification parade which the police and Crown 
Prosecution Service view as unnecessary. 76
In Hope, Limburn and Bleasdale11 , the Court of Appeal held that, where the defendant 
admits to being present at the scene of the offence but denies involvement, then there is no 
disputed identification. It was a jury decision as to whether the witness was correct in 
stating that the defendant was involved. In cases where the defendant admits presence but 
denies involvement, the requirement for a Turnbull 78 warning may also be negated. 79 But 
it does not follow that there will be no need to hold an identification parade. If, as in Hope, 
Limburn and Bleasdale, the defendant denies assaulting, but admits begging from a victim, 
then the nature of the identification evidence is clearly disputed and a parade may be of 
benefit, certainly to the defendant. Hope seems to suggest that where the police decide that 
an identification parade is not needed, then there is no compulsion for them to arrange one. 
The refusal to arrange a parade would be on the basis that there is no disputed
76 It would be a very rare situation where the Crown Prosecution Service would go ahead with a 
prosecution when there is disputed identification evidence yet no identification procedure has been carried out 
(However, this does happen, as can be seen in Alien [1995] Crim.L.R. 643 and in Graham [1994] 
Crim.L.R. 212). This may be to the consternation of police personnel, who view CPS requests for 
identification parades as an unnecessary expense in some cases, such as where there has been a street 
identification or where the witness knows the suspect well.
77 [1994] Crim.L.R. 118.
78 [1976] 3 All E.R. 549.
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identification,80 even though it is possible that, on viewing an identification parade, the 
witness would decide that the defendant was not involved.
Although an identification parade is a source of hope for the suspect in disputing an 
identification, it is a slim one because many witnesses, in recognising the defendant as 
someone who was present at the scene of the crime, would equate presence with 
involvement. Psychologists term the phenomenon "unconscious transference". 81 Where a 
stressful incident has occurred, the memory of a person may remain without an 
accompanying memory of the actions of that person. It remains that there is disputed 
evidence of identification in such a case. This disputed evidence would be that of the role 
played by the defendant, rather than the usual question of whether the defendant was 
present at all. As Code D stands,82 to deny a defendant an identification parade in those 
circumstances, when one is practicable, would surely constitute a breach of D2.3. This is 
because the purpose of an identification parade is as much to afford the defence the 
opportunity of challenging the case against the suspect as it is for the prosecution to gain 
evidence to strengthen that case. Although there are practical difficulties in determining the 
limits of the ability to demand an identification parade, as well as problems for suspects 
who wish to take up the opportunity to test an eyewitness without the support of the police 
(such as the difficulty in securing witness cooperation), the ability to challenge the case 
against you by whatever practicable means is a vital element of the integrity principle. 
Without it, suspects who are at a resource disadvantage at the outset would see protection 
from misidentification reduced, and the fairness of the process would be open to question.
79 See Oakwell [1978] 1 All ER 1223 and Curry and Keeble [1983] Crim.L.R. 737.
80 Hope, Limburn and Bleasdale was held before the current version of Code of Practice D was 
introduced, but it appears that the situation is the same.
81 A number of examples of bystanders being identified as offenders can be found in Loftus, E., 
Eyewitness Testimony (1979), op.cit., 142-144.
82 To change this would mean excepting the Hope type of situation from Code D.
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In addition to a requirement of disputed identification, Code D2.3 provides that "an 
identification parade shall be held if the suspect consents". Where identification evidence is 
disputed or where the investigating officer sees a need for an identification parade, but the 
suspect does not consent to one, then the police have the option to proceed covertly with 
some other form of identification procedure. 83 Before this is considered, the police will 
often attempt to arrange a group or video identification with the suspect's consent. 84 It may 
be that the suspect refuses to take part in an identification parade (for example if he or she is 
unhappy with the volunteers offered by the police), but does consent to a group 
identification. Similarly, under Code D2.10 and D2.ll, suspects may consent to a video 
identification where they have refused to take part in either a parade or a group 
identification. In such a case a video identification would almost certainly be conducted 
with the suspect's consent85 in preference to covertly arranging for the suspect to be 
identified by any other method. It is clear that the last resort is a confrontation, which 
should only be held where all other methods are impracticable.
Where a suspect does not consent to any identification procedure, it would be almost 
impossible to proceed with an identification parade. But a group identification or 
confrontation can be organised without the suspect's knowledge. This step can also be 
taken where the suspect has agreed to take part in an identification procedure but has failed 
to attend. 86 In practice, a suspect will be given more than one chance to attend an 
identification parade and it may take up to three non-attendances for the police to decide that 
they will proceed by means of a covert identification. 87
83 The option to proceed covertly was introduced specifically for the first time with regard to group 
identifications in the 1995 revision of Code D, at D2.7 and Annex E:4 and 33. 
8-4 Code D2.6.
85 In this way the suspect would be given the safeguards contained in the Notice to the Suspect, under 
D2.15 and D2.16, see below.
86 Under Code D2.6 for identification parades and Code D2.7 for group identifications.
87 This is what happened at an Identification Suite in the West Midlands when police procedures were 
observed over a period of several months. There will be more than one chance for a suspect to attend, partly
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It is in the best interests of all parties involved that suspects consent to the procedure. 
Suspects will at least have some control over the people with whom they are viewed by the 
witness. For example, when attending an identification parade suspects can exercise some 
choice over the volunteers who sit in the line, choosing eight from a pool. 88 If a non- 
stationary group is arranged suspects can choose when to walk past the witnesses and in a 
stationary group will be able to decide where to stand. Similarly, a video identification will 
often involve a limited choice regarding the other people who will appear on film with 
suspects. Where suspects consent, certain rights are conferred, such as the right to object to 
any part of the procedure. 89 The police will also benefit from obtaining suspects' consent, 
because if evidence does result from an identification, it will be all the stronger for having 
resulted from a formal, organised procedure. As evidence from an identification parade is 
regarded to be more reliable than that resulting from any other method of identification, the 
police prefer to organise identification parades. Where there is no option but to proceed 
with an identification procedure without the consent of the suspect, the identification officer 
will often opt for a covert group or video identification rather than organising a staged 
confrontation, simply because any evidence resulting from the procedure will be stronger if 
the case goes to court.
because then the court will realise that the police have given the suspect every opportunity to participate in 
a formal identification procedure. A suspect may be able to offer a good reason for not attending one or even 
two identification parades, but three non-attendances would be difficult for a suspect to explain away. 
Giving suspects several chances to attend therefore gives the police a justification for continuing covertly 
whilst feeling that their actions will be evidentially sound.
88 Usually this pool consists of at least twelve people. The size of the pool depends on the relative 
singularity in appearance of the suspect. In Birmingham, the identification officer aims to have a pool of 
sixteen. However, success in constructing a good parade will not be measured by how many people the 
suspect has to choose from, but the similarity in appearance to the suspect of the volunteers. From this 
point, a complete lack of choice where the volunteers are all similar in appearance to the suspect would be 
preferable to a hundred volunteers who were nothing like him or her.
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(iv) Impracticability
As well as where suspects do not attend or consent, identification parades may not be able 
to take place because the identification officer is of the opinion that it is impracticable to go 
ahead with a parade. 90 Code D2.4 provides that
"A parade need not be held if the identification officer considers that, 
whether by reason of the unusual appearance of the suspect or for some 
other reason, it would not be practicable to assemble sufficient people who 
resembled him to make a parade fair."
An identification officer may encounter problems in assembling eight people of similar age, 
height, general appearance and position in life to that of the suspect. 91 It may be that the 
suspect is singular in appearance, in which case it is highly unlikely that any breach of 
Code D2.3 and D2.4 would occur were the identification officer to resort to a group or a 
video identification.92 However, the situation is more problematic where difficulties in 
assembling volunteers are surmountable given a reasonable amount of time and resources, 
but where the identification officer fails to arrange an identification parade.
There is a lack of precision regarding exactly when an identification parade will be 
impracticable and when a breach of the provisions of D2.3 and D2.4 occurs. In Tomkinson 
v. DPP93 , a parade was requested, but a group identification was arranged instead. It was 
held that there was no breach of D2.3 and D2.4 unless the identification officer's decision 
was unreasonable in the circumstances. An important point raised by the Court of Appeal in 
this case was that there was a distinction between the inconvenience of assembling people 
for an identification parade and the impracticability of doing so.
89 The rights of the suspect are contained in the Annexes governing the various identification 
procedures and in the Notice to the Suspect at D2.15.
90 Code D2.6 provides that where there is refusal, failure to attend, or impracticability, then a group 
identification, a video identification, or a confrontation should be arranged.
91 A requirement contained in Annex A, paragraph 8 of Code of Practice D.
92 Indeed, where there is genuine difficulty in assembling a parade, it may be fairer to the suspect to 
arrange a group or video identification. An example of this can be seen in a Sheffield case where police 
officers "blacked-up" white men after having difficulty finding suitable volunteers for a parade. The parade 
was described by the local MP as "a ludicrous procedure": "Police defend blacked up identity parade" The 
Independent July 26 1997, 7; "Star of the black and white identity parade" The Times July 25 1997.
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The key to the provision in D2.4 is that the decision is left to the identification officer. If he 
or she considers that it is impracticable to assemble sufficient volunteers to make an 
identification parade fair, for any reason, then some other method of identification should 
be employed. This gives a wide discretion to the identification officer, and creates 
variations of practice throughout the country. For example, identification officers may 
differ in how much time they think it is reasonable to spend in the search for volunteers. 
Because of differing practice, a suspect may have the opportunity of standing on an 
identification parade in one identification suite or police station but not in another in the next 
town. Whilst this may seem unfair, it is necessary to give the identification officer some 
discretion regarding the day to day running of identification procedures. It would be 
impossible for any guideline to cover every situation where it would be impracticable to 
hold an identification parade.
Guidance on what constitutes impracticability has been given in some measure by case law 
on alleged breaches of Code D2.3 and D2.4. The lack of suitable volunteers coming 
forward for identification parades has led to much dispute in court, where the prosecution 
has claimed that it constituted a ground for impracticability, but where the defence suggest 
that a breach of Code D occurred. What is clear from these cases is that the discretion of the 
identification officer is not absolute: there is a requirement of reasonableness involved. In 
other words, the police are not entitled to conclude in every case that to go ahead with an 
identification parade is impracticable. In line with the disciplinary and protective principles, 
some form of a check on the identification officer's discretion is necessary in order to 
ensure that, in all situations where an identification parade is practicable, one is carried out. 
Otherwise, situations may arise where another form of identification is used simply because 
it is easier under the circumstances. Discretion may therefore lead to poor practice, causing
93 [1995] Crim.L.R. 60
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identification officers to abandon identification parades in favour of, ultimately, a 
confrontation.94
It has been confirmed in the case of Penny95 that the lack of suitable volunteers at the time 
of the identification parade does not necessarily make that parade impracticable. Although 
the appeal was dismissed,96 Stuart-Smith L.J. stated that, 97
"It does not follow that because insufficient volunteers could not be 
obtained on that day, it was impracticable to obtain volunteers on another 
day; nor does the agreement of the appellant to take part in a group 
identification necessarily mean that he accepts that it is impracticable to hold 
a parade."
This seems to suggest that where there are not enough volunteers available for an 
identification parade on one day, then the identification officer should arrange to try again 
on another day. Although this may involve considerable inconvenience for the witnesses 
attending the identification procedure and would be at further cost of police time and 
resources, it seems to be only fair to the suspect. There is obviously a sensible limit to this: 
if there is another failed attempt to find suitable volunteers, then it is doubtful that any court 
would suggest that the police had not fulfilled their duty under D2.4. In practice, many 
identification officers make more than one attempt to find suitable volunteers. This is
94 This problem of unfair practice is addressed in part by a judicial limit to an identification officer's 
discretion and in part by the provision that the identification officer is not involved in the investigation of 
the case.
95 (1992) 94 Cr.App.R. 345
96 It was held that, even if there was a breach of D2.4, then the trial judge had a right to exercise his 
discretion to allow the evidence (under PACE s78), that a group identification did not necessarily act to the 
disadvantage of a suspect and that there was no evidence that the police had acted to try and get around the 
provisions of the Code. It was probably the case that, had the identification evidence been the only evidence, 
it would not have been admissible. But as there was other, strong evidence against Penny, it was held that 
the judge had made the correct decision in the circumstances. However, the police could have arranged an 
identification parade on another day; it was simply that most of the volunteers had been used for an 
identification parade involving another suspect to the same offence. The identification officer was probably 
concerned with getting the identification over and done with on that day, not least because to arrange a 
parade on another day would mean that the witnesses would have to attend again. Although it is true that 
there is a fine balance between fairness for witnesses and suspects, it is submitted that, if the suspect was 
not singular in appearance and volunteers could have been found on another day, then a clear breach of Code 
D2.4 had occurred.
97 Penny op.cit., at 349
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because the police are concerned to safeguard a possible prosecution case, which will only 
be achieved if it can be shown that everything within sensible limits was done to assemble a 
parade before resorting to any other method of identification.98
It is possible that a parade which would be impracticable on one day may be practicable at 
another time. In situations where that is the case, it may well be that ignoring future 
practicability would constitute a breach of Code D2.4. It is submitted that this may have 
been the case in Ladlow, Moss, Green and Jackson^', where the prosecution submitted that 
it would have been necessary for the police to hold 231 identification parades for 21 
suspects on a Bank Holiday. While there was obviously a problem in finding volunteers, 
the police surely did not have to hold the parades there and then. Given a relatively short 
amount of time to organise volunteers, it is likely that identification parades could have 
gone ahead. To arrange 231 parades sounds a daunting task, but in effect only 21 parades 
would have to be organised, as all 11 witnesses could view, one by one, the individual 
suspects in the same line-up. Confrontation was resorted to instead, and the judiciary 
showed that it was prepared to invoke the disciplinary principle and use its discretion to 
exclude evidence to ensure compliance with Code of Practice D. 100 The case seems to be a 
clear illustration that an identification parade may be impracticable on one day, but not on 
another.
98 This is certainly the case in Birmingham, where two or three attempts are usually be made before a 
group or video identification is arranged. There may be some justification for not trying further where the 
suspect is obviously singular in appearance. It could be argued that in such a case, the scheduling of another 
identification parade would be a waste of time and resources.
99 [1989]Crim.L.R. 218
100 There was no suggestion by the judge that identification parades could be organised on another day. 
Instead, he felt that there was a breach of Code of Practice D because a group identification could have been 
arranged rather than a confrontation. However, his assertion that two or more suspects could have been 
placed within a group of six volunteers showed a lack of comprehension of the provisions contained in 
Code of Practice D. Annex A, which at that time governed group identifications, clearly stated that the 
arrangements for a group identification should follow as closely as possible those for an identification 
parade (at paragraph 19 of the 1st edition of the Codes of Practice), namely that no more than two suspects 
can be paraded together and that, if two suspects are paraded together, then there should be at least twelve 
other persons paraded with them.
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However, there will be also be a limit to this proposition. If there are too few volunteers to 
construct a fair identification parade today but there is a good chance that suitable 
volunteers will be found in six months time, there would obviously be a good case for 
stating that an identification parade was, for the purposes of Code of Practice D, 
impracticable. To conclude otherwise, expecting the police to delay the investigation for a 
considerable length of time, would be unreasonable. This point is illustrated by the case of 
Jamello \ where it was possible to arrange an identification parade, but it would have taken 
some weeks. 102 The identification officer decided that a parade was impracticable and 
arranged for a group identification procedure to take place. The Court of Appeal ruled that 
"practicable" under Code of Practice D involved the question of when, as well as if, it was 
practicable to hold an identification parade. The delay of a few weeks, especially when it 
may have taken the police a considerable time to arrest a suspect in the first place, is a 
matter for the concern of both the prosecution and the defence. It is desirable that inaccurate 
identifications are kept to a minimum and an eyewitness's memory may fade. 103 However, 
it is not uncommon for there to be long waiting lists for identification parades. 104 Where a 
delay is within normal limits then the desire for a swifter conclusion to the identification 
process should not take over. If a parade is practicable, but does not take place, there is a 
clear breach of D2.4. The reasonable limits should be based on both national averages and 
local norms. There has to be a delicate balance between the right of the suspect to have the
101 [1993] Crim. L.R. 52
102 Similarly, in Tomkinson v. DPP [1995] Crim.L.R. 60, a group identification was arranged 
because it was viewed to be impracticable to arrange two parades involving juveniles in the school holidays. 
The police doubted they would find enough juveniles and parental consent: a school would be able to give 
consent, but could not do so in the school holidays. To delay until the start of the school term would not be 
appropriate due to the seriousness of the charge. The Court of Appeal did not seem convinced by the 
argument that this was a police policy, but held that there had been no breach of Code D.
103 See Cutler and Penrod (1995), op.cit., 105.
104 For example, officers in the West Midlands have to wait four to eight weeks between booking an 
identification parade and its taking place.
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opportunity of standing on an identification parade and the interests of the public in 
bringing the investigation swiftly to its conclusion.
Where suspects change their appearance between the time of the offence and the 
identification parade, the identification officer may decide that the change is so important 
that a parade is impracticable. Under Code D4.1 and 2.1 (vii) a, suspects are informed 
when they have their photograph taken at the time of arrest and in the Notice to the Suspect 
that any significant change in appearance before the identification procedure is attempted 
may result in evidence being given about the change in court. A change of appearance also 
allows the identification officer to consider other methods of identification. 105 For minor 
changes of appearance, a parade should still be practicable, because hats can be worn when 
hair has been grown or shaved, or sticking plasters can cover small tattoos.
The most common ground for finding that there is a lack of suitable volunteers (and 
therefore that it is not practicable to hold an identification parade) is that the suspect is of an 
unusual or "singular" appearance. Indeed, the unusual appearance of the suspect is cited in 
Code D2.4 itself as a ground for impracticability. The decision as to when it would not be 
practicable to hold a fair parade for this reason is again left to the discretion of the 
identification officer. The most striking illustration of the difficulty encountered where a 
suspect is of a singular appearance can be seen in R v Campbell and another. 106 The police 
may have difficulty in arranging parades where the suspect is a member of a group who 
form a small percentage of the population, or who are reluctant volunteers. 107 To some 
extent, this varies from area to area, but some groups tend to be rare in the population or
105 The prevalence of changes in appearance by suspects is discussed in Chapter 6. See also Bucke, T., 
and Brown, D., In Police Custody: Police Powers and Suspects' Rights Under the Revised PACE Codes of 
Practice Home Office Research Study 174 (1997 London:HMSO), 50.
106 [1993] Crim.L.R. 47
107 There may be a number of reasons, besides mistrust of the police, for reluctance to stand on an 
identification parade. For example, office workers may not want to give up time in their working day to sit 
on a parade.
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unwilling to volunteer on a national basis. 108 These include black women, white men with 
red hair, 109 older black males and Rastafarians. 110 Rastafarians in particular stand out as the 
group most reluctant to volunteer to stand on identification parades. Campbell is a classic 
example of the problem, which unfortunately failed to give a solution to the question of 
how much time, trouble and expense the police should go to before deciding that an 
identification parade is not practicable.
The identification method used in Campbell was a confrontation because, the police 
claimed, other Rastafarians were not prepared to stand on an identification parade. There 
would have been too few people in any given crowd who were similar in description to 
Campbell to warrant a group identification. The Court of Appeal condemned the lack of 
cooperation between the police and Rastafarians, and found it "deplorable" 111 that the 
protection of Code of Practice D was not being extended to a section of the community, 
albeit because of the attitude of its own members. The court said it was unfair that some 
members of the public were able to participate in an identification parade and some were 
not, as standing on an identification parade is part of the process which makes an 
investigation and any subsequent trial fair. In other words, the integrity of the criminal 
justice process is undermined where the protective principle is not in place at the pre-trial 
stage for a particular group in the population. The result is that a suspect who is part of the 
group who are not given the protections offered to the rest of society is at a disadvantage. It
108 Although volunteers are paid between £5 and £15 depending on the area in which the parade is 
conducted.
109 See, for example, Knowles [1994] Crim.L.R. 217. Incidentally, the Court of Appeal in the case 
thought that the difficulties of assembling a parade may have been overstated, without explaining why it 
thought this.
110 See the analysis of the interviews conducted with suspects, below, for a further discussion of die 
groups in society who seem reluctant to act as volunteers, or who are comparatively rare in the population. 
Each police force has discretion as to how much they pay volunteers. The methods employed to obtain 
volunteers vary from keeping a number of "regulars", searching for volunteers in public places and 
recruitment from schools or other organisations, to recruitment with the aid of employment agencies. See 
"Rich Pickings", Police Review 18/09/92, 1725.
111 See 156 Justice of the Peace (1992), 610.
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was for this reason that the Court of Appeal despaired that Rastafarians were denying 
members of their own community the protection of PACE. The Metropolitan Police 
Force112 was urged to make greater efforts to ensure that conditions were provided where 
identifications could be held for Rastafarians. The provisions of Code of Practice D can 
therefore be seen to be failing for certain sections of the community.
Where there is a problem such as the one in Campbell, it is easy for the Court of Appeal to 
urge that greater cooperation take place: it is difficult to see how it will be achieved. It is 
possible that some sort of press campaign would help, ideally led by members of those 
sections of society who are reluctant to cooperate. The act of volunteering to stand on an 
identification parade could then be portrayed in terms of helping friends and peers rather 
than aiding the police. However, there are several difficulties with taking such a route. For 
example, how do the police go about recruiting trusted community members to help with 
the campaign? How is the campaign run without highlighting, disproportionately, the 
amount of crime committed by the particular section of the community? Is the long term 
effort and expense justified when few identification procedures are needed in relation to a 
group such as Rastafarians? The solution may lie in the introduction of video libraries. 
When Campbell was originally heard, video identification was not an option, but has been 
since 1991. Whilst a video library of groups such as Rastafarians may take some time to 
build up, it would offer a better form of identification procedure than a confrontation. It is 
obvious that cash incentives do not hold enough appeal for the members of these groups. 
Although incentives must be given, the basic problem must be addressed, certainly in the 
case of Rastafarians: that of general mistrust of the police. How to do this is another matter, 
but without doing so, the provisions of Code D offer little protection. 113
112 The statement also applies to any other police force experiencing difficulties in persuading certain 
groups to volunteer to stand on identification parades.
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It can be seen that, where the suspect is a member of a group in society for which the police 
experience difficulty in finding volunteers, 114 it is unlikely that the decision of the 
identification officer to resort to some other form of identification procedure will be seen as 
a breach of Code D. It could be the case that, although the police would be unable to recruit 
suitable volunteers, the suspect would have little difficulty in doing so. Where there is an 
unexplored possibility of the defence assisting in the recruitment of volunteers, it is 
doubtful that the identification officer will be seen to have done all that is reasonable to 
afford the defendant the "right" to a parade and any identification evidence may be excluded 
under s.78 PACE.
The abstract possibility of allowing defence assistance in the recruitment of volunteers 
raises a number of questions. For example, does every suspect have the right to bring his 
or her own choice of volunteers, or does the principle only apply when the police 
experience difficulty in constructing an identification parade? 115 If the former, is there the 
danger that there will be a resulting dependence upon the defence to recruit volunteers, 
removing the onus from the police to ensure a fair parade takes place and effectively placing 
it on the suspect? Another question is whether the defence can decide that they are unhappy 
with the volunteers presented by the police and insist that they provide their own.
A number of cases have dealt with the extent to which the defence can play an active role in 
the construction of an identification parade. For example, in Thorne116 , the suspect had 
insisted upon substituting a volunteer of his choice, although the police had sufficient 
volunteers on the identification parade. The Court of Appeal held that it was up to the 
police to select the volunteers for a parade and not a matter for the suspect. This case was
113 See Gilchrist, S., "When the parade passes by" (1992) 136 Solicitor's Journal 889.
114 This also applies to members of religious groups, such as traditional Sikhs.
115 The identification officer in Birmingham appears to have little objection to the suspect bringing 
friends or family members to stand as volunteers on the identification parade.
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heard before the introduction of PACE. Code D provides that the suspect has the right to 
object to any person on the parade and that the person would be removed if practicable. 1 ' 7 
It seems to follow that, if the suspect has a substitute for the parade member objected to, 
then it will be practicable to replace the subject of the objection.
The ability of the defence to provide volunteers is the key to the first instance decision in 
Gaynoru% , where evidence of identification was excluded on the basis that there was a 
breach of Code D because the identification officer, in considering the practicability of a 
parade, had not properly exercised his discretion. The police experienced difficulty in 
assembling sufficient mixed race males for an identification parade. There was evidence 
that the defence could have made up the numbers of volunteers in a short time, and it was 
held that the suspect should have been given 24 hours to assemble a pool of volunteers, as 
there was no urgency involved. The court went further in Britton and Richards 1 ^, where it 
was held that a request of a week to find volunteers should have been acceded to. In 
addition, the Court stated that the identification officer should himself have considered 
whether the defence were in a position to help. 120
The decisions in both Gaynor and Britton and Richards are fine in principle, but 
implementation may entail problems in some cases. Firstly, who makes the decision that 
there is no urgency involved in any particular case? It is the identification officer's job to 
make any decisions regarding identification. Yet an identification officer cannot be involved 
in the investigation of the case. The decision as to urgency would therefore lie with the
116 [1981] Crim.L.R. 702
117 At Annex A, paragraph 10.
118 [1988] Crim.L.R. 242
119 [1989] Crim.L.R. 144.
120 In an effort to avoid exclusion of evidence in any subsequent prosecution (and also to achieve what 
they see to be the most reliable form of identification), many identification officers now take the initiative 
and ask suspects if they will be able to provide volunteers at a rearranged time. The points noted about the
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investigating officer, who is supposed to play no part in the identification procedure. To do 
so may invite the exclusion of evidence in court. Secondly, a number of problems arise 
even if a case is not viewed as "urgent" for identification purposes because, due to long 
waiting lists at identification suites, it is likely that some weeks would have elapsed 
between the apprehension of a suspect and the conduct of an identification parade. 
Witnesses would have to be asked to attend again, with no guarantee that a parade would 
go ahead the next time. 121 Further, with the advent of the dedicated identification suite, it 
would be impossible in many areas to give the suspect a 24 hour period (or indeed one 
week as in Britton and Richards) to find volunteers, as suites are heavily booked in 
advance. The period would be more likely to be a matter of weeks. This in turn would 
affect the decision as to urgency.
It can be seen that the courts in Gaynor and Britton and Richards may have put some 
pressure on police resources by ruling that the suspect has the right to assist in the 
gathering of volunteers where the police have difficulty in doing so. However, the cases 
also highlight the preference for a parade above any other identification procedure, and the 
willingness of the judiciary to exclude evidence where there is not strict observance of that 
preference. The problems of delay and busy identification suites could be avoided should 
the widespread use of video libraries be allowed under Code D. Video parades could be 
arranged quickly and a national library kept on computer would mean that police forces 
have access to a wide range of volunteers on video. The efficiency of identification 
procedures could be greatly enhanced without compromising on the standard of evidence 
gained.
ruling in Gaynor and Britton and Richards merely highlight problems which may be encountered in doing 
so.
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The courts offer guidance to identification officers regarding best practice in a number of 
situations. The case law discussed so far has, however, depended on the fact that there has 
been an effort to conduct an identification parade in the first place. What happens when a 
formal identification procedure is not attempted has also proved to be a problematic issue.
(v) When is a Suspect "Known?": Confrontation, Street Identification and Recognition 
Under the provisions of Code D, it is beyond dispute that the identification parade is the 
preferred method of identification procedure in all cases where the suspect is known. What 
is not beyond dispute, however, is when the identity of the suspect actually becomes 
known and whether an identification parade should be held where an informal identification 
has already taken place.
When a suspect is known to the police, Code D2.0-2.16 applies. However, the Code also 
offers guidance to police officers on how they should proceed where they do not have a 
known suspect. Code D2.ll and D2.18 provide that:
"2.17 A police officer may take a witness to a particular neighbourhood or 
place to see whether he can identify the person whom he saw on the relevant 
occasion. Before doing so, where practicable a record shall be made of any 
description given by the witness of the suspect. Care should be taken not to 
direct the witness's attention to any individual.
2.18 A witness must not be shown photographs, photofit, identikit or 
similar pictures if the identity of the suspect is known to the police and he is 
available to stand on an identification parade. If the identity of the suspect is 
not known, the showing of such pictures to a witness must be done in 
accordance with Annex D."
Whether the suspect is known to the police has caused considerable dispute in the past. For 
example, in Campbell 122 the defendant was the owner of a car involved in an offence and 
the police officer who had witnessed the offence identified him from a photograph. The
121 Whilst witnesses would probably have to attend again if an alternative identification procedure was 
proposed, at least they would have the reassurance that an identification procedure was almost guaranteed to
go ahead.
122 [1994] Crim.L.R. 357
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Court of Appeal held that, at the time the police officer viewed the photograph, Campbell 
was not a suspect who was "known" and D2.18 applied. It is submitted that the suspicion 
of the police officer, Campbell's ownership of the car, and his failure to report it stolen 
would amount to his being "known" for identification purposes. An identification parade 
could have been arranged, at which the police officer could have attempted to identify the 
offender in a way which complied with Code D. Since Campbell, Code D has been 
amended to include direction to police officers on when a suspect will be considered as 
"known". Note for Guidance 2E provides that a suspect is known where "there is 
sufficient information known to the police to justify the arrest of a particular person for 
suspected involvement in the offence".
Whilst Code D2.17 and D2.18 allow police officers to use street and photographic 
identification where they have no known suspect, if the witness identifies someone in the 
street or from photographs the police will then have a known witness. There is always a 
possibility that a witness will spot the offender by chance and it would be unfair to exclude 
evidence where the identification was of such an informal nature. There is very little the 
police can do to prevent such identifications. Indeed, common sense demands that, even if 
there was a method of avoiding chance identifications, it should not be employed, as they 
represent the most natural mode of recognition. However, once the informal identification 
has been reported to the police, they have a known suspect and, on a literal reading of Code 
D, should arrange an identification parade. Whether a parade or other procedure under 
D2.1 has to be held following a street or informal identification has proved to be a 
problematic issue.
1 1 1
The approach to the matter depends on whether the interpretation of D2.3, that "whenever a 
suspect disputes an identification, an identification parade shall be held" 123 should be 
approached literally or purposively. As Code D can be revised by the Home Secretary more 
easily than an Act of Parliament, 124 there is something to be said for a literal approach: the 
judiciary should not interfere because the executive could change any provision which 
undermined the purpose of the Code.
A good example of the purposive approach to Code D2.3 can be found in the case of 
Long125 , where the driver of a car being chased by the police managed to get away and later 
reported at the police station that his car had been stolen. The police officers who had 
witnessed the reckless driving incident entered the police station and immediately identified 
Long as the driver. Because of the nature of the identification, no parade was held. As a 
result, the defence sought to exclude the identification evidence, claiming a breach of Code 
D2.1. It was held that Long did not become a suspect at the police station until the 
identification had taken place and that D2.1 did not apply. 126
The logic behind this judgment is clear: it was due to chance that the officers bumped into 
Long, and Code D was not designed to prevent evidence of informal identifications being
123 Unless it is not practicable to arrange a parade, or a group or video identification is held: if D2.4, 
2.7 and 2.10 apply, a parade does not need to be held.
124 When the Home Secretary proposes to amend the Codes of practice, he or she publishes a draft and 
considers representations made upon that draft. The Codes must then be approved by both Houses of 
Parliament.
125 [1991] Crim.L.R. 453
126 The situation was compared to the possibility that the police officers would go to Long's address 
to further their enquiries and then identify him. In such a case there would be no need for an identification 
parade. The identification at the police station was seen as comparable: Long had voluntarily and 
unexpectedly entered the police station, as opposed to being asked to attend. (See the case of Kensett (1993) 
J.P. 620, where a speeding vehicle was on lease to the defendant. With this knowledge, the police visited 
Kensett's home. At this point, it was held by the Court of Appeal, Kensett was a suspect and an 
identification parade should have been arranged). However, the Court of Appeal did hedge its bets somewhat 
in Long, by stating that, even if there had been a breach of D2.1, then the trial judge had exercised correctly 
his discretion to admit the evidence under s.78 PACE. This addition regrettably confuses the issue.
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presented to the courts. 127 The important aspect of such informal identifications is that they 
take place by chance or "accidentally". If the identification of Long had been deliberately 
devised to enable the police officers to identify him without complying with Code D, it is 
almost certain that the evidence would have been excluded under the judicial discretion 
contained in s.78 of PACE. 128 The reasons for this are twofold: the suspect would have 
been known, for the purposes of Code of Practice D; and a planned identification which 
does not comply with Code D would be viewed as a deliberate attempt to evade the 
safeguards contained in it. 129
In using the purposive approach, the courts have had an eye to the practicalities of policing. 
This was illustrated in the case of Kelly130 where the Court of Appeal held that, when a 
complainant made a tentative identification within minutes of the offence occurring but in 
difficult light and at a distance, then the natural and sensible reaction would be to take her 
for a closer look. 131 An implicit suggestion in this approach to D2.3 is that once a street 
identification has taken place, there is usually little point in arranging an identification 
parade, because any positive identification at a parade which followed a street identification
127 Rather, Code of Practice D was designed as a coherent set of procedures for the identification of 
known suspects, and procedures for selecting a suspect by the showing of photographs, or taking witnesses 
back to the vicinity of the offence (Code D2.17).
128 See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the effect of "bad faith" actions by the police on the exercise of 
discretion under s78 PACE.
129 The case of Oscar [1991] Crim.L.R. 778 offers a further example. There, a witness identified the 
suspect within minutes of the offence, after his arrest near the scene. Oscar's appeal was dismissed, because 
the Court drew a distinction between cases where the police arrest a suspect after some days and those where 
the suspect is arrested and is subject to a confrontation within minutes. Code D was seen to be required in 
the former but not the latter type of case. The Court of Appeal unfortunately also referred to the case not as 
being a true identification case but rather one of identification of clothing. The implication was that a 
formal identification parade would have been of little use in the circumstances because the suspect would be 
wearing different clothes. See also Rogers [1993] Crim.L.R. 386.
130 [1992] Crim.L.R. 181
131 The commentary in Kelly suggests that when police officers take a witness to the suspect within 
minutes of the offence, it should be seen as a form of confrontation under Code D2.13. This is problematic, 
because D2.13 is only to be used where the alternative methods of identification under D2.1 are 
impracticable. It is difficult to see that an identification parade would be impracticable in a case such as 
Kelly . The commentary goes on to recommend that if the idea of confrontation at the scene of the crime is
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would only prove that the witness is confirming that the person on the parade is the person 
they saw in the street. This is certainly a more efficient approach, saving the time and cost 
of arranging identification parades where suites are already overbooked. In R v Hickin and 
others the Court of Appeal said that "Code D is not to be interpreted in such a way as to 
require the police to act in a manner which would be an affront to common sense." 132
However, those who favour the literal approach think it fair to offer the suspect a chance to 
show that the witness cannot make an identification from a parade. This reflects a belief that 
identification procedures should offer suspects the chance to show their innocence as well 
as give the prosecution a chance to gain evidence indicative of guilt. 133 This point was 
highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Brown, 134 where the witness had viewed the 
offender for a few seconds in poor lighting, but made a positive street identification ten 
minutes after the offence had occurred. At trial, the judge held that the street identification 
made an identification parade otiose. The Court of Appeal disagreed, pointing out that the 
witness might have had doubts or identified another person when faced with several men of 
the same description and that unless it was impracticable to hold a parade, there was no 
reason not to do so. The view of the Court was that D2.3 is mandatory, and requires an 
identification parade to be held regardless of what had gone before.
not achievable within Code of Practice D, then the Code should be amended. The recent amendment in April 
1995 has not included the suggested provision.
132 [1996] Crim.L.R. 584. The court declined to "tie the hands of the police", but did suggest that 
where there were two or more witnesses to an offence, only one should be allowed to informally identify the 
suspect. This would mean that the remaining witnesses could view an identification parade. See also Bush 
Unreported, 27 January 1998; and Anastasiou [1998] Crim.L.R. 67.
133 Whilst they followed the decision in Popat (discussed below), the Court of Appeal in R v WJjelan 
(Unreported 31 July 1998) concluded that there should be some assessment of what is useful to the suspect 
as well as what is useful to the Crown.
134 [1991] Crim.L.R.368. It is the practice in the West Midlands to hold a parade after a street or 
informal identification is made. For example, one case I observed during interviews with witnesses involved 
a street identification after an attempted robbery which took place over a period of ten minutes in good 
lighting. It was deemed necessary to follow up a spontaneous street identification with an organised 
identification parade. See also R v Macmath [1997] Crim.L.R. 586; R v Wait [1998] Crim.L.R. 67.
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Several recent cases on Code D2.3 have fuelled the debate. In Popat 135 the appellant was 
convicted of attempted rape and indecent assault following a street identification by the 
victim. The police did not hold an identification parade. In delivering the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal, Hobhouse LJ. stated that, in some situations, the holding of an 
identification parade will be required even where there has been an informal identification, 
and that the identification officer should exercise discretion in deciding when it would be 
useful to do so in "the interests of justice". Further, he said that "Code D is not to be 
construed as if it expressly provided for all possible situations. It provides a scheme to be 
followed and principles to be applied." 136 The court drew a distinction between the line of 
cases which had followed Brown and Popat on the basis that in the latter the identification 
made was "fully satisfactory", whereas in Brown and other cases D2.3 applied because of 
some problem with the original identification: 137
"If it is a one to one identification carried out under good condition and there 
is no risk of any corruption of the reliability of the identification then made, 
the identification by the witness is complete and it can truly be said that no 
further identification is required and no useful purpose would be served by 
holding an identification parade."
The court therefore firmly rejected the literal approach to D2.3 in favour of a purposive 
assessment of whether it would be useful to hold an identification parade. Hobhouse L. J. 
was firmly of the opinion that it was not correct to say that suspects who had been 
identified informally should be stood on an identification parade if they continue to dispute 
the identification.
The decision in Popat meant that where an "actual and complete" identification of the 
accused had been made, Code D2.3 did not apply. Whilst the court acknowledged that the 
assessment of whether an identification is actual and complete can be difficult to make, and
135 [1998] 2 Cr.App.R. 208. See also RvMalashev [1997] Crim.L.R. 587; El-Hannachi, Cooney, 
Ward and Tanswell [1998] 2 Cr.App.R 226; RvBell [1998] Crim.L.R. 879, where the conclusion in 
Popat that D2.3 was not mandatory after a street identification was followed, but where a parade would have 
been useful because the witness identified a group of people rather than individuals. 
136 Ibid., at 215.
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will depend on the facts of the case, it is submitted that the difficulty was underestimated. 
Furthermore, it is the police who would have to make that assessment. Whether they are 
either equipped or best placed to make those assessments is questionable. Deciding whether 
an identification is both "fully satisfactory" and "actual and complete" requires some 
examination of the fairness of the evidence. That is best left to the judge to consider when 
determining if evidence should be excluded under s.78 PACE. Popat seems to conflate the 
fact of a breach with the reliability of the evidence, and further requires the police to assess 
fairness in deciding whether to hold an identification parade. Although fewer parades could 
increase identification suite efficiency, a standard procedure is fairer and easier to 
administer.
A number of cases followed the approach in Popat , adopting a purposive approach to 
Code D2.3. It appeared that R v Forbes 13 * had swung the pendulum back in favour of a 
literal approach, by deciding that Code D2.3 is mandatory, even where the holding of an 
identification parade is of no, or very limited, utility. According to Forbes, the only 
exemptions from the duty are those specified by the Code, namely where it is not 
practicable to hold a parade, or where a video or group is held instead. In reviewing the 
decision in Popat, the court were dismissive of the requirement to assess whether there had 
been an "actual and complete" street identification in deciding whether D2.3 applied, stating 
that it was "very difficult to see how there could be such shades of grey in the answer to 
what ought to be a relatively hard-edged issue" because the terms of D2.3 are "quite 
unambiguous". 139 The court followed the reasoning in Brown, stating that the decision in 
Popat amounted to a re-writing of the Code. After Forbes, Code D was again subject to a 
literal interpretation, but it was a short-lived circumstance. In July 1999, the Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed Popat and concluded that it should be the guide until the matter is
137 Ibid.
138 The Times, May 5 1999.
139 Ibid.
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reviewed by the House of Lords. Whilst the purposive approach appears to now be quite 
settled, given the flux in the area over the 1990s it remains to be seen whether it will 
continue its ascendancy. It is submitted that, in terms of the integrity principle, it is correct 
to take the literal approach to D2.3: the purposive approach gives a great deal of discretion 
to officers in assessing fairness and increases the number of suspects who will not be 
afforded the protections of Code D. The literal approach may have its practical problems, 
but offering protection for as many suspects as possible and ensuring that the police operate 
to the discipline of procedural rules is worth some inconvenience for officers in individual
cases.
Conclusion
Code of Practice D is the focus for the operation of the disciplinary principle in eyewitness 
identification cases. The Code sets out best practice and the limits to police discretion, from 
which the courts can glean the seriousness of an alleged breach of the Code or whether any 
breach was intentional. In other words, the Code acts as a guide to officers, suspects and 
the courts, enabling all parties to assess whether the police conducted a procedure fairly. 
Cases on whether it was practicable to hold a live parade illustrate the point welling the 
police discretion whilst maintaining an emphasis on the pre-eminence of the live parade. 
The Code is also the home of the protective principle for eyewitness identification cases, 
offering protection to suspects from both intentional breaches and, to some extent, 
mistaken witnesses. It outlines the boundaries of fair and unfair procedures in many cases. 
The issue of whether real unfairness has been caused to the suspect because of a breach of 
the Code cannot be assessed from the Code alone, but it is a useful tool in judging what 
should be deemed to be fair in the circumstances. Unfortunately, those charged with minor 
offences and those who plead guilty are not afforded the evidential protections which result 
from the Code. However, most suspects do benefit from the pre-trial procedural fairness 
which Code D encourages at the time an identification procedure is undertaken.
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All formal procedures must comply with the rules governing identification, but it is 
debatable whether they apply to situations where the witness sees a suspect by chance and 
spontaneously identifies him or her. Under D2.17 and D2.18, where the suspect is not 
known to the police, witnesses may be shown photographs or taken around the area where 
the offence occurred in an attempt to identify the culprit. Whether an identification parade is 
also required has proved to be a problematic question. Where the suspect is known to the 
police and denies that he or she is the offender, the rules are more clear cut. Although 
several methods of identification may be used, the identification parade is the preferred 
method. Accordingly, a parade must be arranged in all cases where it is practicable to do 
so. In all cases where another method is used, the identification officer must be able to 
show that a parade was impracticable. Identification evidence is not only a tool for the 
prosecution, but may also serve to benefit the defence where no positive identification is 
made. The following chapters assess the ability of Code D to offer defendants protection 
from mistaken identification and evaluate police diligence in following its procedural 
guidance.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUSPECTS' PERCEPTIONS OF IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Introduction
This chapter discusses the views of suspects involved in identification procedures at 
Ladywood Police Station in Birmingham. The interviews with suspects ranged over a 
number of issues, including their general feelings about identification evidence and its 
usefulness, their understanding of the procedures involved, and how this related to their 
actual understanding of key points about what would happen once the procedure was under 
way.
The main objective in interviewing suspects attending identification procedures, which 
most commonly take the form of identification parades 1 , was to obtain their perception of 
the process and its fairness. Suspects' perceptions of the identification process have not 
been examined in any previous study of identification procedures. Yet they are the most 
important participants. Indeed, without their consent, identification procedures adhering to 
Code of Practice D could not go ahead. It is necessary to examine, for instance, how much 
suspects understand about what is about to happen on the parade, group identification or 
confrontation. Code of Practice D2 requires that the Identification Officer give a written 
copy of the Notice to the Suspect to every suspect attending an identification procedure and 
that this be read aloud to suspects. The Notice outlines what will happen during the parade 
and the rights of the suspect. Most suspects also have legal representation. A further 
objective of the research was to assess the adequacy of these methods of imparting 
information. It is only where suspects understand what is happening that they can exercise
1 In accordance with Code of Practice D2.1
2 At D2.15
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their rights under Code D. If the protections of Code D fail through a lack of adequate 
information then not only will the protective principle be undermined, but with it the 
integrity of the criminal justice process as a whole Where suspects do not understand their 
rights, then the rights effectively do not exist for that suspect, because there is no way for a 
suspect to access rights of which he or she is unaware.
Conducting the interviews
A sample of fifty suspects attending identification parades at Ladywood Police Station in 
Birmingham was interviewed between June and November 1993. 3 A further four suspects 
refused to be interviewed, and one suspect was not lucid enough to interview at the time of 
his identification parade.4 Separate samples of witnesses and suspects attending different 
parades, group identifications, or confrontations were interviewed5 . Five pilot interviews 
were initially conducted, and these indicated that a rigidly structured interview schedule 
would not be appropriate.
A sample of suspects was drawn, without regard to type of offence, sex or race of suspect, 
or whether the suspect was being detained in custody. The vast majority of interviews were 
tape- recorded. 6 The suspects were interviewed both before and after the identification 
procedure (where one took place) in order to assess any change of attitude as a result of
3 Three of the suspects approached during this period refused to give an interview, one of these on 
his legal representative's advice. Five of the fifty suspects interviewed declined to speak to the researcher 
after an identification procedure had taken place.
4 This suspect was a schizophrenic, who was deemed fit to take part in the identification procedure, 
but who did not appear to me to be able to give an interview. Also, from the identification officer's point of 
view, the time spent and risk taken in my interviewing the suspect was not advisable.
5 An initial proposal to interview witnesses and suspects involved in the same procedure had to be 
abandoned, due to a number of practical considerations. The system in use at Ladywood Police Station, 
under which parades are scheduled at two hourly intervals, made this task a difficult one to achieve. With 
only one interviewer, the time restriction proved to be too great to attempt to interview witnesses and 
suspects involved in the same procedure. This difficulty was be magnified where a procedure was attended by 
multiple witnesses.
6 Four interviews were not tape-recorded, in three cases on the advice of the suspect's legal 
representative, who was the same person in each instance. Some suspects needed reassurance that their
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appearing on a parade. One aim of the research was to examine the suspects' perception 
and knowledge of the identification process before the parade took place and their feelings 
after the experience, including their level of satisfaction with all aspects of the procedures 
involved.
An initial concern was that suspects might be reluctant to speak to a researcher, especially at 
what was for many a stressful time. Whilst this was rarely a problem, many of those 
interviewed were rather uncommunicative and needed considerable prompting to encourage 
them to speak. Others showed substantial insight into the process and what it meant to 
them.
A difficulty in conducting the interviews was that many respondents wanted to talk about 
the offence for which they were appearing on the parade7 or about other factors which 
affected their case rather than the identification process. Some took the opportunity to 
protest their innocence; others asked for legal advice or information about how 
identification procedures worked, especially where a legal representative was not in 
attendance. Steering respondents back on course sometimes proved to be a difficult task.
Cancellations and long waiting periods also made the task of interviewing suspects quite 
frustrating. Much time was spent waiting for a parade to begin, and the sheer number of 
cancellations made the process very time consuming and wasteful. For this reason, the 
expected time allocated to interviewing had to be expanded, and some days spent in 
Ladywood police station proved fruitless. Days when four parades went ahead as planned
views would be anonymous and that the researcher was in no way connected with the police service. On the 
whole, however, both suspects and their representatives seemed quite happy about the use of a tape recorder. 
7 As this would be at the forefront of their minds at the time of the identification procedure, the 
problem is hardly surprising. The difficulty was compounded by the fact that they appeared to have a 
willing listener, and as such it would have been strange if many had not protested their innocence.
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were unusual8 , and "wasted" days or half days were not uncommon. There were also a 
number of postponements due to a lack of suitable volunteers. Problems regarding the 
number of suitable volunteers occurred where the suspect was of a "singular appearance" in 
the identification officers' terminology. However, "singular" includes a number of broad 
bands, such as Rastafarians (noted nationwide to be reluctant participants); black females, 
especially when over the age of eighteen; older black males; white males with red or blonde 
hair; and men with facial hair. Whilst the Ladywood Identification Suite has no shortage of 
volunteers for the most common categories of suspect - mixed race young males, young 
black males, and white males with light brown to dark hair - other categories present more 
serious difficulties.
The difficulties discussed above meant that the task of carrying out fifty interviews with 
suspects became protracted and caused much more frustration than anticipated. The 
problems outlined above nonetheless meant that more time was spent observing the day to 
day running of the Ladywood Identification Suite, which enhanced my understanding of 
the process.
The study has a number of limitations. Firstly, it involved a small sample of cases, which 
prevented comparisons of the treatment of suspects with regard to ethnic background, 
gender, or type of offence. 9 The size of the sample also meant that comparisons of the 
"success" of witnesses and the fairness of procedures between parades, group 
identifications, video identifications and confrontations could not be made. Indeed, the vast
8 For example, in October 1993, of the 137 identification procedures booked at Ladywood, only 
fifty went ahead. Fifty-seven of those which collapsed did so within less than two days of the planned 
procedure. Where costs were incurred for a collapsed parade, the average was £53. In December 1993, 96 
identification procedures were booked, but only 37 were carried out, thirty of those which collapsed doing so 
less than two days before the identification procedure was due to be carried out. It can be seen that collapsed 
and cancelled parades account for a great deal of expenditure and lost time. (A collapsed parade incurs around 
half the cost of one which goes ahead).
9 For example, only two of the respondents were female.
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majority of identification procedures in the sample were identification parades, and so the 
discussion in this chapter focuses mainly on issues regarding parades. Second, separate 
samples of witnesses and suspects were used due to time constraints. This limits the ability 
of the study to assess the strength of an eyewitness' identification, because I did not have 
access to the full versions of witnesses' descriptions and had little or no information on the 
circumstances in which the offence took place. Third, it was not practicable to track cases 
through the system after the identification parade and so there is no information in this 
chapter regarding the use made of the identification evidence gained in the sample at later 
stages in the criminal process. Fourth, there were amendments made to Code D after the 
empirical study with suspects had taken place. The main area where this potential to create 
a difference in the results is the introduction of Code D2.0, whereby the witness' original 
description is made available to the defence by the time of the parade. It could be that the 
introduction of the provision in D2.0 has resulted in an increase in the number of legal 
representatives who advise their clients to object to parade members or refuse to take part in 
a parade. However, conversations with the identification suite staff and the impression 
gained from the empirical study with witnesses suggests that D2.0 has made little 
difference to the operation of identification procedures in Birmingham. This is unsurprising 
given the general level of apathy amongst legal representatives witnessed whilst 
undertaking this study. It can therefore be concluded that the revisions to Code D did not 
significantly change the operation at Birmingham identification suite and therefore that the 
results of this study would not be noticeably different had it been conducted after the 1995 
revisions.
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Findings
The most striking finding to emerge from the interviews with suspects was the 
overwhelming passivity of the respondents. Most possessed little ability to have input into 
their own identification procedures. This acquiescence was expressed in a number of ways. 
For example, when interviewed many respondents would not be satisfied that the 
volunteers on the parade had fulfilled the requirement of sufficient similarity. Yet it was 
rare that any objection regarding volunteers was made to the identification officer. The 
opinion of legal representatives was placed before any reservations suspects themselves 
had. Respondents tended to feel rather helpless in the face of an official identification 
procedure, and that they had no choice but to take part. There was also considerable anxiety 
amongst those respondents attending their first parade about what would happen once the 
procedure was under way. This apprehension increased amongst those suspects who not 
previously been involved in a parade. It is probable that the underlying reason for the 
evident passivity of respondents was their lack of knowledge about identification 
procedures and the rights conferred them. The effect of this ignorance is also evidenced by 
suspects' perceptions of the officers working in the identification suite, which altered 
considerably after their parades had taken place.
ft) Suspects' Characteristics and the Rate of Positive Identifications Made 
The 50 suspects questioned in this part of the research were, as noted above, a convenience 
sample. The vast majority of respondents, 96 per cent, were male, 10 and 20 per cent of 
those questioned were juveniles, 90 per cent of whom were mixed race or black males. In 
terms of ethnic background, the respondents can be categorised as in Table 1 below.
10 All five suspects who were not interviewed were adult males
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Table 1: Ethnic Background of Respondents 11
Ethnic Background
Asian
Black
Mixed Race
White
Total
Percentage
12
40
10
38
100
Suspects in my sample of 55 suspects (of whom 50 were interviewed) overwhelmingly 
faced charges relating to property offences. 70 per cent of respondents were suspected of 
involvement in theft, burglary, robbery and deception offences. Seven per cent were 
suspected of assault, seven per cent of indecent assault, and 3.5 per cent of wounding. One 
respondent was suspected of committing driving offences (which were not specified 
further), 3.5 per cent of criminal damage, 3.5 per cent of violent disorder and 3.5 per cent 
of attempted murder.
In the sample of 55 suspects, 49 per cent of suspects were identified, 42 per cent were not 
identified, and nine per cent had their parade aborted. 12 Whilst the percentage of suspects 
identified appears to be much higher than the average "hit rate" in Manchester and 
Birmingham, which was between 30 and 35 per cent in the years 1992-1995, the figures in 
my sample record the number of suspects identified, rather than the number of procedures 
where there is a positive identification. This could skew figures because parades may be 
run for one suspect but involve several witnesses. For example, only one of six witnesses 
may identify a suspect. In my study, that is recorded simply as an identification. In police
11 Police classification of the suspect on the day of his or her parade has been used. There are 
drawbacks in using this approach, as the categories are simplistic. Similar problems were encountered in 
Gudjonsson, G., Clare, I.C., Rutter, S., and Pearse, J., "Persons at risk during interviews in police 
custody: The identification of vulnerabilities", Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Research Study 
No.l2(1993)(London:HMSO), 10.
12 The 49 per cent of suspects who have been classed as "identified" were identified by at least one 
witness. Where there were multiple witnesses, even where one or more did not identify the suspect, this has 
still been taken to mean that the suspect was identified. For example, one suspect, case 22, was only 
identified by one witness out of six. However, this was seen as enough to charge him, and as such he was, 
for all intents and purposes, identified.
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statistics, there will be one identification and five "misses" recorded. In addition, monthly 
figures in Birmingham do rise in some instances to over 50 per cent. 13
The vast majority of the suspects in my study took part in an identification parade. 83.5 per 
cent of suspects took part in an identification parade on the day their procedure was 
booked, nine per cent had their procedure postponed to another day, five per cent took part 
in a confrontation (one without consent), and 1.5 per cent took part in a group 
identification. Photographs had been shown to witnesses in three suspects' cases, but in 
only one case did the photographs shown include the suspect. In two cases, witnesses 
were asked questions other than "Can you make a positive identification?", in one case by 
British Transport Police, and in the other by the suspect's legal representative.
(ii) Suspects' Lack of Knowledge about Identification Procedures 
Although the identification officer fulfilled his duty14 to read aloud the Notice to the 
Suspect and also to give the suspect a written copy, this often proved ineffectual when 
dealing with those who were participating in an identification parade for the first time. The 
failure of suspects to fully understand the Notice can be partly attributed to its hasty 
delivery by the identification officer at the Ladywood Identification Suite. Whilst 
complying with Code of Practice D, the Notice was read too quickly for the suspect to 
follow important passages in at least 35 cases. 15 It is therefore not surprising that suspects 
did not seem to assimilate the information given to them by means of the Notice to the
13 For example, in May and October 1995. The figures are also comparable to those found in my 
study on witnesses and identification procedures: see Chapter 5.
14 Under Code of Practice D2.15.
15 This point is also made by Brown, D., PACE Ten Years On: A Review of the Research Home 
Office Research Study 155 (1997) (London: Home Office),with regard to the reading of the Notice to 
Detained Persons: "What is to the custody officer a highly routinised procedure, the provision of rights, 
may not be so to the suspects, some of whom may fail to take in the information they are given" (at 244). 
The take-up of rights may also be affected by the manner in which they are orally conveyed to the suspect: 
see Brown, D., Ellis, T., and Larcombe, K., Changing the Code: Police detention under the Revised PACE 
Codes of Practice Home Office Research Study No. 129 (1992, London:HMSO). Brown et.al found mat 
rights were conveyed unclearly or too quickly in some cases.
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Suspect. In interview, the information given in the Notice was rarely mentioned and, as 
discussed later, over one third of suspects had no idea of what was going to happen during 
the parade. This was despite the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, suspects had 
received legal advice as well as the Notice before the interview was conducted. Whether 
these methods of imparting knowledge to suspects are sufficient is brought into question.
In a minority of cases, it was unsurprising that the advice given to suspects by their legal 
representatives did not appear to enhance their knowledge about their rights or about what 
would happen during the identification procedure, because representatives arrived late or 
spent very little time talking to their clients. In one case, the solicitor's firm sent a female 
legal representative to advise a client who refused to allow a woman to represent him. The 
firm were aware of this, and it made for an uncomfortable episode for the representative, as 
well as an unproductive session of legal advice for the suspect. In another case, the legal 
representative simply failed to arrive, and although the suspect was accompanied by his 
father, a lack of qualified advice may have contributed to the suspect's acceptance of what 
was an unfair parade. The suspect had a moustache, yet many of the volunteers were clean 
shaven, and none had a moustache which was as full as the suspect's. Legal 
representatives arrived over an hour late in a further two cases, and in one of these the 
representative was an ex-police officer who had not met the suspect before. He commented 
that he was unable to give his client advice on the similarity of volunteers because he found 
it "difficult to tell the difference between black people". As with other studies of legal 
advice at police stations, 16 many of the representatives attending identification parades were 
clerks, legal executives and "runners". 17 Since the time of my study, the Law Society have
16 See, for example McConville, M., Hodgson, J., Bridges, L., and Pavlovic, A., Standing Accused 
(1994, Oxford University Press), 83-90; McConville, M., and Hodgson, J., Custodial Legal Advice and the 
Right to Silence Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study No. 16 (1993 London: HMSO); 
and Sanders, A., Bridges, L., Mulvaney, A., and Crozier, G., Advice and assistance at police stations and 
the 24 how duty solicitor scheme (1989 London: Lord Chancellor's Department).
17 "Runners" tended to be retired police officers, who had considerable knowledge about identification 
procedures, but who were generally unwilling to challenge volunteers and were sometimes less than
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introduced a scheme for accreditation of legal representatives who are not qualified 
solicitors, and a study by Brown found that 18
"the proportion of unqualified legal staff advising at police stations has 
declined, due to a rise in solicitors attending and the introduction of 
'accredited representatives'. Whether this development has led to any 
improvement in the legal advice suspects receive remains unclear."
Although the sample in my study is too small to comment on the general level of legal 
advice to suspects in identification procedures, there appeared to be little difference in the 
abilities and attitudes of legal executives and qualified solicitors. Contrary to the view of 
McConville and Hodgson, 19 there was no apparent lack of confidence amongst non- 
qualified legal advisers in this study. In addition, whilst the advice given by ex-police 
officers was often lacking, some of the legal executives had extensive experience and a 
high level of knowledge about identification parades. A small number of legal 
representatives had met with their clients beforehand and had told them what to expect 
when appearing on a parade, or in a group or confrontation. However, most met their 
clients for the first time in the identification suite and offered cursory advice, and very few 
objected to any part of the identification procedure.
A further barrier to suspects' knowledge about identification procedures was that they were 
all given a written copy of the Notice to the Suspect, but only a few read it. In fact only 
seven suspects made any real attempt to read the Notice. That many suspects do not read 
their rights highlights the importance of well-delivered verbal information. A reluctance for 
suspects to read official notices was also a feature of Gudjonsson et al.'s study on the 
Notice to Detained Persons, where respondents stated that they could not be bothered to 
read the Notice, they never read forms, they found it too complicated, or had not had a
sympathetic towards their client. McConville and Hodgson (1993), ibid, suggest that non-qualified advisers 
may over-identify with the police, because they are dependant on police co-operation, or because they are 
former police officers.
18 Brown, D., (1997), op.cit., 70.
19 (1993), op.cit.
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chance to read it.20 The first three reasons could well apply to the suspects in my study 
also. Many of them appeared to be too nervous to read an A4 typed sheet, and after a quick 
glance they soon gave up.
As the volume and complexity of material contained in the Notice to the Suspect may deter 
suspects from reading it, one solution could be to hand suspects a small card with the most 
important points simply stated. It should include information regarding the right to legal 
advice, the right to have a legal representative present during the identification procedure, 
the right to refuse consent to take part in the procedure and the consequences of doing so. 
In piloting an alternative to the Notice to Detained Persons, Clare and Gudjonnson21 found 
that a laminated card containing short pieces of information increased respondents' recall of 
their rights, and arguably their ability to exercise them.22
The failure of suspects to absorb the information given to them may also be attributed in 
part to the timing of its delivery. The day of their identification parade is not the best time to 
try to explain to a suspect what will happen once the procedure is under way. This is 
because anxiety may understandably stand in the way of some suspects' ability to digest the 
information given. As one respondent put it:
"I'm listening but I'm not listening. I just want to get it over with and go" 
(Case 37).
There are advantages to giving information immediately before the identification procedure 
takes place, when consent to taking part in the parade is given, and when many suspects
20 Gudjonsson et.al., op.cit., 18.
21 Clare, I.C.H., and Gudjonsson, G., "Devising and piloting an experimental version of the 'Notice 
to Detained Persons'" Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study Number 7 (1992) 
(London:HMSO).
22 Ibid., 5 and 26. However, the positive benefits of the card were lost when combined with a more 
complicated information sheet. Clare and Gudjonsson conclude that "the most likely explanation for this 
finding is that, because the further information leaflet is very detailed, access to it confused, rather than 
assisted, subjects." (at 26). As the study was conducted under experimental conditions, it is unclear whether 
die results would be replicated under "live" conditions: see the discussion on the applicability of 
psychological research findings to the criminal justice process in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
129
meet their legal representatives for the first time. However, suspects may have more 
success at understanding and remembering information if it was given to them earlier. 
Earlier explanation of identification procedures need not be at the expense of the 
information given on the day of the identification parade. On the contrary, the retention of 
the requirement for the Notice to the Suspect to be read just before the identification 
procedure takes place would serve to reinforce and clarify important points. Whether this 
should be the responsibility of the police force involved or of legal representatives is 
debatable.
Many suspects had difficulty in actually explaining procedures, yet the vast majority, 39, 
said that they understood the procedures involved.23 This could be because of a reluctance 
to admit lack of knowledge, as in the following example:
"All it is really is an identification parade...You've nothing to know about, 
have you?" (Case 24)
Not surprisingly, those suspects who had taken part in identification procedures before 
were the most knowledgeable about what would happen. They were more likely to be 
familiar with one-way screens, the number of volunteers who would be present and other 
salient details. As one with earlier experience stated:
"I'll sit behind a black screen in a room with eight other lads, they should 
look like me. The witnesses will come in on the other side of the screen and 
I won't be able to see them, and they'll pick who they think they saw. 
They'll pick a number". (Case 23)
But most knew only the general purpose of the identification parade and little about 
procedures, as in the following examples:
"As far as I know I'm going to go in there, sit down or stand up, and the 
witness is going to come in, walk past, look at everyone. I haven't ever 
been to an identification parade, I'm only just guessing. I'm just guessing 
on what's going to happen, I don't know". (Case 2)
23 Of the remaining eleven respondents who were not certain about this point, six thought that they 
understood.
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"I'll go on, and I'll sit there with them [the volunteers] and the witness will 
try to identify me if he can". (Case 6)
"You stand with some others, about ten others, that they have to choose one 
of, the witness does. They go in and walk past you and if they recognise 
you they point you out". (Case 9)
"I just stand in line with a load of others. You're either picked out or not as 
the case may be. Far as I know anyway". (Case 10)
"All I know is, the witnesses walk past the window and if they pick you out 
then that's it...That's about all I know about it". (Case 24)
"This is my first time. I've seen like on TV when people's lined up. The 
witness has to say which one is which". (Case 29)
As can be seen above, the bulk of information given by suspects centred around references 
to witnesses viewing the identification parade and trying to identify the perpetrator of the 
offence. Most knew that a witness had to attempt to choose them, but did not know how 
the procedure was to be carried out.24 36 per cent of suspects had no real idea of what 
would happen once they were on the parade. As a rule, this was because it was their first 
involvement in an identification procedure.
It is evident that suspects who have appeared on an identification parade before are more 
confident and comfortable in their knowledge of what will happen. Those taking part in an 
identification procedure for the first time have little knowledge of the important details, 
beyond the fact that the witness has to try to pick them. This lack of knowledge seemed to 
have increased anxiety in some instances. A possible remedy might be to ensure that the 
rights given to the suspect are understood rally.
Although suspects' knowledge on the subject of identification procedures is poor, it 
appears that they are aware of the problems surrounding the use of identification evidence,
24 The limitation of knowledge to that of basic rights or information was also a feature of 
Gudjonsson et al.'s study: op.cit., 18; and Brown et. al. (1992), op.cit.
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and their fears are legitimate ones. Witnesses may have questionable memories25 , and as a 
result may mistakenly identify an innocent suspect. That this is a possibility, and that a 
conviction could result from such an identification, does not go unrecognised by suspects. 
Similarly, some of the scepticism noted in much of the psychological experimentation 
dealing with eyewitness identification and memory processes is echoed in the responses of 
suspects. For example:
"Well, it matters how long ago, after the incident, really. Memory and 
recollection fades pretty quickly. If the ED parade isn't held within the first 
two weeks I think it's basically a waste of time" (Case 11)
The time span involved in setting up an identification parade can be lengthy,26 which may 
mean that a witness's memory will fade. A speedy investigation benefits all parties and 
would ensure greater reliability of eyewitness evidence.27 The problems with reliance on an 
eyewitness's memory were highlighted in case 11 above, where a volunteer had been 
identified. The suspect continued:
"... just imagine it now if that guy was the one in my shoes. He'd have 
been going through a court case now for something he hadn't done... 
there's got to be better ways of getting a conviction".
The problem of mistaken identifications being made by witnesses is one which suspects are 
aware of,28 and worried about, as illustrated in the examples below:
"It could be anyone in that line could be picked out really, couldn't they? 
You know, I could be sitting there, you've got a one in nine chance. If you 
happen to be the unlucky one, you're the suspect and the one who they 
pick. It could be you even if you was never there or anything else. It could 
be you, you could be picked out" (Case 10)
"People can get convicted on identification evidence when it probably 
wasn't them anyway. So it should be... physical evidence, not like a geezer 
coming in and saying "Yes, that's him"". (Case 43)
25 See texts such as Loftus, E., Eyewitness Testimony (1979 Cambridge: Harvard).
26 Even where the police find a suspect soon after the commission of the offence, the waiting list for 
an identification parade is usually at least six weeks.
27 See Malpass, R.S., and Devine, P.O., "Guided memory in eyewitness identification" (1981) 66 
Journal of Applied Psychology 343.
28 Illustrations of mistaken identification can be found in Foot, P., Who Killed Hanratty? (1971 
London: Jonathan Cape) and Main, P., Mistaken Identity (1976 London: Quartet).
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"I don't think you can ever be 100% right, can you... I think that they've 
got to change it somehow, I don't know how. I don't think it's fair. Look at 
all the wrong people who get picked out. You can never be 100% sure 
unless you're like we are now... But if it's only a fleeting glimpse then you 
would have problems, wouldn't you?" (Case 1)
Whilst it was clearly important to suspects that the identification procedure provided them 
with an opportunity to prove their innocence, the experience was a bewildering one for 
most respondents. It was evident that an identification parade was viewed as something 
which happened to the suspects, rather than as an evidential procedure in which they could 
actively play a part. Suspects' understandable concern about wrongful conviction and 
mistaken witnesses did not prevent their own input into their identification parade being 
almost exclusively limited to obediently standing in line. A lack of knowledge can be seen 
to be the single main contributor to the reluctance of suspects both to take an active role in 
decisions regarding their identification procedure and to object where they are unhappy 
with any aspect of the conduct of the parade. Suspects who are unaware or unsure of their 
rights will clearly be unable to fully exercise them.
Although the Code of Practice on identification gives considerable protections to the 
suspect which ensure that the police follow coherent practices and which go some way 
towards an attempt to avoid misidentification, the protections offered are not satisfactory 
when suspects are not knowledgeable enough to be able to exercise their rights in relation 
to the operation of the parade. Without greater efforts from both the police and legal 
representatives to ensure that suspects understand the areas where they can exercise some 
control over their own procedure, Code D fails in its attempt to uphold the integrity of the 
criminal justice process, because where protections are undermined, ease of practice and 
efficiency may take over, to the detriment of suspects. Where suspects are unaware of the 
areas where they can affect the identification procedure, the Code is not fulfilling its full 
potential to protect suspects from the dangers of misidentification.
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(Hi) Suspects' Confidence in the Fairness of Identification Procedures 
When asked what they thought about identification procedures, and how they felt about 
taking part in a procedure, 18, or 36 per cent of the suspects said that they wanted to prove 
that the police were wrong. These suspects therefore saw an opportunity to extricate 
themselves, as in the following examples:
"I'm quite happy to take part. The word's not happy but I'll go along, you 
know. Take part, clear my name" (Case 7),
"Well, this policeman, he thinks I did it. It was a policeman that was at the 
scene of the crime, but it don't bother me coming here to do it, because I 
know I'm not going to get picked out, because I know that it wasn't me 
who did it" (Case 8)
"[it's] to my advantage... .Maybe because I wasn't the culprit and if I'm not 
picked, that will prove my innocence wholly" (Case 12)
"I don't really care you know, at the moment, because I never done it 
anyway. So, I'll go on a parade quite confident that I won't get picked out" 
(Case 29)
"If the suspect's been accused of something then to clear his name he can go 
in front of an identification parade ... to prove his innocence". (Case 34)
These suspects recognised the importance of identification evidence in their cases and 
hoped that, if the witness could not make an identification, it would force the police to 
abandon their investigation. After the parade, one suspect, happy that the witness did not 
identify him, stated that:
"...sometimes they can make sure they've got the right person... I've had 
an ID parade and I'm in the clear you see. If I never had an ID parade, they 
would probably have said "You're lying" and ... locked me up or 
whatever". (Case 6)
However, only 8 of the 18 suspects saw the chance to "prove" their innocence in a positive 
light, with the other 10 feeling that they were forced to take part in an identification 
procedure because the police had left them no choice in the matter:
"...the only way to prove I'm not [guilty] is to stand here, isn't it? Because 
if I don't do it, then I'm admitting guilt, aren't I? Because they're convinced 
it's me and I'm 100% sure it wasn't me. Therefore I've got to stand, 
otherwise they're going to charge me anyway" (Case 1)
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IITII'm just not happy about it. As far as I'm concerned, right, I haven't done 
what they've said I've done. They're just wasting my time. That's all 
they're doing" (Case 2)
"...it's wasting my time. It's just pissing me off because I haven't done it" 
(Case 11)
"Well, my brief... said that when they ask me to go on an ID parade I can 
refuse, but he said that if it does go any further it's always going to look 
worse for you if you've refused it. So I was in a damned if you do, damned 
if you don't sort of thing". (Case 11)
"...it wasn't me who committed the offence... If they want to go ahead with 
an identification parade then that's it. They're wasting money at the end of 
the day, because I know deep down that it wasn't me...it just isn't right. 
I'm not satisfied. I know the law just isn't going down the right way. 
Somebody ought to go about it the right way. It just isn't right" (Case 28)
IITII've got no option. I have to do it really. I don't like it. I shouldn't be here 
in the first place"(Case 39)
Although some suspects felt that standing on an identification parade was "better than just 
you on your own" (case 23)29 and "sensible ... witnesses come over and can look for 
themselves" (case 33), the overriding feeling was that there was no choice but to participate 
in an identification procedure. This feeling affected both suspects who were saw the 
positive aspects of a chance to prove their innocence and those who were thoroughly 
dissatisfied, so that 60% of suspects expressed the feeling that they had no choice in 
whether they participated or not. This was despite the provision in the Notice to the Suspect 
that the suspect be told "that he does not have to take part in a parade, or co-operate in a 
group identification, or with the making of a video film."30
29 Sitting with other people on a parade was viewed by suspects as preferable to having to undergo a 
confrontation. It is unclear whether the preference for an identification parade rather than any other form of 
identification is due to common sense, which determines that if they are placed with other people the 
witness is less likely to choose them than if they stand on their own. Alternatively, the preference may be 
due to experience, either their own or others'. It could even be the result of advice from a legal 
representative, who may have explained that government rules for police practice favour identification 
parades above other identification procedures, as categorised in Code of Practice D 2.1.
30 Code D2.15 (vi). However, the following section of the Notice provides that the police may 
"proceed covertly" should the suspect decline to give his or her consent.
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Suspicions about police malpractice were rife among the respondents in the sample. There 
was a particular concern that the police would inform the witness of their identity. Although 
suspects claimed to be confident that they would not be picked by any witness, there were 
obviously underlying worries. Horror stories were recounted, and four suspects in 
particular doubted that the police would adhere to Code of Practice D:31
"If they pick me out, I'll be more than shocked, I'll be more than shocked. 
We'll put it to the test. We'll see how honest they [the police] are." (Case 1)
"Hopefully, they'll [the witnesses] be honest people, that's all I can hope 
for, and that the Old Bill are playing it straight. I don't care what he says 
[the Inspector] about them lot playing it straight. We've all seen enough to 
know that they don't always play it straight". (Case 11)
"The police have too much opportunity to show people photographs. It 
should be before you're charged not after three months in custody" (Case 
21)
"...I never done it anyway. So, I'll go on a parade quite confident that I 
won't get picked out. If I get picked, it's the police that's told the person, 
you know" (Case 29)
Many suspects, particularly persistent offenders, were observed to be as uncomfortable 
about being in a police station as they were about participating in an identification 
procedure, with eight suspects actually expressing the feeling verbally.32 Ladywood Police 
Station is operational,33 with many people passing through, and this factor perhaps 
increases anxiety that they may not be dealt with fairly. If suspects are already suspicious 
that the police may not conduct the identification procedure fairly, then seeing people both 
in reception and walking past the identification suite could increase that suspicion. Suspects 
do not know who is connected with their case and who is not. As can be seen in the
31 Suspects' suspicions about the integrity of the police, and accounts of police improprieties, are 
documented in McConville, M, Hodgson, J., Bridges, L., and Pavlovic, A., Standing Accused (OUP 
1994), 77-78. The use of persuasive tactics by police in interviews, or the perception of the use of such 
tactics, understandably shape the impressions suspects have of police officers in all contexts: see also 
Sanders et.al (1989), op.cit.; and McConville, M., "Videotaping interrogations: Police behaviour on and off 
camera" (1992) Criminal Law Review 532.
32 Gudjonsson et.al., op.cit., found that subjects in their study also felt distressed being in a police 
station, and "appeared preoccupied about being let out of the police station" (at p. 15).
33 ie. is used for other police business. The West Midlands Police now have a purpose-built 
identification suite, which is unaffected by other police business. This solves some of the problems 
encountered during the study and may increase the confidence of suspects in identification procedures.
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following example, this worry can extend to the volunteers waiting in reception when the 
suspect arrives:
"I just don't like being here with all that lot down there. It's just like a cattle 
market... I never expected that lot to be waiting outside the front door... I 
think they should have their own place, keep it away from public view. 
Anybody could walk through that door. All they've got to do is say "That's 
him" or whatever, then you're earmarked... you don't know who's coming 
in, who's going out". (Case 1)
As can be seen from the following examples, suspects felt far from relaxed in the 
atmosphere of a police station:
"...if you've been in police stations, like I have, oh, lots of times, then 
you're on edge even if you come in to make a complaint. You don't want to 
be here. You just want to get your arse out of here, because of what's gone 
on before. I just don't want to be here. I don't like them. I don't put nothing 
past these bastards" (Case 1)
"...being in a police station is what's worrying me. I don't really like them. 
That's the only worry of probably everybody, you know, because you 
know you're innocent but when they put you in a police station, when they 
put you on an ID parade, what can you do?... Policemen stitch you up by 
telling the person who is meant to pick out the person "pick out that 
person". They can do all them kind of things". (Case 28)
"I just want to get it over with. I'm just a bit nervous being in here" (Case 
48)
When questioned after their parades, however, the vast majority of suspects, 39 in all, 
were satisfied with the way their parade had been conducted and with the arrangements in 
place at Ladywood police station. Suspects were also generally satisfied with the conduct 
of identification officers, who were seen as separate from the rest of the police officers who 
were involved. In the minds of the majority of suspects, identification officers could be 
separated from police officers conducting the investigation into their case and were seen as 
"just doing their job" (case 31). The attitude of suspects to the identification officers is a 
further illustration of the harm done by ignorance of procedures. Before their identification 
parades, many suspects doubted the integrity of the identification suite staff, because they 
did not know what to expect. Once they had had the experience of an identification parade, 
the more general suspicions about police malpractice remained, but particular fears about 
the identification procedure (such as police influence of witnesses) dissipated.
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Only six of the 45 suspects who expressed an opinion on the matter of the conduct of the 
parade had any doubts at all about the fairness of the procedure. Of these, only one was 
completely dissatisfied with the way his parade had been conducted. This suspect focused 
on the provision and behaviour of volunteers:
"Most of the people in here knew each other... all laughing and joking, 
while I just sit here... straight and normal. I stood out -1 reckon I stood out 
a lot ... everyone should have sat here all calm and normal, no messing 
about. Like I was. Then I reckon I would have stood more of a chance, 
wouldn't I?" (Case 2)
This sentiment was echoed by others who, whilst happy with the conduct of their parade, 
had reservations, for example:
"I thought everyone should have just sat quiet because it's obvious I'm not 
talking to anyone" (Case 40)
"I think they should give you more time to organise everyone in here. Apart 
from that it was all right" (Case 42)
The behaviour of the volunteers appearing on the parade was a cause of anxiety for a 
minority of suspects. The fear was that it would be obvious who was the suspect if 
volunteers were laughing and joking. This problem was also noted by the researcher during 
observation of parades. For twenty-four per cent of suspects, volunteers were chatting 
loudly, laughing, or listening to personal stereos. In over half of those cases, suspects 
either joined in, or only one or two volunteers were involved. However, five suspects did 
stand out because of a general raucousness which did not involve them. All but one of 
these suspects were identified. It is difficult to draw conclusions from such a small sample, 
and it is impossible to know how strong the eyewitnesses in the cases were. It remains that 
the behaviour of volunteers must have allowed witnesses to exclude some members of the 
parade, and so contributed to an unfair procedure. It is clear from the psychological 
literature on relative judgment that, where volunteers are listening to personal stereos or are 
chatting amongst themselves, the functional size of the parade will diminish.
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Where suspects stand out because of the behaviour of other members of the parade, there is 
an obvious undermining of the protective principle at work: whatever the number of other 
protections, if the suspect stands out in the mind of the witness because of the nature of the 
procedure as opposed to the strength of the witness' memory then mistaken identification 
may occur. The problems which did occur were not, as suspects feared, due to deliberate 
police malpractice, but rather to problems in discipline of volunteers. Officers used the 
intercom system to warn volunteers to be quiet, and so some effort at discipline was 
attempted. However, no volunteer was replaced on the parade, usually because officers 
were mindful of the time constraints they were under, and the two volunteers who were 
observed nodding in time to their stereo headphones were not spoken to at all. 
Furthermore, the suspect's legal representative objected in only one of the cases, where a 
volunteer was pointing to the person sitting next to him.
The greatest dissatisfaction expressed by respondents concerned the similarity of 
volunteers34 . Only thirteen suspects were satisfied or thought that the volunteers were "all 
right". The general feeling was that there could have been volunteers offered who had 
greater similarity to the suspects in general appearance and position in life, so satisfying the 
criteria contained in Code of Practice D. Volunteers at Ladywood police station are paid 
"regulars", a system which facilitates police routines. If regular volunteers are not 
available, it is more time consuming to find appropriate people willing to stand on an 
identification parade. At an identification suite where demand for parades is high, this could 
delay procedures further. 35 However, the police time saved by using regular volunteers 
may prove to be detrimental to some suspects, as less effort will be made to obtain those 
who are sufficiently similar. This point is illustrated in the following examples:
34 Code of Practice D2.8 stipulates that a parade should "consist of at least eight persons... who so 
far as possible resemble the suspect in age, height, general appearance and position in life".
35 A possible alternative would be to use video libraries, which are especially useful when dealing 
with "difficult" groups such as Rastafarians or traditional Sikhs.
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"It could have been better. I mean I was under the impression that there was 
going to be eight people with slim build, short dark hair and a moustache, 
but you just get whoever turns up at the front door to earn a bit of money, 
don't you?" (Case 8)
"Basically they've just gone out and picked up any young black man they 
could find,... not even people fitting my description. One of them there is 
about six foot four and as black as the ace of spades...these lads are just 
coming for their eight quid, they don't care, and the police don't care, they 
haven't got the time to be going out looking for the description" (Case 11)
"There could have been a lot more steps taken to make people look like me 
because loads looked five or six years older. They should have arranged to 
get people that look like me to come in. They should go out looking - maybe 
have a service, you know like you have a jury service, you should have to 
come to an ID parade" (Case 41)
There was a particular problem in finding volunteers for parades concerning juveniles: it 
was in those parades where the identification officers placed volunteers who were older or 
physically bigger than the suspect on the parade. For example, in Cases 14 and 15, the 
suspects were put on a double parade, because they were both juveniles, although they 
weren't particularly similar, and in Case 36 many older volunteers were used on a 
juvenile's parade.
Comments expressing dissatisfaction with the volunteers available were made despite legal 
representatives being present at the time of the identification parade. Legal representatives 
usually accepted the best volunteers from the pool offered by the police and only one, who 
acted for four suspects in my sample, was particularly pro-active about noting the level of 
similarity to the suspect. He made detailed notes regarding skin tone and similarity of 
features.36 Other legal representatives rarely made any notes at all. Legal representatives in 
only two cases made any comment to the police about the similarity of volunteers: one 
requested that the volunteers wear hats because of his client's distinctive hair style; the 
other advised his client to reject the volunteers. (This was the only case where the suspect 
rejected the volunteers.) In the other cases which were aborted, the identification officer
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took the decision that the suspect was so singular in appearance that a fair identification 
parade could not be run. Although there were many other parades which featured 
volunteers who had very different skin tones, facial hair and general appearance to the 
suspect, legal representatives did not object to the procedure going ahead. 37 These 
observations reflect the findings of Brown et.al's study regarding police interviews, where 
legal advisers only intervened in eight per cent of cases.38 Where legal representatives had 
objected in the past, they were viewed by the police officers as troublesome and 
uncooperative. Several studies have found that legal advisers are at a disadvantage in the 
police station, because they are on police territory and any intervention to protect their 
client's interests can result in obstructive measures by some officers. 39 The result in this 
study was that legal representatives overwhelmingly "fall in with police routines and are 
responsive to police expectations".40
Given the lack of intervention by legal representatives, the temptation for suspects to go 
ahead with a parade even if they are unhappy with it is understandable. The tendency of 
suspects to take a passive role in their identification parades may be attributed to a lack of 
knowledge regarding their right to object. When ignorance and confusion are combined 
with a desire to "get it out of the way" (Case 34) and a legal adviser who is happy to let the 
parade go ahead, it is not surprising that suspects do not object.
36 However, he never advised his client to object to the volunteers: rather he was gatthering evidence 
to use at any later trial.
37 For example in Case 35, where the suspect had distinctive tattoos and was wearing a short-sleeved 
shirt. Although the study was conducted before the 1995 introduction of D2.0, whereby the defence are 
given access to the witness' original description of the offender, the general lack of proactive measures 
undertaken by legal representatives in the study leads to the conclusion that D2.0 would have made little 
difference to the pre-trial actions of legal rpresentatives.
38 Brown et.al. (1992), op.cit.; higher participation rates were found by McConville and Hodgson 
(1993), op.cit. and Baldwin, J., The Role of Legal Representatives at Police Stations Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice Research Study No.3 (1992 London: HMSO). However, in both Baldwin and 
McConville and Hodgson's studies, intervention by legal advisers was often warranted but did not occur. 
39 Baldwin (1992), op.cit.; Sanders et.al. (1989), op.cit., Cape, I:., Defending Suspects at Police 
Stations (1993 Legal Action Group).
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Conclusion
Suspects' lack of knowledge of what was going to happen to them and their failure to play 
an active role41 were the most striking findings to emerge from this study. Ignorance is 
likely to increase apprehension and anxiety. It is clear that the Notice to the Suspect and the 
attendance of a legal representative, measures in place to inform suspects of their rights and 
how the identification parade will proceed, are not working as efficiently as they might. 
This is due in part to the timing of the information given to the suspect. Such a widespread 
lack of knowledge is indicative of the fact that many suspects are appearing on 
identification parades with no real grasp of the rights they have. It was rare for suspects to 
object to any aspect of the conduct of their parade, even though some felt dissatisfied, 
especially with the similarity of the volunteers paraded with them. The vast majority of 
suspects rely completely upon the advice of their legal representatives, even when choosing 
volunteers or deciding where to sit. Suspects' poor level of knowledge regarding 
identification procedures, when questioned in the few minutes before their parade took 
place, suggests that the current methods of imparting information are failing substantially.
In terms of taking part in an identification procedure, there was a general feeling of 
apprehension, particularly amongst those suspects who were appearing on an identification 
parade for the first time. This often manifested itself in comments about unfair police 
practice, and there was a general tendency for respondents to be suspicious about how the 
police would conduct the parade. There seems to be no solution to this problem, as it is a 
matter of widely held mistrust.
Some suspects were also apprehensive about appearing on an identification parade held in 
an operational police station. Identification parades are more likely to be fair when the
40 McConville et.al., (1994), op.cit, 100.
41 By, for example, objecting to volunteers or changing their position in the line.
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suspect is relaxed, because if nervous he or she may stand out from the other members of 
the parade. Therefore, holding parades in an operational police station could well bias 
procedures against the suspect. Since the study was conducted, Birmingham has a 
purpose-built Identification Suite, which should alleviate some anxiety felt by suspects 
when arriving for their identification procedure.
Suspects were aware of the dangers of mistaken identification,42 which were the subject of 
much concern. Therefore, suspects' knowledge of the workings of identification parades 
may be poor, but they are more than aware that things can go wrong. Some of their fears 
may be allayed by more careful provision of information about the safeguards in place in 
Code of Practice D, but this would be unlikely to eliminate worries. Indeed, the available 
evidence suggests that eyewitness identification is not a reliable form of testimony.43 The 
fear is that if a witness is guessing, then there is a one in nine chance that the suspect will 
be randomly chosen. A guess will then be treated as admissible evidence. This fear is 
illustrated by examination of the existence of the theory that witnesses use a "relative 
judgment process". The exponents of this theory claim that witnesses viewing an 
identification parade are likely to identify the person who most resembles their recollection 
of the offender. Of course, the person closest to a witness's memory of the offender is not 
necessarily guilty of committing the offence. In this way, an innocent suspect may be 
identified simply because he or she resembles the perpetrator more than other members of
42 General discussions of the danger of false-positive identifications are contained in Goldstein, A.G., 
"The fallibility of the evidence: Psychological evidence" in D.B. Sales Psychology in (he Legal Process 
(1977, New York: Spectrum), 233; and in Hilgendorf, E.L., and Irving, B.L., "False positive identification" 
(1978) 18 Medicine, Science and the Law 255.
43 The recognition unreliability, especially with a "fleeting glimpse" type of identification, is the 
basis of die measures in place today which attempt to keep unreliable identification evidence to a minimum. 
The case ofTurnbull[\916] 3 All E.R. 549, for example, warns of the dangers of mistaken identification in 
all cases which rely substantially on identification of the accused.
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the identification parade.44 This evidence implies that suspects are justified in their concern 
about being positively identified and subsequently convicted on the strength of the evidence 
of a witness who made a guess at an identification.
Many suspects saw identification parades as an opportunity to prove their innocence and 
were happy to be given a chance to stand in line with eight other people rather than 
participating in a confrontation. The official preference of the parade above any other 
method of identification is one which meets with suspects' approval. Many suspects see 
identification parades as a lesser form of evil - imperfect, but the best option open to them. 
However, there was a general feeling amongst the suspects in my sample that they had little 
choice but to participate in an identification procedure of some sort, and in agreeing to take 
part in an identification parade, even when they were unhappy with the volunteers offered 
by the police, they could get through the process more quickly. Suspects displayed 
reluctance to exercise their right to object to volunteers, although they did express 
dissatisfaction during their interview with me. Many were unaware that they had the right 
to object, and few had definite understanding before the identification procedure about what 
would happen during it. Legal representatives usually did little to enlighten suspects about 
identification procedures, with many arriving late and meeting the suspect for the first time 
immediately prior to the parade. As discussed earlier in this chapter, without awareness of 
the rights available to them, suspects cannot hope to exercise them. Where there is general 
ignorance, then the protections of Code D in offering suspects the opportunity to have 
some control over the procedure is nullified. Where volunteers are not objected to despite 
reservations, the protective principle is further undermined by the increased potential for 
unfairness when the functional size of a parade diminishes, in turn causing an increased 
risk of misidentification. In short, where suspects are ignorant of their rights and are not
44 On the subject of the relative judgment process, sec Wells (1984), op.cit., and Luus, C.A.I7.., and 
Wells, G.L., "Eyewitness identification and the selection of distractors for lineups" (1991) 15 Law cut!
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encouraged by legal representatives to exercise them, Code D does not offer a satisfactory 
standard of protection from misidentification.
Suspects should be given a copy of the Notice to the Suspect at the time their parade is 
booked, and should then be given verbal information and a short summary card of their 
rights on the day of the identification procedure. The current methods of imparting 
information are obviously insufficient, as most of the suspects in my sample who were 
attending an identification procedure for the first time were lacking in any knowledge other 
than that gained from seeing identification parades in movies or other forms of popular 
media. It is only by increasing suspects' understanding about identification procedures that 
their confidence in the process, their ability to exercise their rights, and therefore the level 
of real protection offered by the provisions of Code D, can be improved.
Human Behavior 43.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WITNESSES AND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the views of witnesses attending identification 
procedures in Birmingham. The particular focus is upon the confidence felt by witnesses in 
the correctness of their choice, and on the factors which influence their confidence and 
accuracy. 1 Witnesses were interviewed about how they felt about participating in an 
identification procedure and their knowledge about what would happen once the procedure 
was underway. They were also asked to describe the circumstances in which they 
originally viewed the offender, and reference is made to the Turnbull2 guidelines and to 
psychological research on witness and event factors. 3 As noted earlier in this thesis, in 
addition to the variables surrounding the witnessed event itself identification procedures can 
affect the reliability of any identification made and therefore affect the level of protection 
from misidentification offered by the criminal justice process. Witnesses were questioned 
about the identification procedure they attended, including such issues as the similarity of
1 The question of the existence of a relationship between the confidence and accuracy of eyewitnesses 
has produced an abundance of conflicting research by psychologists. The generally accepted view is that 
confidence is no indication of accuracy (see Wells, G.L., and Murray, D.M., "Eyewitness Confidence" in 
Wells, G.L. and Loftus, E.F., (eds) Eyewitness Testimony (1984 Cambridge University Press) 155). 
However, there is a growing body of research which suggests that there may be a confidence-accuracy 
relationship, especially where the viewing conditions are good (see, for example, Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, 
S.D., "Forensically relevant moderators of the relation between identification accuracy and confidence" 
(1989) 74 Journal of Applied Psychology 650.
2 [1976] 3 All ER 549.
3 The term "witness and event factors" is used here to include such issues as the effect of witnessing 
a violent crime (which, for example, may include stress and weapon focus), visibility at the time of the 
event in question, as well as individual factors such as the personal biases of the witness in question. Such 
factors cannot be influenced by procedural rules on identification. In other words, they are variables which 
are out of the control of the police when staging an identification procedure.
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volunteers,4 and the pressure upon witnesses to make a choice. Pressure can stem from a 
desire to please the police, in the knowledge of the time and effort expended to stage an 
identification procedure, and from the idea that there is "no smoke without fire". In other 
words, witnesses may feel that suspects would not be present if they were not guilty. Such 
pressure is supposedly offset by the provision in Code D, Annex A: 14, whereby witnesses 
are told that the person they saw may or may not be present on the parade, and that if they 
cannot make a positive identification they should say so. The perception of pressure to 
choose can result in a form of guessing, which can in turn increase the possibility of 
inaccurate identifications being made. Whether Code D successfully prevents witnesses 
feeling under pressure to choose is therefore explored.
The study focuses on the confidence levels of witnesses at various stages of the 
identification process. The relationship between the confidence and accuracy of witnesses 
is an important one, because where witnesses are confident it is more likely to impress a 
jury or magistrate than where they are hesitant. The acceptance of evidence could therefore 
be affected by the credibility and demeanour of the witness presenting it. Whether accurate 
witnesses are usually more confident in their testimony than those witnesses who are 
mistaken is a crucial question. This problem can affect all kinds of testimony, but is 
increased where the evidence is that of an eyewitness. As stated in the Devlin Report, 5
"Identification...is evidence of a special character in that its reliability is 
exceptionally difficult to assess. It is impervious to the usual tests. The two 
ways of testing a witness are by the nature of his story - is it probable and
4 See Code of Practice D, Annex A:8. There is some evidence to show that poor similarity of 
volunteers may affect the functional size of the identification parade, making the requirement for eight 
volunteers a nonsense: see Nosworthy, G.J., and Lindsay, R.C.L., "Does nominal lineup size matter?" 
(1990) 75 Journal of Applied Psychology 358. However, some researchers are of the opinion that the 
similarity of the volunteers to the suspect is not the important issue. Rather, their similarity to the original 
description of the witnesses is: McKenzie, I., "Psychology and legal practice: Fairness and accuracy in 
identification parades" (1995) Criminal Law Review 200. For a discussion of functional and nominal size of 
identification parades, see chapter 2 of this thesis.
5 Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on 
Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (1976 London:HMSO), at paragraph 4.25. The point is also 
made at paragraph 1.24.
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coherent? - and by his demeanour - does he appear to be honest and 
reliable?...But in identification evidence there is no story; the issue rests 
upon a single piece of observation...Demeanour in general is quite 
useless...Witnesses who are themselves convinced of the truth of their 
identification and who are able to impart to a jury their own sense of 
conviction, have not infrequently been found to be mistaken."
Whether or not there exists a confidence-accuracy relationship has great potential to affect 
the integrity of the criminal justice process with regard to eyewitness identification, because 
if there is no positive relationship between confidence and accuracy, the danger of 
wrongful conviction is heightened. Conversely, the conviction of the guilty could be 
obstructed where the correct evidence of a hesitant witness is not accepted. Ideally, the 
system should have in place strong protection for suspects from erroneous but convincing 
identifications.
The relationship between confidence and accuracy may therefore be of prime importance to 
the outcome of any prosecution in a case involving disputed eyewitness testimony. The 
confidence-accuracy relationship is inherently difficult to assess where the identification is 
made in a real, rather than simulated, situation, because there is no way of knowing 
whether a positive identification of a suspect is accurate or inaccurate. Picking out a 
volunteer, however, can be reliably classed as an inaccurate identification. Rather than 
entering into the debate on the existence of a confidence-accuracy relationship, this chapter 
seeks to assess the effect of parade factors, event factors, and whether witnesses' choices 
are confirmed on their professed confidence levels.
It was a striking finding of the study that many witnesses used a relative judgment process 
when choosing from the identification parade. Quite often, those members of the parade 
who were unlike the offender were discounted quickly, and a comparison of the remaining 
members was undertaken to see which one looked most like the offender. There is a danger 
that witnesses are simply choosing the person who is the most similar in appearance to the 
suspect, rather than looking at each parade member in isolation and deciding whether or not
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they are the offender. This can be fatal for the innocent suspect who shares some of the 
offender's characteristics, as was illustrated by the cases which triggered the Devlin 
Committee's inquiry into eyewitness identification evidence, those of Luke Dougherty and 
Laszlo Virag. 6 This chapter, in outlining the extent of the use of the relative judgment 
process7 amongst the sample of 50 witnesses, explores the problem of its use, especially 
where witnesses are very confident that they are accurate.
Conducting the interviews
A sample of 50 witnesses attending identification procedures in Birmingham was 
interviewed, before and after the viewing of the procedure, between August and October 
1995. A further 19 witnesses were interviewed before the viewing of an identification 
procedure only. 8 All interviews were tape-recorded. A pilot study of five interviews was 
conducted to assess the suitability of the questions posed.
The fifty interviews took place at two sites, Dudley Road and Bridge Street West Police 
Stations.9 Witnesses wait at a different police station from the one housing the 
identification suite, in order to prevent any accidental viewing of the suspect (or any of the 
volunteers) prior to the identification procedure. 10 In order to have sufficient time to speak 
to witnesses before they viewed an identification procedure, interviewing involved 
travelling between the two police stations. In this way, it was ensured that witnesses were
6 Ibid., chapters 2 and 3.
7 Wells, G., "The psychology of lineup identifications" (1984) 14 Journal of Applied Psychology 
89.
8 Out of these 19 cases, the identification procedure did not go ahead in 17, for a variety of reasons, 
the most common being the non-attendance of the suspect. The remaining two witnesses did view a 
procedure, but left the Identification Suite immediately afterward. Two witnesses refused to speak to me. 
These were bank staff who did so on the advice of a senior member of their company. One further witness 
agreed to be interviewed but spoke very little English. The interview was, to all intents and purposes, 
abandoned for this reason.
9 Bridge Street West Police Station is the site of the purpose- built Identification Suite, and differs 
from the site used for identification procedures when interviews with suspects were conducted two years 
earlier.
10 Such a viewing would be likely to constitute a breach of Code D, Annex A: 12.
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interviewed both before and after their viewing of the identification procedure. Changes in 
confidence levels and in opinions about the organisation of identification procedures were 
monitored.
Without exception, the main sample of 50 witnesses viewed identification parades." As 
with suspects, the sample of witnesses was drawn without regard to the type of offence 
they had witnessed, the sex, race or age of the witness or the suspect, or whether the 
suspect was in police or prison custody at the time of the identification procedure.
Under Code D, Annex A: 14, all witnesses are required to walk along the line at least twice 
before making a choice. The identification officer routinely writes down, in the presence of 
the suspect's friend or legal representative, the words spoken by each witness. It was noted 
in Birmingham that where witnesses simply state that they are unsure, the identification 
officer will not press them further. Witnesses can be frustrated by being unable to 
elaborate, as was the case with witness 44:
"All I said was 'not sure' and he didn't ask me anything else. It could have 
been number 9,but he didn't ask me."
The identification officer was right to take the approach he did, because any tentative 
identification made would not be evidentially strong. Indeed, where witnesses did choose, 
but were tentative or stated that they were not one hundred per cent sure, statements were 
not taken. It is impossible to say if evidence from an unsure witness would ever be used in 
cases in Birmingham, as there were only three instances of tentative identification during 
my study, one of which was an identification of a volunteer.
150
ft) Problems and Limitations
There were a number of limitations borne in mind when conducting this study. It is 
important to note that a different sample of cases was used for suspects and witnesses. It 
would have been preferable to follow cases through, having interviewed both main 
participants. However, this was not a realistic option. Firstly, time constraints in the 
identification process would have made the task a difficult one to achieve. 12 It is also likely 
that defence solicitors would have objected if I had planned to speak to both parties, with 
the suspicion that witnesses would be given clues as to the appearance of the suspect. Time 
constraints also affected my ability to follow cases through to their conclusion, given both 
the time taken for a case to reach court and the time available to me for empirical study.
It follows that the findings from a small scale study such as this run the risk of distorting 
the importance of identification evidence in criminal cases, especially where the case is not 
followed through to any court hearing. Similarly, there is a danger that the time spent in the 
identification suite did not offer a representative sample of cases. In order to counter this 
danger, data are compared with monthly averages obtained from the Identification Suite 
over a two year period. Whilst this only gives comparisons as to positive identification 
rates and "collapsed" procedures, an indication will be gained of the general applicability of 
the findings from the sample used. 13
Whilst the study of suspects' perceptions of identification procedures was accompanied by 
the observation of their parades, the present study with witnesses did not involve
11 Out of the 19 respondents remaining, one had been told that she was to view a group 
identification.
12 As discussed above in Chapter 4.
13 See Appendix D for identification figures from Birmingham and Manchester Longsight 
Identification Suites.
15 1
observation of the actual procedure. 14 This meant that no comparisons could be made 
between witnesses who had spent a long time viewing the parade and those who made 
immediate identifications, for example. 15 It was impossible to follow the arrangement of 
procedures in the identification suite through from start to finish. This was because 
witnesses wait at a different site, and interviews often took place whilst the parade was 
being arranged. However, adopting this approach had the benefit that all aspects of the 
identification procedure were covered over the course of interviews with both suspects and 
witnesses. Witnesses were also interviewed immediately after their viewing of the parade 
and I waited outside the viewing corridor.
Conducting interviews in two sites in Birmingham in itself led to many hurried journeys 
across the city. More problematic, however, was the lack of communication between the 
two police stations. The waiting area for witnesses in the Dudley Road Police Station was 
open only for limited hours. Although the station was quiet and provided sufficient space 
for a witness waiting room, police there often had no idea of the number of identification 
procedures scheduled or the number of witnesses expected on any day. Where witnesses 
made their own way to the station, there was often no attending witness officer present on 
their arrival to ensure that the requirements of Code D, Annex A: 12 were met. This 
provision states that the witness officer is responsible for ensuring that witnesses do not 
communicate with each other about the case, see any member of the parade (including the 
suspect), or be reminded of any photograph or description of the suspect before the parade. 
In some instances, witnesses had ample opportunity to discuss the case by the time witness 
officers arrived, reducing the protection intended by Code D and increasing the risk that 
witnesses would affect each other's memory of the offender, thereby potentially increasing
14 As my arrival at the Identification Suite would be at a time when the procedure had been arranged 
and the suspect was seated, a request for consent to view the parade would have added stress to the suspect, 
and would most likely have been met with a refusal.
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the risk of misidentification. Much of the time wasted when conducting interviews with 
witnesses could have been prevented had myself or the staff at Dudley Road Police Station 
been informed by the Identification Suite staff that the identification procedure would not 
go ahead and witnesses would not be attending.
The facilities at Dudley Road station are far from satisfactory. The witness waiting room 
has limited refreshment and entertainment provision. Whilst this may seem a minor point, it 
was a cause of much complaint amongst witnesses. Some witnesses were left waiting for 
hours in a cold room without a hot drink, TV and magazines, or a comfortable chair to sit 
on. This is in contrast to the witness waiting rooms at the fairly new purpose-built 
identification suite at Bridge Street West Police Station, which are much more comfortable. 
Yet witnesses spend a very short time, on average five minutes before the procedure and 
five minutes afterwards, in a witness waiting room in the identification suite. The poor 
facilities at Dudley Road Police Station were a source of complaint for 62 per cent of 
witnesses in the study.
Witnesses commonly had a long waiting period because of the way identification 
procedures are organised. They are asked to arrive at Dudley Road at the same time the 
suspect is expected to attend at the Identification Suite. The arrangements for the procedure, 
such as the reading of the Notice to the Suspect 16 and the choice of volunteers, 17 are 
conducted at that point. Witnesses are left waiting at the other police station whilst this 
happens. The average waiting time was over one hour with some witnesses waiting over 
two hours, which can seem a waste of time because nothing appears to be happening.
15 In observing parades in my study on suspects' perceptions of the identification process, the longest 
time a witness took to view the parade before making a choice was just under two minutes. Most 
identifications take place very quickly: see Chapter 4.
16 Found in Code D2.15.
17 For some suspects, this is the point at which volunteers are looked for. For others, enough 
volunteers will have attended the identification suite and there will simply be a choice. The latter course is 
obviously less time-consuming.
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However, if the procedure was arranged before witnesses had to arrive at the station and 
they then did not attend, there would be a considerable waste of police time and resources.
The length of the whole process provoked much comment from witnesses, who had 
usually taken time from work or family commitments. There was general dissatisfaction 
with what often amounted to a half day spent in police stations waiting for an identification 
procedure which took only minutes to be completed. This dissatisfaction was increased 
where witnesses had attended more than once for the same offence, as in the following 
examples:
"It has cost a day's wages just for me to come here, and hours of waiting 
around. Giving him another chance to get off with it as far as I'm 
concerned...! don't see why he should have that chance. If he hadn't turned 
up then it would have fell through again. Why have that other chance, 
taking it later in time?" (Case 13)
"This is the third time I've been here and nothing has happened yet...It was 
quite annoying...(l) not knowing if it was going ahead, and (2) not 
knowing when. I think a really major thing as well is not having a really 
nice, calming room, like a Green Room for people to sit in. It is not 
conducive to saying, 'Will you come back if it does not go ahead now?'" 
(Case 63)
"Well, I feel happy to help the police. But the last time we came they 
couldn't organise it and now they have called us again and there is no sign 
that it will happen. So it seems that we are victimised twice, not once. Once 
in the City Centre and once in the police station. If they can't organise the 
parade then they shouldn't call the witnesses in." (Case 65)
It was striking that, although no specific question was asked about the waiting period 
during the interviews with witnesses, 34 per cent 18 of the main sample mentioned it 
spontaneously during their interview. 19 Comments outside of the interview regarding the 
waiting time were made in 83 per cent of all cases. 20 A consequent concern of the 
researcher was that after a long wait, witnesses might not wish to take extra time to be
18 Where necessary, percentages are rounded up or down to the nearest whole percentage.
19 The number was lower for those 19 respondents who were interviewed only before their procedure 
(hereafter referred to as the PPI sample), 16 per cent, making for a combined percentage of 29 per cent. 
However, when it is considered that the PPI respondents would be interviewed only at the beginning of their 
wait, this is not surprising.
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interviewed after they had viewed an identification parade. In the event, this only occurred 
in two cases. Although a long waiting period was the cause of much frustration for 
witnesses, it was not without its benefits for the researcher because witnesses tended to 
chat in a relaxed way about their feelings.
Related to the long periods of waiting is the recurrent problem of late cancellations of 
parades. It has already been noted that those witnesses who were attending for the second 
or third time in relation to the same offence and suspect expressed a great deal of 
dissatisfaction about the time taken up by the identification process. It can therefore be seen 
that the cancellation of identification parades at a late stage is counter-productive to retaining 
the goodwill of eyewitnesses.
After the interviews with suspects attending identification procedures had been conducted, 
the West Midlands Police moved its Identification Suite site to Bridge Street West Police 
Station. This resulted in a great improvement in the facilities available, although a number 
of problems remain. Late cancellation and postponement of parades are two of those 
problems. Cancellations a couple of days before the procedure is due to take place only 
affect witnesses indirectly, because they are usually informed by the officer in charge of the 
investigation that they will no longer be required to attend. However, it will mean that there 
will be a longer period of time between the offence and the identification procedure. An 
increased retention period has been found by psychological researchers to result in a decline 
in accurate identifications, and possibly an increase in incorrect identifications. 21 If 
procedures are cancelled at a stage where it is too late to move forward or book another 
suspect's parade, then the identification suite will be left empty, a considerable waste of
20 This broke down as follows: 84 per cent of respondents from the main sample and 79 per cent of 
respondents from the PPI sample spoke of their dissatisfaction whilst waiting.
21 Shapiro, P.N., and Penrod, S.D., "Meta-analysis of facial identification studies", (1986) 100 
Psychological Bulletin 139.
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resources. The long waiting periods for identification parades are in part due to the 
inefficiency of the system. Not only do postponements waste resources, but they add to the 
congestion in bookings when they are re-scheduled. Although as a rule four parades a day 
are booked, fewer are held. This has not noticeably changed since the opening of a 
purpose-built suite. Indeed, the problem is exacerbated, because expensive facilities lie idle 
and more staff are working at a slow rate, resulting in greater financial loss than when there 
were fewer resources available for identification. There is little attempt to fit new bookings 
into cancellation slots, or to move existing bookings forward.22
When there has been no prior cancellation of an identification procedure, witnesses feel the 
effects the most. Cancellations occur for a variety of reasons, such as where the suspect 
fails to attend. If this is the case, witnesses wait for at least 30 minutes only to be informed 
that the identification procedure has been postponed. Where an identification parade is 
postponed because of the lack of availability of suitable volunteers, or defence objections to 
the volunteers offered to them by the police, the waiting period is likely to be much longer 
than 30 minutes before witnesses are informed that the parade will not go ahead.
In 17 out of the 69 cases in the study, no identification procedure went ahead, and there 
were other cases where Identification Suite staff informed me that it would be pointless to 
attend. This was because they knew that they would be unable to produce a sufficient 
number of suitable volunteers and the parade would not go ahead. 23
Although there are now more staff assigned on a full time basis to the running of 
identification procedures in Birmingham, these are used mainly in a clerical capacity, or to
22 For further discussion about the inefficiency of the Identification Suite in Birmingham, see 
Chapter 6.
23 Indeed, none of the 12 cases where police anticipated difficulty in assembling a suitable parade 
resulted in the successful running of an identification parade, or other identification procedure, on that day,
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find and supervise the volunteers who sit with the suspect on the identification parade. 
Officers from the same station as the investigating officer, rather than identification suite 
staff, are responsible for looking after the witnesses before the procedure is underway. As 
with the period spent in the Identification Suite when interviewing suspects, the majority of 
police errors observed involved allowing witnesses to talk with each other about the case, a 
breach of Annex A: 12(i).
The main practical function of the witness officer is to prevent discussion between 
witnesses about the case or the description of the offender.24 The witness officer was late 
or left witnesses alone in the waiting room on seven separate occasions during the study. In 
three of these cases, the witness officer was absent for the majority of the time.25 Although 
this number is fairly small, it represents a large enough proportion of cases to be of 
concern.26 To be fair to the officers involved, attempts to limit the difficulties in adhering to 
Annex A: 12 were observed during the study. For example, in many instances (especially 
where there were three or more witnesses attending a procedure) more than one witness 
officer was in attendance. This kept to a minimum any difficulty caused by one officer's 
short absence, for example to contact the identification suite or take one witness to the 
toilet. Identification suite staff also regularly reminded officers of the provisions of Code 
D, and placed photocopies of Annex A: 12 around the waiting area and the identification 
suite itself. This is a step in the right direction, but because of the lack of trained and well- 
informed witness officers it does not always have the desired effect. Where witnesses are 
left alone, there is a danger that they will discuss the appearance of the offender and distort 
their own memory of events. Although the Code cannot prevent such discussion outside of
24 The basis of this provision is the prevention of contamination of a witness 1 memory. For 
psychological theory and experimentation on the matter, sec Loftus, E., "Leading questions and the 
eyewitness report" (1975) 7 Cognitive Psychology 560.
25 The length of absence varied from a couple of minutes to 55 minutes.
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the police station, it attempts to offer protection from such contamination of memory while 
witnesses are attending the identification procedure itself. The protection is far from perfect 
in the first place, but it diminishes to no protection at all when witness officers omit to 
perform their duty. Contamination of memory poses a risk of misidentification occurring, 
and therefore more should be done in order to maximise the protection Code D offers in 
practice.
Findings
Out of the fifty cases in the study where the identification procedure went ahead, twenty- 
eight per cent of witnesses made no choice, eighteen per cent chose a volunteer and fifty- 
four per cent chose a suspect. The first thing to note about these figures is that the number 
of positive identifications made are much higher than the average percentage "hit rate" in 
both Manchester and Birmingham, which sits at 30-35 per cent over the years 1992-1995. 
However, it is clear that the percentage of positive identifications in Birmingham, although 
averaging around 33 per cent, has risen in some instances to over 50 per cent. 27 In my 
study on suspects' perceptions of identification procedures, 100 witnesses viewed parades 
for 55 suspects. Of those, 46 per cent chose the suspect, 22 per cent identified a volunteer 
and 32 per cent made no choice. It can be seen that the figures from my earlier study are 
comparable to those gained in this study.
The number of "collapsed" procedures, where parades did not go ahead, totalled 29, or 36 
per cent, in my study. In seventeen of these I interviewed the witness prior to the 
identification procedure. In the remaining twelve, the Identification Officer advised me the 
day before the parade that it would not go ahead. These 29 cases do not include the
26 In none of these cases was the issue brought to the attention of the suspect's legal representative. It 
is likely that that is usual for breaches of Annex A: 12, because witnesses are kept at a separate site to 
suspects. If so, then many breaches of Code D go undetected each year. 
21 For example, in April, September and November 1994; and May and October 1995.
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instances where parades were cancelled more than two days in advance. The percentage of 
procedures which were not carried out in my study is comparable to both Birmingham and 
Manchester, where "collapsed" parades occurred at rates between 39 and 69 per cent. The 
figures from the identification suite in Birmingham are generally higher than those in 
Manchester, largely because they include instances where parades were cancelled more than 
two days in advance.28
(i) Witness Characteristics and Biases 
(a) Gender. Age and Ethnicity
As was noted in relation to the interviews with suspects attending identification parades, the 
majority of suspects were male. In the main sample, 49 out of the fifty cases involved 
suspects who were male. 29 The majority of witnesses, 66 per cent, were also male, leaving 
the most common relationship being a male witness attempting to identify a male suspect. 30 
Eighteen, or 39 per cent, of the male witnesses interviewed were also victims of the 
offender in question. This increased to 55 per cent where the witness was female, 
suggesting that although there are fewer female witnesses attending identification 
procedures, the ones who do attend are the victims of the offence, rather than bystanders, 
on a more regular basis. Although the sample is small, and so may not be representative of 
cases overall, witnesses who are also victims of the offence generally experience greater 
stress both in experiencing the event and attempting a later identification of the offender. 31 
An increase in stress can reduce the reliability of any identification made, as discussed later 
in this section.
28 For further discussion of the cost of identification procedures, and the inefficiency of the current 
system, see Chapter 6.
29 In the PPI sample, all suspects were male.
30 In some cases, more than one witness to the same offence was interviewed, because their 
experiences will necessarily be different on a personal basis. In terms of correspondence of witnesses and 
suspects both on gender and race bases, a suspect may appear more than once. However, figures on race and 
gender, and their correspondence, are still valid: die suspect was in effect experiencing a different 
identification procedure for each witness.
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Out of the 69 cases, twelve involved juvenile suspects. Four of these were white, seven 
were black and one was mixed race. Twelve of the witnesses were also juveniles, five of 
whom were victims of the offence in question. Four were Asian, 7 were white and 1 was 
black. Table 1 shows the ethnicity of all respondents and the suspects they had been asked 
to view.
Table 1: The Ethnicity of Participants in the Study
Asian
Black
Mixed Race
White
Total
Witnesses
18
3
-
48
69
Suspects
12
20
9
28
69
The general descriptions used by identification suite staff when advertising for volunteers 
are followed in Table 1. The ethnic categorisations are very simplistic,32 but as they are 
used routinely by police officers in the identification suite, and I did not see all suspects to 
make my own judgment, using police descriptions was a practical necessity.
It can be seen from Table 1 that the majority of witnesses viewing identification procedures 
were white. Similarly, the majority of witnesses were attending the Identification Suite to 
view a white suspect. Despite this, other races, especially black suspects, were over- 
represented in terms of percentage of population. This is borne out by the interviews 
conducted with suspects, where twenty respondents were black and five mixed race,
31 Deffenbacher, K.A., "The influence of arousal on reliability of testimony" in S. Lloyd-Bostock and 
B.L. Clifford (eds) Evaluating Witness Evidence (1983 London: Wilcy), 235.
32 For example, Afro-Carribbeans and Africans are both categorised as "black". Similarly, there is no 
precise breakdown of the term "Asian" (the tenn includes Indian , but not Chinese or Malaysian people, for 
example).
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totalling half of the sample.33 As the sample is small, it is impossible to speculate on the 
reasons for, or wider implications of, the over-representation. However, some of those 
respondents who had witnessed an offence committed by a black or mixed race offender 
did tend to adhere to social stereotypes of the criminal activity of those groups, as in the 
following example:
"These people doing these things, it's all black men. Since it happened, I'm 
suspicious of all the black people coming into the shop. It's not just because 
of what happened, it's because they're all doing it. "(Case 2)
The general tendency of witnesses to guess or choose the person who most resembles the 
offender increases where a witness simply looks for a certain colour or shade of skin. 
Table 2 shows how the ethnicity of respondents and the suspects they were to view 
corresponded on a case by case basis.
Table 2: Ethnic Relationship Between Respondents and Suspects
White suspect/ white witness
White suspect/ asian witness
Black suspect/ white witness
Black suspect/ black witness
Black suspect/ asian witness
Asian suspect/ white witness
Asian suspect/ black witness
Asian suspect/ asian witness
Mixed race suspect/ white witness
Mixed race suspect/ black witness
Total
Percentage
37.5
3
19
1.5
8.5
1.5
1.5
14.5
11.5
1.5
100
46 per cent of respondents attended an identification procedure where the suspect had a 
different ethnic background to themselves. It is usual that a witness will find it easier to 
identify someone of the same race than of another ethnic grouping. 34 The potential for the
33 See chapter 4 above. A detailed discussion of the possible basis of the apparent over-representation 
of black and mixed race suspects is outside the scope of this study.
34 On the existence and causes of own-race bias, see Lindsay, R.C.L. and Wells, G.L., "What do we 
really know about cross-race identification?" in Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford (1983), op.cit.; and Bothwcll, 
R.K., Brigham, J.C., and Malpass, R.S., "Cross racial identification" (1989) 15 Personality and 
Psychology Bulletin 139.
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use of relative judgments or for misplaced confidence is therefore greater in almost half of 
the cases in the study, as those witnesses would be unable to differentiate quite as well as 
would a member of the same ethnic background as the suspect. Witnesses were asked 
about the sufficiency of similarity of parade members, and the following examples illustrate 
the dangers of own-race bias well:
"They were all Asian, that's all I saw" (Case 10)
"Black people, they do tend to look more like others than, say, white 
people." (Case 42)
"Well, they were all black" (Case 48)
"Not being prejudiced but he's coloured black and to me they're all blacks. I 
find it hard to recognise them." (Case 62)
Two of these four witnesses made a choice and were very confident, when interviewed a 
few minutes after their parade, that they were correct. The role of expectations and 
stereotyping, especially with regard to identifying those of other races, is discussed in 
some detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
(b) Stress
It is well established that, while there are individual differences between eyewitnesses,35 
accuracy can nevertheless be affected by other factors. 36 The conditions surrounding an 
eyewitness's original encounter with an offender undoubtedly affect the ease with which 
the individual witness will successfully encode, retain and retrieve the information 
contained in such an encounter. 37 It follows that the circumstances surrounding a witnessed 
event could affect the reliability of any eyewitness identification evidence later adduced in
35 Examples of research in this area can be found in Loftus, E., Eyewitness Testimony (1979 
Cambridge: Harvard), chapter 8 and Stephenson, G.M., The Psychology of CriminalJustice (1992, 
Oxford: Blackwell) 164-168.
36 There is extensive research on the type and effect of differing witness and event factors. For a 
general review see Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, S.D. Mistaken Identification (1995 Cambridge University 
Press).
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court. It is for this reason that the Turnbulf 91 guidelines require an assessment of the quality 
of identification evidence before it is left to the jury.
Police officers tend to view a no choice as a simple failure to identify an offender who was 
present. The witness who chooses a volunteer is clearly mistaken. It was an aim of the 
study to assess whether the circumstances of the original offence for those witnesses who 
chose a volunteer or who did not choose at all were generally less conducive to accurate 
identifications than in those cases where the suspect was chosen. In doing so, certain key 
aspects of the offences were examined, including stress, visibility and length of time 
available to view an offender, both of which are taken into account when assessing the 
quality of eyewitness evidence in court.
It is likely that the stress aroused by a violent incident will adversely affect the accuracy of a 
later identification.39 Witnesses attended the police station with regard to a variety of 
offences, and a sample of fifty is too small to make comparisons on the basis of type of 
offence. However, it is useful to compare the number of positive identifications made by 
witnesses to violent and non-violent offences. The increased stress levels involved in 
witnessing a violent incident may be a factor which tends to decrease identification 
accuracy,40 as documented in the psychological research on "weapon focus". 41 This is 
because of the interference that extreme stress may have upon a witness's perception of an 
event.
37 Such event factors are the subject of much psychological experimentation. See, for example, 
Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., and Martens, T.K., "The reliability of eyewitness identifications: The role of 
system and estimator variables" (1987) 11 Law and Human Behavior 223.
38 [1976] 3 All ER 549
39 See Deffenbacher (1983), op.cit.
40 This idea is generally termed the Yerkes-Dodson law, which states that stress can aid learning and 
perception up to a point, after which performance begins to decline. Examples of literature in this area can 
be found in Loftus (1979), op.cit., 33 and Deffenbacher (1983), op.cit. on the optimality hypothesis.
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A far greater number of violent than non- violent offences were the subject of identification 
parades in this sample. Robbery (including attempted and armed robbery), aggravated 
burglary, assault, wounding and sexual assault numbered 47 (68 per cent) of the sample as 
a whole.42 This is consistent with the average spread of offences in Birmingham in 
1993,1994 and 1995.
As the eyewitnesses who were the victims of crime were likely to experience greater stress 
levels than those who were bystanders, the problems of interference with the memory by 
increased stress theoretically are the highest for victims of a violent crime. Of those 
respondents who chose a volunteer, and were therefore mistaken, over half were victims of 
the offence in question. Of those witnesses who chose a suspect (54 per cent of the main 
sample) 18, or 66 per cent, had witnessed a violent event and 12 (or 44 per cent) were 
victims of crime. It appears, therefore, that violence of an incident and increased stress 
from being the victim of a crime, did not greatly affect choosing and confidence in the 
identification procedures in this study. However, the sample is a small one. It may also be 
that, although the rate at which witnesses made a choice is not affected, accuracy rates are.
Whilst it has been found that extreme stress did not affect the choosing and confidence rates 
of the sample as a whole, the effect of stress on individual witnesses came across quite 
strongly during interviews. It became clear that individual differences in identification 
ability and personalities accounted for the varying coping strategies employed. Put simply, 
some eyewitnesses could cope with stressful situations better than others. One particularly
41 See chapter 2 above for a discussion of the psychological experimentation conducted on the 
presence of weapon focus, and Kramer, T.H., Buckhout, R., and Eugenic, P., "Weapon focus, arousal and 
eyewitness memory? Attention must be paid" (1990) 14 Law and Human Behavior 167.
42 This broke down as follows: 30 (60%) of respondents in the main sample and 17 (90%) of the PPI 
sample had witnessed a violent offence.
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striking example of the effect of being the victim to a violent event illustrated the theory of 
"weapon focus":
"I looked up and glanced and then I saw the knife and I never took my eyes 
off it again. Hopefully I will pick him, but I didn't really look at him at all." 
(Case 4)
This respondent's confidence was clearly affected and she made no choice. The current 
sample is not large enough to make any firm conclusion on the effect of stress on 
identification accuracy, but it is clear that individual respondents were greatly affected by 
the events they witnessed.
(c) Fears and anxieties
Many witnesses felt natural anxiety about their ability to identify the offender and a desire 
to further the prosecution case. The anxiety to be "successful" and to aid the police in the 
prosecution of the offender also led to pressure to make a choice, with the anxiety centring 
around making the 'right" choice:
"You just feel as though you've let them down. They've organised all this 
to try and put this man away and I didn't recognise him so it's a waste of 
time." (Case 4)
"I was just worried because I kept thinking, say if now when I've picked 
number 9, say its the wrong one and say it was number 6. I'm thinking, is 
that going to ruin it all, is that going to let him get away with it." (Case 13)
"It's like, if they turn round to me and say, well you picked number 9 and 
he was one of the stooges, well, I'll be, OK, carry on, do whatever you've 
got to do. But I'd feel like I'd made a right balls-up." (Case 19)
"I'm anxious that I'll be successful, that's all." (Case 34)
"I'm anxious that I'll still be able to recognise the chap that did it. It's been a 
good few weeks now." (Case 49)
These witnesses had understandable concern that they would in some measure fail to help 
the police prosecute the offender.
Related to this is the general nervousness felt by witnesses at some point during the 
procedure. Out of the 50 respondents in the main sample, 33 commented during the pre-
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parade interview that they were nervous or frightened. Nervousness before the 
identification procedure was in part due to the lack of information given to them before they 
are taken to the identification suite. Whilst some witness officers do attempt to tell 
eyewitnesses what will happen, this is a rather hit-and-miss exercise, particularly as those 
officers are often unfamiliar with the details of the process themselves. It was clear that 
much of the knowledge of identification procedures that witnesses did possess came from 
friends or television. This is unsatisfactory. Although witnesses are spoken to on their 
arrival at the identification suite, it is after they have experienced a long wait at another 
police station. They should be given information at an earlier stage.43 Perhaps then, fears 
and speculation would be reduced. There are some fears and apprehensions, of course, that 
are in the nature of the process, as in these examples given in the interviews after the 
parade had taken place:
"Everyone was looking at me, as to how I reacted looking at the line. And 
they say look at them twice. But when you know its that person you don't 
want to go over and over it. I just wanted to get out of there. My heart was 
going, and you feel under suspicion in a way because all these people are 
concentrating on you." (Case 42)
"It all made me uneasy. Four people watching me while I was trying to 
identify him. I just wanted to get out the room as soon as possible." (Case 
44)
"It 1 s a bit nerve-wracking. I don't know why but it does unnerve you." 
(Case 46)
However, over half of the 33 witnesses who professed anxiety and fear, 18, felt nervous 
about whether the suspect would be able to see out from behind the screen. Perhaps, as the 
respondent in case 15 suggests, witnesses could be shown the viewing corridor before the 
parade is arranged. This could even take place on a different day. There would be some
43 The poor treatment of witnesses to and victims of crime throughout the criminal justice process, 
especially in terms of the lack of information imparted to them, has been the subject of much debate: see 
Lacey, N., Wells, C., and Meure, D., Reconstmcting Criminal Law (1990 London: Wiedenfield and 
Nicolson) and Mawby, R., and Walklate, S., Critical Victimology (1995 London: Sage).
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organisational pressures put onto the identification suite staff if this became standard.44 
However, there may be an improvement in the confidence and accuracy of eyewitnesses 
once the fear that they can be seen is erased. This fear was not alleviated by simply being 
told that the suspect could not see them, after the parade had taken place, and is evidenced 
in the following examples:
"It scares the hell out of you, you're frightened to death because its got all 
glass and they[the police] tell you its one-way, but you're frightened 
they[the parade members] can see...It's a pity they can't show you from the 
other side first, that would be a good idea. I mean, I've never looked 
through a on-way screen." (Case 15)
"It felt like they could see me." (Case 18)
"Walking up there I was thinking, oh God, if I see him, what am I going to 
do?. ..it seems a lot of pressure on the witness. I think it's better if they have 
pictures in a book and you can choose like that, because if you're face to 
face with somebody, it's just so nerve-wracking. You're thinking, God, 
can they see me, even though they can't." (Case 37)
"I felt like they could see me because I could see them laughing and they 
were looking straight at me. Are you sure they can't see me?" (Case 39)
"I was really frightened because they look at you and you think they can see 
you." (Case 40)
The distress of some of these witnesses is clear. It is also easy to reduce by a more careful 
explanation of the identification process. Where witnesses are more relaxed, it is more 
likely that the integrity of the process will be upheld, because they will be more attentive to 
instructions and more likely to take time to look carefully at the parade members before 
making a choice. Where witnesses want to get out of the viewing corridor as quickly as 
possible, the protections of Code D are bound to fail because, for example, anxiety will get 
in the way of listening to the instructions designed to decrease the risk of misidentification.
4-1 Use of video identification would prevent much of the nervousness involved in confronting the 
suspect, as well as being easier to arrange: see chapter 6.
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(ii) The Confidence of Eyewitnesses
(a\ Before the Identification Procedure
Prior to an identification procedure, the vast majority of eyewitnesses in the sample were
confident about their ability to pick out the offender. Table 3 shows how confident
respondents were about their own ability as eyewitnesses.45
Table 3: The Confidence of Eyewitnesses Prior to an Identification Procedure
Very Confident
Confident
Unsure
Very Unsure
Percentage
43.5
17.5
13
26
It is interesting to note that those respondents lacking confidence in their own ability as an 
eyewitness often expressed frustration about the time between their original viewing of the 
offender and the arrangement of the identification procedure.46 This is illustrated in the 
following examples:
"The length of time, from when it happened to now, is over a year...They 
[the police] have got to go through their process of detection and all the rest 
of it and do what they can to grab hold of whoever has done whatever. But 
the time lapses you know. I'm sitting here wondering if I'm going to be 
able to remember the face." (Case 19)
"It's too long ago, isn't it?" (Case 30)
"If you had asked me that a couple of weeks ago, I would have said yes, 
definitely" (Case 33)
45 Table 3 represents responses from all 69 witnesses who were interviewed prior to the identification 
procedure. In some instances, respondents' level of confidence was difficult to categorise. In those cases, 
professed confidence levels of 99 or 100 per cent were classed as 'very confident'. Levels at 50 per cent and 
below were classed as "very unsure". Those who stated that they may or may not be able to identify, 
depending on the circumstances, were placed in the 'unsure1 category.
46 The length of retention interval has been considered as an accuracy variable by a number of 
researchers in the field of eyewitness evidence, for example see Shepard, R.N., "Recognition memory for 
words, sentences and pictures" (1967) 6 Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 156. Indeed, it 
appears to be a matter of common sense that, the longer the period of retention of a memory before recall, 
the greater the possibility that the memory will be affected by fading or post-event information.
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"...it's such a long time. When the police told me I would have to do an 
identity parade, I thought it would be a week later, or two weeks later. But 
three months, no, I'm not too confident." (Case 44)
"The longer it goes, the more you forget. I think that is quite worrying in 
the respect that you could identify the wrong person because the time gap 
has dulled your memory." (Case 63)
"Not that confident. I was more confident before, but then it was 
cancelled." (Case 68)
A concern about the time gap between offence and identification was not confined to a lack 
of confidence before the identification procedure, but was also a common source of 
complaint after the parade had taken place. The retention interval between the offence and 
the identification procedure affected the confidence of witnesses quite markedly after they 
had viewed the parade and it became clear that witnesses were not complaining without 
reason. It was an important finding in the research that witnesses often waited for a 
considerable period of time between the commission of the offence and when an 
identification was attempted. Whilst witnesses lacking in confidence cited a long retention 
interval as a cause, unease was not limited to those respondents who were not confident in 
their abilities. As one witness explained:
"There shouldn't be such a delay. They should arrange it quicker so the 
witnesses have got it fresh in their minds and they know what the person 
looks like. It would be easier to pick them out. Better chance of picking 
them out because you tend to forget their face if you don't see them soon 
afterwards." (Case 44)
It is acknowledged that police investigations may take some time, and that there is often no 
immediate obvious suspect. However, in case 44, the suspect had been apprehended 
immediately, but no identification parade was held for three months. In the study, the 
average waiting period between offence and identification parade was three months. This 
rose to over 18 months for three witnesses and over six months for a further six witnesses. 
58 per cent of witnesses waited for more than three months, and no witness attended a 
procedure within six weeks of the offence. This is unacceptable, as six weeks is in itself a 
considerable delay.
69
The average retention period of three months was used as a cut-off point to measure the 
effect of longer delays on eyewitness confidence before the identification parade. There 
was no difference in levels of confidence between those witnesses waiting for more than 
three months to attend the identification procedure and those waiting less than three 
months.47 However, none of the witnesses had very short retention periods, and so it is 
impossible to fully assess the effect of longer retention intervals on eyewitness confidence, 
except to state that many of those who admitted to a lack of confidence did so because of 
the length of time between the offence and the identification procedure. When reviewing 
eyewitness performance after the identification procedure, it emerged that seven of the nine 
witnesses who chose a volunteer, and so were mistaken, had had a retention interval of 
more than three months. The remaining two had witnessed an offence ten weeks prior to 
the identification procedure.
Some delays are unavoidable, but there is a clear need for shorter waiting times and 
increased efficiency regarding the booking of identification parades. This does not by any 
means apply solely to identification suite staff, but also to investigating officers who are 
responsible for booking and keeping to the date of identification parades. Some provision 
for slotting in parades where others are cancelled one or two days before they are due to go 
ahead would greatly reduce the waiting time for some witnesses, and increase the 
likelihood of accurate identification evidence.48
Whilst those respondents who were "very unsure" about their memory of the offender prior 
to any identification procedure highlighted the length of memory retention periods, those 
witnesses who were "unsure" of their own ability had different concerns. These focused on
47 60 per cent of those whose retention interval was more than three months, and 58 per cent of those 
where the retention interval was less than three months classed themselves as "very confident" or 
"confident" about their ability to identify the offender.
48 For further discussion of the effects of long retention intervals on the reliability of memory, see 
chapter 2.
1 70
the belief that a further viewing of the offender would trigger a memory which had proved 
difficult to recall in the meantime.49 In the examples below, witnesses describe their hope 
that, although they felt unable to put the description of the offender into words, a further 
viewing may result in recognition:
"I can't remember him that well, but it might just jog my memory if I see 
him again" (Case 24)
"If you asked me to describe him I might struggle, but I think I might 
recognise him." (Case 27)
"I just don't know...I mean, I might know him straight away and I might 
not know him at all. I'm not very good at recognizing people again 
anyway." (Case 36)
"Well, I don't know until I see him. In my own mind I think 'will I be able 
to recognise him or not'. I feel just a little bit doubtful, but it might all come 
back to me, you see." (Case 46)
"Usually if I see someone for the first time, I can't see their face in my 
mind, but if I see them again I recognise them. That might happen today." 
(Case 49)
"I can't remember what happened last week, never mind four months ago. I 
have got a major problem with memory for faces and names. I know one 
person who has been through it and that was five months. They said they 
never forgot the face, so I'm working on the premise that there will be some 
remnants of memory in there somewhere." (Case 59)
Amongst those witnesses who felt unsure about their ability to make an identification, there 
was a concern that offenders would have changed their appearance since the time of the 
offence. There was a general emphasis on superficial aspects of an offender's appearance, 
such as dress or hairstyle. One respondent who was not sure about his ability to identify 
was positive about the benefits of triggers, stating:
"I'm just going to go in and do my best. I don't think I will be able to pick 
him, but then again I might just see something that reminds me of him." 
(Case 57)
49 It is generally the case that witnesses find it easier to recognise than verbally to recollect an 
individual's features: see Luus, C.A.E., and Wells, G.L., "Eyewitness identification and the selection of 
distractors for lineups" (1991) 15 Law and Human Behavior 43.
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It is worth noting that this witness does not speak of seeing actual features, superficial or 
otherwise, but relies on a reminder of the original offender as a trigger to his memory of 
events. The danger to a suspect who is not the offender but who does remind such a 
witness of that offender is clear: a positive but mistaken identification could be made, 
possibly resulting in a wrongful conviction.
One third of respondents commented before the parade that their confidence level was 
dependent on the stability of some particular feature. It was understandable that some of 
these features, such as piercings, were noticed and highlighted in witnesses' memories: 50
"I'm confident in as much that, providing he hasn't changed his appearance, 
that is, that he hasn't changed his blonde front bit that he had got in his 
hair." (Case 43)
"Well, there's obviously some distinguishing features, like his hair, so if 
they have been changed, say his hair's changed, I think it will make it more 
difficult." (Case 58)
However, such features will not necessarily be peculiar to the offender, as in this example:
"I'll know him anyway because of his nose stud. Unless he has taken it
out."
(Case 54)
As a particular hairstyle or piercing does not necessarily mean that the suspect is the 
offender, the Identification Suite staff covered distinctive features5 ' with a hat or sticking 
plaster. Otherwise, the suspect would stand out as the only member of the identification 
parade who had that feature. The covering of piercings and distinctive hairstyles tests the 
witnesses on their ability to identify the offender by reference to features other than those 
which are unusual. This certainly applies to cosmetic features, but will also probably apply 
to scars and tattoos. However, any distinctive feature will be evidence which would be 
likely to sway a jury to believe the testimony of an eyewitness. Indeed, it would be odd if a 
witness did not mention an outstanding feature in an original description. The observation
50 This reliance on superficial features was also observed in the study on suspects. For example, in 
Case 41, the witness made no choice from the parade but stated to police in the viewing corridor that "If 
he'd got the same clothes on I'd be able to identify him".
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of such details could make an eyewitness more reliable. The problem arises where the 
memory of the offender consists of only those features, especially when the memory 
revolves around a particular style of clothing.
The level of reliance on superficial features among respondents in the study was striking. It 
not only affected the level of confidence witnesses felt before the identification procedure, 
but also contributed to witnesses' difficulty in, or failure to, identify the suspect. The 
discovery that a suspect had changed his or her appearance understandably shook the 
confidence of eyewitnesses when interviewed in the few minutes after the parade. As the 
following witness stated:
"I cannot believe that. It was so hard. I just felt that I would know him 
straight away. He was just so clean and his hair. I thought I would have 
been able to get him without even looking at the rest of the lineup...He was 
clean shaven and really taken time. None of them looked as thin." (Case 3)
The witness above illustrates that concern about change of appearance was not limited to 
those witnesses who focused on one aspect of an offender's appearance. Just under half of 
the respondents expressed some concern about changes of general appearance, or were 
confused (as in case 3) when general aspects of appearance were changed.52
The confidence of witnesses was also affected by the length of time they had to view the 
offender and visibility at the time of the offence. It was a clear finding that the longer 
witnesses had had to view an offender, the more confident they were before the 
identification procedure. Similarly, the witnesses who had viewed an offence in the dark 
were less likely to be very confident than those who had seen the offender in the middle of 
the day. However, these factors did not affect the likelihood of witnesses making a choice, 
and a lack of confidence continued only where no choice was made. The implication here is
51 Where the feature was not shared by a number of the volunteers.
52 Police officers also expressed concern about suspects' changes of appearance in Bucke, T., and 
Brown, D., In Police Custody: Police Powers and Suspects ' Rights Under the Rcvided PACE Code of 
Practice Home Office Research Study 174 (1997 London: I1MSO), 50.
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that witnesses are just as likely to make a choice, and be confident that they are right, where 
they had a fleeting glimpse of an offender in poor light as where they witnessed a lengthy 
offence in a well lit area. Where the circumstances of the original identification meant that 
the offender was not seen clearly, the memory is likely to fill in gaps to coincide with the 
general expectations of the witness. 53
It can be seen, therefore, that although 61% of witnesses attending identification parades 
were confident in their ability to identify the offender before the parade took place, long 
retention intervals and fears about changes in the offender's appearance could damage that 
confidence.
After the Identification Procedure 
Eyewitnesses were interviewed immediately after their viewing of an identification 
procedure in order to assess the confidence they felt in their choice. Once police officers 
have informed witnesses of the "correctness"54 or otherwise of their choice, then 
confidence levels can be affected, because confirmation that the person chosen was the 
suspect is likely to make witnesses more confident. 55 Similarly, the knowledge that they 
have chosen a volunteer will almost certainly decrease their confidence in the identification 
made.
53 For a discussion of the selective and constructive processes of memory, see Loftus (1979), op.cit., 
chapters.
54 "Correctness" is used in the sense that the witness had chosen the suspect. Although the choice 
may still be incorrect, witnesses would, quite understandably, view their choice as correct in such 
circumstances.
55 This is termed "bolstering" and has been found to occur in experiments where police officers 
confirm that the person chosen was the suspect: see, for example, Loftus, IZ.F. "Psychologist in the 
Eyewitness World" (1993) 48 American Psychologist 550
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This assumption was confirmed in twenty cases,56 where I talked to witnesses for a third 
time after the police had spoken to them. All of the five witnesses who had chosen a 
volunteer felt less confident in their choice. Only one the fifteen witnesses who had chosen 
a suspect claimed to feel the same level of confidence after their choice had been confirmed. 
All others felt an increase in confidence. Results from psychological experiments suggest 
that this confidence would be likely to carry on increasing as a form of self-confirming 
exercise, resulting in a very confident and persuasive eyewitness should the case reach 
court. 57
This study also examined whether such self-confirmation begins at an earlier stage than the 
time witnesses are told whether they chose the suspect or not. If self-confirmation does 
begin earlier, confidence levels will change in the few minutes between the identification 
and the interview. To facilitate this, there follows an evaluation of the confidence witnesses 
felt immediately after the identification parade. This takes two forms: firstly, if witnesses 
made a choice, how confident were they that they had made the correct choice. This applies 
to cases both where witnesses chose the suspect and where they chose a volunteer. 
Secondly, if no choice was made, what was the witness' level of confidence that the 
offender was not present on the identification parade.
The witnesses who chose a volunteer are the ones who are certainly mistaken. 58 Out of the 
nine witnesses who chose a volunteer, five were victims of the offence. Table 4 categorises 
the levels of confidence felt by these witnesses.
56 It proved impossible to speak to all witnesses after they had seen a police officer, as the researcher 
often had to travel back to Dudley Road Police Station immediately after the identification parade had taken 
place. Fourteen of the fifty had made no choice, so speaking to them for a third time would have been 
pointless. Out of the twenty cases where I did speak to the witness again, five had chosen a volunteer and 
fifteen had chosen the suspect.
57 See Cutler and Penrod (1995), op.cit., chapters 6 and 7, and the discussion in chapter 2 of this 
thesis.
58 It would be very unusual indeed for a witness to choose a volunteer who was indeed the offender.
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Table 4: The Confidence of Witnesses Who Chose a Volunteer
Case No.
1
9
10
13
15
26
32
34
49
Before Parade
Very Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Confident
Unsure
At Time the 
Choice was Made
Not Sure
Very Confident
"Looks Like Him"
70-80% Sure
90% Sure
Not 100%
"Pretty Sure"
Confident
Very Confident
Minutes After 
Parade
Less Confident
Very Confident
"Looks Like Him"
70-80% Sure
90% Sure
More Confident
"Pretty Sure"
More Confident
More Confident
In only one of these cases did the respondent, a mistaken eyewitness, suffer a declining 
confidence in the few minutes it took to interview her (this is in stark contrast to the 100% 
rate of decline in confidence for the five who were later told by the police that they had 
chosen a volunteer). Three witnesses stated that they were more confident after a few 
minutes than they had been when they had made the identification. Although some 
witnesses acknowledged that they could not be sure about their choice, none of them felt 
outright that they had made a mistake. The relative certainty of mistaken witnesses confirms 
the necessity for caution when relying on eyewitness identification in criminal cases. The 
confidence of the following witnesses who identified a volunteer, when interviewed 
minutes after the parade but before they were spoken to by police, highlight this point:
"I'm very confident, because I saw him from up close, and when you see 
someone from ten steps away and then you are asked to identify him from 
thirty or forty steps away then you get a good chance. I'm positive I'll 
say."(Case 9)
"His face just leapt out at me." (Case 49)
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If witnesses who have identified a volunteer can be this confident, so can a mistaken 
witness who has identified a suspect. It is this danger which forms the background to the 
Turnbull guidelines, and was the reason for the Devlin Committee inquiry in 1976. The 
public outcry over the cases of Laszlo Virag and Luke Dougherty,59 both victims of 
mistaken but certain witnesses, highlighted the problems in reliance on eyewitness 
identification. My study confirms that mistaken witnesses can be very confident about their 
choice. This is particularly dangerous for innocent suspects who are similar in appearance 
to the offender, because witnesses may choose them on the basis that they are the person 
on the parade who looks most like the offender. That those witnesses who chose a 
volunteer were in general confident in their choice confirms that the protections of Code D 
alone, however rigidly adhered to, will not eliminate the danger of misidentification. 
However, a well organised parade which maximises the protections Code D has to offer 
may minimise the effect of the relative judgment process by ensuring that the suspect does 
not stand out when the parade is seen by a non-witness. Protection will be enhanced when 
rigorous application of Code D is combined with the protection offered by the Turnbull 
guidelines. It is imperative for furtherance of the protective principle that jury members are 
aware of the dangers of misidentification and that they understand that procedural fairness 
cannot eliminate the potential for mistaken identification.
The danger of misidentification by a confident witness is illustrated further by witnesses 
who were prepared to choose even where they were unsure. There has been debate 
regarding the existence of a relative judgment process. 60 The process rests on the idea that 
eyewitnesses do not choose on the basis of the suspect's similarity to the offender alone. 
Rather, a comparison takes place, whereby the member of the identification parade most
59 Devlin Report, op.cit., chapters 2 and 3.
60 For examples of the literature on the relative judgment process, sec Lindsay, R.C.L., Lea, J.A., 
Nosworthy, G.J., and Fulford, J.A., "Biased lineups: Sequential presentation reduces the problem" (1991) 
16 Journal of Applied Psychology' 796; and Wells (1984), op.cit.
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like the offender when compared with everyone else in the line is chosen. Six of the nine 
witnesses who chose a volunteer were evidently using comparison in making their choice, 
as the following examples illustrate,
"Well, it looks like him, that's all I will say. He is the closest one I can get 
to. His [the suspect's] build and height are much like him [the offender]. He 
is the closest. "(Case 10)
"I brought it down to two; and I wouldn't say it was 50:50 between them. I 
would say it was more like 80:20...! wanted to make a choice. I think if I 
hadn't made a choice I'd be thinking I should have. I just keep thinking the 
two of them were fairly alike...I definitely remember himfthe offender] 
being thinner than myself. Two were similar, but one was a bit more gaunt 
than the other one...and that's how I made my choice. If I'm wrong now 
it's not going to matter, is it?...I'll be surprised if it wasn't him." (Case 13)
"He looked most similar to the offender." (Case 26)
Taking Case 13 as an example, the choice came down to which one of two members of the 
parade was thinner. The witness obviously had some difficulty in choosing, yet stated that 
he would be surprised if he had not chosen correctly. This appears to be the relative 
judgment process at work.
An important finding to emerge was that those witnesses who picked out the police suspect 
were by no means immune to the relative judgment process. The difference is that in many 
of their cases, a criminal prosecution will rely to some degree on eyewitness evidence. In 
ten of the 27 cases (37 per cent) in which a witness identified a suspect, the respondent 
stated that they had chosen between two or three, but that the one they did choose looked 
most like the offender. This is a disturbingly high proportion. The following examples 
offer an insight into the processes used by those respondents who identified the suspect on 
a comparison basis:
"There were two similar. They were both sitting together which is why I'm 
not sure." (Case 7)
"They all looked the same. He just looked the most like him." (Case 24)
"They could all have been him. There were about two others I was guessing 
with, but he took it seriously." (Case 31)
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"I say it's number six but it might not be. You know, looking at all the 
others you think, well it can't be them, it's got to be him. He's[the suspect] 
the one who looked most like him[the offender]." (Case 42)
The way an identification procedure is organised affects the way witnesses choose and their 
accuracy in making that choice. It is clear that, where there is little similarity, the functional 
size of the parade will decrease. 61 In other words, it will be easier for the witness to 
"guess" which person the suspect is because a number of parade members can be 
immediately rejected.62 In the study, well over half of respondents, 58 per cent, felt that not 
all the parade members were sufficiently similar to each other, or to the initial description 
witnesses had given of the offender, as illustrated by the following examples:
"They were quite different. Well, their colour is the same, but otherwise 
their appearances were different." (Case 1)
"They were in little groups of who looked similar to each other." (Case 15)
"The first four or five looked similar, until you went down to the end and 
then you saw them change." (Case 35)
"Their hair was sort of similar, but not really, no." (Case 40)
"There was too much comparison. Long hair, short hair, skinny and fat. It 
wasn't a match." (Case 45)
Psychologists recommend the use of cautionary instructions as a means of limiting the 
relative judgment process. The high incidence of relative judgment in this study suggest 
that the cautionary instructions to witnesses in Code of Practice D, stating that the offender 
may or may not be present on the parade, are not very effective. The instructions have a 
sound basis in psychological theory,63 and were implemented in order to alleviate the 
pressure felt by witnesses. Respondents who chose from the line, whether it was a suspect
61 On functional and nominal size of identification parades, see Nosworthy and Lindsay (1990), 
op.cit.
62 In case 38 of the study on suspects, the process of relative judgment could be seen at work for two 
witnesses. Their descriptions were of a light-skinned black male, but the suspect was dark-skinned. The 
witnesses actually chose light-skinned members of the parade, illustrating that they had discounted members 
of the parade who had darker skin tones, including the suspect. This is not to assume that the suspect was 
the offender, but simply illustrates that witnesses may discount or choose members based on relative 
judgment.
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or a volunteer, had evidently not always taken on board the instructions they were given, 
suggesting that Code D has minimal effect in protecting suspects from misidentification 
where a witness' memory is lacking.
Psychological research also suggests that the relative judgment process can be limited by 
changing the presentation of the identification parade, photo-array or video. Rather than 
allowing witnesses to view all of the volunteers, photographs or videos together, they 
recommend sequential presentation, where each parade member is shown one at a time to 
the witness. In this way, comparison between members is reduced. This would not prevent 
random guessing, but would limit relative judgments. 64
When examining the confidence levels of those 27 witnesses who chose the suspect from 
the identification parade, only one felt less confident at the end of the post-parade interview 
minutes after the parade than when the choice was initially made. This witness (case 24) 
had been unsure as to his ability to choose the offender before the procedure took place. He 
was not confident immediately after making his choice, and admitted to using relative 
judgment. Other witnesses, although clearly using a relative judgment process, felt 
increasingly confident about their choice. For example, the witness in Case 7 stated at the 
end of the post-parade interview that she was sure she had "picked the right one", despite 
reporting earlier that she was unsure.
In all, ten witnesses who had chosen the suspect reported increased confidence in their 
choice between making it and completing the interview with me. As discussed earlier, it is 
likely that their confidence would increase further when they were informed that they had
63 On the effects of giving cautionary or biased instructions, see Malpass, R.S., and Dcvine, P.O. 
"Eyewitness identification: Lineup instructions and the absence of the offender" (1981) 66 Journal of 
Applied Psychology 482.
64 There are some practical problems in using sequential presentation: see chapter 3.
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indeed chosen the suspect. The following example offers an insight into how a witness 
may progressively become more confident that they have made an accurate identification:
"I wasn't quite sure. I picked him...and afterwards I thought it wasn't him. 
I wasn't very sure. And then when I came in here I felt really confident that 
it was him." (Case 17)
Those witnesses who decline to make a choice (there were 14 who did so in this study) are 
often viewed by police officers as poor eyewitnesses. I observed policemen commenting 
that witnesses were particularly nervous, or that they had not expected them to make a 
choice from the outset. It appeared inconceivable to many of the police officers 
investigating a case that an eyewitness who fails to choose the suspect from a parade may 
be correct in doing so. In other words, there is an assumption that the suspect is the 
offender. This occurred most strikingly in the case of a sexual assault on a teenage girl 
(case 40). The girl did not choose the suspect, saying
"He wasn't sitting there. I know one of the people on there, I talk to him as 
a friend and stuff. He's number 4, but he was nothing to do with it."
The suspect was number 4. Police officers insisted that, because the girl was very nervous, 
she had failed to identify him. Yet she seemed adamant that she knew the suspect and that 
he was not the offender, a man with whom she had spent over an hour. So it was not the 
case that she did not recognise anyone because she was so nervous. In fact she recognised 
but discounted someone.
Because of the general assumption that witnesses who make no choice are merely failing to 
identify an offender who is present, it is worth examining the confidence levels of those 
witnesses both before and after the identification parade. The main question to be addressed 
here is: are witnesses who make no choice generally less confident than those who do?
Out of the 14 witnesses who declined to make a choice, four were unsure and six were 
very unsure before the identification parade took place. The concentration of unsure
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witnesses in this group suggests that the witnesses were far more cautious from the outset. 
This may be due to a number of reasons. For example, it could be that the witnesses were 
simply aware that their memory was not very good. By contrast, it might be that they had 
thought about the importance of the procedure and were exercising caution for that reason. 
This is supported in some way by comments made after the identification procedure, where 
respondents spoke of thinking that a particular member of the parade was the offender, but 
declining to make a choice because they were unsure. Witnesses who make no choice are 
therefore more resistant to the relative judgment process than those who do make a choice. 
The point was illustrated by eight respondents, for example:
"I'm not 100 per cent confident that he wasn't there. There's still a doubt 
about the one, definitely, but I just think if you're not certain then you 
shouldn't say...I'm just open about it. It could have been him, but having 
said that, that wasn't the question I was asked. I was asked 'was it him'. If 
you can't say it 100 per cent, the answer's no, isn't it?" (Case 27)
"There were a couple who could have been the guy, but I couldn't be sure, 
and...unless I'm sure I won't pick anyone." (Case 47)
The witness in case 27 had obviously taken to heart the cautionary instruction given by the 
Identification Officer immediately before viewing the parade, which make it clear that if a 
witness cannot make a positive identification, then he or she should say so. 65
The caution of respondents like those quoted above is in sharp contrast to the witnesses 
who chose by a process of relative judgment. An important finding from the interviews 
with witnesses is that a decision not to choose should not be seen as a failure. Some of 
those respondents who did not make a choice were quite certain that the offender was not 
present. Respondents who could not be certain at least had the presence of mind not to 
choose when they were in fact unsure. 66
65 CodeD, Annex A: 14.
66 Despite being less prone to guessing, those witnesses who made no choice were no less resistant 
as a group to self-confirmation after the identification parade. Out of the 14 who made no choice, six felt 
more confident at the end of the interview that the offender had not been present on the parade than when 
they had decided to make no choice. Only one respondent, in case 4, became less confident.
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Conclusion
Witnesses attending identification procedures are, on the whole, confident in their abilities 
to present accurate identification evidence. However, the majority of respondents in this 
sample were apprehensive about some aspect of the procedure. Some of their fear reflected 
the length of time it had taken for the identification procedure to take place. It was found 
that retention intervals were indeed quite lengthy. Greater efforts should be made to ensure 
that identification procedures go ahead as scheduled. Where this is impossible, 
postponements should be short.
Witnesses who had attended more than once for an identification procedure felt the greatest 
dissatisfaction, and complained especially about the amount of time taken up by the 
process. It was noteworthy that the vast majority of respondents, 83%, mentioned the 
length of time they were expected to wait before going to the identification suite. This 
difficulty was clearly compounded where the identification procedure was postponed or 
cancelled. Without the goodwill of witnesses, identifications simply could not go ahead. 
Shorter waiting periods, fewer cancellations, and more comfortable surroundings are 
clearly required to maintain that goodwill.
Where witnesses were nervous, a longer wait increased that nervousness. Many of the 
respondents' concerns could be attributed to a lack of knowledge about the identification 
procedure. Whilst some witness officers attempted to give guidance, many were at a loss to 
explain what would happen once the parade was underway. The most common concern 
was that the suspect would be able to see the witnesses. Adoption of video identification 
would eliminate much of the waiting time and anxiety involved for witnesses, because the 
procedures would be arranged before witnesses arrived at the police station, and there 
would be no need for them to see a live parade. In the meantime, if witnesses were
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routinely given information before they entered the identification suite and could see the 
viewing corridor beforehand, some fears would be alleviated. When witnesses have to wait 
for a considerable time on the day of the procedure before viewing the parade, it is unfair to 
leave them feeling anxious. A comprehensive scheme of information would not be difficult 
to arrange. At the moment, it is a hit and miss affair, with many witnesses acquiring 
knowledge from television crime programmes.
Despite widespread nervousness, the generally high confidence of witnesses tended to 
increase after the procedure in almost half of all cases. Whilst this is not of concern in 
itself, when coupled with the finding that many respondents whose confidence increased 
had used relative judgment to identify the suspect, the picture becomes more problematic. It 
was encouraging to see that 28 per cent of witnesses made no choice, refusing to choose 
when they were unsure. These witnesses took the instructions given to them at the start of 
the procedure very seriously.
However, unsure witnesses were not confined to those who made no choice. For example, 
ten of the 27 witnesses who chose a suspect spoke of using some form of relative judgment 
in reaching that choice. A witness who has used relative judgment but then becomes 
confident in that choice offers unreliable but persuasive evidence. Further, the use of 
relative judgment was not confined to those witnesses who originally viewed the offender 
in difficult circumstances, such as in poor light. Because of this, not all which are made by 
use of the relative judgment process will later constitute evidence which will be viewed as 
poor quality under the Turnbull guidelines. The Code D protections from the use of 
relative judgment found in the instructions given to witnesses also appeared to be 
ineffectual for these witnesses, and it has to be concluded that the operation of current 
safeguards offer a far from water tight protection from misidentification for suspects. 
Where a relative judgment is made in spite of the Code D instructions, and the witness
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made what would be viewed as a "good quality" identification under Turnbull, the 
protective principle is undermined in a subtle manner. Chapters seven and eight explore 
further how protection from misidentification can be increased by better information for the 
jury regarding memory processes. It is perhaps through better utilisation of psychological 
information, rather than through any reform of Code D, that the protective principle is 
likely to be promoted where a relative judgment process has taken place.
The witnesses in this study offer an insight into the dangers of reliance on eyewitness 
identification, because many remained confident after using a relative judgment process. 
Evidence from the ten witnesses who had chosen the suspect by using relative judgment 
lacks reliability. As they all presented as certain when they made their identification, the 
police record of a clear and seemingly confident choice could become the basis for decision 
making by prosecution and defence lawyers on the course of action to take and the line of 
questioning to use in their case. Furthermore, the jury in any later trial would have no idea 
that the eyewitness evidence was based on a "guess". This creates considerable danger of 
wrongful conviction.
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CHAPTER SIX
OBSERVATIONS OF IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Introduction
At the time of the study on suspects in 1993, Birmingham had an identification suite which 
was part of an operational police station, and whose space was used as a general 
thoroughfare at times when a parade was in operation. Indeed, people would wander 
through the viewing corridor immediately before and after parades, which could undermine 
the fairness of the procedure. For example, in Case 47 of the sample of suspects, police left 
the corridor doors open after the suspect had chosen his place in the line. Lots of people 
were walking back and forth without being asked for identification. It was obvious who the 
suspect was, because he spoke to his legal representative a few times. The potential for 
breach of Annex A: 12, whereby witnesses should not be allowed to see the suspect or 
receive any indication as to his or her identity, is increased where no effort is made to keep 
the suspect out of public view, as in Case 47.
By the time the study on witnesses was conducted in 1995, Birmingham identification suite 
had moved to a new site, with an increase in staff members assigned to it. The suite was 
purpose built, was in an annex of a police station, and offered a good degree of security. 
However, the cost of running a purpose built suite is high, as the space is dedicated to 
identification, more staff are involved and the facilities lie idle when there is no parade. In a 
climate where identification parades are conducted for every case involving an issue of 
identification (even where the witness and suspect know each other), the costs are too high 
to justify. Instead, alternative methods of identification should be considered, such as 
greater use of video identification libraries. Problems regarding cancellations and 
postponements could then be alleviated. Although the use of video identification is
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increasing, along with evidence from CCTV cameras, it is still not the norm, and the Code 
continues to ensure (along with routinised practices) that a live parade is the first port of 
call.
In this chapter, observations from empirical studies of witnesses and suspects are used to 
illustrate the procedures used for identification and the experiences of officers running 
identification suites. The difficulties in running an identification suite are discussed, along 
with some options for reform of the system in place in Birmingham and a number of other 
major cities in England and Wales. 1 This involves an examination of the cost of running an 
identification suite, the system used to find volunteers, and the abundance of procedures 
which do not take place at the scheduled time.
How Identification Procedures Are Organised
ft) Methods of Identification
Under Code of Practice D2.1, the police may use four methods of identification in cases 
where a suspect is known to the police:2 the identification parade, a group identification, a 
video film, or a confrontation. 3 The parade is the preferred method of identification, 
because it is thought to produce the most reliable evidence, allowing witnesses to see the 
suspect in a live setting with others who are similar in appearance. Where the police cannot 
organise a parade due to the difficulty in assembling volunteers, they can have recourse to
1 For example, Manchester also has a purpose built suite at Longsight Police Station, where staff 
and facilities are only used for identification procedures.
2 For a discussion of when a suspect can be said to be "known" to the police, see Chapter 3 of this 
thesis and Code D, Note 2E.
3 Where a suspect is not known, police officers may use less formal methods of identification. Under 
Code D2.17, witnesses may be taken to a place to see whether they can identify the offender. Even though 
this is less formal than methods of identification used where the suspect is known, records of descriptions 
should still be kept before taking the witness to the neighbourhood or place. Under Code D2.18, 
photographs, photofit or identikit may be shown to witnesses where the suspect is not known to the police. 
Again, some formalities must be followed: see Code D, Annex D.
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other methods of identification.4 A group identification in Birmingham usually takes place 
at the railway station, with the suspect being given a set amount of time to walk through the 
barriers. The railway station is chosen because it offers a good range of people to form a 
group. Where a suspect is in custody, group identifications have been held in the 
identification suite, with a number of people joining the suspect and moving around. 5 
Video identification was never used during the period of both Birmingham studies, 
although there were facilities available in the identification suite and despite the fact that 
video libraries are kept in some areas. 6 Where a parade or group are not practicable, 
identification by confrontation is considered. This involves the witness seeing the suspect 
alone, and being asked "Is this the person?". Confrontations are seen to produce less 
reliable evidence than other methods of identification, because there is less of a test for the 
witness when presented with the suspect in isolation rather than amongst a number of other 
people.
When combining the data from both the study on witnesses and that on suspects, the 
overwhelming majority of procedures were identification parades. Out of the 100 
procedures in the samples which went ahead, 96 involved identification parades, one was a 
group identification, and three were confrontations. The police are successful in following 
the hierarchy of procedures as laid down in Code of Practice D2.1, but whether this is the 
most cost-effective approach is questionable. The cost of identification parades and whether 
they are so superior to other methods of identification that they warrant extra resources and 
expense is discussed later in this chapter.
4 See Code of Practice D2.4 and D2.6.
5 Volunteers who did not fit the requirement of sufficient similarity under Code D, Annex A:8 could 
be used in a group identification, as there is no requirement of similarity. The use of the identification suite 
for a group identification is a rarity, and the identification officer would normally move to identification by 
confrontation.
6 Most notably in Bradford. Video libraries tend to be used for those groups who are difficult to 
arrange parades for: such a Rastafarians and red-headed males.
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fit) The Organisation of Identification Procedures in Birmingham 
During the study on suspects' perceptions conducted for this thesis, the Birmingham 
identification suite had two full time members of staff: an inspector (the identification 
officer) and a sergeant. Upon moving to the purpose built suite, two civilian members of 
staff were added, as well as a police trainee. The civilian staff then did some of the work 
formerly carried out by the sergeant, such finding and looking after volunteers, and 
ensuring the smooth running of the identification suite. The sergeant booked parades and 
fielded all enquiries. He also took on the role of the Inspector during times of absence. The 
inspector had responsibility for talking to suspects and witnesses, delivering the Notice to 
the Suspect, and making decisions as to whether a procedure should go ahead. He also 
decided whether the police would try to arrange another parade if volunteers had been 
rejected by the suspect, and was responsible for making a written record of what was said 
by witnesses and presenting the responses as evidence in any later criminal proceedings. A 
good proportion of the inspector's time was spent in court giving evidence, and so the 
sergeant had to be well versed in all aspects of the inspector's duties. 7
The Birmingham identification suite books up to four parades a day, and there is also 
limited provision for evening and Saturday morning parades. Group identifications and 
confrontations are not booked in the first instance, but rather come about because 
volunteers cannot be found for an identification parade. Where the identification officer 
feels that a parade could be run on another occasion, and where suspects are willing to 
provide some of the volunteers for their parade, a second attempt at arranging a parade may 
be mounted. Where the second try has failed, or where the suspect is singular in
7 Code D2.2 provides that: "The arrangement for, and conduct of, these types of identification shall 
be the responsibility of an officer in uniform not below the rank of inspector who is not involved with the 
investigation ('the identification officer')". In a minority of cases, inspectors from the police station 
conducting the investigation would step in for a parade when the identification suite inspector was on leave. 
Although this meant that a more senior member of staff was conducting the identification procedure, the 
sergeant was normally more able to carry out the role, due to his experience of identification and Code of
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appearance, a group identification or confrontation may take place on the day. However, 
where the identification suite staff have spent a long time trying to arrange the parade, there 
may not be sufficient time before the next booking to go ahead with a group identification, 
and these may be scheduled for a later date. It can be seen that, for some suspects and 
witnesses, the identification procedure is time-consuming and may involve two or three 
visits to the identification suite.
Witnesses are asked to arrive at Dudley Road Police Station, across the city from the 
identification suite, at the allotted time of the parade. They wait there until the parade has 
been arranged and are then escorted to the identification suite by the witness officer, who is 
an officer from the police station investigating the offence. 8 This ensures that they will 
have no opportunity to see the suspect or any volunteers until the parade had been 
arranged. 9 Witnesses are taken to a witness waiting room in the identification suite, and 
are shown the parade one at a time. Other witnesses in the waiting room cannot hear or see 
what is happening. In all cases observed during the study on suspects' perceptions, 
witnesses were informed by the identification officer that they should view the parade twice 
and that the offender may or may not be present in the line. For the most part, witnesses 
during the study on suspects made their decision very quickly: the longest any witness 
spent viewing the parade before choosing a parade member was two minutes. This was 
much longer than any other witness had taken. Witnesses' responses are written down 
verbatim, and no hesitant responses were recorded as positive identifications during the 
time I observed parades in Birmingham. For example, if witnesses stated that "I think it's 
number three but I can't be 100 per cent sure", this would not be recorded as a positive 
identification. The identification officer at Birmingham identification suite was therefore
Practice D. In order to satisfy Code D2.2, the sergeant was referred to as an acting inspector during the 
regular inspector's absences.
8 Witness officers cannot be the investigating officer, who can play no part in the identification 
procedure: Code D2.2. There are some difficulties in having witness officers who are not routinely involved 
in identification procedures, as discussed below and in chapter 5.
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scrupulous in recording accurately the responses of witnesses, and in doing so increased 
the protective measures of Code D whilst playing a part in the decision as to which cases 
were viewed as having positive identification evidence upon which a prosecution could 
proceed. 10
Suspects are encouraged by identification suite staff to have a friend or relative present if 
they do not have legal representation. In my study on suspects, it was rare for a suspect to 
fail to take advantage of the availability of legal representation. Other studies on the 
frequency with which suspects avail themselves of the right to legal advice suggest that 
only 25 to 30 per cent of suspects request legal advice." However, those studies were 
conducted at the stage where suspects were interviewed by police officers. Identification 
procedures are at a later point in the criminal process, when most suspects are aware that 
police interest in them has gone beyond a "routine" inquiry. Most will have been charged 
with an offence, and so the higher take-up of legal advice is unsurprising.
Upon arrival at the identification suite, suspects are taken to a waiting room where they are 
read the Notice to the Suspect, which outlines, amongst other things, the purpose of the 
identification procedure and the entitlement to free legal advice. Whilst this is happening, 
the pool of volunteers are brought into the identification suite. Suspects have a choice from 
this pool, and the extent of the choice varies according to the number of volunteers the 
police have managed to find. During the study on suspects, the smallest pool a suspect had 
to choose from was eleven. Identification suite staff try to offer a pool of sixteen volunteers
9 As required by Code D Annex A: 12 (ii) and (iv).
10 However, some witnesses appeared to be positive when in fact they were unsure or had guessed: 
see chapter 5.
1 ' See Brown, D., Detention at the Police station under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
Home Office Research Study No. 104 (1989 London:HMSO); Brown, D., Ellis, T., and Larcombe, K., 
Changing the Code: Police Detention under the Revised PACE Codes of Practice Home Office research 
Study No. 129 (1992 London:HMSO); Sanders, A., Bridges, L., Mulvaney, A., and Crozier, G., Advice and 
Assistance at Police Stations and the 24 hour Duty Solicitor Scheme (1989 London: Lord Chancellor's 
Department).
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where possible. Suspects rarely reject volunteers, although identification suite staff may 
decide that they cannot assemble a satisfactory number for a parade to go ahead. Once 
suspects have chosen eight volunteers for the identification parade, they are taken back into 
the waiting room to sign the consent to take part in the identification parade. After this, they 
decide where to sit on the parade and they wait for the procedure to begin. A photograph is 
taken of the parade, which the suspect can have a copy of and which may be used as 
evidence in any later trial. The identification suites in both Birmingham and Manchester 
have a one-way screen, and suspects are informed that the parade is about to begin by way 
of intercom. In Birmingham, parade members sit behind a number on the floor, and the 
police do not allow witnesses' requests for them to stand up or speak. 12
Breaches of Code of Practice D
Within the identification suite in Birmingham, no serious breaches of Code of Practice D 
were observed. However, the identification officer did read the Notice to the Suspect in a 
perfunctory and rushed fashion, which probably contributed to the finding that suspects 
had little knowledge about what would happen during the identification procedure and what 
their rights were. 13 Identification officers can be compared to custody officers in that they 
are not involved in the investigation and are expected to ensure that the PACE Codes of 
Practice are followed. Some studies 14 have questioned the ability of custody officers to
12 In some other identification suites, this is allowed. For example, staff at the identification suite at 
Manchester Longsight Police Station spoke of parades where they had acceded to requests by witnesses that 
the parade members say certain words. Code of Practice D has provision for movement and speech, as 
Annex A: 17 states: "If a witness wishes to hear any parade member speak, adopt any specified posture or 
see him move, the identification officer shall first ask whether he can identify any persons on the parade on 
the basis of appearance only. When the request is to hear members of the parade speak, the witness shall be 
reminded that the participants of the parade have been chosen on the basis of physical appearance only. 
Members of the parade may then be asked to comply with the witness' request to hear them speak, to sec
tn^TYl mf\\/f* r»r tn a/inr\f onw ern=kr»ifi#>H ri/^eHir**"them ove or to adopt any specified posture". 
13 See the discussion in chapter 4.OCC U1C U1M.U&MU11 111 UimjJICI t
14 McConville, M., Sanders, A., and Leng, R., The Case for the Prosecution (1991 London: 
Routledge); and McConville, M., and Hodgson, J., Custodial Legal Advice and the Right to Silence Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study No. 16 (1993 London: HMSO).
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divorce themselves from the needs of the investigation, because they are too closely allied 
to policing values. There is, in essence, a conflict between the role of the custody officer in 
upholding PACE requirements and the wishes of investigating officers. In the studies for 
this thesis, identification officers and the sergeants within the identification suite were 
found to be very conscientious in following PACE requirements. They reminded officers 
of the provisions of Code of Practice D and were not observed swaying from those 
provisions through both studies. This finding reflects the views of Dixon, 15 who argues 
that custody officers recognise the need to follow PACE rules and thus avoid exclusion of 
evidence. The officers working in Birmingham identification suite appeared to consciously 
set themselves apart from the investigation, striving for independent working procedures. 
They had a very good working knowledge of Code of Practice D and were diligent in their 
efforts to prevent breaches of the Code. Despite this, identification procedures became 
highly routinized, as illustrated by the hurried reading of the Notice to the Suspect and the 
use of regular volunteers even where they may not have been suitable. None of this 
amounted to a serious breach of the Code, but could nevertheless affect the fairness of the 
procedure.
Although the identification suite staff were knowledgeable about Code of Practice D, police 
errors occasionally occurred during the studies, and these could be so serious as to make 
any positive identification evidence inadmissible. Lack of supervision of witnesses once 
they have arrived at the police station is perhaps the most frequent problem. It is imperative 
under Code of Practice D16 that police officers ensure that there is no communication 
between witnesses regarding the offence and the appearance of the offender. 17 During the
15 Dixon, D., "Legal regulation and policing practice", (1992) \Social and Legal Studies 515.
16 Code of Practice D, Annex A, p.98, para 12(i).
See R v Finlay [1993] Crim. L.R. 50 for an example of police breach of Annex A paragraph 12 
(i). In this case, the fact that a warning had not been given to the witnesses to the etTect that they should 
not discuss the case whilst they were being kept together was only one of a number of breaches. However, 
it seems likely that this alone would be a sufficient breach to entitle the judge to exclude identification
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period of the study, this occurred in a small number of cases because the police officers 
responsible for ensuring that there was no communication between witnesses prior to the 
parade failed to arrive at the time requested. If officers are late, there is an obvious danger 
that witnesses may be left alone together and discuss the case. The need for a warning as to 
communication about the incident is just as necessary where the witnesses already know 
each other. This is because it is the responsibility of the identification officer to ensure that, 
once at the police station to take part in the identification procedure, witnesses do not 
discuss the matter. 18 This duty exists regardless of whether there has been an opportunity 
at some other time for communication between witnesses. It may be that confidence in the 
procedure would be increased were the officers responsible for ensuring adherence to Code 
D on the issue of communication between witnesses (known in some areas as "witness 
officers") to be assigned full time to working within the identification suite. 19 In this way 
there would be no confusion as to their duty.
At present, officers given the task of looking after witnesses are recruited from the police 
station where the offence in question is being investigated. Although these officers are not 
involved in the case, they are taken away from their normal duties and may not be familiar 
with what is expected of them or with the provisions of Code D. Their late arrival may be 
caused by the burden of other duties, and officers may not be aware that this may 
jeopardise the admissibility of identification evidence.
evidence from the jury. This is so even though the witnesses claim not to have discussed the case. 
Therefore, the very opportunity for "cross-pollinisation", without any evidence that this actually occurred, 
may be sufficient suspicion of unfairness to exclude identification evidence.
18 Some psychological experimentation has been conducted on the issue of communication between 
witnesses: see, for example, Warnick, D.H., and Sanders, G.S., "The effects of group discussion on 
eyewitness accuracy" (1980) \QJournal of Applied Social Psychology 249.
19 The Longsight Identification Suite in Manchester operates this system. The purpose built suite has 
full time staff to carry out every aspect of the identification process. The staff at Ladywood Police Station 
are hopeful that better staffing will accompany the provision of Birmingham's new identification suite.
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The involvement of the investigating officer in an identification procedure, prohibited under 
Code of Practice D20 , can also result in exclusion of identification evidence. Cancellations 
of parades may result from such involvement, as identification officers are likely to abort 
any procedure where there is a clear breach of Code of Practice D. This is another example 
of an area where errors may be prevented by an increase in the number of staff assigned to 
work in the identification suite. Case law has emphasised the dangers of investigating 
officers' involvement in the conduct of identification parades21 , and this appears to be an 
area where much care is now taken, certainly in the West Midlands area. As a result, 
cancellations did not, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, occur because of such a 
breach.
The breaches observed during the studies were overwhelmingly the result of actions by 
police officers who did not work full time in the identification suite. This was exacerbated 
on the few occasions where the identification officer was replaced by an inspector who was 
inexperienced in the procedures for running an identification parade. In one case in 
particular, the inspector was largely unaware of Code of Practice D requirements and failed 
to read the Notice to the Suspect.22 Where the identification officer is on leave or in court, 
replacements who are familiar with Code D should be found. Failing this, the identification 
suite sergeant should be able to act as identification officer for short periods of time.
Cancellations and Postponements
There are a number of problems with arranging and carrying out identification procedures 
which occur frequently, much to the frustration of everyone involved. Four parades per 
day are usually booked by the West Midlands Police Force in Birmingham, which, along
20 Code of Practice D2.2
21 See especially cases such as Ryan [ 1992] Crim.L.R. 187 and Gall ( 1990) 90 Cr.App.R. 64.
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with a suite in Wolverhampton, serves as the site for identification procedures for the 
whole of the West Midlands area. The waiting time for a parade to be booked is as much as 
seven weeks. This delay in itself creates problems as far as the validity of the eyewitness 
evidence is concerned, because longer retention intervals increase the probability that 
witnesses will have their memories distorted or will forget the appearance of the offender 
completely.23
Holding four parades in a day is rarely achieved for a variety of reasons. Last minute 
cancellations are a particular problem and serve to decrease efficiency within the 
identification suite, and time and money are wasted as a result. Police officers often cancel 
parades a couple of days before they are due to go ahead. As volunteers are advertised for, 
such cancellations are usually at too late a stage to arrange another parade or to move 
forward one already booked. Such cancellations also mean that the completion of other 
identification procedures at an earlier time cannot be accomplished. Cancellations, 
therefore, have an effect not only on other investigations, due to unnecessary delays24 , but 
also on the general running of the identification suite.
A further difficulty facing officers who run the identification suite is that of human 
unreliability. The problems here are difficult to anticipate and they include suspect non- 
attendance, witness non-attendance, and non-attendance of the suspect's legal 
representative or appropriate adult. The first two of these problems could be reduced by a 
greater police effort to ensure attendance. However, there seems to be a general reluctance
22 Case 1 in the study on suspects. The suspect's legal representative made no complaint.
23 See Shepherd, J.W., "Identification after long delays" in S. Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford, B.L. 
Evaluating Witness Evidence (1983 London: Wiley)
24 Such delays may have a negative effect on the reliability of any positive identification resulting 
from the parade. Although it has not been conclusively shown that a longer retention interval before 
retrieval is attempted lowers the accuracy of an identification, what is clear is that the memory is malleable, 
and can therefore be manipulated. The longer the retention interval, the greater the likelihood that new 
information will distort recollection of the event: see Loftus, E.F., and Hoffman, H., "Misinformation and 
memory: The creation of new memories" (1989) \8Journal of Experimental Psychology': General 100.
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to do this, particularly where suspects are concerned. The police do not have a formal 
responsibility to ensure that suspects arrive at the police station for an identification parade, 
but it would certainly be in their interests to make certain that all participants in the 
procedure are present at the correct time. If successful, such efforts would eliminate the 
waste of police time, money25 , and identification suite resources, which could otherwise be 
in use. The goodwill of witnesses, who often take time off work to participate, would also 
be more readily secured. These advantages could be gained with little effort in most cases, 
and would, in time, become routine to the police officers involved.
There has been concern that identification parades have to be cancelled because suspects are 
changing their appearance between the time they are interviewed by police and the time the 
parade is due to take place.26 Out of the 55 cases in the study on suspects, three suspects 
had changed their appearance in some way. This represents approximately five per cent of 
cases in the sample. In the first case, case 5, the parade went ahead, because the suspect 
had simply had his hair cut; in the second case, case 43, the change in appearance was 
more serious, resulting in volunteers arriving who were not at all similar in appearance to 
the suspect. The police opted for a confrontation in that case. In the third case, case 55, the 
suspect refused to shave off his beard and denied that there had been any change in 
appearance. As there had been no photograph of the suspect taken after arrest, the police 
proceeded cautiously and simply postponed the parade. Bucke and Brown27 report that in 
their survey there had been an estimate that suspects changed their appearance in five per 
cent of cases, which reflects the findings of the study on suspects. They also report that, as 
in my study, not all changes in appearance result in the cancellation of an identification
25 Money could be saved in terms of police wages as well as in payment of volunteers, which is still 
made in such a situation, albeit at a reduced rate.
26 Bucke, T., and Brown, D., In Police Custody: Police Powers and Suspects' Rig/its under (he 
Revised PACE Codes of Practice Home Office Research Study 174 (1997 London:HMSO). Witnesses also 
expressed concern about suspects' change of appearance in the study discussed in chapter 5 above.
27 Ibid., 50.
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procedure. Instead, suspects may be asked to wear a hat, shave off a beard, or be subject to 
a confrontation.
Under Code of Practice D2.15 (vii)a,28 suspects are informed that significant changes in 
appearance "between the taking of any photograph at the time of his arrest or after charge 
and any attempt to hold an identification procedure" may result in the change of appearance 
being given in evidence during any later trial, and would allow the identification officer to 
consider other forms of identification. Officers at the identification suite in Birmingham 
viewed the few cases of change of appearance as little more than an annoyance, but 
investigating officers were not questioned on the matter. It may be that if they had been, 
they would have concurred with the officers in Bucke and Brown's study, which found 
that:29
"[WJaming a suspect about the consequences of changing his or her 
appearance was not viewed as a deterrent, with some stating that the suspect 
had little to lose by making such alterations. In such cases establishing that a 
change of appearance had been made was viewed as a relatively weak piece 
of evidence compared to a positive identification by a witness. In short, 
suspects had more to gain than lose in changing their appearance, with some 
officers suggesting that stronger sanctions should exist, such as a 
presumption of guilt or adverse inferences."
The cases where suspects change their appearance and an identification parade cannot go 
ahead are very few and, in the absence of a widespread problem, the need for stronger 
sanctions is doubtful. In order for a comment under Code D2.15(vii)a, or any stronger 
sanction, to be made, photographs of the suspect would have to be taken at the time of 
arrest or bail, and used to show the extent of the change in appearance by the time of the 
identification parade. Having photographs could also aid identification staff in their 
requests to suspects to shave off beards or revert back to their original appearance in some
28 Code D4.1 also states that suspects should be told, when having their photograph taken at the time 
of arrest, that any change of appearance between that time and an identification procedure could result in 
evidence of it being given in court.
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other way. The lack of any proof that the suspect in Case 55 had had stubble rather than a 
full beard was instrumental in his refusal to shave and in the need to postpone his parade.
The problems of cancellations and postponements are not confined to the Birmingham 
identification suite. In Manchester Longsight identification suite, there is an annual average 
of 41 per cent of parades which do not take place.30 During 1993, 1994 and 1995 in 
Birmingham, the average rate of cancelled and postponed procedures stood between 50 and 
60 per cent, illustrating that a startlingly high proportion of procedures are not taking place, 
but are still costing time and money. Even where cancellations occur before volunteers have 
been found and witnesses brought to the police station, staff time is taken to organise and 
then cancel the parade. If this happens in 40 to 60 per cent of cases, then the cumulative 
effect is considerable.31 As an illustration, the cost of running an identification procedure in 
Birmingham in 1994 was an average of 83 pounds. The average cost of the 633 procedures 
which did not go ahead was 33 pounds.32 These figures factor in only the costs in paying 
volunteers to attend, and not for staff time spent on procedures which do not take place.
29 Bucke and Brown (1997), op.cit., 50.
30 For the years 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
31 Figures from Birmingham and Manchester illustrate that the problem is more pronounced than 
estimated by officers in Bucke and Brown's 1997 study (op.cit.). In that study, officers thought that 20 to 
30 per cent of procedures did not go ahead, largely because suspects and witnesses failed to turn up. This 
study shows that the problem is broader than mere non-attendance.
32 1215 procedures were booked during 1994. Only 48 per cent went ahead. The cost of cancelled and 
postponed procedures was 14,114 pounds, and procedures which went ahead cost 52,315 pounds. These 
figures do not include general running costs for the identification suite, staff wages and so on, but focus 
purely on the cash handed over to parade volunteers.
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The problems surrounding cancellations of parades could in some measure be addressed by 
the police officers themselves. There seems to be a widespread ignorance amongst police 
officers in the West Midlands Force about the mechanics of identification parades, and the 
identification officers in Birmingham are frequently frustrated by this. It is a problem that 
needs to be addressed urgently, either by education and training of police officers,33 an 
increase in permanent sworn staff assigned to the suite, or a change in the methods of 
identification used.34
Volunteers for Identification Parades
In cases where all parties attend, the main reason for postponement of parades is the lack of 
suitable volunteers. The identification suite in Birmingham places a notice outside of the 
building outlining the times of parades for the following week, and the main elements of 
the suspect's description. There are many regular volunteers who sit on three or four 
parades a week.35 During the time of the study, volunteers were paid seven pounds per 
parade, which rose to ten pounds should the organisation of the parade take over two 
hours. Where volunteers appear in the pool offered to the suspect but are not selected to sit 
on the parade, they are paid five pounds. For unemployed young men who attend a number
33 Some of the officers who were expected to ensure that Code D provisions were adhered to, by 
monitoring witnesses or looking after volunteers, had never even seen an identification procedure. Breaches 
of Code D are virtually inevitable when some of the officers involved in identification procedures are 
ignorant of what constitutes a breach and are unaware that their actions may jeopardise any subsequent trial. 
It is acknowledged that individual officers can never be familiar with every piece of legislation affecting the 
work of the police force as a whole, but it is surely not unreasonable to expect that officers who are 
involved in conducting an identification procedure at least know the basic law in the area.
34 Superintendent John Scott, in an article in the Birmingham Post, complained about the high 
number of cancellations (up to 70 per cent) and the fact that only one in three witnesses made a positive 
identification. The long waiting periods for identification parades were also berated. West Midlands Police 
then made a move to increase the opening hours of the identification suite, rather than address education or 
the possibility of lobbying for the use of other methods of identification: "Identifying why poor results are 
on parade" Birmingham Post August 11, 1998, page 5.
35 One volunteer in Nottingham stated that he was "doing between 50 and 60 identity parades a year": 
"Mr 0 ... Crime Fighter" Nottingham Evening Post June 23 1998, page 5. Another in West Yorkshire 
claimed that he had been a volunteer on up to eleven parades a week, but normally did four or five: "We 
name the innocent men" The Evening Standard October 9 1997, page 23.
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of parades a week, the nominal amount per parade can build into a useful supplement to 
their state benefits.
The identification suite staff also have a list of contacts to call who are willing to gather 
together a group of people fitting the broad description of the suspect. This is particularly 
useful where the suspect is unusual in appearance. In a small number of cases, officers still 
go out in vans looking for volunteers in the city centre or at the University. In some cities, 
employment agencies are used, but this was not necessary in Birmingham. Although some 
other forces operate a more formal database of volunteers,36 the network operating out of 
the identification suite in Birmingham was good, and it was only with suspects outside of a 
broad mainstream appearance,37 or with juveniles, that the identification suite staff had 
problems in arranging a parade.
However, there are some drawbacks in using a regular pool of volunteers. For example, 
the routinized nature of identification procedures, as discussed above, can result in reliance 
on regular volunteers even where they do not result in a very good parade, because they are 
available and it is easy for police officers to organise them. Ease of organisation is very 
important to identification suite staff, so that where a contact has been used to get a number 
of volunteers together, they are paid even when they do not fit the description of the 
suspect enough to go into the initial pool. A further drawback in using regular volunteers is 
that they become very familiar with the process and can treat the identification suite as a
36 For example, Nottinghamshire Police had a database of 1000 volunteers by mid-year 1998. They 
want to increase this further: "Mr 0 ... Crime Fighter", ibid. South Yorkshire Police have a database of 
around 3000 people: "We name the innocent men", ibid.
37 In 1997, West Midlands Police felt compelled to advertise nationally for volunteers who look like 
a member of the pop group ZZ Top. They had consulted the Birmingham School of Speech and Drama, the 
Musicians' Union, and a talent agency in their bid to find volunteers: "We name the innocent men", op.cit.; 
"Hairy lookalikes would be a hit in police pop parade" The Daily Telegraph , 8 October 1997, page 3.
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social club. This can present problems where a suspect is very nervous and therefore looks 
out of place, or where volunteers laugh and joke amongst themselves.38
Where suspects had unusual hairstyles, scars or tattoos, the identification officer arranged 
for all members of the parade to wear hats, sticking plasters, or long-sleeved shirts. Hats 
were usually worn where suspects had short dreadlocks, shaven heads, or two-tone 
colouring on their hair. 39 The identification officer was fair in his assessment of what was a 
totally unsatisfactory parade, and would advise suspects that they should consider a group 
identification. In one case, where the suspect was very short and stocky, good volunteers 
could not be found. The identification officer, rather than the suspect's legal representative, 
took the decision that the parade would not be fair. However, the suspect opted to go 
ahead, and was not identified. In another case, the identification officer advised the suspect 
to take off his tie because otherwise the parade would be unfair. Provision of hats and 
sticking plasters meant that a fair parade could be run even though the suspect had one 
distinctive feature. The effort to hold a parade wherever possible, rather than resorting to 
other methods of identification, illustrates a commitment to following Code of Practice D. 
The officers in Birmingham usually40 made sensible distinctions between suspects who had 
one unusual feature, which could be covered up and a parade run, and those who were 
singular in appearance. For example, where volunteers could not be found for a red headed 
male suspect with stubble, officers did not suggest a shave and the wearing of hats. Rather, 
they realised that skin tone, eyebrows and lashes were also distinctive and so organised a
38 For a discussion of the behaviour of volunteers in the parades observed during the study on 
suspects, see chapter 4. The problem appears to be nation-wide. One West Yorkshire volunteer has been 
reported as saying "I was in Leeds once and everybody was dead serious standing in front of the spotlights. 
Then one of the lads farted just as the parade started. Everybody laughed apart from the suspect and he got 
picked.": "We name the innocent men", op.cit.
39 Identification officers should ensure that they do not allow the use of hats, sticking plasters etc. to 
the point that it constitutes a disguise, or makes for unfairness against the suspect: see R v Hutton [1999] 
Crim L.R. 74, where parade members were given baseball caps and scarves, which covered half of their 
faces.
40 Although a nationwide search for volunteers who look like members of ZZ Top may be less than 
sensible: "We name the innocent men", op.cit.
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group identification. This is in stark contrast to the officers in Sheffield who, in their 
efforts to arrange an identification parade for a six foot three bald black suspect, put dark 
make-up on the faces of white volunteers.41
Reform Suggestions
The studies conducted for this thesis illustrated that the protections of Code of Practice D 
are generally working well within its own limits, at least in the West Midlands. However, 
the empirical studies with suspects and witnesses served to highlight the shortcomings and 
limitations of the Code in protecting suspects from misidentification where there was 
relative judgment used by witnesses, or where suspects failed to exercise their rights 
through a lack of knowledge.
The use of specialist staff increases the likelihood that the provisions of Code D will be 
observed once the suspect and witnesses are within the identification suite. Identification 
officers can be likened to custody officers in the sense that they are charged with ensuring 
that the rights of the suspect are upheld. Whilst there has been some doubt about the ability 
of police officers in specialised posts such as custody or identification to divorce 
themselves from the culture of the investigation and withstand the pressures from 
investigating officers, the identification officers in Birmingham were extremely diligent in 
their quest to ensure that Code D was followed. Where breaches of the Code did occur, 
they were at the hands of witness officers or temporary identification officers who had not 
had the benefit of recent training or experience. If the integrity of the process is to be
41 "Police defend 'blacked up' identity parade", The Independent, July 26 1997, page 7; "Star of the 
black and white identity parade", The Times July 25 1997, Home news. The judge in the case was quoted 
saying "It's a farce when the faces of white men are painted black for an identity parade. Ethnic origin is not 
only to do with colour, it is to do with other features" The Independent, op.cit, 7. Apparently Gloucester 
police made a similar decision, putting volunteers in wigs and make-up to make them look like the suspect, 
who was a Rastafarian. One white volunteer in West Yorkshire also claimed that he had once been asked to 
impersonate someone from Pakistan : "We name the innocent men", op.cit.
203
promoted, there is a need for specialised and well trained officers to perform all tasks 
associated with identification. Furthermore, specialised staff should be regularly monitored 
and kept up to date by educational training sessions. During the months spent conducting 
the studies on witnesses and suspects, routine performance of familiar tasks sometimes 
threatened the protection afforded to the suspect by Code D. For example, the identification 
officer read out the Notice to the Suspect very quickly, so that a suspect hearing it for the 
first time would be unlikely to digest much, if any, of its content.
Although Code D is generally well observed, it is questionable whether the expense of 
running a purpose built identification suite is justified: staff spend a good proportion of 
their time with little to do. When parades are cancelled or postponed, time and the facilities 
are left free, costing West Midlands Police considerable sums of money. Other methods of 
gathering identification evidence, which could streamline the process and involve fewer 
staff members, should be explored. The Runciman Report42 recommended that all major 
urban areas should have purpose built identification suites and millions of pounds have 
since been spent equipping police forces with them.43 The purpose built suites represent 
greater ability to have specialised officers who can follow Code D, but they are based on a 
false premise: that the identification parade is by far the best method of identification.
It is the traditional view that a live parade offers the best from of identification test: it offers 
three dimensional, natural, moving parade members who can be viewed not only for facial 
features but also for build and, in some areas, gait. However, a recent study by Cutler, 
Herman. Penrod and Fisher has reviewed a number of studies and casts considerable doubt
42 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report (1993 London:HMSO) Cmnd 2263, 11.
43 For example, Burton-on Trent recently spent over one million pounds on a purpose built suite: 
"Suite will soon be on parade" Derby Evening Telegraph July 15 1999, 23. The quest for volunteers 
creates problems and is extremely costly. One area advertised for make-up artists to make volunteers fit the 
general description of the suspect. Hopefully, this will not progress to the "blacking-up" of volunteers 
which occurred in Sheffield in 1997: "Parade your talent for police" Grimsbv Evening Telegraph May 31 
1999, 5.
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on the traditional view. Cutler et.al. believe that "it is not worth the trouble and expense to 
use live lineups".44 Therefore, cheaper and less time consuming methods could easily be 
employed without compromising the protections offered to suspects, nor the overall 
integrity of the criminal process.
Video identification libraries45 could offer a moving image which is superior to 
photographs, and which shows the suspect in a real setting, as do live identification 
parades. Metropolitan Police have begun compilation of Metldent, a video library which 
will be used throughout the Metropolitan area.46 It is hoped that facial matching will 
follow, streamlining the system further. There is little reason why resources cannot be 
pooled, eventually allowing for a national video library. With the onset of technological 
advances, the gap between live and video identification has narrowed, and the studies on 
suspects and witnesses illustrate that a more efficient system is needed. Video libraries 
would decrease the cost and administrative effort involved in arranging live parades, and 
their development should be prioritised to avoid increasing problems with cancellations, 
postponements, time and cost when arranging live parades.
Volunteers could be employed to be filmed in front of the same background, sitting or 
performing the same task. A one-off payment increases cost-effectiveness instantly. The 
images could then be kept on a central database, linked to regions via a secure intranet 
system. If funding co-operation was not forthcoming, regional databases could be set up. 
Under either a national or regional system, specialist officers could be based in each region 
to access the database, look after witnesses and ensure that suspects are aware of, and can 
access, their rights. Once an investigating officer had requested a parade, a description of
44 Cutler, B.L., Berman, G.L., Penrod, S., and Fisher, R.P., "Conceptual, practical and empirical 
issues associated with identification test media" in D.F. Ross, J.D. Read and M.P. Toglia Adult Eyewitness 
Testimony: Current Trends and Developments (1994: Cambridge University Press), 163, 181.
45 Some areas in the UK, such as West Yorkshire, have (albeit limited) video libraries already.
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the suspect, or the witness's description of the offender could be run through the computer 
to come up with a pool of volunteers from which the suspect could choose the video parade 
members. A combination of both the description and the suspect could be used for video 
parades, because the computer software could be programmed to look for common 
features, or concentrate on the salient features in the witness' description. The video could 
be entered as evidence in contested trials, to allow jury members to judge the quality of the 
parade for themselves. Procedures similar to those in use for video and live identification 
parades in Annexes A and B of Code D could be used, with little reform needed. Video 
identification offers a less stressful procedure for witnesses at a reduced cost to police, with 
no consequent infringement of suspects' rights.
Conclusion
The arrangement and conduct of identification procedures in the identification suite in 
Birmingham is a costly, time-consuming and inefficient process. Brief observation in 
Manchester Longsight identification suite revealed the same problems as in Birmingham 
and there is no reason to believe that other identification suites are dissimilar. Using live 
parades as the main means of gathering identification evidence results in a high number of 
cancellations, long waiting periods for witnesses, and great monetary cost. Whilst 
identification suite staff are knowledgeable and conscientious in their efforts to follow the 
provisions of Code of Practice D, procedures become routine and formulaic. For example, 
the use of regular volunteers has helped to increase the speed of the identification process, 
but sometimes this is at the expense of finding the most suitable volunteers. Police officers 
recruited to look after witnesses are not members of identification suite staff and often
46 "Virtual identity parades may soon fit the bill", The Times August 20, 1997; "Hi-tech helpers 
keep police bang on target" The Times, February 4 1998.
206
breach Code D, highlighting the need for more education about the requirements of the 
Code.
Specialist officers should be used for all aspects of identification procedures, with 
provision for ongoing training and supervision. Furthermore, Code of Practice D should be 
reformed to allow the use of video identification as the primary method of identification in 
England and Wales. The negligible increase in reliability of identifications from live parades 
is not worth the high levels of cost and time involved in arranging them. Long term savings 
justify the substantial initial outlay needed to set up a database library, as does the potential 
increase in efficiency. Although Code D can never be a panacea to the problem of 
misidentification, its efficiency can be increased whilst improving the protection of suspects 
from misidentification. Greater efficiency would allow for shorter retention intervals, less 
anxiety for both suspects and witnesses, and a recordable procedure such as video 
identification offers further protection in any later trial. The integrity of the process would 
therefore be enhanced by the reforms suggested here, and the often frenzied search for 
volunteers and make-up artists could then come to an end.
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PART TWO: PRESENTING EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE IN COURT
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE AND THE WARNING TO THE JURY
Introduction
Where eyewitness identification evidence has been collected by the police and the 
identification remains in dispute, the defendant is protected both by statute and by judicial 
practice from unreliable or improperly obtained evidence. The Turnbull 1 guidelines provide 
for a judge to withdraw a case from the jury where the prosecution relies upon 
identification evidence alone, and a breach of Code of Practice D may result in the 
exclusion of identification evidence under PACE s.78. This chapter examines the judicial 
approach to the exercise of s.78 discretion and the circumstances in which the direction in 
Turnbull will result in a case being withdrawn from the jury.
The Turnbull guidelines were largely a response to the Devlin Committee Report2 in 1976, 
which recommended a warning to the jury in eyewitness identification cases. This chapter 
discusses the background to the guidelines and the rejection of some of the Devlin 
Committee recommendations in favour of a broader judicial discretion. The Turnbull 
guidelines have imposed a duty on judges to inform the jury of the dangers of eyewitness 
identification, the reasons for those dangers, and any specific weaknesses in the eyewitness 
evidence in that case. Judges have to make an assessment of the quality of the evidence, 
and also whether there is any evidence which is capable of supporting the identification. It 
is hoped that educating the jury about the dangers of mistaken identification will increase 
protection from wrongful conviction for those accused who have been misidentified. This 
chapter examines what factors determine whether evidence is deemed to be of "good" or
1 [ 1976] 3 All ER 549
2 Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on 
Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (1976, London:HMSO).
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"poor" quality, what evidence may support an identification, and when judges should 
withdraw a case from the jury. In doing so, the chapter will assess whether psychological 
findings are used to best effect in the Turnbull direction, and whether the protection it 
offers to suspects is adequate. The sufficiency of a judicial direction in eyewitness 
identification is explored further in chapter 8, where increased utilisation of psychological 
findings in the form of expert evidence is discussed.
Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 offers judges a broader discretion 
to exclude evidence than that available at common law. The discretion affords some 
protection to defendants in identification cases, providing they plead not guilty and the case 
proceeds to trial. This chapter discusses the effectiveness of section 78 as a protection for 
defendants, the approach of the judiciary to the exercise of the section 78 discretion, and 
the impact this has had in identification cases.
The Turnbull Guidelines
The Turnbull warning to the jury outlines the responsibility of trial judges in eyewitness 
identification cases to advise the jury of the danger of convicting on evidence of 
identification alone: 3
"Whenever a case...depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of 
one or more identifications of the accused...the judge should warn the jury 
of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on 
the correctness of the identification or identifications. In addition he should 
instruct them as to the reason for the need for such a warning and make 
some reference to the possibility that a mistaken witness can be a convincing 
one and that a number of such witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided this 
is done in clear terms the judge need not use any particular form of words."
Explanation of why the jury should be cautious about accepting evidence of identification 
was an important step forward and remains an integral part of the warning today. 4 By
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informing jurors of the reasons why a warning is necessary, the Turnbull direction seeks to 
further the protective principle by making the jury wary of accepting the evidence of 
eyewitnesses in cases where their evidence is very important to the success of the 
prosecution case.
(i) Background
The Turnbull warning was formulated by the judiciary, largely in response to the 
recommendations of the Devlin Report. It appears that the court sought to limit the Devlin 
Committee recommendations to allow for the retention of judicial discretion in eyewitness 
identification cases. The Turnbull guidelines themselves outlined the responsibility upon 
trial judges in eyewitness evidence cases to advise the juries of the dangers of convicting on 
evidence of identification alone.
Although the Turnbull judgment followed hot on the heels of the publication of the Devlin 
Report, a number of cases in England and Ireland had dealt with the issue of summing up 
in identification cases before that time. These cases constitute an important background to 
Turnbull, and they also provide support for the view that what the judiciary claimed was a 
willing implementation of the recommendations of the Devlin Report was rather an attempt 
to avoid the introduction of legislation on a special direction to the jury.
A general warning to the jury in all cases involving reliance on eyewitness identification 
was given in the Irish case of The People v. Dominic Casey (no.2) 5 , prompting the first
3 Op.cit., at 551-552. The Turnbull warning is also in use in a number of Commonwealth 
countries: for example Jamaica, Canada, Australia and Trinidad; and others have incorporated a similar 
warning into statute, for example S.344D of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961.
See, for example, R v Elliott (Unreported) Court of Appeal 22 December 1997.
5 [1963] I.R. 33. Casey had been convicted at a retrial of assault and indecent assault on two five 
year old boys. The Court of Criminal Appeal refused leave to appeal but certified that its decision involved 
a point of law of "exceptional public importance" and the appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. As well 
as holding that a general warning on eyewitness identification evidence was desirable, the Court allowed die
21 1
serious discussion of the benefits of such a warning in England and Wales. In Casey, 
Kingsmill Moore J. stated that judicial experience had shown that, 6
"[PJarticular types of warnings are necessary in particular types of 
case...The category of circumstances and special types of case which call 
for special directions and warnings from the trial judge cannot be considered 
as closed. Increased judicial experience, and indeed further psychological 
research, may extend it."
The view taken in Casey was that the judges may well be aware of both the fallibility of 
identification parades and the number of cases in which eyewitness identification had been 
later proved to be mistaken, but that the same could not be assumed of juries. The opinion 
that juries could not be expected to have such knowledge was a realistic one: juries did not 
(and still do not) have the same access as judges to information and there is a real danger 
that they will place too much reliance on identification evidence. 7 The possibility of 
tempering blind acceptance of identification evidence with a judicial warning was seen as 
the easiest route to take.
The warning given in Casey* formed the basis of that used 13 years later in Turnbull. The 
Supreme Court held that it was "desirable" that, where a case depended wholly or 
substantially on visual identification evidence, the attention of the jury should be drawn to 
the fact that in a number of such cases the evidence had later been proved false or mistaken 
(even where the honesty of the witness was not in question) and that caution should be 
exercised before the decision to convict was taken.9
appeal and ordered a retrial. Particularly interesting in the judgment is the consideration of a number of cases 
where the need for a direction to the jury to take care had been recognised. Notable amongst these is The 
People v. Keffard (unreported) where the conviction was set aside because the identification evidence was not 
accompanied by cautionary comment by the trial judge.
6 Ibid., at 37-38. The comment on psychological research here by Kingsmill Moore J. was 
particularly enlightened for the time.
7 Mock jury research on the utilization of eyewitness evidence and the difference a warning as to its 
unreliability can make are examined in the next chapter.
8 See the judgment of Kingsmill Moore J. in Casey op.cit., at 39-40
9 There was a crucial assertion by the court that the "corroboration" of one eyewitness by another did 
not necessarily rule out the possibility of mistaken identification. The judgment in Turnbull made heavy 
weather of distinctions between identification by "fleeting glimpse" and identification where observation 
was for longer period and in adequate lighting. The Court in Casey steered away from complicated
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It appeared that the stage was set to introduce guidelines in England and Wales like those in 
Casey . However, resistance to a general warning could be seen up until the time of the 
Devlin Report. In Arthurs v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland10, the House of Lords 
rejected the provision of a general warning, stating in the leading judgment of Lord Morris 
of Borth-y-Gest that "it would be undesirable to lay down as a rule of law that a warning in 
some specific form or partly defined terms must be given." 11 The House of Lords 
acknowledged that in identification cases a judge must direct the jury with care, but was of 
the opinion that the requirement to do so was usually executed without the implementation 
of a general warning. Although the issue was left open for "future consideration", 12 the 
House of Lords was against imposing any "stereotyped pattern" 13 for summing-up in 
identification evidence cases. This was because14
"An incantation of certain words will be a poor substitute for or a useless 
addition to the discerning guidance which the features of a particular case 
may require."
The judgment in Arthurs was followed in a case heard by the Court of Appeal in 1973, R v 
Long]S , in which the only prosecution evidence was that of identification by three 
witnesses, none of whom knew the appellant. The decision in Arthurs applied only to those 
cases where recognition was involved: there was no specific ruling on those cases where 
the witness did not know the offender prior to the incident in question. It was open to the 
Court of Appeal in Long to introduce a warning for cases involving the identification of a 
stranger. This they did not do. It was held that: 16
distinctions such as those put forward in Turnbull, preferring instead to state that erroneous observations 
could still be made where the "opportunities for observation had been adequate": Ibid., at 40.
10 (1971)Cr.App.R 161
11 Ibid., 170
12 Ibid., 169
13 Ibid., 170 
Ibid.
15 (1973)57Cr.App.R871
16 In the leading judgment of Lawton L.J., at 877-878. The question of a warning in identification 
cases where the accused was unknown to witnesses who had had a limited time to identify the offender was
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"In our judgment, the law does not require a judge in this kind of case to 
give a specific warning about the dangers of convicting on visual 
identification; still less does it require him to use any particular form of 
words...in cases in which guilt turns upon visual identification by one or 
more witnesses it is likely that the summing-up would not be fair if it failed 
to point out the circumstances in which such identification was made and the 
weaknesses in it...Above all the jury must be left in no doubt that before 
convicting they must be sure that the visual identification is correct...The 
trial judge is in the most advantageous position to decide what kind of 
direction is best suited for the case which he is trying."
Although pointing out the circumstances in which the identification was made and any 
deficiencies in identification evidence were seen to be an important part of any summing- 
up, the courts were careful to resist any encroachment upon the discretion of trial judges.
In 1976, the Devlin Committee recommended the use of a warning to the jury, because 
eyewitness evidence was "impervious to the usual tests". 17 In identification, the witness 
does not provide a narrative, from which a general picture can be gained: there is only one 
specific piece of evidence, that the accused is or is not the person seen by the witness at the 
scene of the crime. The "usual tests" of the witness's story and demeanour therefore reveal 
little about the reliability of the evidence. The Committee acknowledged that: 18
"A single mistake may be fatal, since in identification cases where there is 
no corroboration the verdict has to rest on a single point: the risk of error in 
observation or in comprehension is not spread as it is when a conclusion 
rests upon a number of observations."
classed by the Court of Appeal in Long as being a point of law of general public importance, but leave to 
appeal to the House of Lords was refused. The House of Lords also refused leave to appeal.
17 Devlin Report, op.cit, at para. 4.25. The Criminal Law Revision Committee, in its Eleventh 
Report, recommended a judicial warning to the jury in eyewitness identification cases, but it was not 
implemented at that time: (1972, Cmnd.4991). Two years after the Devlin Report, the Bryden Committee 
reported in Scotland. They recognised the fallibility of eyewitness identification, but thought that Devlin 
Report over-emphasised the unreliability of evidence of identification. This was in part because of the 
requirement for corroboration in Scotland: Identification Procedures Under Scottish Criminal Law (1978) 
Cmnd. 7096, para. 1.03.
18 Devlin Report, op.cit.
214
The solution proposed by the Committee was implemented, in a modified form, by the 
Court of Appeal in R v Turnbull19 and is still in use in the courts today. Whilst informing 
the jury of the reasons behind the need to take special care in eyewitness identification cases 
(namely the difficulty in assessment), the Committee recommended20
"That the trial judge should be required by statute:
(a) to direct the jury that it is not safe to convict upon eyewitness evidence 
unless the circumstances of the identification are exceptional or the 
eyewitness evidence is supported by substantial evidence of another sort; 
and
(b) to indicate to the jury the circumstances, if any, which they might regard 
as supporting the identification; and
(c) if he is unable to indicate either such circumstances or such evidence, to 
direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty."
On the issue of a warning to the jury of the danger of convicting on eyewitness evidence 
alone, the Devlin Committee was of the opinion that: 21
"the judicial introduction of a new principle into the common law is not now 
to be looked for...either the law must be left as it is or it must be changed by 
statute."
The Committee reached its conclusion largely because of the Court of Appeal decision in 
the case of Long22 , which had rejected the need for a warning. Leave to appeal to the 
House of Lords on the matter was then refused. The refusal of leave to appeal appeared to 
indicate that the judiciary either opposed the introduction of a mandatory warning to the 
jury in identification cases or did not want to rule on the issue.
19 [1976] 3 All E.R. 549. The significance of the fact that the Devlin Committee recommendation on 
this issue was implemented by the Court of Appeal rather than by legislation is discussed in the next 
chapter.
20 Devlin Report, op.cit., para. 8.4. The Committee had in mind a general rule. However, it is clear 
that the rule was envisaged as flexible, as stated at 4.84: "It is the effect rather than the words that is to 
count." At para 4.59 the Committee concluded that trial judges should take time in summing up to address 
eyewitness identification evidence and outlined matters which could be relevant to this process. These 
examples included the witness (such as the possibility of stress resulting from the incident affecting the 
reliability of his or her identification); the conditions at the scene, such as lighting and length of 
observation; lapse of time between the incident and the identification; the procedure adopted at any 
identification parade which took place; and the presence or absence of any circumstantial evidence.
21 Ibid., at para. 4.78
22 (1973)57CrAppR871
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However, in July 1976 the Court of Appeal dealt with four appellants in cases involving 
disputed identification,23 resulting in what have become known as the Tumbull Guidelines. 
Lord Widgery CJ acknowledged that eyewitness identification evidence carried a special 
risk of miscarriages of justice and that "the number of such cases...necessitates steps being 
taken by the courts, including this court, to reduce that number as far as possible."24 The 
root of the warning was therefore protection of the accused from wrongful conviction 
where a n eyewitness was mistaken in his or her identification. The court largely followed 
the Devlin Report recommendations on the matter, with the exclusion of the phrase 
"exceptional circumstances". To avoid excessive case law on which circumstances were 
and were not to be considered exceptional, the court instead referred to the overall quality 
of the identification.
As noted above, the judiciary had, before this time, been reluctant to incorporate a warning 
to the jury into the summing up in cases of disputed identification. It is probable that the 
change of heart in Turnbull was a direct result of the recommendations put forward in the 
Devlin Report. The reasons for acting upon the recommendations are less certain: the Court 
of Appeal might have wished to see the recommendations implemented quickly. 
Alternatively, it may have sought damage limitation, avoiding a complete bar on discretion 
should the warning become statutory. Any legislation on the matter would certainly have 
taken a long time to be drafted and implemented, and by acting swiftly the Court of Appeal 
ensured that any requirement of a general warning in identification cases would be on their
23 Three separate appeal hearings took place over two days, R v Turnbull, R v Camelo (who were 
jointly convicted of conspiracy to burgle) and R v Roberts and R v Whitby (convicted of unlawful 
wounding and robbery respectively). The appeals of Turnbull and Camelo were dismissed, due to other 
evidence supporting their identifications. The appeals of Roberts and Whitby were allowed and their 
convictions quashed because there was no supporting evidence.
24 Lord Widgery CJ at 551. Other countries have similar jury directions to the one found in Turnbull. 
For instance, the first move was made for the inclusion of cautionary guidelines in U.S. courts with the 
decision in United States v. Telfaire 469 F.2d 552 (D.C Cir. 1972).
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terms. In this way, the judiciary could pick and choose which of the Devlin Committee's 
recommendations to follow.
(ii) When Should There Be A Turnbull Warning?
The Court of Appeal in Turnbull stated that a warning should be given: 25
"Wherever the case against the accused depends wholly or substantially on 
the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the 
defence alleges to be mistaken."
The protections afforded to the defendant by the warning are compromised by the rather 
selective nature of its use. In Zander and Henderson's Crown Court Study, barristers 
reported that a Turnbull warning was given in only the half of the contested cases where 
eyewitness identification was an important or fairly important issue.26 This represents a 
clear erosion of the protective principle for a high proportion of suspects. In part this is a 
result of the nature of a judicial warning: it is left to the judge to decide whether a warning 
is necessary, rather than the defence being able to proactively educate jurors about the 
dangers of misidentification. One possible route to allow the defence to give information to 
the jury is to enable an expert witness to give evidence regarding the dangers of relying on 
eyewitness identification. However, there are also drawbacks to that option, as discussed 
in chapter eight.
It is clear that, as held in Spencer, 21 where the prosecution case relies on visual 
identification a full Turnbull direction is necessary. Although the Court in Turnbull was at
25 Turnbull, op.cit., 551. It was stated in Scott [1989] A.C. 1242 that only in exceptional 
circumstances would a conviction based on uncorroborated identification evidence be sustained in the 
absence of a Turnbull warning (at 1261). It is clear that the Turnbull guidelines apply not only to jury 
trials, but also to cases heard in magistrates' courts. In such circumstances, the triers of fact must remind 
themselves of the dangers of convicting upon identification evidence. This principle can also be seen at 
work in Gandy [1990] Crim.L.R. 346, where the failure of a judge to direct himself along the lines of 
Turnbull during a Newton hearing was seen as sufficient grounds for allowing the appeal against sentence.
26 Zander, M, and Henderson, P., The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Crown Court Study 
Research Study No. 19 (1993 London:HMSO), 93. Eyewitness identification was deemed to be important or 
fairly important in one quarter of all contested cases.
27 [1995] Crim.L.R. 235
217
pains to ensure that the guidelines should be tailored to the individual case, a direction 
which only speaks of the need for caution, without any elaboration, will be seen at any 
appeal as inadequate. In reality, therefore, there is something approaching an absolute 
formula, because if salient points are not mentioned by the trial judge, the direction will not 
amount to a full Turnbull warning.28
Precisely when a Turnbull warning is required has been the subject of a significant amount 
of case law, much of which refers to fleeting glances and encounters. For example, in 
Oakwelt29 , the Court of Appeal spoke of the function of Turnbull as off-setting the risks of 
fleeting encounters, as opposed to those cases which involved prolonged observation. 
Similarly, in Curry and Keeble30 , the Court stated that the sole use of Turnbull directions 
was for dealing with sightings of the fleeting glance type. A distinction has also been 
drawn between fleeting encounters and cases of recognition. This is surely not what the 
Court of Appeal in Turnbull envisaged when formulating the guidelines. The fleeting 
encounter was seen as an example of the type of identification which must be withdrawn 
from the jury when unaccompanied by supporting evidence, not as the only type of 
identification evidence requiring a general cautionary warning to the jury. The original 
judgment, as quoted above, suggests that other, "good" quality methods of identification 
may be left before the jury but they must still be accompanied by a Turnbull direction.
In this way, cases such as Oakwell and Curry and Keeble suggest that subsequent case law 
has narrowed the definition of the type of case requiring a Turnbull direction and has
28 See R v Hunjan (1978) 68 Cr.App.R. 99; and R v Breslin (1985) 80 Cr.App.R. 226, where the 
Court emphasised that there was flexibility within the requirements of Turnbull , but that there was a 
general priniple which should be followed. Where a judge disregards Turnbull, the Court of Appeal are 
damning: see R v Whitehead (8 May 1989) The Times 17 May 1989, where the judge was described as not 
even paying "lip-service" to the direction. The trial judge had been blatantly biased throughout the 
summing-up, stating, amongst other tilings, that the identification parade was "eight innocent members of 
the public and the defendant".
29 [1978] 1 All E.R. 1223
30 [1983]Crim.L.R. 737
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therefore reduced the number of suspects who may rely on the protection of a judicial 
warning to the jury. However, both cases involved defendants who did not dispute all of 
the identification evidence against them. Whilst conceding presence at the scene of the 
crime, the role the defendants were alleged to have played was denied. When taking that 
element into account, it can be seen that the problem addressed by Turnbull, that of 
eyewitnesses mistakenly placing the accused at the scene of the crime, was not present. 
Oakwell and Curry and Keeble can surely be distinguished from recognition cases where 
the accused does dispute attendance at the scene of the offence. This factor has not, 
however, prevented confusion over the requirement for a Turnbull direction in recognition 
cases.
Indeed, a number of recent cases have raised the question of whether a Turnbull warning is 
necessary in cases of identification by recognition. In Bowden3 ', for instance, the appeal 
relied upon the trial judge's failure to follow the guidelines laid down in Turnbull when an 
identification, based on recognition, was made by a police officer. The trial judge made no 
reference to the fact that mistakes could still occur even where the witness knew the 
accused well. At the appeal, prosecution counsel relied upon the cases of Oakwell and 
Curry and Keeble when claiming that the Turnbull guidelines did not need to be used in 
full. The Court of Appeal in Bowden distinguished the cases, holding that the failure to 
give a Turnbull warning was a sufficient ground for setting aside the conviction. The 
decision is consistent with the wording of the Turnbull judgment itself, in which Lord 
Widgery CJ highlighted the problems inherent in reliance upon an identification by 
recognition. 32
31 [1993] Crim.L.R. 379
32 Turnbull, op.cit., p.552. The Court of Appeal in Bentley [1991] Crim. L.R. 620 also emphasised 
the importance of advising the jury of the possibility of mistake in recognition cases, even where the 
witness is convinced and convincing. The witness in Bentley had been under the influence of alcohol at die 
time he had observed what he took to be the defendant's arm coming towards his face. Although the two 
knew each other well, the witness did not identify Bentley precisely and the need for a Turnbull direction
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That a Turnbull direction is necessary in recognition cases was confirmed in the robbery 
case of Thomas33 where the duty of the judge to point out that the witnesses may recognise 
the appellant as a customer but be wrong in identifying him as the offender had not been 
executed. There is a concern in such cases that the jury may be under the impression that 
recognition is much more reliable than identification of a stranger. This would be especially 
problematic in a case such as Thomas where the witnesses did not know the appellant well, 
but simply as a customer of their shop. The danger of confusing different customers is 
obvious.
It is clear, however, that the lack of a Turnbull direction in recognition cases will not 
necessarily lead to the quashing of a conviction where other evidence points to the 
correctness of that conviction. In Joseph 34 no warning was given to the jury about the 
dangers involved in mistaken recognition, yet because of other convincing circumstantial 
evidence as to identity, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that no miscarriage of justice had 
occurred. So, whilst the absence of a Turnbull direction is enough in itself to result in the 
Court of Appeal overturning a conviction, that will not be the inevitable result. 35 This 
accords with the approach of the courts to the discretion to exclude evidence found in 
section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. There, the courts utilise the 
protective principle in looking to the degree of unfairness caused to the accused by the 
breach of Code D. Where there has not been a judicial warning, courts will likewise look to
was even greater, as the identification evidence was based predominantly on assumptions made by the 
witness.
33 [1994] Crim.L.R. 128. In this case, the judge also failed to give a proper direction on the dangers 
of dock identification. See also R v Wait [1998] Crim.L.R.67
34 [1994] Crim.L.R. 48. This case also deals with the impracticability of holding an identification 
parade and how the judge should direct upon subsequent confrontation evidence in such cases.
35 See, for example, the recent Privy Council Jamaican case of Freemantle [1994] Crim.L.R. 930 
where good quality recognition evidence was held to make safe a murder conviction.
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whether there has been unfairness in deciding whether the protective principle has been 
breached.
Exactly when the requirement that the prosecution case rests "wholly or substantially" on 
the issue of identification is fulfilled has also been the subject of much debate. Andrews36 
illustrates the difficulty that judges may encounter in assessing when a case involves an 
identification issue requiring a Turnbull warning. There was no eyewitness identification in 
the strict sense at all in Andrews, but the case against the accused rested upon his being the 
third man involved in an assault. The evidence was that there was a third man, seen by 
police officers witnessing the scene, who fitted the description of Andrews; that Andrews 
was found in a nearby street acting aggressively; and that his brother, with whom he had 
spent the evening, was a co-accused convicted by the jury. In the absence of a direct 
identification by an eyewitness, there appears to be no reason to give a Turnbull direction, 
because the prosecution was not relying upon the identification which the defence alleged to 
be mistaken. Despite this, the Court of Appeal held that it would have been prudent for a 
Turnbull direction to have been given, because the identity of the third man seen at the 
scene of the crime was a crucial issue.37
Where the accused admits being present at the scene of the crime but disputes playing the 
part alleged, a Turnbull warning is not always necessary.38 This is because the situation is 
not strictly seen as an identification case and a warning following the Turnbull guidelines
36 [1993] Crim.L.R. 590
37 The direction in the case had effectively withdrawn the issue in the case from the jury, with the 
trial judge's words "quite plainly that was John Andrews". Allowing the appeal on those grounds would 
have been one thing, but to fit the facts to Turnbull in order to hold that there had been a misdirection was 
quite another.
38 See, for example, Oakwell and Curry and Keeble, op.cit., and Reavy (acting as next friend for H) 
v DPP; R v Dunstable Youth Court Justices, ex parte H CO/1865/98, CO/4483/97 Queen's Bench 
Division, Crown Office List. A Turnbull direction may be necessary in some cases, however, such as the 
situation seen in Hope, Limburn and B leas dale [1994] Crim. L.R. 118; see also the commentary of Slater 
[1995] Crim.L.R. 244.
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could serve to distract and confuse the jury. The issue in such cases would be "what role 
did the defendant play?" rather than "was the defendant the person seen at the incident?". 
This point was illustrated in Slated, where the Court of Appeal held that a Turnbull 
direction will not necessarily be needed when the issue is not the presence of the accused at 
the scene of the crime, but what they were doing there. This leaves open the possibility 
that, in some cases where the accused admits to being present at the scene, a warning will 
be needed. An example of such a case would be where there was a possibility of the 
witness mistaking one person for another, due to similarity of build or clothing. It appears 
that the general rule is that a Turnbull direction will not normally be needed, but that the 
individual circumstances of a case may necessitate it.40
When a full Turnbull direction is not used, but where the witness had little time to view the 
offender at the scene of the crime, the judge may have a responsibility to draw the attention 
of the jury to the dangers of relying on identifications made in such circumstances. 
Examples can be found in affray cases such as Oakwell.41 The court allowed the appeal in 
the case of Graham,42 stating that the summing up at trial merely paid lip- service to 
Turnbull, with no reference being made to the poor lighting in which the identification was 
made. However, the tenor of cases such as Oakwell is that, if there is a duty to draw the
39 [1995] Crim.L.R. 244. The case concerned an allegation of assault, in which the defendant 
admitted being in the nightclub concerned, but denied being involved in any disturbance.
40 See, for example, Thornton The Times, June 2 1994. Although the courts do not see cases such as 
Slater and Oakwell as being identification cases in the strict sense, the psychological literature tends to 
show that a witness can often correctly place someone at the scene of the crime whilst being mistaken 
about the part played by that person. This poor encoding of memory may be due to the in-built expectations 
and biases of the witness and is sometimes termed "unconscious transference": see Read, J.D. 
"Understanding bystander misidentifications: The role of familiarity and contextual knowledge" in D.F. 
Ross, J.D. Read and M.P. Toglia, Adult Eyewitness Testimony (1994 New York: Cambridge University 
Press), 56. Such research suggests that the courts may be defining too narrowly what is an identification 
case and what is not. Whilst Turnbull may not be an appropriate warning in such cases, it could be 
dangerous to offer no words of caution at all. In such cases, it may be that expert evidence offers an 
alternative method of highlighting the dangers of mistaking a bystander for the perpetrator. The viability of 
expert evidence is discussed in chapter eight of this thesis.
41 [1978] 1 A11E.R. 1223
42 [1994] Crim.L.R. 212
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attention of the jury to matters such as poor lighting, it is not one which amounts to the 
requirement of a full Tumbull direction. This illustrates the confusion prevalent in cases 
where a defendant admits to being at the scene of a crime but denies involvement. It is 
difficult for trial judges to make a reliable decision on which circumstances warrant a 
Turnbull direction, when the Court of Appeal itself appears to be confused on the matter.
A Turnbull warning may also be needed where a third party is the subject of the eyewitness 
identification, although the defendant is not.43 This situation does not strictly come within 
Lord Widgery C.J.'s formulation, which stated that a Turnbull direction was required 
where the case rested upon the disputed identification of the accused.44 However, if a 
witness asserts that a known companion of the accused was alongside the offender at the 
scene of the crime, then there is an obvious inference that the accused was the offender. 
This amounts to a form of identification of the accused. If the defence disputes the 
identification of the third party, the need for a Turnbull direction is clear.45
The warning is still required in cases where the eyewitness is a police officer,46 although it 
is well established that evidence of identity given by police officers is regarded to be of a 
higher standard than that given by an ordinary member of the public.47 The employment of 
a higher standard takes the form of directing the jury that a police officer may be correct
43 See, for example, R v. Bath [1990] Crim.L.R. 716 and Castle [1989] Crim.L.R. 567. In the 
former, a child accompanying the appellant was identified. It was held that a Turnbull warning would 
probably have been needed had the defence raised the issue. The argument is strengthened by Castle, where 
the admittedly accurate identification of an accomplice could amount to supporting evidence of the 
identification of the accused.
44 Turnbull. op.cit., at 552.
45 Whilst it appears that Turnbull may not only apply to identification of the accused, this principle 
does not extend beyond human beings. Identifications of inanimate objects are not subject to a Turnbull 
direction. (See Browning (1992) 94 Cr.App.R. 109, where the defence appealed on the grounds that an 
identification of a motor car should be subject to a direction analogous to Turnbull). The warning is only 
required where the it is the identification of a human being which is in issue. Where animals or inanimate 
objects are the subject of identification, a careful summing-up, but not a full Turnbull direction, is required: 
R v Huddart (Unreported) Court of Appeal 24 November 1998.
46 ReidvR[l99Q] 1 AC 363.
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when a mere casual observer may not be, due to the training in observation received by 
police officers as a result of their profession. Police officers are also regarded as being less 
excitable when confronted with violent events and more able to appreciate the importance of 
identification than are members of the general public. The basis for the assumption that 
police officers make more reliable eyewitnesses is dubious in itself, as is illustrated by 
psychological research on the issue.48 Whilst the warning is still necessary, a direction to 
the jury that identification evidence given by police officers is more reliable than that of 
other witnesses runs the risk of undermining the point of Turnbull, by presenting police 
officers as people apart from ordinary members of the public.
It can be seen that the application of the Turnbull guidelines has caused the judiciary some 
problems, but that there exists a general scheme of applicability: the warning is to be given 
in all cases resting wholly or substantially on the disputed identification of the accused. 
Whether or not the prosecution could be said to rely substantially upon identification 
evidence is a matter for the judge to determine in each individual case. A full Turnbull 
warning is, in some circumstances,49 viewed as superfluous. 50 Recognition cases are no 
exception to the requirement of a Turnbull direction, although cases where the accused 
admits being present at the scene of the crime may be. In such cases the judge still has a 
general duty when summing up to draw the attention of the jury to the possibility of 
mistake and any flaws in the evidence. Where a judge gives a full Turnbull direction based
47 See, for example, Ramsden [1991] Crim.L.R. 295 and Tyler and others [1993] Crim.L.R. 60
48 On the subject of knowledge of the police regarding issues affecting the reliability of eyewitness 
identification, see Bennett, P., and Gibling, F., "Can we trust our eyes?" (1989) 5 Policing 313. The 
authors found that police officers were no more knowledgeable about identification issues than were 
members of the general public. The judicial assumption that, as professionals within the criminal justice 
system, police officers appreciate the importance of identification and therefore make better witnesses, must 
therefore be questioned. Police officers may acknowledge the importance of reliable identification evidence, 
but may not know what affects that reliability. As such, they will probably be no better than the average, 
observant member of the public.
49 Such as where the defence is based on the contention that the witness is lying rather than 
mistaken.
50 An example of this can be seen in Courtnell [1990] Crim.L.R. 115
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upon the available research, it has the potential to advance the protective principle a great 
deal. Here is potential for the ultimate protection via Turnbull because it may result in the 
case being withdrawn from the jury. However, the level of protection actually offered to 
individual suspects is dependent not only on the provision of a warning but also on the 
decision of the judge as to the quality of the eyewitness evidence and whether it is 
supported by other evidence in the case.
(Hi) The Quality of the Evidence
In its 1976 Report, the Devlin Committee recommended a requirement that "exceptional 
circumstances" should exist before eyewitness evidence could be accepted unaccompanied 
by supporting evidence. The meaning of the phrase "exceptional circumstances" was not 
clarified, because the Committee wanted to avoid a long list of exceptions. 51 However, 
examples of circumstances which may be regarded as exceptional were given, such as 
familiarity with the accused, the suspect admitting presence at the scene of the incident, lack 
of alibi evidence and repeated or prolonged observation.52
However, the idea of exceptional circumstances was rejected by the Court of Appeal in 
Turnbull.™ Instead, the Turnbull guidelines require the judge to consider the quality of the 
evidence when deciding whether a case can be left before the jury. Where there is no 
supporting evidence and the identification evidence is of poor quality, the case should be 
withdrawn from the jury. 54 It is clear from Turnbull that the judge should assess the 
identification evidence both at the end of the prosecution's case and at the end of the 
defence case. 55 It is also clear that the judge should consider whether the case should be
51 The concern was that if such a list was produced it would be seen as definitive and would restrict 
the discretion of the judiciary to add to the list at appropriate times.
52 Devlin Report, op.cit., paras. 4.61-4.65
53 Turnbull, op.cit., at 552
54 See ReidvR[ 1990] 1 AC 363.
55 Turnbull, op.cit., at 554.
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withdrawn from the jury whether or not defence counsel requests it. 56 However, where the 
evidence is of good quality the case can be left before the jury notwithstanding the fact that 
there is no evidence capable of supporting the eyewitness testimony, providing a Turnbull 
warning is given.57 In any case where eyewitness identification is an issue, the judge 
should direct the jury to assess the quality of the evidence by telling them to "examine 
closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made."58 
The Court in Turnbull offered examples such as lighting and distance, Widgery LJ stating 
that: 59
"All these matters go to the quality of the identification evidence. If the 
quality is good and remains good at the close of the accused's case, the 
danger of a mistaken identification is lessened; but the poorer the quality, 
the greater the danger. In our judgment, when the quality is good...the jury 
can safely be left to assess the value of the identifying evidence even though 
there is no other evidence to support it...Were the courts to adjudge 
otherwise, affronts to justice would frequently occur."
In this passage, the court took the Devlin Committee's idea of "exceptional circumstances" 
and give it the rather vague label of "quality", in order to avoid case law on which 
circumstances could be classed as exceptional. Yet the use of the term "quality" leads to 
much the same dilemma without the guidance of having an established set of examples, 
resulting in reliance upon an individual judge's discretion in any given case. One judge may 
see an identification as "good quality" where another would not. This could mean that 
whether or not a case is withdrawn from a jury is a matter of chance, depending in 
borderline cases at least on the opinion about identification problems of the particular trial
56 See R v Fergus (1993) 98 Cr.App.R. 313.
57 In Jamaica, there was some resistance to applying Turnbull because of a belief that it compromised 
the decision in R v Galbraith [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1039, which lays down principles for judges to deal with 
submissions of no case to answer. However, in Daley v R [1993] 3 W.L.R. 666, the Privy Council 
emphasised that Turnbull and Galbraith could co-exist, because the former dealt with evidence "so slender 
that it is unreliable" (even where the witness is honest), whereas the latter dealt with judgments as to credit 
of witnesses. In R v Fergus, op.cit., the court of Appeal held that the "trial judge's duty to withdraw the 
case from the jury in an identification case is wider than the general duty of the trial judge in respect of a 
submission of no case to answer."
58 Turnbull, op.cit., at 552
59 Ibid. The reasoning in Arthurs was dealt with at 552, with Lord Widgery's statement that 
recognition still carried with it the possibility of mistake, a factor which should be conveyed to the jury in 
such cases. However, recognition was rightly seen as more reliable than identification by a stranger.
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judge. A judge therefore has a responsibility to highlight any problems in an eyewitness's 
evidence, yet may not have the requisite knowledge of the issues to identify all of the flaws 
in the "quality" of such evidence. It is at this point that the integrity principle is in particular 
danger of breaking down, because judges are unable to offer protection through the 
provisions in the warning when they are themselves ignorant of the issues at hand. Judicial 
education regarding current psychological research is therefore vital if the protective and 
integrity principles are to be upheld by the use of a warning to the jury.
Any specific weaknesses in the identification evidence should be drawn to the attention of 
the jury, thereby reminding jurors of the problems inherent in reliance on such evidence. In 
R v Fergus , 60 a 13 year old schoolboy had been convicted of assault with intent to rob, 
solely on the basis of eyewitness identification evidence. He appealed, on the grounds that 
the case should have been withdrawn from the jury and that the weaknesses in the 
identification evidence were not dealt with adequately in the judge's summing-up. Steyn 
LJ, whilst acknowledging that no particular words must be used, went on to say that: 61
"[I]n a case dependent on visual identification, and particularly where that is 
the only evidence, Turnbull makes it clear that it is incumbent on a trial 
judge to place before the jury any specific weaknesses which can arguably 
be said to have been exposed in the evidence. And it is not sufficient for the 
judge to invite the jury to take into account what counsel for the defence said 
about the specific weaknesses. Needless to say, the judge must deal with the 
specific weaknesses in a coherent manner so mat the cumulative impact of 
those specific weaknesses is fairly placed before the jury."
This firmly places a duty on the trial judge to ensure that the jury take account of all the 
weaknesses in the identification evidence by making it clear that they are matters which the 
judge, rather than counsel, feels the jury should weigh carefully in their deliberations. This 
approach was applied in R v Elliott , 62 where the court, in allowing an appeal against 
conviction for murder, were concerned that individual points of weakness may be
60 Op.cit. Also R v Whelan unreported, Court of Appeal 31 July 1998.
61 Ibid., at 317.
62 Unreported, Court of Appeal 22 December 1997. See also Brissett v R Privy Council 29 
November 1994.
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overlooked should the judge discusses the weaknesses only in the course of recounting the 
arguments of defence and prosecution. However, there is no suggestion the judge is 
required to sum up in a particular way, or deal with the evidence at a particular time, merely 
that the weaknesses are coherently presented to jurors in a manner which allows them to 
appreciate the overall effect on the reliability of identification evidence in the case. 63
So, where the quality of the identification evidence is "good", the case will be left before 
the jury even where identification is the only evidence against the accused. However, 
where the evidence is deemed to be "poor", then, unless there is supporting evidence, the 
trial judge is obliged to withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal. The fleeting 
glance is the classic example used to illustrate the meaning under Turnbull of a poor 
identification. Indeed, some commentators feel that the phrase "fleeting glance" became the 
definition of the difference between poor and good identification evidence for the purposes 
of a Turnbull direction. Walker and Brittain, for example, see Turnbull as "a judgment on a 
single issue, that is the duration of the witness's sighting."64 Walker and Brittain's view is 
reflected in the case ofHewett, where the Court of Appeal stated that a general warning to 
the jury was not required in the case because:65
"Turnbull was the product of considerable public anxiety about an 
identification case where the identifier had only a brief moment in which to 
identify his subject. This was not that sort of case at all."
But the Court in Turnbull did recognise that, even where there had been prolonged 
observation in good lighting, the identification evidence may not be reliable. This 
unreliability is largely attributable to the differences between individuals in their ability to 
identify accurately. As documented by psychological research on the issue, some people
63 See R v Qadir [1998] Crim.L.R. 828 and R v Mussel! and Dalton [1995] Crim.L.R. 887 on this 
point.
64 Walker, M., and Brittain, B., Identification Evidence: Practices and Malpractices - A Report by 
JAIL( 1978) JAIL, 17
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will simply be better than others at accurately identifying and recognising other people.66 It 
is difficult to quantify what makes someone a better eyewitness. Although psychological 
findings can help in assessing general trends, such as the phenomenon of own-race bias, 
they cannot tell us whether an individual eyewitness is accurate in their identification. Even 
if a general warning by its very nature "offers little guidance on how to weigh the probative 
value of any particular identification",67 equipping jurors with knowledge of general trends 
is likely to reduce the number of wrongful convictions in eyewitness identification cases by 
increasing the scepticism with which jurors view the eyewitness evidence before them, in 
much the same way that expert witnesses may be used to uphold the protective principle but 
with the advantage that it has the authority and potential neutrality of the court.
(iv) Supporting Evidence
In requiring supporting evidence in eyewitness identification cases, the Turnbull guidelines 
follow the recommendations of the Devlin Report, which whilst rejecting the possibility of 
a statutory requirement of corroboration, recommended that: 68
"As a rule evidence of visual identification standing by itself should not be 
allowed to raise the level of probability of guilt up to the standard of 
reasonable certainty that is required by the criminal law. We consider that a 
jury should be so directed."
The requirement of supporting evidence offers the benefits of a corroboration requirement 
without the drawback that it may prove to be too rigid in application.69 A corroboration
65 June 16 1977 (unreported), see Grayson, E., "Identifying Tumbull" [1977] Criminal Law Review,
510 who offers a useful analysis of the reaction of the judiciary to Turnbull in the year following the
judgment.
56 Generally, see Loftus, E., Eyewitness Testimony (1979 Cambridge: Harvard) and Cutler, B.L. and
Penrod, S.D., Mistaken Identification (1995 Cambridge University Press).
67 Jackson, J.D., "The insufficiency of identification evidence based on personal impression" [1986] 
Criminal Law Review 207.
68 Devlin Report, op.cit., para. 4.54.
69 This has proved to be the case in other areas of law where a legal corroboration requirement has 
been in place. Section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 removed the corroboration requirement for the 
evidence of children, and s.32(l) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 abrogates the 
corroboration warning in cases involving sexual offences and the evidence of accomplices. The only
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requirement could result in a situation where there is persuasive evidence, other than that of 
identification, against an accused which does not technically qualify as corroboration, 
causing the prosecution to fail. Examples considered by the Devlin Committee included 
situations where there were grave crimes involving prolonged observation of the offender 
by the attacker but little or no evidence of any other kind. 70 However, many of the 
celebrated miscarriages of justice, such as the Bam murder case involving George Ince, the 
murder for which James Hanratty was convicted, and indeed the Beck case, had involved 
just such a situation.
Further, the Devlin Committee pointed out that a corroboration requirement, such as where 
one eyewitness corroborates the evidence of another, would not necessarily operate to 
prevent miscarriages of justice. 71 The point is well illustrated by highly publicised incidents 
of wrongful conviction resulting from misidentification, in the majority of which there was 
evidence from more than one eyewitness. Any requirement would therefore quite rightly 
have to stipulate that identification by another eyewitness would not constitute sufficient 
corroboration.
However, the absence of a corroboration requirement did not preclude the introduction of 
something very close to it. The general principle propounded by the Devlin Committee was 
that prosecutions should not be brought on identification evidence alone and that they 
would fail if this stipulation were ignored. The formula appears to be as close to a 
corroboration requirement as it is possible to get without actually using the word.72 The
warnings remaining are therefore those that do not take the form of a strict corroboration requirement, such 
as the Turnbull warning in identification cases.
70 Devlin Report, op.cit., para. 4.38
71 Ibid, paras. 4.30 and 4.31
12 At para. 4.67 the Committee acknowledge that "ignoring the legal definition of corroboration there
is no difference: corroboration is additional evidence and vice versa".
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Committee members themselves described their recommendation as "corroboration in a 
wider sense".73
Under Turnbull, supporting evidence was not envisaged as technical corroboration and the 
door was left wide open for a flexible interpretation by the courts. The Court of Appeal in 
Turnbull thought that "odd coincidences can, if unexplained, be supporting evidence". 74 It 
is the trial judge who is left to identify to the jury which pieces of evidence or "odd 
coincidences" can be capable of supporting any identification of the accused. The jury then 
decide whether the evidence does indeed support the identification.
Whilst there is no technical corroboration requirement for cases based on identification 
evidence, supporting evidence follows the same principles as a corroboration requirement 
without involving rigid legal rules. So, whilst supporting evidence may take the form of 
legal corroboration, it is more flexible. Case law illustrates that evidence which would not 
be classified as corroboration in a legal sense has been accepted as supporting evidence of 
identification. Because of this, fewer cases are withdrawn from the jury than if a traditional 
corroboration requirement were used, but protection from misidentification is offered to 
suspects without introducing a cumbersome and often unfairly rigid rule. Rigidity would 
not operate to uphold the integrity of the criminal justice process precisely because it may 
operate unfairly.
The absence of a legal corroboration requirement does not mean that judges have an 
unfettered discretion under the Turnbull formulation. Although there is provision for a 
fairly broad discretion, there is also a duty both to highlight evidence to the jury which is 
capable of supporting eyewitness testimony and to identify any evidence which the jury
Devlin Report, op.cit., para. 4.65 
7-1 Turnbull op.cit., at 553
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may think is supportive but which lacks that quality. In other words, the judge must ensure 
that the jury is aware of what is capable of being supporting evidence in the case and what 
is not. 75 Where the judge does highlight to the jury evidence which is capable of supporting 
eyewitness testimony, care must be taken to ensure that jurors are aware that it is for them 
to decide whether the additional evidence before them is indeed supportive of the 
identification evidence in the case. 76 Supporting evidence can take many forms and might 
be merely circumstantial,77 such as evidence of the offender disappearing into what 
transpires to be the defendant's house. If no other explanation is offered on the point, the 
jury are entitled to view it as supporting the evidence of identification of the accused. In 
Etiennen , where a bag-snatching inside a shop was witnessed by the shopkeepers, the 
Court of Appeal "were not at all sure"79 that previous sightings of the suspect could act as 
supporting evidence for a fleeting glimpse identification.
If it is thought that the defendant is lying, then this may also support identification evidence 
of him or her. This is most likely where the defendant lies about evidence which is directly 
related to identification. The most common form of directly related evidence is the alibi. 
Alibi evidence is often seen as the other side of the identification coin. This is because 
defendants using an alibi are claiming that they could not be responsible for the offence as 
they were not present at the scene of the crime at the relevant time. Although it has been 
stated that a false alibi can only support identification evidence where the sole reason for the
75 Ibid., per Lord Widgery C.J., 553
76 The trial judge inAkaidere [1990] Crim. L.R. 808 directed the jury that the identification evidence 
was so poor that he would have stopped the case if it had stood alone. This may have led the jury to believe 
that the judge viewed the evidence as safe to act on. That was a jury issue and as such there had been a 
material misdirection.
77 For example, see Lippit v. Chief Constable of Staffordshire 1986 (unreported: Vaughan, 
Identification Evidence, 1988 85(4) L.S.G. 18), where the accused's admissions that he was nearby at the 
relevant time, wearing clothing similar to that described by the eyewitness and left the (well lit) scene in the 
direction described by the witness were all supportive of the identification evidence against him. A case tried 
before the Turnbull judgement illustrates that a chain of coincidences have always been seen as capable of 
supporting identification evidence: Long (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 871.
78 (1990) 154 J.P. 162
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alibi is to deceive the jury,80 it is unclear quite how the distinction is realistically drawn 
between an alibi which has been formulated deliberately to deceive the jury and an alibi 
which is false because of poor witnesses, inadequate defence, or mistake. In all 
probability, a judge and jury would see the inadequacies in a defendant's alibi yet would 
not have the information upon which to make a decision regarding deliberate deception.
Disputed identification evidence may be supported by evidence that the witness correctly 
identified another participant in the crime who has pleaded or been found guilty. The Court 
of Appeal in Castle* 1 found that, if a defendant was found guilty, then it was established 
that any identification of the defendant was correct. This made it more likely that any 
identifications of other defendants by the same witness were also correct. 82 Identification 
by different eyewitnesses of the same accused can also support each other,83 even though 
many of the celebrated miscarriages of justice cases have involved multiple eyewitnesses. 84 
However, where the evidence of different eyewitnesses is used to support their 
identification of the same defendant, the warning to the jury should make it clear that more 
than one eyewitness can be, and have been, mistaken. 85 What is clear is that supporting 
evidence does not have to be independent of identification evidence.86
79 Ibid., p. 163
80 Keane (1977) 65 Cr.App.R. 247, CA; see also R v Elliott op.cit.
81 [1989] Crim.L.R. 567. See also R v Gummerson [1999] Crim.L.R. 680; and R v Wait [1998] 
Crim.L.R. 67.
82 The commentator in Castle points out that this is only fair: if the witness had been proved wrong 
in the identification of the first defendant, this would enable the defence to attack the identification of the 
second defendant. This being the case, the opposite should also be allowed. Yet one correct identification 
does not ensure that another identification made at the same time will also be correct.
83 For examples of this see Shelton and Carter [1981] Crim.L.R. 776 and R v Weeder (1980) 71 
Cr.App.R. 228.
84 One of the earliest cases, that of Adolf Beck, involved over twenty eyewitnesses.
85 See R v Weeder, op.cit.; R v Breslin (1985) 80 Cr.App.R. 226; R v Greer Unreported, Court of 
Appeal 11 December 1997; and Grant [1996] 2 Cr.App.R. 272.
86 For example, in R v Marais Unreported, Court of Appeal 16 May 1997,evidence of identity from a 
handwriting expert was called to support the eyewitness evidence in the case.
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However, whether an identification about which the jury is not sure can support another 
identification about which it is also not sure has been the subject of debate. In 
McGranaghan*1 the court dealt with the issue of whether similar facts can be adduced to 
support identification evidence. The defendant was convicted of three aggravated burglaries 
involving assaults against women. At trial, the judge directed the jury that, because of 
similarities between the three offences, evidence relating to one offence could be probative 
of the defendant having committed the other offences. On appeal, it was held that the jury 
should have been directed to consider first whether, disregarding the similarity of the facts, 
the other evidence was enough to satisfy it that the defendant committed one of the 
offences. Only if it was satisfied of this should the similar fact evidence become relevant 
and admissible. Similar facts went to show that the same person committed the offences, 
not that the defendant was that person.
Subsequent case law dilutes the line taken in McGranaghan . The decision was subject to 
much criticism, with the 1995 edition ofArchbold suggesting that "it may go too far". 88 In 
Downey, Evans L.J. stated that: 89
"There are.. .two different aspects, at least, in this kind of situation.. .The 
first is whether in deciding whether the defendant committed offence A the 
jury can have regard to evidence that he also committed offence B. This 
involves proof, not only of similarity, but that the defendant did in fact 
commit offence B. The second is where there is evidence that both offences 
A and B were committed by the same man, but the evidence falls short of 
proving that that man was the defendant in either case, regarded alone. If 
there is evidence which entitles the jury to reach the conclusion that it was 
the same man, even though the evidence in either case does not enable them 
to be sure who the man was, then it follows that they can take account of 
evidence relating to both offences in deciding whether that man was the 
defendant."
87 (1991)43L.S.G. 44 
Archbold, J.F., Plead, 
Maxwell) Volume I, para. 13-36. 
89 [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 547, 
491; R v Brown and Others [1997] Crim.L.R. 502; and in Grant [1996] 2 Cr.App.R. 272.
88 ing, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases ( 1995 London, Sweet and 
at 552. The same conclusion was drawn in Barnes [1995] 2 Cr.App.R.
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The Court of Appeal confirmed the Downey approach in later decisions, signifying a 
concern that defendants who have committed offences bearing a "striking similarity" should 
not be able to avoid the law. The decisions also reveal a belief that a number of 
eyewitnesses to similar offences cannot be mistaken, something which undermines the 
tenor of the Turnbull direction to the contrary. Whilst the Court of Appeal have reasoned 
that:90
"where a number of witnesses independently identify the same suspect, the 
chances of their all being mistaken are so remote that the jury would be 
entitled to conclude that all the identifications are accurate, and that in an 
appropriate case the judge is entitled to sum up on that basis",
the history books contain numerous examples of cases where a number of eyewitnesses 
have been mistaken about offences which were all committed by the same person. These 
cases show that similar facts can be correct in that one person committed all of the offences, 
but that this on its own does not prove the defendant's identity. It is true that the protections 
offered to defendants in McGmnaghan could result in acquittals of the guilty, and it may be 
fair to say that fewer innocent people will be convicted under Downey than guilty people 
acquitted under McGranaghan. The Court of Appeal have therefore "balanced" the risks 
and decided that there is a lower risk of innocent people being convicted using the Downey 
approach than the risk of guilty people being acquitted under the McGranaghan approach. 
However, the balance has no reference to the rights of victims and defendants, nor to what 
aims and principles the justice process should be attempting to advance.91
Similar fact evidence from previous convictions where the defendant pleaded guilty has 
also been used to support identification evidence. The general principle in such cases is to 
consider whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, which 
is a question of degree.92 However, in identification cases the criteria for use of similar fact
90 Grant, ibid., per Laws J. at 278.
91 For a discussion on die "balancing" approach to criminal justice policy generally, see Ashworth, 
A., The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (1994; Clarenden, Oxford), 292-296.
92 As stated in DPP v. P [1991] 2 A.C. 447
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evidence remains uncertain. Case law has in the past suggested that, in cases involving 
identification, the criteria for admissibility are higher. In DPP v. P,93 Lord Mackay L.C. 
suggested that a special similarity leading to the conclusion that each incident bears the 
signature of the accused is required. According to this formulation, the judge should look at 
both the similarities and disparities when deciding whether evidence fulfils the special 
similarity criteria. 94
The recent decision ofRuiz95 , however, dismissed the idea that a different principle applied 
in identification cases. According to Ruiz, special direction on identity is not necessary, 
although the court also held that there should be regard to the features described in earlier 
cases as striking similarity or signature. Therefore, disputed identification cases appear to 
have been brought back within the general principle of probative value overcoming 
prejudicial effect. Striking similarity or signature is a method of determining if the general 
principle is satisfied, rather than a necessary component in the use of similar fact evidence. 
This conveniently brings uniformity into the law regarding similar fact evidence. But it is 
difficult to imagine a case where the similar fact evidence will be sufficiently strong without 
it being capable of satisfying the test of striking similarity or signature.
This examination of the Turnbull guidelines has illustrated that they provide for the 
withdrawal of a case from the jury where the identification evidence is of a "poor" quality, 
which is the ultimate protection which can be offered once a case gets to trial. However, 
the warning also seeks to advance the protective principle by informing jurors of the 
dangers of convicting on the basis of eyewitness identification even where it is considered
93 Ibid.
94 This was confirmed in Johnson [1995] Crim.L.R. 53, an attempted rape and buggery case, where it 
was held that the trial judge, in considering similar fact evidence from two previous cases, attached too 
much weight to the fact that all three women remarked upon the gentleness or light touch of the intruder 
whilst dismissing disparities as irrelevant. The case of Boardman [1975] A.C. 421 established the phrase 
"striking similarity" for similar fact cases.
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to be of a high enough quality to remain before a jury. The warning offers considerable 
protections to the accused, but the sufficiency of its protection relies upon the information 
given being relevant and up to date. For this to occur, a system of judicial education needs 
to take place. Judicial warnings have the advantage of encompassing the authority of the 
court as opposed to coming from a single witness, especially where it is forcefully and 
fully delivered. The sufficiency of the Turnbull warning, whether expert witnesses would 
offer better protection, or if both experts and a judicial warning should be used in tandem, 
is discussed in chapter eight.
One of the main limits on the protection offered by the Turnbull warning, and one which 
leads to the conclusion that more could be done to uphold the integrity of the criminal 
justice process, is that it covers only a relatively small proportion of those whose cases rely 
to some degree on eyewitness evidence. The warning is not delivered in the most minor 
cases, and it only applies to those who decide to proceed to a contested trial. The Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984,96 which gives the trial judge a discretion to exclude 
identification evidence which has been obtained unfairly, suffers from similar limitations. 
We now turn to PACE s.78 and discuss the circumstances in which judges exclude unfair 
identification evidence.
95 [1995] Crim.L.R. 151
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) requires that Codes of Practice be issued to 
regulate the powers of police officers. Code D refers to all aspects of police procedure regarding 
identification. The first edition of the Codes came into force on 1 January 1986 and the second on 1 April 
1991. The Codes were recently revised, coming into force on 10 April 1995. Under s.66(l 1) of PACE, the 
Codes of Practice, where relevant, are admissible as evidence in all criminal and civil proceedings.
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Code of Practice D and the Exclusion of Evidence under Section 78 PACE
Code of Practice D represents the move from mere guidelines to a coherent set of 
provisions with enforceable remedies. Police officers can be disciplined for breaches of the 
code and the discretion to exclude evidence is conferred by s.78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE), as follows:97
"In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, 
having regard to all the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, 
the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." 
Any breach of Code D may result in the exclusion of evidence, but it does not follow that
all breaches will have that effect. Tucker J made this point clear in Grannelf*, by stating 
that "simply because there was a breach, important though it is to observe the Codes of 
Practice, does not of itself mean that the evidence is inadmissible". 99
In practical terms, the burden of proof lies on the defence in showing that unfairness did 
arise from a breach of the rules. Although the courts have said that it is unclear where the 
burden of proof lies, 100 the defence have to show that there will be unfairness if the 
evidence in question is admitted. Generally, the court has to be persuaded that there was a 
significant breach of the rules which creates substantial unfairness. As the prosecution do 
not have to disprove unfairness, the practical burden lies with the defence.
Whether a breach of Code D is judged to be serious enough to warrant the exclusion of the 
identification evidence has been the subject of much debate. Although there is a variable 
approach to the exercise of the discretion under s.78, it is likely that there has to be a
97 On section 78, see generally Gelowitz, ML, "Section 78 of the Police and criminal Evidence Act 
1984" (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 327; and Alien, C.J.W., "Discretion and security: Excluding 
evidence under s.78(l) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984" (1990) 49 Cambridge Law Journal 
80.
98
99
(1990)90CrAppR 149 
Ibid, at 153
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consideration of the effect of the breach upon the validity of the identification evidence and 
therefore the prosecution case as a whole.
ft) The General Approach of the Courts to Section 78
PACE s.78 gave judges a broader discretion to exclude evidence than at common law, 
where the tradition was that all evidence was basically admissible. In R v Sang, 101 the 
House of Lords held that judges had no general discretion to exclude evidence simply 
because of the improper way in which it was obtained. 102 Although the common law 
provided for the exclusion of evidence where its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative 
value, s.78 allows an examination of fairness, a much broader concept.
Under a strict crime control approach, the question posed in exercising the discretion to 
exclude evidence under s78 would be much the same as that at common law: whether the 
breach had affected the reliability, or probative value, of the evidence. As the purpose of 
the trial is to determine guilt or innocence, mere technicalities should not stand in the way. 
A due process approach would result in the exclusion of evidence wherever the rules had 
been breached, in order to protect the moral integrity of the criminal process and prevent 
future breaches. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure in 1981 ("The Phillips 
Report") questioned the usefulness of a due process based exclusionary rule, 103 because it 
could only operate in the small amount of cases where the defendant pleaded not guilty, 
months after the breach had occurred. An exclusionary rule would, under this view, be 
unable to curb police misconduct. Rather, effective monitoring and disciplinary procedures
100 RvAnderson [1993] Crim.L.R. 447.
101 [1979] 2 A11E.R. 1222.
102 Confession evidence was an exception to this general approach: see Zander, M., The Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (1995: London Sweet and Maxwell), 233.
103 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, "Report", Cmnd 8092 (1981 London: HMSO), paras. 
4.123-4.128. In response to these arguments, see Ashworth, A., "Excluding evidence as protecting rights" 
[1977] Criminal Law Review 723; Stuntz, W.J., "The American exclusionary rule and defendants' 
changing rights" [1989] Criminal Law Review 117; and Heydon, J.D., "Illegally obtained evidence" [1973] 
Criminal Law Review 690.
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for police practice would enable the police to supervise themselves. Whilst compelling in its 
conclusion that effective protection of individual defendants will not be achieved by the 
exercise of an exclusionary rule, this argument does not account for the powerful messages 
sent out by judicial condemnation of police behaviour, 104 nor the problems of self- 
supervision. In reality, s.78, whilst based on due process principles, operates somewhere 
in the middle of pure due process and crime control approaches. As Sanders and Young 
comment: 105
"There are no systems in democratic societies which use absolute 
inclusionary or exclusionary rules. This means that rules and principles 
have to be developed which effect some kind of compromise.. .The exact 
compromise will depend on the priorities allocated to the competing claims 
of truth.. .and of moral integrity."
The traditional common law approach reached a compromise which leaned towards crime 
control principles. Section 78 pulls the balance back to due process values, but the extent of 
the change is largely dependant on judicial interpretation of "unfairness". The interpretation 
of "unfairness" in the context of s.78 varies greatly. It has been held106 that any significant 
or substantial breach of Code of Practice D means prima facie unfairness. An examination 
of the case law on s.78 shows that this is a simplistic view, however. The prima facie 
unfairness may often be rebutted even where there is a substantial breach; and a minor 
breach may lead to the exclusion of evidence. Although this chapter attempts to identify the 
general principles employed by judges in exercising their discretion to exclude eyewitness 
evidence under s.78, it should be emphasised that there has not been a consistent approach 
or theoretical basis for the application of the section to date: 107
104 Similar arguments were raised in New Zealand on the introduction of Bill of Rights legislation. 
However, Court of Appeal condemnation of police behaviour has established limits and rights which are, 
for the main part, observed. Anecdotal discussions with police officers suggest that radical changes in police 
practice occurred not as a result of the legislation, but as a result of judicial interpretation of that 
legislation. See also Zuckerman, A.A.S., "Illegally obtained evidence: Discretion as a guardian of 
legitimacy" [1987] 40 Current Legal Problems 55.
105 Sanders, A., and Young, R., Criminal Justice (1994 London; Butterworths), 417.
106 Powell v. DPP [1992] RTR 270, relying on Walsh (1990) 91 Cr App R 161.
107 Zander, op.cit., 237. There have been a number of theoretical principles suggested, but judges 
themselves do not claim to have any of the principles in mind when exercising their discretion. This may
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"[S]ection 78 has become both established and accepted as a means for the 
courts to determine what breaches of the rules or improper conduct are 
acceptable on a case by case basis without any clearly articulated theory."
The courts themselves are very clear that they should approach section 78 decisions on a 
case by case basis, because "circumstances vary infinitely". 108 The result is that it is 
difficult to determine when improperly obtained evidence will result in exclusion of 
evidence, because "judges may well take different views in the proper exercise of their 
discretion even when the circumstances are similar". 109 This in itself undermines the 
protective function of an exclusionary power. Mixed messages are sent to the police and 
suspects alike.
(ii) The Protective Principle
The underlying aim of Code of Practice D is the protection of the suspect from erroneous 
identification by ensuring that a fair identification procedure takes place. The courts have 
sometimes looked to the protective principle 110 in exercising their discretion to exclude 
improperly obtained evidence, ensuring that the defendant does not suffer a disadvantage a 
result of the breach of the Code. In using the protective approach, the motivations of the 
police and the level of seriousness of the breach are secondary to its effect on the 
defendant's case. The problem with this approach is the subjective nature of an assessment 
of "prejudice" or "disadvantage".
explain the complex and inconsistent approach evident in the case law: see Hunter, M, "Judicial discretion: 
Section 78 in practice" [1994] Criminal Law Review 558.
108 Samuel (1988) Cr. App. R. 232, 245, per Hodgson J.
109 Jelen and Katz (1990) 90 Cr.App.R. 456, 465 per Auld J. The exercise of discretion will not be 
interfered with by the Court of Appeal unless no trial judge could reasonably have reached that view: see 
Middlebrook Unreported February 19 1994, where a group identification instead of a parade was held. The 
Court of Appeal reasserted the Wednesbury principle that if a reasonable judge must have concluded that the 
evidence would produce unfairness, then a ruling going the other way would be set aside: Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. V Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223. 
1 lo See Ashworth [ 1977], op.cit.
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In deciding whether the defendant's case has been prejudiced, the courts look at the 
purpose of the breached provision. For example, it was held in R v Samms ll] that 
confrontation evidence resulted from a breach of Code D which "partook of the dangers 
sought to be prevented by a parade". In other words, the purpose of Code D had been 
undermined. Grannell offers a further example of this approach. In that case, Tucker J 
held that: 112
"there was nothing which prejudiced the appellant by the failure to carry out 
the terms of the Code. We emphasise that it is important that the Code 
should be followed, but what is equally important is to see whether any 
unfairness arose from the failure to do so."
InRyan 113 a witness was taken to the police station by an officer investigating the offence 
and was moved from one place to another by other investigating officers. The trial judge 
decided that there had been a major breach of the Code, but exercised his discretion under 
s.78 to admit the identification evidence. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the existence 
of a substantial breach did not oblige the judge to exclude evidence. The key factor was 
whether there had been prejudice caused to the defendant by the breach. To do this, there 
must be an assessment of the purpose of the relevant provision. 114
However, there may be difficulties in assessing the real harm resulting from a breach of 
Code D. For example, it was concluded in Ryan that the breach caused no unjust prejudice 
to the defendant, but the witness was not questioned on the matter. The court simply took 
the police at their word when they stated that there had been no communication about the
111 [1991] Crim.L.R. 197
112 (1990) 90 Cr App R 149, 153. See also R v Malashev [1997] Crim.L.R. 587; R v Graham [1994] 
Crim.L.R. 210; R v Macmath [1997] Crim.L.R. 586; and RvHickin and others [1996] Crim.L.R. 584.
113 [1992] Crim.L.R. 187. See also R v Wright [1994] Crim.L.R. 131; R v Andrews unreported 
Court of Appeal 21 March 1996; and R v Quinn [1990] Crim.L.R. 581.
m See the case of Jones (Terrence) [1992] Crim.L.R.365, where the investigating officer escorted the 
suspect to the identification parade. The Court of Appeal held that there was either no breach, because 
escorting a suspect was not part of the procedure, or if there was a breach, it was not sufficiently substantial 
to warrant the exclusion of evidence. The purpose of D2.2 is to prevent the investigating officer from 
influencing the witness, and whilst escorting the suspect to the parade may technically be classed as a 
breach, it does not create the danger which the provision aims to prevent.
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case, without seeking any corroboration from the witness. Even if the presence of the 
investigating officer merely made the witness more convinced that the offender was there, 
there will be damage done, especially in a confrontation case such as Ryan. 1 15
The protective principle, while focusing on the rights of the defendant, is dependent upon 
subjective assessments of prejudice. It can also be difficult to ascertain exactly how much 
disadvantage has been caused to the defendant. The principle may, as Ashworth 
suggests, 116 further the fairness of the process by allowing for evidence to be excluded 
where a breach was unintentional or "technical", but it may also result in evidence being 
admitted where there was a substantial breach of the Code. It is doubtful whether this either 
upholds a concern for defendant's rights or aids the process in its aspiration to be seen as 
"fair".
(Hi) The Disciplinary Principle: Bad Faith and Significant Breaches 
The disciplinary principle rests on the idea that the courts should exclude evidence gained 
outside of proper procedures. By doing so, the police will be disciplined and may be 
deterred from breaching the rules in future. The success of the disciplinary principle rests in 
part on whether the police are affected by decisions where evidence is excluded and 
therefore change practices because of that effect. Like the protective principle, the 
disciplinary principle offers a dilemma for the courts should an absolute approach be taken: 
in cases where the evidence is highly probative of guilt and there is no real prejudice to the 
individual defendant, automatic exclusion of evidence for bad faith or significant breaches 
of the Code may result in acquittal of the guilty.
115 For a discussion of the influence police officers may (albeit unwittingly) have on witnesses, see
Loftus(1979), op.cit., 73
116 Ashworth, A., (1994) op.cit., 123.
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Where there is a significant breach of Code D, identification evidence may be excluded 
regardless of the effect of the breach on the defendant's case or the motivations of the 
police. An example can be seen in Gall, 117 which was concerned with a breach of Code 
D2.2, which states that "...No officer involved with the investigation of the case against the 
suspect may take any part in [identification] procedures". The reasoning behind this 
provision is clearly the prevention of both deliberate and unintentional influence by the 
investigating officer on the witness. In Gall, an investigating officer had entered the room 
where the identification parade was being held and had spoken to the identification officer. 
It was held that the investigating officer had clearly taken part in the conduct of the parade, 
even though he had not played a part in its arrangement. Because of this, the court was of 
the view that: 118
"a prisoner could well feel considerable suspicion of what might be going 
on if an investigating officer comes into the parade room, has a look at the 
parade, has the opportunity to talk to the witness, and then the witness is 
introduced into the parade".
Where officers deliberately breach the rules in "bad faith", the courts are generally willing 
to exclude evidence gained as a result. This is best illustrated in identification cases by the 
approach of the courts to staged confrontations, an example of which can be found in the 
case ofNagah 119 , where police practice was described by the Court as "a complete flouting
117 (1990) 90 Cr.App.R. 64. Gall had been tried with two counts of wounding and one of violent 
disorder. He was convicted of violent disorder, acquitted of one count of wounding and was retried on the last 
count, because the original jury had failed to agree on a verdict. At Gall's first trial, the judge had excluded 
identification evidence, but this was admitted at the re-trial. Another example is Hope, Limburn and 
Bleasdale [1994] Crim.L.R. 118, where the witness was shown a photograph of Limburn before his 
actions at the scene of the offence had been described by the witness. As there was a dispute regarding the 
part played by Limburn in the incident, it was held that Code D applied. The witness was shown 
photographs of the three defendants only, breaching Annex D paragraph 3 and making a nonsense of several 
of the other provisions of Annex D.
118 Ibid., McCowan J. at 69. See also R v Khan [1997] Crim.L.R. 584, where the investigating 
officer had spoken to the witnesses whilst he had a copy of the suspect's photograph in his pocket. This is 
potentially a very serious breach of Code D, although the witnesses stated that they had not been shown the 
photograph and the evidence was admitted. The action was enough to leave the defendant with "considerable 
suspicion" that the identification procedure was unfair. It is submitted that the Court of Appeal should have 
taken a stance in this situation, rather than dismissing the appeal.
119 (1991)92CrAppR344
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of the Code". 120 The suspect121 had agreed to attend an identification parade, but, as he left 
the police station after being interviewed, he was identified by the complainant, who had 
arrived in a police car. During Nagah's trial, the judge rejected a submission that the 
identification evidence of the complainant should be excluded under s.78 PACE as it 
breached Code D2.1. The relevant section of the Code, D2.1, 122 clearly stated that
In a case which involves disputed identification evidence a parade must be 
held if the suspect asks for one and it is practicable to hold one. A parade 
may also be held if the officer in charge of the investigation considers that it 
would be useful.
As Nagah had been asked to consent to an identification parade, it was obviously viewed as 
practicable and necessary. That a parade was practicable was highlighted by the fact that 
another witness tentatively identified the suspect in a subsequent parade. However, the trial 
judge was of the opinion that, as the suspect was not at the police station at the time of the 
identification by the complainant, then D2.1 did not apply and the street identification was a 
valid one.
The Court of Appeal quashed Nagah's conviction on the grounds that there was a clear 
breach of the Code. That Nagah was leaving the police station at the time of the 
identification was not a satisfactory reason for submitting that there was no breach: if the 
Code did not apply in such circumstances, then it would be easy for the police to arrange a 
confrontation in every case. The Code would then offer no protection to suspects and its 
purpose would be invalidated. 123
120 Ibid., at 349
121 Nagah had been interviewed for, but not charged with, the offence of attempted rape. The 
description of the offender given by the victim in this case was strikingly different from the appearance of 
the suspect.
122 The first edition of Code of Practice D was in use at the time of Nagah's identification and trial. 
The corresponding provision in the 1995 edition can be found at para. D2.3.
123 Also see Samms, Elliot and Bartley [1991] Crim.L.R. 197
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The use of an assessment of bad faith may, however, be unfair to defendants. In 
Campbell124 , the Court of Appeal held that a trial judge could decide that a breach was 
committed in good faith and admit the identification evidence. Yet if a breach is serious it 
could have an affect on the fairness of proceedings regardless of whether the motivation of 
the police was in good or bad faith. In addition, it may difficult to ascertain whether a 
breach was in fact committed in good faith or not. Not all breaches are as transparent as 
Nagah125 , where there was an obvious disregard for the provisions of Code D on the part 
of the police.
The bad faith principle noted in Campbell can be combined with an examination of the 
extent of the breach. This is approach was taken in Finlay126 , which dealt with the common 
problem of "cross-pollinisation" of evidence between witnesses. There is a danger that 
memory of the incident will change if witnesses discuss the offence or their description of 
the offender. 127 Code D attempts to avoid the contamination of witnesses' memories in this 
way by providing in Annex A: 12 that:
"The identification officer is responsible for ensuring that, before they 
attend the parade, witnesses are not able to... communicate with each other 
about the case or overhear a witness who has already seen the parade..."
The court in Finlay came to the conclusion that, because so much had gone wrong and so 
many parts of the Code had been broken, most notably Annex A: 12, it was difficult to 
believe that the police were merely guilty of inefficiency. Rather, they appeared to be 
deliberately flouting the Code. 128 In other words, the breaches of Code D were seen to 
have been committed in bad faith. The Court of Appeal went on to state that police action in 
the case meant that Finlay would be justified in having little confidence in his identification
124 [1994] Crim.L.R. 357
125 [1991] Crim.L.R. 55.
126 [1993] Crim.L.R. 50
127 See, for example, Warnick, D.H., and Sanders, G.S., "The effects of group discussion on 
eyewitness accuracy" (1980) 10 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 249.
128 At [1993] Crim.L.R. 51
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procedure. The warranted suspicion of the motives of the police led the court to the 
conclusion that it was "bound to appear that justice did not seem to have been done". 129 
Allowing the appeal, it was held that the identification evidence in the case should have 
been excluded.
In other cases the courts have combined the protective and disciplinary principles to act as a 
deterrent measure on poor police practice, as in Martin and Nicholls 1 ™ where, before an 
identification parade had been arranged, witnesses spontaneously identified the defendants 
outside court. The Court of Appeal may have upheld the conviction had the defendants 
been identified in conditions akin to a group identification, but this was clearly not the case. 
Nicholls was identified when standing alone and Martin was of an appearance which would 
stand out in the particular crowd outside the courtroom. The defendants were clearly 
unprotected by any of the safeguards of Code D. It can be seen that, in the circumstances of 
Martin and Nicholls, this is unfair: the prosecution in the case should have taken the time to 
arrange a formal identification procedure before the case got to court. This may sometimes 
be difficult, but had the Court of Appeal ruled differently, then the ensuing problems would 
have been twofold. Not only would there have been unfairness in the case at hand, but 
there would also have been the possibility of future evasion of the provisions of Code D. 
This evasion could be achieved by delaying formal identification procedures and hoping 
that the witness would identify the defendant informally outside court. Whilst the 
identification in Martin and Nicholls appeared to be one of genuine spontaneity, to allow
Ibid.
130 [1994] Crim. L.R. 218. In this case money was demanded from two young schoolboys. Two older 
boys fitting the description of the offenders were nearby and were arrested as suspects for the offence. The 
police decided not to hold an identification parade, but Crown counsel requested that one be conducted. The 
case came to court before an identification parade had been arranged and the schoolboys identified the 
defendants. The case illustrates the conflict of opinion which often arises between the police and the CPS 
regarding the use of identification procedures and the problems surrounding the long waiting lists apparent 
in most identification suites.
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the evidence arising from that identification would risk contrived identifications occurring 
in similar circumstances.
(iv) Guidelines for the Exercise ofs. 78 Discretion
From the discussion above it can be seen that there is no logical and consistent approach to 
the exercise of discretion under s.78 of PACE. 131 Whilst the protective and disciplinary 
principles offer a theoretical distinction, judges "mix and match" considerations of 
protection, bad faith and significance on a case by case basis. A more coherent approach to 
the considerations and their relative importance is required.
Upholding the integrity of the system requires both condemnation of rule-breakers and 
protection of the defendant's interests, 132 although not all breaches of the rules warrant the 
exclusion of evidence. I would advocate for exclusion wherever the rights of the defendant 
need to be protected, or where there is a substantial breach or bad faith on the part of the 
police. Judges would be required to enter into a three stage inquiry. Firstly, they should 
ask 'did the defendant suffer prejudice?'. If the answer is affirmative, then the evidence 
should be excluded. If no disadvantage is found, the focus should shift from the protection 
of the individual defendant to the protection of the broader integrity of the criminal process 
by asking 'was the breach substantial?', and evidence gained from significant breaches of 
the Code should then be excluded. The third stage, 'was the breach committed in bad 
faith?', would then be relevant only in cases where a minor breach had caused little or no 
disadvantage to the defendant. To exclude evidence for bad faith would signal judicial 
condemnation of improper practices, which is central to the ideals of the integrity principle.
131 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report (1993 London: HMSO Cmnd 2263) did not 
offer any evaluation of s.78, despite its status as a much-utilised and debated section of PACE.
132 This interpretation of "integrity" is broader than the view that the principle argues that "the 
integrity of the courts.. .would be compromised if it were to act on evidence mat had been obtained as a 
result of departure from proper procedure": Ashworth (1994), op.cit., 302. This implies a strict disciplinary 
approach, whereas, in my view, integrity involves upholding both consequen ces for breaching proper 
procedure and protection for the defendant.
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Where minor breaches caused in good faith created no prejudice to the defendant's case, the 
evidence would be safely admitted.
This three stage inquiry represents a more structured and logical approach to a combination 
of disciplinary and protective ideals than that present in case law to date. It offers guidelines 
to judges without unnecessarily fettering their discretion to respond to the facts of 
individual cases. It could be criticised for its dependence on subjective assessments of 
"minor", "good faith" and "prejudice", but any system of discretion will involve a measure 
of subjectivity, and the restriction on absolute judicial discretion would involve a higher 
degree of certainty than we have at present. It also requires a restrictive cut-off point, 
perhaps allowing for the acquittal of more guilty defendants, but this is warranted if we 
believe that it is only minor good faith transgressions which do not significantly undermine 
the integrity of our criminal justice process.
Conclusion
It has been seen that the Turnbull guidelines and Code of Practice D combine to give a 
safeguard to defendants who dispute identification evidence against them. The Turnbull 
guidelines, introduced largely in response to the Devlin Report in 1976, aim to inform the 
jury that a convincing witness can be a mistaken one and that wrongful convictions have 
arisen from unreliable eyewitness identification in the past. A Turnbull warning should be 
given whenever the case against the accused rests wholly or substantially on the disputed 
identification of the accused, including where the identification evidence is that of 
recognition. Where the identification evidence is of good quality, that is, made in 
favourable conditions, the judge is entitled to leave the case before the jury even though 
there is only evidence of identification against the accused, providing the warning has been 
given. However, where the identification evidence is deemed by the judge to be poor, the
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case should be withdrawn from the jury in the absence of supporting evidence. 133 
Supporting evidence may take the form of legal corroboration but need not do so and there 
is no bar to one identification supporting another. 134 In this way, one poor quality 
identification could be supported by evidence of another identification of the accused.
A Turnbull direction, therefore, aims to advance the protective principle by informing the 
jury of the dangers of eyewitness identification and of any evidence which may decrease 
these dangers in convicting a defendant. What impact the warning has on juries is not 
known, 135 but it is debatable to what extent a warning on the need for caution will affect the 
deliberations of a jury. The warning has the advantage of coming from an authoritative 
source, but the protection it offers is reduced by the lack of judicial education regarding 
mistaken identification and the rather limited number of cases in which a warning will be 
given. However, if the procedural rules governing police practice are broken, it is possible 
that the identification evidence, regardless of its quality under Turnbull, will not be left 
before the jury.
If the police breach any of the provisions of Code D, they risk the exclusion of evidence 
under PACE s.78, although the approach of the courts to the exercise of their discretion is 
far from consistent. Insofar as the protective and disciplinary principles co-exist, it is to be 
assumed that courts will exercise a preference for any one approach or a mixture of 
approaches on the basis of the facts of the case. Where there is an obvious flouting of the 
Code, it would be difficult for the prosecution to claim that the identification procedures 
were fair. However, there may be no bad faith evident, rather inefficiency or mistake, and
133 Turnbull op.cit., 552-553.
134 Weeder(mG) 71 Cr.App.R. 228
135 Katzev, R.D., and Wishart, S.S. "The impact of judicial commentary concerning eyewitness 
identifications on jury decision making" (1985) 76 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 733 
discovered that juries often find judicial commentary confusing and complex. They also found that giving
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those cases necessitate an examination of the purpose of the breached provision, whether 
any actual prejudice to the defendant was the result and the seriousness of the breach. 
Currently, the choice of approach taken to the s.78 discretion depends on the context and 
content of any particular case.
Whilst Turnbull and Code D provide safeguards against unfair or unreliable identification 
evidence being considered by a jury, these mechanisms often do not work, and there is a 
continuing danger of miscarriages of justice in identification cases. It has been noted that 
the warning given to the jury may be insufficient if the aim is to inform jurors about the 
dangers of convicting on the basis of eyewitness evidence, and that it may be difficult for a 
court to evaluate the motive behind, or effect of, a breach of Code D. Furthermore, the 
exclusion of evidence will be considered in only a small percentage of cases, leaving the 
majority of defendants unprotected against breaches of Code D. Whether the results of 
psychological research can be utilised to offer protection through the introduction of expert 
witnesses is discussed in the following chapter.
instructions only at the end of the trial reduced the impact the instructions may have on jurors' decision- 
making, as the decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence may already have been made.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CASES
Introduction
In this chapter, the status of expert evidence in the English courts will be examined, 
drawing on concerns about and criticisms of expert evidence in general, and on the 
application of evidential rules in the courtroom. Given the inadequacies of the protections 
offered by current trial safeguards, as discussed in the previous chapter, the discussion in 
this chapter will determine the effect of rules on eyewitness experts, assess whether the 
results from psychological experimentation could be put to better use, and examine the 
efficacy of expert evidence in eyewitness identification cases.
The first section of this chapter addresses difficulties involved in the admission of expert 
evidence. The discussion then concentrates on the evidential rules surrounding the 
admission of expert testimony in the criminal courts in England and Wales. An examination 
of the general rules governing expert evidence highlights the problems faced by 
psychologists who aim to give their expert opinion on the reliability of eyewitnesses. The 
final section of this chapter explores the effect of evidential rules on the admissibility of 
expert evidence on eyewitness identification, and assesses whether the English courts 
should take the step of accepting such evidence.
Before any detailed review of the evidential rules relating to expert evidence is undertaken,
it should be noted that among the questions raised by the use of expert evidence are the
following:
(1) How do the courts decide whether or not to admit new methods? How is reliability
assessed?
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(2) Are expert witnesses impartial?
(3) Are expert witnesses competent?
(4) How do the courts decide between conflicting testimony?
These questions will be considered in the discussion of expert opinion evidence in this 
chapter. The competency and reliability of experts and their evidence are addressed within 
the law relating to expert opinion evidence.
Criticisms of Expert Evidence
In order to place the evidential rules in context, it is necessary to consider the historical 
attitude of the courts and legal commentators to expert evidence in general. Although the 
courts began to admit expert evidence many years ago, a basic reluctance to allow experts 
to have too much influence is evident. Many of the criticisms have gained strength as 
scientific advances have increased the number of trials where expert evidence is admitted. 
The behavioural sciences, viewed as less reliable and rigorous than the pure sciences, bear 
the brunt of much criticism. In this section, some of the objections to expert evidence will 
be examined briefly, with particular emphasis on evidence relating to eyewitness testimony.
(i) Hired Guns and Battling Experts
Critics of the use of expert evidence in criminal trials point to the possibility that witnesses 
may not be impartial, especially where they are receiving payment from one of the parties 
for their services. Experts who compromise their independence through a desire to present 
a favourable case for their employer have been termed "hired guns". Cutler and Penrod 
draw attention to the ethical dilemma this can create for expert witnesses, especially in the 
field of psychological research, 1
"It is not uncommon for expert psychologists to feel pressured to 
misrepresent the psychological literature - for example, by not discussing
1 Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, S.D., Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, Psychology and (he 
Law, (1995 Cambridge University Press), 243.
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specific findings; by not acknowledging limitations of research...; or by not 
developing factors that might operate to increase the likelihood of a correct 
identification. These pressures emanate from attorneys who are attempting 
to put on the strongest case possible.. .Many psychologists and other experts 
feel uncomfortable being thrust into a role where they may not have an 
opportunity to present a fully balanced overview of research findings and 
theories."
In the English system, an expert will usually be employed by the prosecution, and even 
with the possibility of legal aid, the defence team will often be unable to present their own 
witness. Expert evidence on eyewitness identification is one of the few exceptions to this 
general trend, because the evidence in general will revolve around the unreliability of 
memory, possibly undermining the identification evidence of prosecution witnesses. 
However, the problem remains that there may be pressure to present a case in favourte 
hiring party, even where this may mean that contrary conclusions or research are 
downplayed.
However, the criticisms do not diminish even where the defence can present their own 
expert. That expert too is suspected of being a hired gun and what results, it is claimed, is a 
"battle of the experts". The argument is that such battles are costly, time consuming and 
serve only to confuse the jury. There is also a danger that in highly publicised trials a battle 
of the experts will damage the reputation of both the law and psychology.2 Proponents of 
expert evidence claim that experts will battle only on issues where there is no scientific 
consensus. Unfortunately, psychological evidence can be open to deep disagreement, as 
with the debate regarding repressed memory syndrome. That debate has split the 
psychological community in two, polarising views between those who believe that it is a 
valid phenomenon and those who assert that it is merely "false memory syndrome". 3
: Cutler and Penrod (ibid., at 245-6) cite the example of John Hinckley Jr., who was accused of 
attempting to assassinate President Reagan. Six prosecution experts concluded that Hinckley was legally 
sane at the time of the offence, whereas the same number of defence experts stated that he was legally
insane.
3 See, for example Loftus, E., "The reality of repressed memories" (1993) 48 American 
Psychologist 518; Freckleton, I., "Repressed memory syndrome: Counterintuitive or counterproductive?",
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Although the experts might inform the jury of the debate, they are unlikely to do more than 
confuse jurors with opposing experimental results. There is a danger that the jury will 
believe the expert who was more credible on the witness stand. If the experts have 
comparable qualifications and experience, a credibility assessment would necessarily focus 
not only on which witness was clearer in giving evidence and more skilled in fielding 
cross-examination, but also on which witness was more likeable as a personality. This can 
hold true for all kinds of witnesses, but is magnified for expert witnesses who usually 
testify on crucial issues in the case and are presenting complex evidence. Decisions as to 
guilt or innocence could be made not on the basis of evidence but on the basis of which 
party has the most charismatic expert.4
A further issue in assessing the usefulness of expert evidence where opposing experts 
disagree is whether they will make any difference to the jury's assessment of the case. One 
possibility is that both experts' evidence will be discounted as confusing, but it is just as 
likely that, where one expert's evidence is in line with common sense, the jury will believe 
it because it does not challenge their intuitive assumptions. The argument that battling 
experts simply clog trials with extraneous issues becomes convincing where the effect is 
simply to confirm widely held views. 5 Opposing this line of argument are the findings of
(1996) 20 Criminal Law Journal 7; van der Kolk, B. and Fisler, R., "Dissociation and the fragmentary 
nature of traumatic memories: Overview and exploratory study" (1995) 8 Journal of Traumatic Stress 505; 
and Loftus, E., and Ketcham, K., The Myth of Repressed Memory (1994 St. Martin's Press, New York). 
4 The role of the charismatic expert is discussed further below. It is difficult to assess the reactions 
of the jury to expert evidence due to a lack of jury research. There are several studies with mock jurors. See, 
for example Wells, G., Lindsay, R.C.L., and Tousignant, J., "Effects of expert psychological advice on 
human performance in judging the validity of eyewitness testimony, (1980) 4 Law and Human Behavior 
275. Research conducted with actual jurors recently in New Zealand suggests that the personality of both 
counsel and individual witnesses can affect the opinion of jurors, but that they are still conscientious in 
considering the evidence at hand (New Zealand Law Commission unpublished research: Young.W., 
Cameron, N., and Tinsley, Y., 1999).
5 See Norris, J. and Edwardh, M, "Myths, hidden facts and common sense: Expert opinion evidence 
and the assessment of credibility", [1995] 38 Criminal Law Quarterly 73, 88. Countering this argument, 
see Holdenson, O.P., "Admission of expert evidence of opinion", (1988) 16 Melbourne University Law 
Review 521, 537, who argues that the floodgates will not be opened in such circumstances and that the 
courts will not "grind to a standstill" because the judge can at any time prevent evidence being called. The 
fact that this may cause unfairness where one side has called an expert witness but the other is prevented 
from doing so is not dealt with by Holdenson.
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an experiment conducted by Lindsay, MacDonald and McGarry6 designed to assess the 
attitudes of the general public, defence lawyers and prosecutors to different forms of expert 
evidence. In raising the subject of a battle of experts, they concluded that: 7
"members of the public do not feel that a battle of the experts would confuse 
the jury, nor that such battles would discredit either the law or psychology. 
They also feel that psychologists.. .can convey information to the jury that is 
not a matter of commonsense."
Although Lindsay et.al. are optimistic about expert evidence, there are some 
methodological issues which undermine the findings from their study. The most important 
of these is that the survey used 50 members of the general public, drawn from different 
social backgrounds. There is no indication of how many had had experience of the criminal 
process or how many had served on a jury where expert evidence was admitted. Without 
such experience, members of the public can only hypothesise as to the effect a battle of the 
experts would have on the deliberations of a jury. This makes the assertion that there would 
be no confusion meaningless. 8
One solution to the perceived problems of battling experts is to allow the courts to appoint 
court experts, who would give impartial evidence to the tribunal of fact. This is possible in 
the US but is seldom used as an option by judges. 9 It would counter concerns that expert 
witnesses are simply hired guns, but in areas of debate the jury would be offered only one 
viewpoint, and this could mean that biased information was still being heard. Lindsay et.al. 
found that10
"The court-appointed expert was seen as least biased in favor of the defence
6 Lindsay, R.C.L., MacDonald, P., and McGarry, S., "Perspectives on the role of the eyewitness 
expert", (1990) 8 Behavioural Sciences and the Law, 457.
7 Ibid., 463.
8 The survey was based on a written questionnaire and so the questions may have been biased 
towards a certain response. (The questionnaire is not reproduced in the report of the experiment). There was 
also a difference in completion methods: some respondents completed the questionnaire in the presence of 
the researcher; others completed it later and posted it back. It would be interesting to know whether this 
produced any difference in results.
9 Cecil, J.S., and Willging, T.E., "The use of court-appointed experts in federal courts" (1994) 78 
Judicature 41.
10 Op.cit., (1990), 460.
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and most biased in favor of the prosecution. However, overall the court- 
appointed expert was viewed as neutral by most of the respondents. The 
court-appointed expert was perceived as most likely to educate the jury, 
most likely to be trying to reduce inappropriate convictions, and most likely 
to be trying to alter improper police procedures."
Whilst the use of court-appointed experts appears to be a good solution to the problem of 
battling experts, there are some problems. For example, adversarial principles demand that 
opposing evidence be presented and challenged through cross-examination, a tool which 
would be severely limited in cases involving court-appointed experts. It could be 
impossible to find a number of eminently qualified psychologists who would be both 
willing to do the job and who could be said to represent a generally accepted viewpoint. 
There simply is no consensus in some areas of psychological research. Identifying an 
impartial and disinterested psychologist to act as court-appointed expert in such 
circumstances would be difficult. These points lead to the conclusion that the problem of 
battling experts cannot be solved completely by the introduction of a system of court- 
appointed experts. Moreover, concerns that expert witnesses invade the province of the 
jury and partake of "grandstanding" would be unlikely to disappear with the advent of 
court-appointed experts. If anything, experts would be more likely to usurp the role of the 
jury, as they would be seen to have the court's explicit approval.
(ii) Grandstanding and Undue Weight
One of the main concerns regarding expert evidence is that it can grab the attention of the 
jury with more force than most other evidence. The witness is likely to be highly qualified 
and self-confident. This combination, it is feared, is enough to make jury members accept 
the evidence of the expert without considering its weight relative to other evidence in the 
case and without raising doubts about discrepancies. To do so would seriously undermine 
the integrity of the criminal justice process by allowing undue weight to be given to one 
witness, perhaps at the expense of others. This concern was illustrated by the comment in 
R v French that accepting expert evidence on the reliability of a witness's evidence
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could, 11
"open a Pandora's box from which there could be no resiling, of confusion 
and usurpation of function.. .It is not "empty rhetoric" to speak of the 
'^usurpation" of the function of the jury in these circumstances"
In theory the weight of evidence is its probative worth in relation to the facts in issue. It is 
largely a matter of common sense. How much weight is attached to a piece of evidence 
could be determined by the extent to which it supports or contradicts the other evidence 
produced, the credibility of the witness, and the reliability of the source. The weight to be 
attached to the evidence is a question of fact for the jury, so once the judge has determined 
that a piece of evidence is relevant and admissible, it is for the jurors to decide what weight 
if any to attach to it. In some circumstances, they are given advice by the judge, but they 
make the final decision.
Although the weight given to expert evidence is a matter for the tribunal of fact alone, when 
dealing with complex scientific data it may be difficult for a jury to do anything other than 
accept the evidence of an expert. This may run dangerously close to "usurping the role of 
the jury", because where evidence is taken on trust there will be no independent 
conclusions drawn by the jury members and the expert could in effect take over their role. 
The importance of retaining the role was discussed by Lord President Cooper in Davie v 
Edinburgh Magistrates?2
"Expert witnesses, however skilled or eminent, can give no more than 
evidence. They cannot usurp the functions of the jury or judge...their duty 
is to furnish the judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing 
the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury to form 
their own independent judgement by the application of these criteria to the 
facts proved in evidence."
11 (1977) 37 CCC (2d) 201, 211. Wigmore stated in his text Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn 
rev.ed. 1978) that the language of usurpation of the jury's function was "so misleading, as well as unsound, 
that it should be entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty rhetoric."
12 1953 SC 34, 40. See also the U.S. case ofCriglow v State (1931) 183 Ark. 407, 36 S.W.2d 400 
at 401, where it was stated that "[T]he question whether these witnesses were mistaken in this 
identification... was one for which the jury and not an expert witness should answer. This was a question 
upon which one man as well as another might form an opinion, and the function of passing upon the 
credibility and weight of testimony could not be taken from the jury."
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Some see both the "rhetoric" surrounding usurpation of the role of the jury and the imagery 
of the judge as protector of that role as rather absurd and outdated. One amusing example 
of this viewpoint raises questions regarding the over-protectiveness of the law and its 
attitude towards expert witnesses: 13
"Empty rhetoric or not, courts still use this language as if it meant 
something.. .Unquestionably, the language does fire the imagination. When 
one confronts the Usurping Experts Argument with all of its colourful talk 
of usurpations and provinces being invaded, it might be well to remind 
oneself that we are in a courtroom, not in the midst of a campaign out of 
Caesar's Gallic Wars. Even so...I picture the following scenario in my 
mind's eye. I see an aggressive looking expert, complete with credentials 
and testimonials, push himself into the jury box, shove the cowering jury 
aside, plunk himself down, and testily declare: Tm taking over here. Get 
out!' Finally, however, the judge conies to the rescue, wagging a learned 
finger at the expert, scolding him as follows: 'No, you cannot do that. You 
are usurping the jury's function. You are invading the province of the jury.' 
The dejected expert then departs."
Although lighthearted, the author is making a valid point: the meaning and worth of judicial 
statements regarding expert witnesses invading the province of the jury are seldom 
questioned. It could be said that all expert witnesses will, strictly speaking, usurp the role 
of the jury because that is what we ask of them. They are called to speak on matters which 
the jury would either have difficulty in resolving alone or which involve counter-intuitive 
issues upon which an expert can offer enlightenment. The use of the usurpation argument 
as a reason for excluding expert evidence in areas of natural science has lost most of the 
validity it had in the past, because scientific advances have forced the courts to make a 
nonsense of its reasoning. The presentation of much scientific evidence, such as DNA 
evidence, is often conclusive and could be said to make up the mind of the jury on ultimate 
issues. But the admission of such evidence is only just, because scientific advances which 
have general acceptance should be utilised. However, it is difficult to justify non-operation 
of the argument regarding usurpation for some types of expert evidence but not for others. 
It appears that it is used for the behavioural or "soft" sciences, but not for the natural or
Murphy, J.P., "An evaluation of the arguments against the use of expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification", (1987) 8 University of Bridgeport Law Review 21, 27.
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"pure" sciences. The question has surely become one of validity of the scientific data and 
importance to the case. If validity and importance are the determining issues, then the 
courts should no longer use what indeed can amount to the "empty rhetoric" of invasion 
and usurpation.
In those cases where expert evidence is admitted, it is wrong to direct a jury that expert 
evidence should be accepted where it is not contradicted by other expert opinion 
evidence. 14 Even where evidence is uncontradicted by other expert evidence, there may be 
circumstances or facts to consider in the case which lead the jury to attach less weight to the 
evidence of an expert. However, where there are no facts or circumstances contrary to the 
expert evidence, it would be a misdirection to tell the jury that they may disregard it. 15 In R 
v Bailey , 16 the Court of Appeal held that, whilst the jury are not bound to accept medical 
evidence, they cannot reject it where there is nothing offered to cast doubt on it. This 
suggests that where the expert evidence is truly undisputed, it can be determinative of the 
facts in issue. The consensus now appears to be that, where there are no other 
circumstances to consider, the jury should be directed to accept clear and uncontradicted 
expert opinion evidence. Where there are other circumstances to consider then the expert 
evidence should be assessed along with those circumstances. 17 As with cases where the 
expert evidence is contradicted by another expert, the jury should consider such matters as 
the expert's qualifications and credibility when deciding on the weight to accord to her 
evidence. However, credibility and qualifications in themselves can be matters which 
would sway a jury to accept evidence which may be dubious. An illustration of the 
potential danger of blanket admission of expert evidence can be found in Norris and 
Edwardh's discussion of the replacement of old common sense theories with new
14 n-jIbid.
15 RvMatheson [1958] 1 WLR 474 (CA); Anderson v R [1972] AC 100 (PC); R v Bailey (1978) 
66CrAppR31 (CA).16 Ibid.
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scientifically based ones, 18
"As more and more 'expert' opinions are offered for consideration by the 
triers of fact, there is a real risk that old myths will simply be replaced by 
new ones that are even more insidious because of their appearance as 
scientific truths."
Accompanying this danger is a complication: in an adversarial system counsel is enjoined to 
do everything possible within evidential rules to achieve victory. This could include using 
expert witnesses even where their evidence can be a minor part of the case. The imagery of 
"grandstanding" is brought to mind here, where a star performer is employed with the task 
of capturing the attention of the audience, diverting it away from the other, less exciting, 
actors. They will then leave the show satisfied, even though none of the performers other 
than the star remains etched in their minds. A poor case could therefore be boosted by the 
"star" expert witness. If the jury give her evidence undue weight, flaws in the rest of the 
case become less important. Indeed, the fear of some commentators is that expert evidence 
could be used where there is a lack of convincing evidence in the case, and counsel rely on 
their "star-turn" to dazzle the jury with science. The evidence may not be solid, but the 
qualifications of an expert give her an authority which leads to unquestioning belief, 19
"[Y]ou must ask yourselves whether your help is really needed, or whether 
you are merely engaged as magicians to perform an intriguing side-show so 
that spectators will not notice the crisis in the center ring."
Whilst concerns about "grandstanding" highlight the problems with the adversarial 
process,20 it is not an adequate argument against the admission of expert evidence as a 
blanket rule. For example, such concern is not upheld where we have a situation which is 
just as vehemently criticised: the battle of the experts. Both experts may be confident,
17 R v Sanders (1991) 93 Cr App R 245 (CA).
18 Norris, J. and Edwardh, M, (1995) op.cit., p.75.
19 Judge Bazelon in an address to US psychologists, cited by Tapp, J.L., and Levine, F.J., 
"Reflections and Redirections" in J.L. Tapp and F.J. Levine, Law, Justice and the Individual in Society 
0977).
For further discussion of the adversarial process, see Leigh, L.H., and Zedner, L., A Report on the 
Administration of CriminalJustice in the P re-Trial Phase in England and Germany, Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice, Research Study No. 1 (HMSO, 1992); and McEwan, J., Evidence and the Adversarial 
Process (1998 Oxford: Blackwell).
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21persuasive and highly qualified. Blind acceptance is then impossible.
Even where expert evidence is used to hide flaws in a case, the danger of wrongful 
conviction arises only where the evidence does not relate to the main issue, or lacks 
validity, or is open to contradiction which the jury does not hear. The evidence may be 
perfectly valid, and be properly accepted by a jury. The danger therefore lies in those cases 
where the expert evidence does not reach such a high standard, yet it is delivered 
confidently by a highly qualified expert. There is then the risk that the jury will place undue 
weight on what the expert tells them and in effect allows the expert to decide on the issues 
in the case.
It must be noted, however, that arguments regarding the danger of unquestioning 
acceptance of expert evidence may also underestimate the intelligence of juries. Too little is 
known of their decision-making process for conclusive statements to be made, but 
Holdenson asserts that to rule expert evidence inadmissible because the jury may accord too 
much weight to it is to rely 22
4tupon the false premise that juries are not true to their sworn duties.. jurors 
can be cautioned that such evidence is only one piece of evidence to be taken 
into account, and to look for sound scientific data supporting the proffered 
opinions."
It is logical to assume that blanket acceptance will occur in only a small percentage of cases, 
because other persuasive evidence will be presented in the majority of trials. However, risk 
of undue weight in some cases highlights the necessity of criteria being met before an 
expert is allowed to give evidence. The solution to this problem lies in the power of the 
judge to exclude expert evidence where appropriate. To be effective the power should be
Similarly, the problem does not arise where expert evidence is the only evidence in the case. There 
is adequate authority that a jury in such a case would be correct in accepting the expert evidence: Bailey, 
op.cit. 
" Holdenson, (1988) op.cit., 537.
262
23accompanied by judicial education to allow informed decisions to be made.
Although there are flaws in the argument that expert evidence results in poor advocacy and 
a reliance on an expert's performance to secure a victory, less dramatic effects could 
certainly occur. For example, jurors may weigh up evidence conscientiously but accord the 
expert evidence more weight than anything else simply by virtue of its source. This process 
may take place subconsciously, and in cases where it is proper and necessary to admit the 
expert evidence. The real danger of usurpation is therefore likely to be at a lower level than 
blanket acceptance, and there may be no acceptable solution. To exclude useful and 
necessary evidence is not a valid option. It may be that we will have to accept that the price 
of expert evidence is that greater weight will automatically be placed upon it. And in most 
cases this will be right and proper, provided that only appropriate and reliable evidence is 
admitted. The question posed later in this chapter is whether expert evidence on eyewitness 
testimony is appropriate and reliable.
The rules governing the admission of expert evidence at trial
Any consideration of the introduction of expert evidence from a particular scientific field 
must include a review of the evidential rules which apply to such evidence.24 In general 
terms, the law of evidence regulates the way in which facts may be proved in courts of law. 
The historically founded nature of the law of evidence begs the question of whether it could 
ever allow the criminal justice process to keep pace with major scientific advances. Reform 
of evidential rules has been slow.25 Perhaps more than any other area of the law of
23 Some argue that the decision as to admission or exclusion of expert evidence should not be made 
by a judge alone, because they are not scientists. Rather, they should consult with a panel of experts in the 
field. This restricts judicial discretion, and may include the risk of biased advice, but would ensure that 
judges were better informed of scientific advances and general acceptance issues.
24 Good general texts on evidence include Keane, A., The Modern Law of Evidence ( 1994 London: 
Butterworths); Tapper, C., Cross on Evidence (1995 London: Butterworths); and Zuckennan, A., The 
Principles of Criminal Evidence (1989 OUP).
25 But it has not been non-existent: for example, strict corroboration requirements are no longer seen 
to be useful. For a discussion of corroboration see Keane (1994) op.cit., chapter 7.
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evidence, the rules relating to expert opinion evidence illustrate the dilemmas involved in 
balancing the interests of legal certainty with the desire to harness new scientific 
techniques.
(i) Evidence of opinion
Expert evidence is a form of opinion evidence. Although opinion evidence may be relevant, 
it is not testimony as to a fact deriving from the witness's personal experience or 
perception. Rather, it is an inference drawn from facts. 26 Any opinion, belief or inference 
regarding facts in issue has traditionally been regarded as inadmissible. The basis of 
madmissibility lies in the obvious problems of establishing reliability where evidence is 
based on opinion27 and also in the danger that the fact-finding role of the court could be 
usurped. It is for the tribunal of fact to decide inferences from facts in issue, not for 
witnesses.
There are, however, two exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility for opinion 
evidence. The first exception is that a qualified expert may give her opinion on a matter 
requiring expertise.28 Courts have long been willing to allow evidence from scientific
26 An example of a personally perceived fact would be eyewitnesses testifying that they saw the 
offender at a certain time and place. An example of an inference drawn from those facts is that the witness 
identifies the accused as the offender. Rather than giving a description and letting tribunal of fact decide if it 
fits the accused, the witness is stating her opinion that the offender and the accused are one and the same.
27 Where reliability of evidence cannot be established, it also loses relevance. So a fact which can be 
proved is relevant, but opinion generally is not. See Hollington v Hewthorn and Co Ltd. [1943] KB 587, 
595.
28 s30 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provided for the admissibility of expert reports in criminal 
cases. This is not automatic admissibility: the leave of the court must be given if it is not proposed that the 
expert gives oral evidence as well. In deciding whether to admit an expert report, the court will consider its 
content, why there is no oral evidence proposed, and whether the admissibility or exclusion will create 
unfairness for the accused. Overall, the admissibility of expert reports in criminal proceedings is a positive 
move. Where oral evidence is given, a written report will serve to clarify and reinforce any difficult points. 
Where there is no dispute about evidence, for example where a specimen of blood has been tested and both 
sides agree on the result, attendance of the expert in person seems superfluous. The report can present her 
findings without her presence. However, there are potential dangers. Where evidence is disputed, absence of 
any opportunity to cross-examine the expert regarding her evidence could lead to unfairness. Evidence may 
be all the more persuasive because it is in written form.
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experts, as the sixteenth century case ofBuckley v Rice Thomas illustrates ,
"...if matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or faculties, we 
commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty which it concerns. 
Which is an honourable and commendable thing in our law. For thereby it 
appears that we do not despise all other sciences but our own, but we 
approve of them an encourage them as things worthy of commendation."
Secondly, in certain limited circumstances a non-expert may state her opinion as a way to 
convey facts she personally perceived. 30
Although expert opinion evidence is an exception to the main rule, this does not mean that 
all expert evidence will be judged to be admissible. It is recognised, for example, that there 
is a great risk that the tribunal of fact will simply accept evidence from an expert in a 
specialised field, without taking the time to question such evidence. This risk is increased 
where the expert is highly qualified and appears confident and authoritative on the witness 
stand. When coupled with the suspicion that experts are 'hired guns' who amend their 
opinion according to which party is paying them, it is unsurprising that the courts have 
shown some reluctance in admitting expert evidence. In focussing on expert opinion 
evidence, the remainder of this section further explores the issues of competency, reliability 
and impartiality.
(ii) The field of expertise
Although the courts have exercised caution in relation to expert evidence, they have 
recognised that some subjects require the aid of expert opinion and that, without it, the jury 
would be unable to reach an informed decision. Before the court allows expert testimony 
the matter must call for expertise, and the expert must be someone who is seen to be
29 (1554)Plowd 118, 124
This is sometimes termed the "compendious mode" of conveying facts. For example, a witness 
who saw the accused stumbling and slurring her words is allowed to state that she was drunk, provided 
reasons are given for the conclusion. The exception covering non-expert opinion evidence in part illustrates 
a recognition that it is often difficult for witnesses to separate fact and opinion in their testimony. Personal 
perception inevitably involves some inference and opinion, influenced by the beliefs of the witness. There 
is criticism of the distinction made between fact and opinion on the grounds that it is artificial.
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qualified to give an opinion on it.
The matters which call for expertise are constantly expanding, and the courts in England 
and Wales have admitted expert evidence on a huge range of issues, covering medical, 
scientific, technological and psychiatric fields. 31 The courts have to decide whether to 
admit evidence covering a novel discipline by determining whether the evidence is 
sufficiently reliable and respectable to aid the tribunal of fact in making its decision. For 
example, evidence that the accused had committed an offence because it was his destiny, as 
shown by a tarot card reading, would not be viewed as reliable and respectable.
In England and Wales, the judge determines the appropriateness of scientific disciplines by 
using the 'field of expertise' test. The boundaries of the field of expertise shift as scientific 
advances are made, with matters which have become commonplace knowledge being 
excluded and new discoveries and complex scientific theories being included. As a general 
rule of thumb, it could be said that matters within the field of expertise sit between those 
issues which are within the common knowledge of the population and those which are 
conjectural and uncertain. 32 As matters which are within the grasp of most people grow in 
number, so the number of speculative matters diminish, 33
"Only a few years ago it would have been necessary to take expert evidence 
on issues with respect to the operation of motor cars, aeroplanes or radio 
which are now so completely inside the domain of popular understanding 
that such evidence would be regarded as superfluous."
The general approach to a new form of expert evidence is to admit it and allow the jury to 
decide on its weight in the light of other evidence heard during the case. An illustration of
For a list of specific examples of matters within the field of expertise, see Keane, (1994) op.cit., 
p399.
For example areas of nature or science which are not yet understood, and matters involving 
astrology, tarot and the like.
Maguire, J., Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law, (1947, Chicago, Foundation Press), 30
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this approach is R v Robb 34 , where an expert was allowed to give evidence on voice 
identification. The evidence was admitted notwithstanding the fact that the method of voice 
analysis used was not one endorsed by a majority of experts in the field and was rather 
unscientific. 35 The obvious drawback of the general approach used in English courts is that 
unreliable methods may be introduced. Although the jury will then assess the weight of the 
evidence, some unreliable evidence is likely to be accepted, increasing the chances of a 
false conviction. 36 A further drawback of using a more permissive rule is that the 
"floodgates" will be opened: 37
"Such a rule broadens the range of cases in which expert testimony is 
admissible. This sets the stage for two collateral effects. First, defence 
attorneys, realising that attempts to introduce such testimony will meet with 
greater success, might increase their recruitment and use of experts. Second, 
more psychologists may represent themselves as qualified and available to 
testify in this capacity. Consequently, there could well be more offers of 
eyewitness-expert testimony, leading to an increased burden on the courts."
However, as the discussion below will illustrate, English courts temper a generally 
permissive rule of admissibility with other rules of evidence, so that expert testimony is 
limited in scope for all forms of psychological evidence.
It can be seen that there are difficult issues for the courts to address when deciding on the 
admissibility of evidence from a particular discipline. A balance needs to be struck between 
two opposing objectives: the need to guard against hasty acceptance of ultimately unreliable 
evidence and the desirability of admitting useful evidence as quickly as possible. This is an 
almost impossible balance to strike, especially where the court may lack the scientific 
expertise to use its judgment appropriately. Even where the discipline itself is deemed
34 (1991)93CrAppR 161 (CA).
35 The expert witness in Robb was an academic who simply listened to the two tapes available and 
paid close attention, without measuring resonance and frequency. The method was held to be sound. The 
expert was also viewed as skilled in the field of voice analysis, and so competent to give evidence.
36 For example, one of the main pieces of evidence against the Birmingham Six was the "Greiss" test 
results, which purportedly showed that the accused had been in contact with explosives. At a later stage, it 
was revealed that a positive result could also be obtained where there had been contact with playing cards or 
cigarette packets: see Ashworth, A., The Criminal Process ( 1994 Oxford: Clarendon), 12.
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admissible, the expert evidence may still be rejected on the grounds that the witness 
proposed is not sufficiently skilled for the task.
(Hi) Competence of expert witnesses
Where the discipline is admissible, it is left to the judge to determine whether the expert is 
competent to testify. 38 This involves an examination of the witness's expertise. A witness 
may be qualified in her chosen discipline through formal study or through experience.39 In 
R v Silverlock 40 , the witness was a solicitor who had studied handwriting as a hobby for a 
number of years. He was permitted to give evidence that an advertisement was in the 
handwriting of the accused. In explaining the approach of the court to competency of expert 
witnesses, Lord Russell stated that:
"the expert must be peritus but we cannot say that he must have become peritus in the way of his business or in any definite way. The question is, is he peritus? Is he skilled?"
In contrast to Silverlock is R v Inch , 41 where a medical orderly who had extensive 
experience in the treatment of cuts was held to be insufficiently qualified to give his opinion 
as to whether a cut had been caused by a weapon or a head butt. It is difficult to see why 
the solicitor in Silverlock was considered to be peritus whereas the orderly in Inch was 
not. 42 What is clear is that formal qualification is an aid to a decision of competency, but
37 Walters, C.M., "Admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification", (1985) 13California Law Review 1402, 1419.
38 Where an expert is deemed to be competent, she will also be compellable. See Harmony Shipping Co SA v Saudi Europe Line Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1380 (CA), where an expert witness advised both prosecution and defence. On realising this, he declined to aid the defence further. It was held that he was 
compellable, and that his contract with the prosecution did not prevent him from giving evidence on the instructions of defence counsel also.
39 Although statute may require specific qualifications, see for example the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead Act 1991, si, regarding medical practitioners. This limits the court's discretion as to what constitutes expertise.
40 [1894J2QB766.
41 (1989)91 CrAppR 51
42 Although it could be argued that the cases are an illustration of the differences in approach endemic in the exercise of judicial discretion, Inch was heard over a century later than Silverlock. However, it is also possible that the relative social class of the "experts" played a part in the decisions. See also R v Robb, 
op.ciL, Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157, R v Oakley (1919) 70 Cr App R 7 (CA), R v Murphy [1980]QB434(CA).
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that informal qualifications may suffice.
If the expert is deemed to be competent in an accepted field of expertise, she must then 
ensure that her evidence does not breach any evidential rules. Her testimony must be useful 
to the tribunal of fact, avoid deciding on ultimate issues in the case, and must be based on 
proven (or assumed) facts.
(iv) Expert evidence and the rule against hearsay in criminal cases 
Where an expert relies upon a fact in expressing her opinion, that fact must be capable of 
proof by admissible evidence. 43 In order for the tribunal of fact to decide the weight to be 
accorded to her evidence, the expert should always state the (assumed) facts upon which 
her opinion is based at the time of examination-in-chief. This allows an assessment of 
credibility, as was recognised in R v Turner, where Lawton LJ stated that: 44
"If the expert has been misinformed about the facts or has taken irrelevant 
facts into consideration or has omitted to consider relevant ones, the opinion 
is likely to be valueless."
In many cases, expert witnesses will rely upon findings from research conducted by others 
in the field, and will not have first-hand knowledge of the facts used to form the opinion 
given in court. They will not be able to prove facts where they have no personal knowledge 
of them because this would breach the rule against hearsay. 45 Therefore, in such cases 
experts will discuss the research findings as assumed facts and counsel will ask 
hypothetical questions. Expert witnesses are allowed to rely on assumed facts in forming 
their opinion without breaching the rule against hearsay, whereas non-experts are not.
Similarly, in forming a opinion in a case, experts can rely upon material within their field of
43
44
See Pattenden, R., "Expert opinion based on hearsay" [1982] Criminal Law Review 85. 
[1975] QB 834, at 840.
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expertise written by other people. In eyewitness identification cases, this means that an 
expert witness can rely upon the results of experiments which she had read about but had 
not performed herself, provided that they represented the established body of knowledge 
for the discipline: 46
"If an expert refers to the results of research published by a reputable 
authority in a reputable journal the court would, I think, ordinarily regard 
those results as supporting inferences fairly to be drawn from them, unless 
or until a different approach was shown to be proper."
In R v Abadom 47 , where the expert witness relied on statistics produced by the Home 
Office to show how common a particular type of glass was, the defence appealed on the 
grounds that the evidence was hearsay because the expert had no knowledge of the method 
used by the Home Office in collecting the statistics or of how reliable that method was. The 
Court confirmed that experts are allowed to rely on the work of others in forming their 
opinions: 48
"Once the primary facts on which their opinion is based have been proved 
by admissible evidence, they are entitled to draw on the work of others as 
part of the process of arriving at their conclusion. However, where they 
have done so, they should refer to this material in their evidence so that the 
cogency and probative value of their conclusion can be tested and evaluated 
by reference to it."
To rule otherwise would have made it very difficult for the courts to find suitable experts in 
any field, as the experts would only be able to rely on experimental work they themselves 
had conducted.
It appears that, with regard to hearsay at least, expert witnesses may testify on the results of
45 For discussion of the rule against hearsay, see for example Keane, (1994) op.cit.; Uglow, S., 
Evidence:Text and Materials (1997 London: Sweet and Maxwell); and Murphy P., Murphy on Evidence 
(1997 London: Blackstone Press).
46 per Bingham JinHv Schering Chemicals Ltd. [1983] 1 All ER 849, 853.
47 [1983] 1 All ER 364. The offence charged was robbery. During the course of the robbery a window 
was broken. The prosecution case was that glass found in the accused's shoe was from the broken window.
48 Ibid., at 368. See also the US Federal Rules of Evidence, r. 703:
"The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
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eyewitness identification experiments conducted by third parties. However, other evidential 
rules have traditionally precluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification, most 
notably the "ultimate issue" and "common knowledge" rules.
(v) Expert Evidence on Ultimate Issues
Ultimate issues are those which the court has to ascertain in each particular case. The rule is 
designed, along with the common knowledge rule, to prevent witnesses from usurping the 
role of the jury: 49
"It is not competent in any action for witnesses to express their opinions 
upon any of the issues, whether of law or fact, which the court or jury has 
to determine."
One of the main criticisms of the rule is that it appears to disregard the very reason why 
expert witnesses are called: to draw inferences from the facts in cases where the jury does 
not possess the expertise to do so. 50 It does not take into account the fact that expert 
evidence may conflict, leaving jurors to weigh up the evidence and decide on the ultimate 
issue in the case. 51 These criticisms would warrant further discussion but for the simple 
fact that the rule has been eroded to the point where it is ineffective. The expert simply has 
to think of a different way to express her conclusion on the ultimate issue than that used by 
the courts, and the rule will not be infringed. This is so even though the expert is, in 
substance, giving direction on the ultimate issue in the case. The letter of the rule is 
followed but not its spirit, it being " a matter of form rather than substance." 52 The
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence."
49 Per Neville J in Joseph Crosfield and Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 
TLR 378 at 379.
50 Of particular interest on the ultimate issue rule is Jackson, R.D.," The ultimate issue rule: One 
rule too many" [1984] Criminal Law Review 75.
51 Where one witness lacks credibility, this argument loses its force. On the other hand, the jury 
could be left in a rather confused state where the two experts are both impressive on the stand. See the 
discussion earlier in this chapter on usurping the role of the jury.
"Per Lord Taylor CJ in R v Stockwell (1993) 77 Cr App R 260, at 265. See also DPP v A & EC 
Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB 159. The Criminal Law Revision Committee believe that the rule no 
longer exists (11th Report Cmnd 4991. Its recommendation that the rule be abolished was not
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common knowledge rule, however, has proved considerably more problematic for experts 
who seek to give evidence on psychological matters.
(vi) Matters within the common knowledge of the jury
Courts require that expert witnesses must have as their field of expertise concepts which are 
difficult for the jury to understand without an expert's help. Lawton LJ explained the rule 
in the leading case of R v Turner : 53
"An expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific 
information which is likely to be outside the ordinary knowledge and 
experience of a judge and jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury can 
form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is 
unnecessary. In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it 
may make judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert witness has 
impressive scientific qualifications does not by that fact alone make his 
opinion on matters of human nature and behaviour within the limits of 
normality any more helpful than that of jurors themselves but there is danger 
that they may think it does."
The rule in criminal cases has followed Lawton LJ's formulation, so that evidence is 
inadmissible where it concerns an issue within the knowledge and experience of the jury or 
where it concerns an issue of human nature and behaviour within the bounds of 
normality. 54 The rule is designed to prevent an expert taking the place of jury, Lawton LJ 
stating that "[w]e do not find that prospect attractive."55 Where the average person can 
understand and draw conclusions on certain issues, the jury should be left to do so without
implemented. The ultimate issue rule is now confined to use in criminal cases: see s3 Civil Evidence Act 
1972, as amended by the Civil Evidence Act 1995, Sched.2.
53 [1975] QB 834, at 841. C.f. Lowery vR [1974] AC 85. See also R v Chard (1971) 56 Cr App R 
268 (CA), where the judge and jury were seen to be as competent as an expert when forming an opinion 
about the intention of a normal man; R v Wood [1990] Crim LR 264 (CA); R v Anderson [1972] 1 QB 
304; R v Stamford [1912] 2 QB 391 c.f. DPP vA &BC Chewing Gum Ltd. [1968] 1 QB 159. 
54 The idea in Turner that an expert should testify only where the testimony comprises evidence about 
"abnormality" (for example where the state of mind of the defendant could be said to be unbalanced to the 
point of legal insanity) has severely limited psychological evidence on issues such as eyewitness accuracy. 
This is because what the expert aims to testify about is the workings of a "normal" memory. The common 
knowledge rule has formed the basis of decisions excluding expert evidence on the effect of pornography: 
DPP v Jordan [1977] AC 699, where the sentiment expressed in Transport Publishing Co. Pty Ltd v 
Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111,119 that "ordinary human nature, that of people at large, is 
not a subject of proof by evidence, whether supposedly expert or not" was approved. The rule was used in 
Australia to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness evidence: R v Smith [1987] VR 907.
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evidence from experts in the field because "the fact-finding tribunal, be it the judge or jury, 
is assumed by the law to have ordinary powers of intellect and a certain reservoir of general 
knowledge."56
The view taken in Turner was that in cases where the material is within the common 
knowledge of the jury, then any expert testimony could serve to confuse jurors and make 
them doubtful of relying upon their own experience. In other words, they could 
compromise their own views by accepting the seemingly superior knowledge of the expert 
witness.
On the surface, then, the rule regarding common knowledge appears to be clear, logical and 
well thought through. However, there are a number of problems with the practical 
application of the rule. Firstly, it is the judge who will decide which matters are within the 
common knowledge of the jury, perhaps with the guidance of precedent. It must be 
questioned how aware judges are of what constitutes "common knowledge". 57 The rule has 
been seen to operate against allowing evidence relating to psychological matters because 
issues of normal human behaviour are seen to be within the province of the jury. However, 
what areas lie outside the understanding of a jury is open to interpretation and the 
requirement has caused much debate regarding a number of disciplines, including that of 
eyewitness identification. In Turner, psychological evidence as to the state of mind of the 
defendant was excluded, signalling that evidence gained from psychological experiments 
may well be considered as within the common knowledge of the "ordinary" person. 
Zuckerman defends the approach on the basis that the courts are following society's lead: 58
"Ajudge deciding whether expert opinion should be accepted as an arbiter 
of a certain matter has to consider the state of public opinion on the point. If
55 Turner, op.cit.
56 Freckleton, I.R., The Trial of the Expert ( 1987 Sydney Butterworths), 38.
The judiciary is part of an elite group in society, and is better educated than many jurors, see 
Griffith, J.A.G., The Politics of the Judiciary (1991 London Fontana Press), 30-38.
58 Zuckerman, A.A.S., The Principles of Criminal Evidence (1989 Oxford: Clarendon), 67.
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the community has come to defer to professional standards on the matters in 
question, the courts will normally follow suit. Medical evidence is 
admissible on matters of health because we accept the authority of the 
medical profession in this regard. Psychiatry has not yet obtained a like 
acceptance."
This argument does not take account of the differing natures of scientific disciplines. It is 
obvious to most of us that we are less knowledgeable about medical matters than an expert, 
because whenever we feel ill or have an accident we consult a doctor. However, many 
members of the public will have given no thought to how a normal mind operates or what 
the boundaries of normality are, and comparatively few will have come into contact with 
psychiatrists or psychologists. Yet many common sense assumptions regarding human 
behaviour have been found to be incorrect. 59 This implies that some areas of normal human 
nature are outside common knowledge. Zuckerman's argument has something about it of 
the chicken and egg: if the public do not "defer to professional standards on the matters in 
question", then the courts will not allow expert evidence; but if the courts do not allow 
evidence of experts on some matters, then juries will continue to use flawed knowledge and 
will never defer. 60
It is widely thought that the problems involved in accurately remembering a face are within 
everyone's experience. After all, almost everyone has been in a position where they have 
tested their powers of recognition, and sometimes have been incorrect. Yet it is doubtful 
that the average person is fully aware of the dangers inherent in eyewitness testimony. The 
interpretation of "common knowledge" here appears to be rather outdated. 61 The danger in 
relying on the common knowledge rule is simply that valuable evidence may be excluded. 62
59 See, for example, Brigham, J.C., and Bothwell, R.K., "The ability of prospective jurors to 
estimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications", (1983) 7 Law and Human Behavior 19.
60 The role of the courts is an important issue here: should they merely reflect public opinion or, 
when in possession of additional knowledge, should they lead public opinion?
Whether the assumption of common knowledge is justified will be examined later in the chapter, 
with reference to some common beliefs which have been repudiated by psychological experimentation.
See Mackay, R.D., and Colman, A., "Excluding expert evidence; A talc of ordinary folk and 
common experience" [1991] Criminal Law Review 800, for an attractive compromise. They argue for 
relaxation of the rule to allow evidence on states of mind brought about by situational forces, which are
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The advocates of expert evidence in eyewitness identification cases vehemently dispute that 
the human memory processes involved are within common knowledge. Holdenson 
encapsulates this viewpoint: 63
".. .the content of such evidence does not fall within the category of ordinary 
human nature: it is outside the knowledge and understanding, and generally 
beyond the experience, of ordinary persons. Furthermore, witnesses giving 
evidence of visual identification form a requisite special class of persons, 
which in turn forms a subject of special knowledge, rendering expert 
evidence as to their mental processes admissible."
Holdenson stretches matters in claiming that eyewitnesses are a special class of persons. It 
is difficult to see how they are more 'special' than any other witness. It is simply that their 
evidence is not easily tested by cross-examination or assessments of demeanour.
A second problem with the operation of the common knowledge rule is that the rule has 
been seen to operate unfairly with regard to issues "within the bounds of normality", 
excluding expert evidence where it could clearly assist the jury in its task. A particularly 
striking example can be seen in R v Masih,™ where the appellant had an IQ of 72. In 
appealing against his conviction for rape, he argued that expert evidence should have been 
admitted as to his ability to know or be reckless as to lack of consent. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the decision to exclude the expert evidence, because Masih's IQ was above that of a 
"mental defective". Had his IQ been 3 points lower, expert evidence could have been called 
because any abnormal characteristics would be outside the jury's experience. This implies
abnormal but not mental disorders in the medical sense. Also useful are Mackay, R.D., and Colman, A., 
"Equivocal Rulings on Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Evidence: Turning a Muddle into a Nonsense" 
(1996) Criminal Law Review 88; and Sheldon, D., and MacLeod, M, "From Normative to Positive Data: 
Expert Psychological Evidence Re-examined" [ 1991 ] Criminal Law Review 811.
63 Holdenson, (1988) op.cit., 532. Holdenson's claim that memory processes are outside the common 
knowledge of ordinary people is explored later in this chapter in a discussion of lay knowledge about 
eyewitness identification.
64 [1986] Crim L.R. 395 (CA). See also R v Weightman [1991] Crim LR 204, where evidence was 
not admitted regarding the accused's abnormal and histrionic personality because it did not amount to mental 
illness. It was therefore seen to be within the bounds of normality. It can be seen that this limb of the rule 
was relaxed with regard to provocation cases, where evidence has been called as to personality disorders 
which comprise a 'characteristic': for example Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008. Whether this will 
continue in England and Wales may be doubtful after Luc Thiet Thuan [1997] AC 131, but it is still the 
case in Canada and New Zealand.
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that common knowledge ceases at the magic IQ level of 69. It was conceded in a later case 
that "to draw a strict line at 69/70 does seem somewhat artificial."65 It is certainly difficult 
to see how three IQ points would make a significant difference to cognitive ability and 
intelligence in an individual case.
Pattenden offers a persuasive argument when she states that the common knowledge rule 
rests on three fallacies. 66 First that (as demonstrated byMasih ) we can clearly draw a line 
where normality ends and abnormality begins. Secondly, that the common sense of the jury 
is the best basis on which to judge a 'normal' person's behaviour, 67
"[T]he law... places its confidence in the common sense of the ordinary 
person for decisions about whether evidence is accurate or not. 
Psychology... cannot replace common sense judgment of the particular
issue."
Yet we often react counter-intuitively, whether due to internal or external pressures. Jury 
members are likely to underestimate the extent of such pressures on themselves, and in 
doing so underestimate their effect on the accused. 68 In this way, juries could apply 
unforgiving and unrealistic boundaries to understandable behaviour. It is human nature to 
see ourselves as morally stronger than we actually are, and apply those (unrealistic) 
standards to others. According to Pattenden, the third fallacy is that experts confine their 
study to the abnormal rather than the normal. This assumption raises the question of how 
scientists can understand the abnormal without first examining the normal. The evidential 
rules in England and Wales do nothing to answer these concerns. However, other 
Commonwealth countries have addressed the issue of expert evidence, including the role of 
the common knowledge rule. Their solutions and suggestions may open the way for expert 
evidence on psychiatric and psychological matters, including those relating to eyewitness
65 Per Hodgson J in R v Silcott [1987] Crim. L.R. 765.
66 Pattenden, R., "Conflicting approaches to psychiatric evidence in criminal trials: England, Canada 
and Australia" [1986] Criminal La\v Review 92, 100.
67
68
Stone, M., Proof of Fact in Criminal Trials (1984 W. Green Edinburgh) 
See Mackay and Colman, [ 1991 ] op.cit.
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and voice identification.
In several Commonwealth cases, the rule in Turner has been adapted and relaxed, resulting 
in a broadening of the range of admissible expert evidence. This especially affects the so- 
called "soft" sciences of non-clinical psychology and psychiatry. The courts in New 
Zealand have been moving away from the common knowledge rule throughout the 
1990s. 69 One highly publicised example was that of R v Bain (No <5), 70 where expert 
evidence as to premonitions, repressed memories and trance-like states was admitted in the 
High Court. In explaining his decision, Williamson J stated that whilst the Court would 
continue to ensure that evidence remained relevant, the degree to which psychiatrists are 
able to give evidence had been extended by recent High Court decisions. 71 The Court was 
of the opinion that expert evidence may help the jury in understanding the phenomena in the 
particular case, which did not constitute mental illness but may generate misconceptions 
regarding its nature.
In Australia, also, there has been some move away from the strict common knowledge test. 
In R v Wright, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria asked whether the jury 
would receive help from the expert, and whether "without the assistance of opinion 
evidence, the jury would have been unlikely to form a proper judgment on the evidence."72 
Similar reasoning can be seen in the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal case of R v
69 Although the New Zealand Court of Appeal has not ruled on the point directly, there has been 
some use of the common knowledge test in the Court of Appeal fairly recently (for example R v B [1987] 1 
NZLR 362; R v Christian Unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 351/95). However, the High Court has been 
moving to a more flexible rule since the early 1990s, and the Law Commission Unpublished Draft 
Evidence Code proposes a similar approach.
70 Unreported, 23 May 1995, High Court, Dunedin Registry, Tl/95. The case involved the murder 
trial of the only surviving member of a family, David Bain. He had returned from his morning paper round 
and found the family dead. There is ongoing debate as to his guilt, with a number of books appearing 
supporting or questioning his conviction: see Karam, J., David and Goliath: The Bain Familv Murders 
( 1997 Auckland Reed Publishing).
71 For example R v Osborne Unreported, 13 February 1992, High Court, Christchurch, T64/91 and 
RvHohana (1992) 10 CRNZ 92. The role proposed is similar to that of the "gatekeeper1 ' judge of Daubert 
v Merrell Dow, op.cit.
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Ronald Condren, 73 where it was held that, although factors influencing speech-style were 
normally within the common knowledge of the jury, expert evidence may point out more 
precisely how such factors affected choice of language.
These cases seem to illustrate that the courts are operating a test which is simply the other 
side of the common knowledge coin: would the evidence help the jury? It could be argued 
that, if the evidence is within the common knowledge of jury members then will it be of 
little help to them. On this analysis, it appears that a requirement that the evidence be of 
help to the jury is little more than a reformulation of the old common knowledge rule. 
However, a "helpfulness" test may make a difference in those cases where the condition is 
within the common knowledge of the jury, but where that common knowledge is based, in 
part at least, on fallacy; or where the jury will not be able to fully comprehend the 
intricacies of the condition. Expert witnesses could then be of help in dispelling common 
myths about the condition in question, or in explaining the finer details. Proponents of 
expert evidence on eyewitness identification would claim that a test of 'substantial 
helpfulness' applies particularly well to evidence of identification, because psychologists 
claim to have found that common sense assumptions are often false. Whether expert 
evidence on eyewitness identification does indeed warrant admission in criminal cases is 
discussed later in this chapter.
It can be seen therefore that there are definitional problems in pronouncing what lies inside 
common knowledge, or what constitutes abnormality. They are not fixed concepts, a 
difficulty illustrated by English cases such as Masih , 74 The judiciary or legislature in 
England and Wales now need to respond with greater flexibility, acknowledging the 
problems of applying a rigid common knowledge rule in an ever-changing scientific
72 [ 1980] VR 593, 608 per Young C.J.
73 Unreported, Law Report 15 June 1987, judgment of Macrossan J.
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climate. As was stated in the New Zealand case of R v Decha-Iamsakun: :
"Matters which to a considerable extent are within the experience of a 
judge... or jury can arise, yet expert evidence may help materially in coming 
to a conclusion. The ordinary experience test need not be interpreted so as to 
exclude such evidence...Scientific knowledge is constantly advancing...the 
law would be reactionary if as a general rule it rejected the help of modem 
scientific insights into human behaviour and cognition."
A serious consideration of allowing greater flexibility in evidential rules regarding expert 
testimony should be undertaken in England and Wales. Strict adherence to a rule which 
operates unfairly to exclude relevant and helpful evidence impedes the attainment of a fair 
trial.
Expert Evidence on Eyewitness Identification Issues
"The goal of expert testimony on eyewitness matters is to decrease the 
likelihood that jurors will believe false eyewitness testimony and increase 
the likelihood that they will believe accurate eyewitness testimony. The very 
fact that there are studies directed at examining the effects of expert 
testimony on eyewitness evidence indicates a level of concern, caution, and 
responsibility in psychology that is unparalleled in other disciplines that give 
expert testimony. 6
Within both the legal and psychological communities, there is disagreement about the 
appropriateness of expert evidence on eyewitness identification. Some psychologists have 
expressed the feeling that giving evidence in an area where there is little certainty and where 
experimental results are not easily applied to real cases is detrimental to psychology's 
reputation as a scientific discipline. 77 Others argue that the experimental results have much
74 [1986] Crim.L.R. 395.
75 [1992] 1 NZLR 141, per Cooke P at 146 (NZCA).
76 Well, G.L., "A reanalysis of the expert testimony issue", in G.L. Wells and E.F. Loftus 
Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (1984 New York: Cambridge University Press), at 
314.
77 McKenna, J., Treadway, M, and McCloskey, M., "Expert psychological testimony on eyewitness 
reliability: Selling psychology before its time", in Suedfeld and Tetlock Psychology and Social Policy 
(1992, New York: Hemisphere), 283-293; McCloskey, M., and Egeth, H., "Eyewitness identification: 
What can a psychologist tell a jury?" (1983) 38 American Psychologist 550; Konecni, V., and Ebbesen, 
E., "Courtroom testimony by psychologists on eyewitness identification issues: Critical notes and 
reflections" (1986) 10 Law and Human Behavior 117.
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to offer jurors in their assessment of the case. 78 This section examines the main bar to 
expert evidence on eyewitness identification: the common knowledge rule, and questions 
whether psychologists are able to give evidence which is substantially useful to the jury. As 
identification cases are subject to the Turnbull 79 judicial warning, the usefulness of expert 
evidence in furthering the integrity principle by offering protection to the accused may be 
reduced. Jurors are, by virtue of the Turnbull warning, alerted to the dangers of accepting 
eyewitness evidence. This section concludes with an assessment of the role expert 
witnesses could play in individual cases and in the formulation of policy on identification 
procedures.
(i) Ultimate Issue and Common Knowledge
The ultimate issue rule is easily circumvented: expert evidence in eyewitness identification 
cases would focus on the factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, with evidence tailored to fit 
the facts of the case. However, expert witnesses would not assess the evidence of 
individual eyewitnesses and give a conclusion on their reliability . For example, the expert 
could comment on the effect of stress, weapon focus or cross-race identification, but could 
not than say, "Witness X is white and the offender was black, therefore she is likely to be 
inaccurate". Although the distinction is fine, in this way experts would avoid the ultimate 
issue rule and would leave jurors to draw their own conclusions.
Although we rely on our memory to recognise people and objects every day, a number of 
studies have found that common knowledge about the factors which contribute to unreliable 
eyewitness evidence is limited. 80 According to these studies, our intuitive assumptions
78 Most notably Elizabeth Loftus. See also Holdenson (1988), op.cit; and Leippe, M. "The case for 
expert testimony about eyewitness memory" (1995) 1 Psychology. Law and Public Policv 909
79 [1976] 3 All E.R. 549
80 For example, see Noon, E., and Hollin, C., "Lay knowledge of eyewitness behaviour: A British 
survey" (1987) 1 Applied Cognitive Psychology' 143, who found that knowledge was not related to age, and 
that previous experience as an eyewitness was not related to knowledge of eyewitness behaviour; 
Deffenbacher, K., and Loftus, E., "Do jurors share a common understanding concerning eyewitness
280
about eyewitness identification are often different from psychological research findings. 
For example, Yarmey and Tresillion Jones81 found that people did not know that 
eyewitnesses had a tendency to over-estimate the length of time they had to view the 
offender, or why identification from photographs may compromise a later live 
identification. The main justification offered for expert evidence in eyewitness identification 
cases is that jurors are too accepting of eyewitness evidence and cannot tell accurate and 
inaccurate eyewitnesses apart, because they are unaware of what factors may affect 
identification accuracy. 82 For example, Brigham and Bothwell, after questioning 100 
people picked at random from the telephone directory about eyewitness identification 
issues, concluded that: 83
"Not only do jury members overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications.. .they also appear unaware, to some extent, of the sources of 
error associated with this type of evidence."
On this view, expert evidence would offer information which is outside the common 
knowledge and would substantially aid the jury in assessing which factors are likely to 
produce inaccurate identifications.
The courts in some US states have accepted expert evidence on the basis of these
behavior?" (1982) 6 Law and Human Behavior 15; McConkey, K., and Roche, S., "Knowledge of 
eyewitness memory" (1989) 24 Australian Psychologist 377; Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., and Stuve, T.E., 
"Juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases" (1988) 12 Law and Human Behavioral; and 
Cutler, B.L., and Penrod, S.D., "Lay knowledge about sources of eyewitness reliability" ; "The ability of 
jurors to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses"; and "Jury sensitivity to factors that 
influence eyewitness reliability" in B.L. Cutler and S.D. Penrod Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, 
Psychology and the Law (1995: Cambridge University Press), 171- 209.
81 Yarmey, A., and Tresillian Jones, H., "Is the study of eyewitness identification a matter of 
common sense?" in S. Lloyd-Bostock and B. R. Clifford (eds.) Evaluating Witness Evidence (1983, 
London: Wiley), 13.
82 Examples of this are Loftus, E., Eyewitness Testimony (1979, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press), 197; Loftus, E., and Monaghan, J., "Trial by data: Pyschological research as legal evidence" (1980)
35 American Psychologist 270; and Lindsay, R.C.L., Wells, G.L., and Rumpel, C.M., "Can people detect
eyewitness identification accuracy within and across situations?" (1981) 66 Journal of Applied Psychology
79.
8J Brigham, J.C., and Bothwell, R.K., "The ability of prospective jurors to estimate the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications" (1983) 7 Law and Human Behavior 19, 29.
84 See, for example, the famous case of State v Chappie 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208, where the
Arizona Supreme Court ruled that expert evidence on eyewitness identification should have been allowed in
that case. This was closely followed by the California!! decision in People v MacDonald 37 Cal. 3d 351,
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arguments. However, Commonwealth courts have been reluctant to admit expert evidence 
on eyewitness identification issues, on the basis that the subject matter is within the 
common knowledge of the jury, and that any help the jury might need is contained in a 
judicial warning. Whilst there has been no ruling on the matter in England and Wales, the 
Australian case of R v Smith 85 offers an indication of what the approach of the English 
courts could be. The accused in Smith was on trial for murder and the central issue was 
that of identification. In response to an application to allow expert evidence on factors 
which may make eyewitness identification inaccurate, Vincent J. held that: 86
"A sophisticated analysis of the process of human recall of information may 
involve reference to a range of scientific and social scientific disciplines 
about which most members of the community must be anticipated to possess 
little, if any, knowledge. What is centrally important in dealing with 
practical problems, however... is whether reliance may be placed upon such 
statements of recollection of visual observation, conversation, or 
identification of persons or objects. Generally speaking, adult human beings 
may be said to possess considerable practical experience as a function of 
ordinary day to day activity within the community in making assessments of 
this type."
In excluding the expert evidence on the basis that it was within the common knowledge of 
jurors, 87 the Vincent J. stated that both U.S. and English case law suggested that such 
evidence should not be admitted. 88 It is likely that, should the question of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification arise in most other Commonwealth countries, the result would 
be the same as in R v Smith.
690 P.2d 709. But see also State v Galloway 275 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1979), where the court used the 
common knowledge rule to exclude expert testimony, because "jurors daily experience the fragility of their 
own memories", per Reynoldson, C.J., at 741, and United States v Amaral 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
85 [1987JVR907
86 Ibid, at 909.
87 This was upheld on appeal, where the Hampel J. stated that the evidence was on matters "within 
the range of human experience": R v Mark Anthony Smith (Unreported) Victorian Court of Criminal 
Appeal, 11 December 1987).
88 The judge relied upon R v Turner [1975] Q.B. 834 and a number of US decisions to state that, not 
only was the evidence within the common knowledge of the jury, but that to admit it may confuse the jury 
and simply make their task harder. Unfortunately, Vincent J. did not appear to be aware of the numerous 
lower court (and, with one exception, some Supreme Court) US cases where expert evidence on eyewitness 
testimony had been admitted. The judge also drew no analogy to the cases of voice identification where 
expert evidence on voice identification had been admitted: R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 and R v 
McHardie and Danielson [1983] 2 NSWLR 733. For a criticism of the judgement, see Holdenson, O.P, 
(1988) op.cit., at 543-4.
282
The view of the court in Smith has been criticised for its assumption that because 
something is a normal everyday process, then it is something which people understand. 
Certainly, there is an abundance of psychological studies suggesting that aspects of 
eyewitness identification are not understood, although not all psychologists adhere to the 
view that jurors need help to appreciate the problems of eyewitness evidence. Some also 
doubt that psychologists can offer any guidance that is needed. For example, Lindsay, 
whilst agreeing that mock jurors did not have a high level of knowledge about eyewitness 
identification issues, also found that "expert testimony did not help (and possibly hurt)"90 
when reviewing a number of psychological studies.
Egeth and McCloskey are amongst the strongest opponents of the use of expert evidence on 
eyewitness identification. 91 They state that: 92
"there appears... to be no reason to assume a priori that people are unaware 
of the problems with eyewitness testimony. Cases of misidentification are 
often widely publicized... and wrongful conviction on the basis of mistaken 
or perjured eyewitness testimony is a rather common theme in fiction."
Even if jurors' knowledge about the unreliability of eyewitness identification is poor, 
expert evidence may not offer much more than one psychologist's interpretation of limited 
data. The experimental method, designed to isolate individual factors for examination,
89 Sheldon, D.H., and MacLeod, M.D., "From normative to positive data: expert psychological 
evidence re-examined" [ 1991 ] Criminal Law Review 811,817.
90 Lindsay, R.C.L., "Expectations of eyewitness performance: Jurors' verdicts do not follow from 
their beliefs" in D.F.Ross, J.D. Read, and M.P. Toglia Adult Eyewitness Testimony: Current Trends and 
Developments (1994: Cambridge University Press), 362, at p.378.
91 Egeth has since tempered this view and is more satisfied with the quality and quantity of 
eyewitness research in the 1990s: Egeth, H.E. "What do we not know about eyewitness identification" 
(1993) 48 American Psychologist 577. However, others remain sceptical: Lindsay, op.cit., and Elliott, R., 
"Expert testimony about eyewitness identification : A critique" (1993) 17 Law and Human Behavior 423. 
92 Egeth, H., and McCloskey, M., "Expert testimony about eyewitness behavior: Is it safe and 
effective?" in G.L. Wells and E.F. Loftus Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (1984: 
Cambridge University Press), 283. See also McCloskey, M., and Egeth, H. (1983), op.cit.; and Konecni, 
V.J., and Ebbesen, E.B., "Courtroom testimony by psychologists on eyewitness identification issues: 
Critical notes and reflections" (1986) 10 Law and Human Behavior 39.
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offers limited information in complex criminal cases.93 Psychologists can say that, in 
laboratory or field experiments, witnesses had a tendency to experience weapon focus, but 
cannot say for certain that it would affect all witnesses, or even most witnesses in all 
circumstances. In other words, an expert witness would offer a slice of knowledge which 
may or may not apply to the case being heard in court. Because of the lack of realism in 
many psychological experiments, the research can only tell us what happens in 
experimental conditions. The reliability of eyewitnesses could well be affected by weapon 
focus, violence and own race bias, but psychologists cannot tell us which witnesses will be 
affected in which circumstances. As Friedman states in relation to psychological expert 
evidence in general, expert witnesses offer "propositions about marginal behaviour. They 
do not pretend to tell us how a certain Mr Jones or Mrs Smith will act". 94 Moreover, 
psychologists will be reluctant to present their findings as facts, but rather acknowledge 
that human behaviour allows for few certainties, as Haward explains: 95
"The fact that a hundred people found it impossible to see X in conditions Y 
does not prove that it was impossible for police constable Z. It may be 
highly improbable, but the impossibility of a scientific event is beyond 
scientific proof... when the forensic psychologist is asked 'Could this 
policeman possibly have done it?', he, as a scientist, has to reply, 'Yes, it is 
possible', however unlikely the event."
It could be argued that all scientific expert evidence suffers from a lack of legal certainty 
because of the requirements of science and the experimental method, which isolates 
individual factors and works on notions of probability. To reject expert evidence simply on 
the basis that science cannot offer the law a definite answer to its questions would be to 
reject almost all scientific evidence, some of which will be helpful to the jury in reaching 
their decision. The distinction made between the natural and behavioural sciences is rather 
unfair in this regard: natural sciences are seen to offer certainty, whereas behavioural
93 This point is discussed in grester detail in chapter 2. See King, M, Psychology In and Out of 
Court (1986 London: Pergamon) for a detailed and forceful argument against the use of the experimental 
method, and psychology's usefulness in a legal setting.
Friedman, L.M., The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (1975 New York: Sage), at 
p.73.
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sciences are perceived to offer mere propositions and theories. Expert evidence on scientific 
techniques such as DNA profiling have been welcomed with open arms. Its proponents 
claim for it all those characteristics thought to be most desirable about the scientific method. 
It is, they claim, an objective, neutral, and virtually 100% reliable method of identification. 
The court accepted DNA evidence in criminal cases without hesitation. Expert witnesses 
produced statistics showing that there was only 1 chance in millions or even billions that 
they had identified the wrong person. Not until the evidence had been used to convict 
hundreds of people worldwide were questions raised about its reliability. It is only now 
that successful challenges to the evidence are being made, and the realisation that the 
evidence is based upon probability is being accepted.
Egeth and McCloskey argue that expert testimony on eyewitness identification would not 
be of help to a jury because what is outside the scope of common knowledge has either 
been poorly documented or has not reached a sufficient standard of 'general acceptance' 
within the field of eyewitness research.96 Yarmey and Jones, whilst concluding that many 
eyewitness identification issues are outside the scope of common knowledge, admit that 
their results also "reflect a major problem of research in this area - that is, experts may 
disagree on what is actually the correct answer".97 In fact, the 'experts' consulted in their 
study had less than 70 per cent agreement on almost half of the questions posed, 
suggesting that many issues in eyewitness identification research, such as the effect of long 
and short retention intervals and the effect of age and gender, have not reached a standard 
of general acceptance in the field. Whilst there is debate in the areas experts could be asked 
to testify on, it could be difficult to assess whether common sense assumptions are 
incorrect and whether their evidence could be helpful to the jury.
95 Haward, L., "The psychologist as expert witness", in D. F:arrington, K. Hawkins, and S. Lloyd- 
Bostock, Psychology, Law and Legal Processes (1979 London: Macmillan), 44-53, at p.48.
96 Egeth, H., and McCloskey, M., (1984), op.cit., 295-298.
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One example of a 'poorly documented' issue is the effect of stress on eyewitness accuracy. 
Some experimental research has found that there is an adverse effect on eyewitness 
accuracy in stressful situations, whereas others have reported an increase in accuracy. 
There is a good level of acceptance amongst psychologists of Deffenbacher's theory that 
stress fits the Yerkes-Dodson inverted U shaped curve, so that low levels of stress can 
increase accuracy, but that high levels can decrease it. 98 However, it is unclear where 
criminal offences would fit on the curve. For example, how violent does an offence have to 
be before it detrimentally affects eyewitness accuracy? And how does the individual 
fortitude of witnesses affect the theory? There is a paucity of experimental research 
explaining exactly what the effect of stress is; how much stress is needed to adversely 
affect the likelihood that an eyewitness would be accurate; and how the effects of stress 
interact with other variables such as cross racial identification. This one example raises 
valid questions about how helpful expert witnesses on eyewitness identification could be to 
a jury, although the court in the Californian case of People v MacDonald observed that: "
"it appears that the principal complaint of Egeth and McCloskey is.. .that it is 
too soon to admit [expert testimony on eyewitness identification]...this is a 
frequent conclusion of academic authors.. .Appellate judges do not have the 
luxury of waiting until their colleagues in the sciences unanimously agree 
that on a particular issue no more research is necessary. Given the nature of 
scientific endeavour, that day may never come."
Although the court ultimately has to make the decision as to whether the evidence will be 
reliable and is within the field of expertise, allowing one expert's view of an area where 
research findings are subject to debate could dangerously skew the evidence in favour of 
one party. 100 Allowing experts to speak for both sides could result in a 'battle of the
Yarmey, A., and Jones, H., op.cit., 37.
98 See the discussion in chapter 2 of this thesis and Deffenbacher, K., "The influence of arousal on 
reliability of testimony", in B.R. Clifford and S. Lloyd-Bostock op.cit.,(1983).
99 (1984) op.cit., at 369.
100 For a review of US case law and an argument that expert testimony did mislead judges in some 
cases, see McKenna, J., Treadway, M., and McCloskey, M., op.cit. The authors respond (at p.291) to the 
court's comment in People v MacDonald by stating that
"[W]e are not suggesting that all the i's must be dotted and the t's must be crossed before 
psychologists should agree to testify as experts. Rather, our contention is that the field of
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experts', with confusion rather than enlightenment of the jury being the outcome. 
Therefore, even if we do conclude that eyewitness identification issues are outside the 
scope of common knowledge, it does not necessarily follow that expert evidence is the best 
method to impart information about the dangers of eyewitness identification. The lack of 
consensus and information in some areas of eyewitness research will reduce the level of 
assistance an expert witness could give, and what is within common knowledge is unlikely 
to be significantly enhanced.
(ii) Would an Expert Witness Help Jurors to Assess the Reliability of Eyewitness 
Evidence?
The general unreliability of memory is beyond doubt, but many mistaken identifications 
will not get as far as a trial in court: in making prosecutorial decisions, the police and the 
Crown Prosecution Service will assess the reliability of an eyewitness identification, 
whether the supporting evidence is sufficient, and whether any alibi evidence has been 
disclosed. The Turnbull warning to the jury, the discretion to exclude eyewitness evidence 
and cross-examination of eyewitnesses are all mechanisms used by the criminal process in 
an attempt to ensure that eyewitness evidence is accepted only where it is reliable. This 
thesis has shown that the protections in place have shortcomings, and celebrated cases also 
suggest that those mechanisms do not work in every case, although the real occurrence of 
wrongful conviction as a result of mistaken identification is unknown. This section 
examines whether expert evidence would prove to be of help to the jury in distinguishing 
between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses.
eyewitness psychology is nowhere near the point of needing only to dot the i's and cross 
the t's"
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The Use of Cross-examination and the Requirement for Supporting Evidence 
Cross-examination can alert jurors to factors which may reduce eyewitness accuracy in 
each individual case. For example, counsel could question witnesses about lighting, 
retention interval, the amount of time they had to view the offender, and so on. This could 
inform jurors of factors affecting reliability where they are outside the common knowledge, 
or draw jurors' attention to issues within the common knowledge which they may not have 
recognised on their own. However, cross-examination can only inform jurors on issues 
counsel are educated about. Lawyers have not been found to be much more knowledgeable 
about eyewitness identification than jurors themselves. 101 A study by Lindsay et.al. 102 also 
found that cross-examination, even where counsel were very skilled and experienced, 
failed to discredit inaccurate eyewitness identification. This was illustrated by the fact that 
mock jurors were just as likely to believe inaccurate eyewitnesses as they were accurate 
eyewitnesses, whether cross-examination was performed by experienced or inexperienced 
counsel. The results could be due to the nature of cross-examination: issues affecting the 
reliability of eyewitness identification could be raised in cross-examination, but there is 
little scope for counsel to fully explain the relevancy or effect of those issues.
Whilst there is no strict corroboration requirement for eyewitness evidence, cases will often 
be withdrawn from the jury when they are based on identification evidence alone. Many 
studies proceed on the basis that eyewitness evidence is dangerous where it is the only 
evidence in the case, 103 as did the Committee of Inquiry into the case of Adolf Beck, which 
concluded that eyewitness identification evidence is an unsafe and insufficient basis for 
conviction unless it is supported by other facts. 104 It is therefore logical to assume that,
101 See, for example, Brigham, J.C., and Wolfskiel, M.P., "Opinions of attorneys and law 
enforcement personnel on the accuracy of eyewitness identification" (1983) 7 Law and Human Behavior 
337.
102 Lindsay, R.C.L., Wells, G.L. and O'Connor, F.J., "Mock-juror belief of accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses: A replication and extension" (1989) 13 Law and Human Behavior 333.
103 Lindsay, Wells and O'Connor are an example: ibid.
104 Cmnd. 2315, vii, 250.
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when coupled with a judicial direction to the jury, supporting evidence could considerably 
reduce the risk of wrongful conviction based on mistaken identification, because cases 
where the sole evidence is that of identification will be withdrawn from the jury. 
However, the success of the requirement of supporting evidence will largely depend on 
judicial awareness of issues affecting the accuracy of eyewitness identification. This is 
because in deciding whether the case can proceed, the judge will consider whether the 
circumstances of the original offence were "good". The assessment will undoubtedly cover 
visibility and the duration of the offence, but may include little else. The Turnbull warning 
itself may offer further protection to the jury in the cases where the judge allows a case 
based on eyewitness evidence alone to proceed, or where there is supporting evidence but 
the identification evidence is weak.
The Sufficiency of the Turnbull Warning 
The Supreme Court of Victoria, in excluding expert evidence on eyewitness identification 
in R v Smith stated that a judicial direction offered jurors enough warning about the 
dangers of mistaken identification: 106
"It is doubtful in the extreme that expert evidence concerned with eyewitness 
identification generally will assist a jury in determining whether or not it 
would be safe to act upon the evidence of any particular eyewitness to any 
substantially greater extent than that which could be achieved by a full and 
accurate instruction by a trial judge."
Where common knowledge about eyewitness identification is lacking, the Turnbull 
warning to the jury should make jurors aware that eyewitnesses are often mistaken. 
Psychologists may argue that the warning is not detailed enough: there is no requirement 
that a particular set of words are used, and the judicial direction suggested in R v
105 Gross offers an interesting argument that although there is an attempt to filter out unreliable 
eyewitnesses before a case reaches court and then by normal evidential rules, exoneration of an innocent 
suspect can be largely a matter of luck. He sees the original reason for suspicion as important: where the 
police suspect someone on the basis of appearance, there can be little else lying them to the offence: Gross, 
S., "Loss of innocence: Eyewitness identification and proof of guilt" (1987) \6 Journal of Legal Studies 
395. On suspect driven searches, see Wagenaar, W., van Koppen, P., and Crombag, H., Anchored 
Narratives (1993 Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf), 84-88.
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Turnbull]Q1 outlines a limited set of issues to consider. Although these include the duration 
of the offence, the distance between the witness and the offender, the visibility at the time 
of the offence, and the retention interval between the offence and the identification, an 
expert witness would present evidence on issues such as stress and confidence as well.
Advocates of expert evidence could argue that the Turnbull direction, although alerting 
jurors to the fact that honest witnesses may nevertheless be mistaken, is less persuasive 
than expert evidence from a psychologist. Firstly, the direction is given as part of the 
judge's summing-up, and so comes at the conclusion of the case. This may result in the 
jury paying it less attention than evidence within the body of a case, because it would be 
given with many other pieces of information and at a point where individual jurors may 
already have decided their view on the credibility and reliability of witnesses. 108 Second, 
the success of the direction is dependent, to some degree at least, on the attitude 
accompanying its delivery: some judges may accord the warning more importance than 
others. Expert witnesses would at least deliver their evidence with conviction.
However, there is little evidence that these potential drawbacks create unfairness in 
eyewitness identification cases. Each criticism can be refuted because of the lack of solid 
evidence. For example, the abundance of case law on the Turnbull direction 109 illustrates 
the seriousness accorded to it: in all cases where identification is an issue, there should be a 
Turnbull direction to the jury; and although the issues discussed in the judgment in
106 Op.cit., at 910.
107 [1976] 3 All ER 549
108 Katzev, R.D., and Wishart, S.S. "The impact of judicial commentary concerning eyewitness
identifications on jury decision-making" (1985) 76 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminolog\> 733,
735. See also Woocher, F.D., "Did you eyes deceive you? Expert psychological testimony on the
unreliability of eyewitness identification" (1977) 29 Stanford Law Review 969.
109 See chapter seven for a more detailed discussion of the Turnbull warning and its application by the
courts.
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Turnbull itself are of limited scope, 110 judges can tailor the direction to the facts of the case 
(provided they are aware of eyewitness identification research). The argument that giving a 
direction within a summing-up diminishes the force of the warning could be countered by 
the fact that the judge is seen by jurors to be an authoritative and impartial figure. A 
warning given by the judge at any stage may therefore be more influential than the evidence 
of an expert witness.
Greene112 undertook a study of the Telfaire instruction, a more limited U.S. equivalent of 
the Turnbull direction, 113 by showing mock-jurors video-tapes of a reenacted trial and 
giving half of them a cautionary instruction. She found that, on the basis of questionnaire 
responses given after deliberations, jurors who received the cautionary instruction were no 
better informed about the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness evidence than were 
the jurors who received no cautionary instruction. However, when Greene revised the 
instruction to include more detail on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, the jurors 
receiving it were more aware of those factors than were the jurors who received the original 
instruction, or no instruction at all. 114 Similar results were gained in Katzev and Wishart's 
experiment, 115 where three different methods of delivering the judicial warning were used: 
in the first condition, the judge delivered a basic instruction; in the second, a summary of
110 For an argument that judges are not equipped to give psychological information on eyewitness 
issues to the jury, see Holdenson (1988), op.cit., 528.
111 As noted by Young, W., Cameron, N., and Tinsley, Y., Juries in Criminal Trials Part Two: A 
Summary of Research Findings (New Zealand Law Commission PP38, Wellington, 1999). The study 
found that, although jurors may have difficulty in comprehending legal instructions, this was often due to 
the manner in which it was delivered as opposed to lack of competence. The finding accords with the New 
South Wales Law reform Commission, who recommend that standard form judicial instructions are used in 
order to aid comprehension: The Jury in a Criminal Trial (1986 No.48) para. 6.30. Despite deploring the 
paucity of available research, the Law Commission in England and Wales also concluded that jurors should 
be able to comprehend judicial warnings, in Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics 
(Report 245), at paras. 3.21, 3.22 and 3.37.
Greene, E., "Eyewitness testimony and the use of cautionary instructions" (1987) 8 University of 
Bridgeport Law Review (Symposium on Eyewitness Identification Testimony) 15. See also Greene, E., 
"Judge's instruction on eyewitness testimony: Evaluation and revision" (1988) 18 Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology 252. 
113 United States v Telfaire 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir 1972)
11J Although the awareness may have been accompanied by some defence-bias: Greene, op.cit., 19. 
1IS Katzev and Wishart (1985), op.cit.
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identification issues was added to the instruction; and in the third commentary on 
psychological findings was included. Fewer predeliberation guilty verdicts and shorter 
deliberation times resulted from the inclusion of both the summary and the commentary, 
meaning that jurors were less likely to believe eyewitness evidence. 116 From experiments 
conducted to date, it is unclear whether jurors are simply made more sceptical about 
eyewitness evidence generally, or whether they are helped in their assessment of 
eyewitness reliability. Although more research is required to determine whether a judicial 
instruction can help witnesses to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses, 
studies suggest that the use of a cautionary instruction can be effective in conveying 
information on the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification, provided that 
it contains full and relevant information. As seen in chapter seven, the problem for the 
criminal justice process is that the current warning does not always contain full 
information, and there is little judicial education to enable a more consistent and informed 
approach at the present time. Until that happens, the integrity of the process and the 
protection offered to the accused are under threat of compromise.
(c) The Effect of Expert Evidence on Jury Decision-Making
The impact of expert evidence on any issue will vary according to the strength of other 
evidence in the case, the demeanour of the expert witness, and the individual beliefs of 
jurors. Nevertheless, a number of psychological studies have made some assessment of the 
effect of expert evidence on juror decision-making. In her 1980 study, Loftus 117 found that
116 Unfortunately, the research did not show whether the scepticism was accompanied by greater 
knowledge about identification issues, or if it simply meant that jurors were less likely to accept any 
eyewitness evidence, regardless of witnessing or identification issues. However, Cutler, Dexter and Penrod 
found that a cautionary instruction has little effect on juror sensitivity and knowledge about identification 
issues: Cutler, B.L., Dexter, H.R., and Penrod, S.D., "Nonadversarial methods for improving juror 
sensitivity to eyewitness evidence" (1990) 20 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1197.
117 Loftus, E.F., "Impact of expert psychological testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification" (1980) 65 Journal of Applied Psychology 9. A number of other studies found that expert 
evidence had an effect on verdict and deliberation time: see, for example, Weinberg, H.I., and Baron, R.S., 
"The discredible eyewitness" (1982) 8 Personality and Social Psychology* Bulletin 60. For more cautious 
conclusions, see Saunders, D.M., Vidmar, N., and Hcwitt, E.C., "Eyewitness testimony and the
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mock jurors who received expert evidence spent longer in deliberations and were more 
likely to give a not guilty verdict than mock jurors who had not been given expert evidence. 
The results must be approached with caution because the study gave the mock-jurors a 
written summary of evidence, which limits its applicability to real court cases where the 
evidence is usually presented orally.
Wells et.al. 118 presented video-taped evidence to their mock jurors and also found that 
those who had seen the expert evidence were less likely to believe the eyewitness. This 
offers a better indication of the effect of expert evidence on jurors than does the written 
evidence in the Loftus experiment, because video-taped evidence allows mock-jurors to 
assess the demeanour of witnesses as well as the content of their testimony. However, the 
evidence was seen in isolation rather than mock-jurors being presented with a video-tape of 
a complete trial, so that they were not asked to decide on the eyewitness evidence in light of 
all other evidence in a trial. It can therefore tell us what may happen where the only 
evidence in a case is that of an eyewitness, but not about the effects of expert evidence in 
more complex cases. As most real cases are more complex, the study is limited in its 
applicability, and is illustrative of the confines of the experimental method, a point 
highlighted by Egeth and McCloskey in their arguments against the use of expert evidence 
in eyewitness identification cases: ' l9
"As with all simulations of jury decision making, problems of external 
validity make it difficult to extrapolate the results of these studies to the 
verdicts of real juries."
The study shows that, in common with judicial warnings, expert testimony may increase 
juror scepticism about the accuracy of eyewitness evidence generally. However, the study 
offered no indication that it helps jurors to decide which eyewitnesses are accurate and
discrediting effect" in S.M.A. Lloyd-Bostock and B.R. Clifford Evaluating Witness Evidence (1983: John
Wiley), 57.
118 Wells, G.L., Lindsay, R.C.L., and Tousignant, J.P., "Effects of expert psychological advice on
human performance in judging the validity of eyewitness testimony11 (1980) 4 Law and Human Behavior
275.
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which are mistaken.
One of the few studies which found that jurors' knowledge about identification issues is 
improved by the inclusion of expert evidence is that by Cutler, Dexter and Penrod, who 
used a video-taped presentation of opening statements, the evidence of four witnesses, the 
evidence of an expert witness in some cases, closing addresses and the judge's summing- 
up. This was therefore the most realistic of the studies, and although the evidence was not 
live, it did include character evidence and the evidence of the defendant himself. Jurors 
who heard expert evidence gave less weight to witness confidence and more weight to 
identification issues such as stress and violence than those who had not heard expert 
evidence. However, in an earlier study where a whole video-taped trial was also used, it 
was found that expert evidence produced less spectacular results than in other studies: all 
juries acquitted the defendant and had comparable views on the credibility of the individual 
eyewitness in the case, although those who saw the expert evidence did not think 
eyewitness identification in general was as accurate or reliable as those who saw no expert 
evidence. 121
The studies on expert evidence suggest that it does make a difference to jury deliberations, 
by increasing the likelihood that jurors will question the reliability of eyewitness evidence. 
However, the studies are limited in their applicability to real trials, and even if the results 
are accepted at face value it is unclear whether expert evidence will enhance juror decision- 
making or simply make the task more complex. Longer deliberation periods and fewer 
guilty verdicts do not necessarily mean that expert evidence is a useful tool to employ in 
criminal trials. In fact, the results of studies such as that conducted by Loftus could be
m Egeth and McCloskey, (1984), op.cit., 293.
1:0 Cutler, B.L., Dexter, H.R., and Penrod, S.D., "Expert testimony and juror decision making: An
empirical analysis" (1989) 7 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 215.
121 Hosch, H.M., Beck, E.L., and Mclntyre, P., "Influence of expert testimony regarding eyewitness
accuracy on jury decisions" (1980) 4 Law and Human Behavior 287, 294.
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interpreted to mean that expert evidence may confuse jurors, distract them from other 
issues, or be given disproportionate weight from other evidence. It appears that expert 
evidence, rather than making jurors question which eyewitnesses may be mistaken in what 
circumstances, could simply increase their scepticism about eyewitness identification 
generally. Fewer convictions are only useful where the accused is in fact innocent. It is 
therefore questionable whether the finding that mock-jurors spend more time thinking about 
eyewitness evidence and are less likely to convict when an expert testifies is an argument in 
favour of admitting expert evidence in eyewitness identification cases. 122 Indeed, Lindsay, 
in reviewing eleven experiments he had been involved in, and after commenting that expert 
testimony not only failed to help but possibly hurt, went on to conclude that: 123
"the best way to reduce the tragedy of wrongful convictions based on 
eyewitness errors is to prevent those errors from occurring. Once the case is 
before the courts, it is probably too late!"
Whilst psychological research indicates that common knowledge on eyewitness 
identification issues is limited, the studies do not show that jurors will be helped to 
discriminate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses should expert evidence be 
admitted. Indeed, expert evidence would seem to add little to juror knowledge: studies are 
unclear whether both the Turnbull warning and expert evidence increase integration of 
knowledge about accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses or whether they simply make jurors 
less likely to believe eyewitness evidence generally, regardless of its reliability. There may 
come a time where research shows more conclusively that expert evidence is helpful to the 
jury, but experiments to date reveal only that jurors are made more sceptical when an expert 
testifies. This is no advance on the effect of a judicial direction to the jury, so to admit 
expert evidence may serve to confuse, not aid, jurors in their deliberations.
m Loftus also cites a real court case, where two brothers were tried together, but with different juries. 
One brother called expert evidence on the eyewitness identifiation evidence, and the other brother's jury 
stayed in the jury room while the evidence was given. The brother who called expert evidence was acquitted, 
whilst the other was convicted. Loftus claims that, apart from the expert evidence, evidence in the case was 
"virtually identical": Loftus, E.F., "Expert testimony on the eyewitness" in G.L. Wells and E.F. Loftus 
Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (1984: Cambridge), 281. 
123 Lindsay, R.C.L., (1994) op.cit., 382.
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The Turnbull warning is a cheaper and less time consuming method of imparting 
information to the jury than expert evidence, and it appears to offer the accused some 
protection from unreliable evidence. When combined with the need for supporting 
evidence, the discretion to exclude unreliable evidence and the use of cross-examination, 
evidence gained where there were poor identifying circumstances or irregular procedures 
will be excluded or challenged. Where the procedures were routine and the identification 
was made in good witnessing conditions, then expert evidence would be able to do little 
more than offer general warnings about the low reliability of memory for faces, something 
which the Turnbull warning can already do. One proviso should be added to this 
recommendation: the success of the combination of cross-examination, discretion and the 
Turnbull direction relies on judicial education about the issues affecting eyewitness 
accuracy. The current range of issues commonly covered by the Turnbull warning should 
be expanded and regularly updated to ensure that adequate protection from mistaken 
identification is given to the accused.
Conclusion: Alternative Uses of Psychological Knowledge
Although expert evidence on eyewitness identification should not be admissible, 
psychologists offer valuable insights into memory processes, and could educate police, 
lawyers and judges about the factors affecting eyewitness accuracy. For example, 
psychologists could have input into police procedures used to gather eyewitness evidence. 
The research on system variables would be especially useful in reform of Code of Practice 
D, especially because experiments conducted on procedural matters suffer less from the 
drawbacks of the experimental method. This is because they are able to be manipulated by 
people, whereas estimator variables such as stress and cross-race identification are not. 
Psychologists can also offer help to Royal Commissions, Committees of Inquiry and
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advise on governmental policy generally. 124 In the area of eyewitness research, 
psychologists have had input into the Devlin Committee Report, which in turn influenced 
police practice and the manner in which the warning to the jury was delivered by judges.
As well as policy reform, experts in eyewitness identification could offer education to both 
judges and lawyers. The number of cases where a Turnbull warning is appropriate but is 
not used illustrates the need for judicial education on mistaken identification. 125 Judges 
should be informed about current issues in eyewitness identification research when 
exercising their discretion to exclude eyewitness evidence which has been obtained 
unfairly, or when deciding whether to withdraw a case from the jury because of a lack of 
supporting evidence. Particularly important is knowledge about what factors should be 
highlighted to the jury when they are given the Turnbull warning. If we are to rely upon 
the mechanisms of exclusion and judicial direction to protect defendants from mistaken 
identification evidence, then judges should have regular, ongoing training about the factors 
affecting identification accuracy. In delivering the education, psychologists should take care 
to inform judges about issues which are still the subject of debate in the field.
By educating lawyers, psychologists could improve cross-examination of eyewitnesses. 
This could take the form of general education seminars, or could be tailored to particular 
cases, with psychologists delivering a report to defence lawyers outlining the potential 
areas of unreliability. Counsel could then draw upon the report when deciding on what 
approach to take and which issue to highlight during cross-examination. As Lloyd-Bostock
124 Kohnken, Wolpass and Wogalter advocate for this approach: Kohnken, G., Malpass, R.S., 
Wolgalter, M.S., "Forensic applications of lineup research" in S.L. Sporer, R.S. Malpass and G.Kohnken 
Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identification (1996: Lawrence Erlbaum), 204.
125 See Zander, M., and Henderson, P., Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Crown Court Study 
Research Study No. 19 (1993 London:HMSO), 93, where it was reported that judges gave a Turnbull 
warning in just over half of all cases where the eyewitness evidence was an important or fairly important 
part of the case.
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has stated: 126
"Psychology often cannot provide a clear 'scientific' solution to a practical 
legal problem. But it can very often make other, less ambitious and more 
legitimate contributions to law in practice."
As illustrated in this chapter, psychological experimentation has much to contribute to the 
furtherance of the protective principle in eyewitness identification cases. The potential is 
largely untapped and could be utilised easily. By educating parties involved in the practice 
of law, psychologists would be making a significant contribution to upholding the integrity 
of the criminal justice process.
126 Lloyd-Bostock, S.M.A., Law in Practice (1988: The British Psychological Society and 
Routledge), 168.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
IDENTIFICATION PARADES: UPHOLDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS?
Wrongful conviction based on eyewitness misidentification has been a source of concern 
for almost one hundred years. The memory is a fragile instrument, susceptible to fading 
and distortion. It is unknown exactly how the stress of witnessing a criminal offence 
affects memory, but psychological research is clear that memory processes can be damaged 
at the stage of perception, retention or retrieval. While there is nothing the criminal process 
can do about how well an offence is perceived, steps can be taken to limit problems in 
accurately retaining and retrieving information. Indeed, the criminal process has taken some 
of those steps already: witnesses are informed that the person they saw may or may not be 
on the parade; there are provisions to prevent discussion between witnesses; and the 
investigating officer is not allowed to take part in the identification procedure. These steps 
protect the rights of the suspect to a fair identification procedure and a fair trial, by ensuring 
that unnecessary prejudice is eliminated. Even so, the danger in relying on eyewitness 
evidence is considerable, as illustrated by the number of witnesses in the study for this 
thesis who used relative judgment when making a choice. Where the problem is so grave 
and the stakes so high, adequate protection for the suspect should be paramount. It is only 
where the safeguards in place offer adequate protection that the process can be said to be 
truly upholding its integrity.
Procedural and Evidential Safeguards: Furthering the Protective Principle?
This thesis has explored how law, psychology and legal practice can combine to further the 
integrity principle, and has found that more could be done to ensure that all suspects and
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accused persons are given access to consistently applied safeguards which take full 
advantage of the psychological knowledge available. Ashworth, in stating that 
psychological evidence suggests that procedural fairness is more important to many people 
than the outcomes of the procedures, reflects the adage that "fairness should be done and 
should be seen to be done". He goes on to state that:
"Much more important is the principled proposition that fairness forms part 
of the integrity of the system, as well as being supported by the classical 
'rule of law' virtues such as impartiality, equal treatment, and consistent 
application of the rules laid down"
It is therefore of prime importance that identification procedures are fair, are applied 
consistently and (as far as possible) are reliable, because a positive identification influences 
the pre-trial decisions by the police and CPS. As few cases result in contested (Crown 
Court) trials, only a minority of defendants are afforded the protections of Turnbull and 
s.78 PACE, leaving Code D as the only safeguard for the vast majority of defendants.
Code of Practice D could be said to be a model of the protective principle in its insistence 
on identification parades and its detailed procedural guidelines. The studies conducted for 
this thesis found that, in general, Code D is working well within its own limits: it gives a 
high level of protection to the suspect by way of routine procedures, and these are largely 
followed by the specialised staff in the identification suite. However, two main problems 
arise with regard to identification procedures conducted under Code D: firstly, non- 
specialised staff commit breaches of the Code through a lack of training; and secondly, the 
Code itself is based on the mistaken premise that the costly and unwieldy identification 
parade is by far the best method of identification.
The first problem is easily addressed: all staff involved in the conduct of identification 
procedures should be well trained. Preferably officers involved at any stage of the 
procedure should be specialists in eyewitness identification, but regular training of non-
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specialists is the bare minimum. This brings us to the second problem. The traditional 
perception of the identification parade is that it offers a level of reliability beyond that of 
other identification test methods, because it involves the use of a higher number of cues and 
presents the suspect in a live setting. Current psychological research suggests that the 
identification parade actually offers negligible benefits over video or photographs, 
removing the justification for a time-consuming and costly approach to the collection of 
eyewitness evidence. Video technology allows for good quality moving images to be 
placed on a database which could be centrally managed and accessible for the police 
nationwide. Further advances may allow the use of virtual imaging, so that three 
dimensional representations of the suspect and volunteers can be viewed by the witness. 
Safeguards protecting the suspect, such as the right to have a solicitor present at the 
viewing, would mean that there would have to be no attendant derogation from the integrity 
principle.
Indeed, the principle of integrity could be furthered by a move to video identification, by 
reducing delay, postponement and cancellation. The average waiting period for a parade is 
in the region of six weeks. By contrast, video identifications could be arranged within a 
matter of days and volunteers would already be available and organised. Suspects could 
choose from a pool of volunteers on video and confirm that they are satisfied with the final 
parade before it is shown to the witness. The suspect's legal representative would then be 
allowed to view the video with the witness to ensure that fair procedures were observed. 
Where the suspect does not have a friend or legal representative, the procedure could be 
videoed, as recommended by the current Code D Annex B, and shown to the suspect later.
At present, video identification is usually undertaken only where a parade or group 
identification cannot be arranged. There are few facilities available for video identification: 
for example, only a minority of areas have video libraries and these are, for the most part,
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limited to groups who are difficult to arrange an identification parade for, such as 
Rastafarians. Reform to allow greater use of video identification would result in easily 
arranged procedures which take less time and cost less money. As video identification 
would also limit delays, suspects would be protected from prolonged pre-trial decision- 
making and would also be offered more protection from misidentification, because the 
witness's memory will have had less time to fade.
Even where a case is contested, Code D retains its importance because the mechanisms of 
expert evidence and judicial warnings offer dubious protection to innocent defendants. The 
Turnbull warning is not delivered in almost half the cases where it is of relevance 1 and yet, 
in cases where there has been no breach of Code D, it is the only safeguard against the 
acceptance of mistaken identification evidence because "identifications are all too easily 
anchored onto the belief that confident witnesses, or a group of witnesses, cannot be 
mistaken".2 The direction in Turnbull is designed to equip the jury with the knowledge that 
eyewitness identification can be mistaken, regardless of how many witnesses there are or 
how honest the evidence is. The warning should also inform the jury about any 
weaknesses in the eyewitness evidence and bring to their attention any other evidence 
which is capable of supporting it. If judges do not give the direction at all, jurors may 
accept eyewitness identification without reference to the danger involved in doing so. 
Rather than failing to give the direction, judges should be increasing its content in order to 
allow jurors to have full information about the dangers of eyewitness identification. This 
could be tailored to the individual case.
As well as highlighting weaknesses in an identification case, judges have to evaluate the 
quality of unsupported eyewitness evidence in deciding whether a case can safely be left
1 Zander, M., and Henderson, P., Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Crown Court Study 
Research Study No. 19 (1993 London:HMSO), 93.
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before a jury. However, it is unlikely that most judges will have access to regular 
information about psychological research findings on memory. Without psychological 
input, their decisions as to quality will not be fully informed. It is for this reason that 
judicial education is a necessary pre-requisite of giving a fuller Turnbull direction.
The final safeguard against mistaken identification is the power of the judge to exclude 
unfair evidence under s.78 PACE 1984. It has been shown in Chapter 7 that there is no 
consistent approach to the exercise of the s.78 discretion. It is therefore suggested that 
guidelines are given to judges which serve to prioritise protective and disciplinary 
principles without removing the ability to make decisions based on the individual facts of a 
case. These guidelines, in routinely excluding improperly obtained identification evidence 
except where the breach is minor, good faith and lacks prejudice to the defendant's case, 
afford high levels of protection against unreliable eyewitness testimony. It is especially 
important to do so in eyewitness identification cases because of the inherently unreliable 
nature of the evidence.
The current approach under s.78 has an eye to the "balancing" of conviction of the guilty, 
acquittal of the innocent and cost efficiency. Because of this, fairness (and therefore the 
integrity principle) may be compromised, focused as balancing is on ensuring that each 
competing interest is looked to. It is unclear which interest takes priority when the 
balancing process is underway. For this reason, this thesis advocates a principled approach 
to the operation of procedural and evidential safeguards in eyewitness identification cases. 
Under the principled approach, the right of the accused to be protected from wrongful 
conviction as a result of misidentification is paramount. This right should be circumvented 
only in extreme cases, for example where a procedural breach was minor, without malice
Wagenaar, W., Koppen, P., and Crombag, H., Anchored Narratives: The Psychology of Criminal 
Evidence (1993 Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf), 138.
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and does not cause actual unfairness to the defence case. It is only where the principled 
approach is followed that the criminal justice process will have the integrity it seeks in the 
difficult realm of eyewitness identification,
Can Psychology Further the Quest to Uphold the Integrity of the Criminal 
Justice Process?
Psychology has already played an important role in improving the fairness and protection 
present in both pre-trial and trial safeguards for those subject to eyewitness identification. 
It has been shown in this thesis that the law and legal practice has been shaped in part by 
key psychological findings regarding the malleability of memory and the methodology of 
gaining the most reliable evidence possible from eyewitnesses. In short, there is already a 
considerable debt to pay. If the protective principle is to be carried further, there is a need 
for criminal justice professionals to take heed of developments in memory research and act 
on them where appropriate. The interplay between psychology, law and legal practice has 
already shown that psychology can inform both formal procedures and legislation, as with 
Code of Practice D, and can also affect legal practice in less formal ways, such as education 
of legal counsel.
Although it questions the usefulness of psychological expert evidence in eyewitness 
identification cases at the present time, the discussion in this thesis indicates that the law is 
not using psychological knowledge to the best effect. For example, the protection offered 
by Turnbull is dependent for its effectiveness on the ability of the judge to assess the merits 
of the eyewitness evidence in the case. The integrity principle demands that the safeguard is 
used fairly, impartially and fully. Where judges are unable to draw on all of the knowledge 
available, fairness cannot hope to be achieved. Provision of psychological knowledge 
could greatly increase the evidential safeguards in place and in doing so, the process would 
be one step further towards real integrity. The quality and quantity of psychological
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memory research is increasing rapidly, and the law needs to grasp the relationship with 
psychology more enthusiastically as technological advances and rapidly increasing 
knowledge create the challenge for legal practice of keeping pace .
Forward into the Twenty-First Century
This thesis suggests that the principle of integrity can be upheld in eyewitness identification 
cases only if specialised police staff are employed to avoid breaches of Code of Practice D, 
judges are better educated in the importance of giving a full Turnbull warning, and 
guidelines are issued regarding the exercise of discretion under s.78 PACE. Furthermore, 
delays in conducting identification procedures could be minimised by the reform of Code 
D, to allow for video identification as the primary method of identification. The reform 
needs to be accompanied by provision of suitable computer software and training of 
identification suite staff. In increasing the efficiency of the process without decreasing the 
reliability of the identification method, the interests of both suspects and witnesses will be 
promoted.
Although the discussion in this thesis has focused on the live identification parade, the 
future promises some exciting moves forward and some new challenges in the area of 
eyewitness identification. Video libraries are beginning to be utilised further, and there is 
adequate technological provision in many dedicated identification suites for video parades. 
Memory researchers are pushing the boundaries in an effort to find a more reliable 
identification procedure which offers benefits for witnesses and ease of use for the police. 
For example, virtual imaging is being tested by academics in New Zealand, in conjunction 
with the New Zealand Police.
At the same time as technology has the potential to advance the law in its provision of 
protective safeguards for suspects, it also offers challenges. With the increased use of
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CCTV in main centres and with the use of virtual imaging, new issues of protection 
become apparent. For example, technology allows for manipulation of images which may 
address witness complaints that the suspect has changed his or her appearance. However, 
the same manipulation of images may threaten the protection of the suspect from 
misidentification because subtle changes in appearance or the provision of changes in gait 
and position go beyond the boundaries of what is acceptable under Code D today.
As the criminal justice process faces the twenty-first century, the integrity principle with its 
focus on fairness should be the principal consideration in order to ensure that advances in 
psychological knowledge and technology are fostered while at the same time the suspect is 
protected as far as possible from erroneous identifications.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SUSPECTS
Interviews followed a semi-structured qualitative format:
Before the Identification Procedure
1. How do you feel about taking part in the parade?
2. Have you got any worries?
3. Can you explain to me what will happen when you are on the parade?
4. Do you understand the procedures?
5. Who, if anyone, helped you to understand?
After the Identification Procedure
1. Many people have argued about whether the police should get evidence by using 
identification parades. What is your view?
2. What is your view about arrangements here for parades?
3. Do you think that your parade was conducted fairly?
4. Are you satisfied with the way your parade was conducted?
5. The other people on the parade are supposed to be similar in general appearance to 
yourself. How did this work in your situation?
6. Did you object to having particular people on the parade? 
7a. If so, why?
7b. If not, why not?
Was there any point at which you wanted to but didn't?
8. Have you got any general comments or complaints?
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH SUSPECTS
Table A: Suspects' Primary Responses to Taking Part in an Identification Parade
Proof of innocence
Positive (other than innocence)
Nervous
No Choice (other than innocence)
Don't Care
Non-committal/ No response
Number
18
5
8
12
2
5
50
Table B: Suspects' Opinions as to Whether Parades Should be Used as a Tool to Obtain 
Evidence
Should be Used
Should Not be Used/ Are of No Value
Not Sure
Don't Know/ Don't Care
No Response
Number
21
17
3
4
5
50
Responses were given after the parade had taken place
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Table C: The Outcome of Parades and Respondents' Views on Their Usefulness
Should be Used
Should not be Used
Not Sure
Don't Know/Don't Care
No Response
Total
Identified
10
8
2
3
3
26
Not 
Identified
9
9
1
1
1
21
Parade 
Aborted
2
1
3
Total
21
17
3
4
5
50
The 26 suspects classed as "identified" were identified by at least one witness, even where 
one or more witnesses did not make a positive identification in multiple witness cases.
Opinions about using the identification parade as a tool for gaining evidence were therefore 
fairly evenly divided between those who were identified and those who were not.
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APPENDIX C 
QUESTIONNAIRES FOR WITNESSES
Interviews followed a semi-structured format:
Before the Identification Procedure
1. How do you feel about taking part in this procedure?
2. How many people will be sitting on the identification parade?
3. What do you expect will happen?
4. Did anyone help you to understand what will happen?
5. How confident are you that, if the offender is present on the parade, you will be able to 
pick him/her out?
6. In what sort of circumstances did you see the offender? (e.g length of time, lighting etc.)
After an Identification Parade: Where a Choice is Made
1. Did the person you chose stand out from other members on the parade to you?
2. The people on the parade are all supposed to be similar in general appearance. Was this 
the case?
3. How similar to your initial description was the person you chose?
4. There is concern that witnesses sometimes feel pressure to choose someone. Did you 
feel under any pressure?
5. Many people have argued about whether the police should get evidence by using 
identification parades. What is your view?
6. You chose number .... How confident are you that you have chosen the person who 
committed the offence you witnessed?
7. Has this level of confidence changed in the few minutes since you made your choice?
8. Was there anyone else on the parade who you felt might have been the offender?
9. Have you got any other comments?
310
After an Identification Parade: Where No Choice is Made
1. Was there anyone on the parade who you felt could possibly have been the offender?
2. The people on the parade are all supposed to be similar in general appearance. Was this 
the case today?
3. How similar to your initial description were the people on the parade?
4. There is concern that witnesses feel pressure to choose someone. Did you feel under any 
pressure?
5. Many people have argued about whether the police should get evidence by using 
identification parades. What is your view?
6. How confident are you that the offender was not present on the parade?
7. Has this level of confidence changed in the few minutes since you decided to make no 
choice?
8. Have you got any other comments?
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Before a Group Identification
1 .How do you feel about taking part in this procedure?
2. Can you explain to me how a group identification differs from an identification parade?
3. Did anyone help you to understand what will happen?
4. How confident are you that, if the offender walks past, you will be able to pick him/ her 
out?
5. In what circumstances did you see the offender?
After a Group identification: Where a Choice is Made
1. Did you feel more uneasy taking part in a group identification than you would have done 
taking part in an identification parade?
2. How similar to your initial description was the person you chose?
3. There is concern that witnesses sometimes feel under pressure to choose someone. Did 
you feel under any pressure?
4. Many people have argued about whether the police should get evidence by using 
identification procedures. What is your view?
5. How confident are you that you have chosen the person who committed the offence you 
witnessed?
6. Has this level of confidence changed in the few minutes since you made your choice?
7. Did you see anyone else here today who you felt might have been the offender?
8. Have you got any other comments?
After a Group identification: Where No Choice is Made
1. Did you feel more uneasy taking part in a group identification than you would have done 
taking part in an identification parade?
2. There is concern that witnesses sometimes feel under pressure to choose someone. Did 
you feel under any pressure?
3. Many people have argued about whether the police should get evidence by using 
identification procedures. What is your view?
4. How confident are you that the offender did not walk past?
5. Has this level of confidence changed in the few minutes since you made no choice'?
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6. Did you see anyone here today who you felt might have been the offender?
7. Have you got any other comments?
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Before A Confrontation
1. How do you feel about taking part in this procedure?
2. Can you explain to me how a confrontation differs from other forms of identification 
procedure?
3. Did anyone help you to understand what will happen?
4. How confident are you that, if the offender is present, you will be able to confirm that 
he/she is the person you witnessed committing the crime?
5. In what sort of circumstances did you see the offender?
After the Confrontation
1. Did you feel more uneasy taking part in a confrontation than you would have done in 
other identification procedures?
2. How similar to your initial description was the person?
3. There is concern that witnesses sometimes feel under pressure to choose someone. Did 
you feel under any pressure?
4.Many people have argued about whether the police should get evidence by using 
identification procedures. What is your view?
5a. (confirmation that the suspect is the offender): How confident are you that you have 
chosen the person who committed the offence you witnessed?
5b. (suspect not thought by the witness to be the offender): How confident are you that the 
person who committed the offence you witnessed was not here today?
6. Has this level of confidence changed in the few minutes since you made your choice?
7. Have you got any other comments?
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APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH WITNESSES
Table A: Offences Witnessed By the Sample
Robbery
Attempted Robbery
Armed Robbery
Deception
Theft
Burglary
Aggravated Burglary
Criminal Damage
Assault
Wounding
Sexual Assault
Agg. Vehicle Take
Driving Offences
Main Sample
9
1
5
6
2
1
5
3
4
4
2
6
2
PPI Sample
3
5
1
1
1
6
2
Total
12
6
6
6
3
2
5
3
10
6
2
6
2
69
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Table B: The Confidence of Witnesses Who Chose the Suspect (Main Sample)
Case No.
2
3
5
6
7
8
11
12
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
28
31
33
38
41
42
43
46
50
Before Parade
Very Confident
Very Confident
VeryConfident
Very Confident
Very Unsure
Very Confident
Confident
Very Unsure
Very Confident
Unsure
Very Confident
Very Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
Unsure
Very Confident
Unsure
Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
Unsure
Confident
Very Unsure
Very Confident
At the Time the 
Choice was Made
Very Confident
Unsure
Very Confident
Very Confident
Unsure
"101%"
Very Confident
Very Confident
Unsure
100%
Very Confident
Confident
"Quite Confident"
Very Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
Very Unsure
Very Confident
Confident
Unsure
Confident
1 00%
Very Confident
Confident
99%
"6/10"
Very Confident
Minutes After the 
Parade
Very Confident
Unsure
Very Confident
More Confident
More Confident
More Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
Unsure
100%
More Confident
Confident
More Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
More Confident
Less Confident
Very Confident
More Confident
More Confident
Confident
More Confident
Very Confident
Confident
99%
"6/10"
More Confident
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Table C: The Confidence of Witnesses Who Made No Choice (Main Sample)
Case No.
4
23
27
29
30
35
36
37
39
40
44
45
47
48
Before Parade
Very Unsure
Very Confident
Unsure
Very Unsure
Very Unsure
Unsure
Unsure
Very Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
Very Unsure
Very Unsure
Unsure
Very Unsure
At the Time No 
Choice was Made
"Just didn't stand out"
Very Unsure
Not 100%
50:50
75%
90%
Very Confident
Very Confident
Very Sure/ Confident
Very Confident
Very Unsure
Unsure
Unsure
Very Unsure
Minutes After the 
Parade
Unsure
Less Confident
Not 100%
50:50
More Confident
More Confident
Very Confident
More Confident
Very Confident
Very Confident
Very Unsure
More Confident
More Confident
Very Unsure
The confidence levels of witnesses who chose a volunteer are represented in Table 4 of 
Chapter Five, at page 176.
Table D: Retention Lengths Between the Offence and the Identification Procedure for 
Witnesses who Chose a Volunteer
Case No.
1
9
10
13
15
26
32
34
49
Retention Interval
4 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
9 months
1 0 weeks
1 0 weeks
3 months
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Table E: Retention Lengths Between the Offence and the Identification Procedure for 
Witnesses who Chose the Suspect
Case No.
2
3
5
6
7
8
11
12
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
28
31
33
38
41
42
43
46
50
Retention Interval
4 months
6 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
15 months
2 months
5 months
3 months
3 months
1 9 months
19 months
19 months
2 months
2 months
2 months
2 months
2 months
2 months
2 months
1 0 weeks
3 months
7 weeks
6 weeks
6 weeks
2 months
3 months
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Table F: Retention Lengths Between the Offence and the Identification Procedure for 
Witnesses who Made No Choice
Case No.
4
23
27
29
30
35
36
37
39
40
44
45
47
48
Retention Interval
6 months
5 months
9 months
2 months
2 months
1 0 weeks
10 weeks
3 months
6 weeks
6 weeks
3 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
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APPENDIX E
THE NOTICE TO THE SUSPECT AND FORMS FOR 
CONTEMPORANEOUS NOTES
MK29
(Amended 4.95)
IDENTIFICATION 
PARADE
CONTEMPORANEOUS NOTES
FOR COURT USE ONLY
Regina -v- .............
Exhibit No .............
Signed ...............
Justice of the Peace/Clerk to
Date
FOR POUCE USE ONLY
Police Force West Midlands 
Division ...............
Description of Item 
Identification Parade 
Original Notes 
Suspect
C.J. Act 1967 s.9 
MC ACT 1980, S.102 
MC Rules 1981, r.70
I identify the exhibit described
as that referred to in the statement made and 
signed by me
Signature Date
INSPECTOR
THE TAPE MUST BE WIPED CLEAN AT THE CONCLUSION OF PROCEEDINGS UNLESS THE 
PERSON CONCERNED IS CONVICTED OF THE OFFENCE OR ADMITS IT AND IS CAUTIONED 
FOR IT. (P.A.C.E. Codes of Practice D. Annex A 19. 20.)
If you require the tape to be wiped clean complete the below tear off section and return it to the 
Identification Suite where the procedure took place.
Ref. Suspect Date Time
I require that the video recording of the above procedure be wiped clean. 
Name Rank No. Date
Signature Station
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West Midlands Police
REPORT OF IDENTIFICATION PARADE (2.19)
(All references are to Code 'D' of the Codes of Practice:, except those preceded by a letter
which refers io t.ie Annexes of Code'D 1)
Station: Place Held:
Date Held: Screen used? YES NO
Name of Suspect ...........................................................
Address ...................................................................
Legal Representative .........................................................
Firm ....................................... Telephone No .................
Offence with which charged/suspected:
Officer in case .............................................................
Location during identification procedure ..........................................
Witness Officer ......................................... (unconnected with case)
Location (prior to parade) .....................................................
Security Officer ......................................... (unconnected with case)
Volunteers Officer ....................................... (unconnected with case)
Reason for not holding an Identification Parade (2.3 to 2.13)
Reason for not holding a Group Identification (as above) 
Reason for not holding Video Identification (as above)
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FORM OF REFUSAL TO IDENTIFICATION
Name:
Address:
I am aged 17 years of over I am under 17 years of age Tic* one box
I have read the Notice to Suspect on Identification Procedures.
I am NOT willing 
I am NOT willing 
I am NOT willing
to take part jn an identification parade 
to take part in a group identification 
to take part in a video identification
My reasons for not wishing to take part are:- (NOTE: You do not have to give any reasons for your 
decision but if you do these reasons may be given in evidence -in any subsequent proceedings).
Signed: Dated:
SOLICITOR (Name) Signature:
Parent or guardian (for juveniles)/appropriate adult (for mentally disordered or handicapped)
Name: Age:
Address:
Status to suspect:
Signed: Dated:
I certify that I have explained the content and served a copy of 'Notice to Suspect1 on Identification 
Procedure
r
Signed (IDENTIFICATION OFFICER) Date/Time
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NOTICE TO SUSPECT ON IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
The purpose of an identification procedure is to test the ability of a witness to pick out from a group, if he is 
present, a person whom the witness has said that they have seen''before with regard to the following 
incident(s).
lncident(s)/date(s)
"You do not have to say anything but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when 
questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you say may be given in evidence."
The arrangements for and conduct of an identification procedure are the responsibility of a police officer in 
uniform of the rank of inspector or above who is not involved in the investigation. This officer is called the 
"identification officer". Details relating to identification procedures are recorded in this notice. You will be 
provided with a copy. I will ask you to sign my copy, which I retain. Identification procedures are provided by 
the "Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers", which you may consult.
You are entitled to free legal advice before making any decisions regarding the identification procedures 
proposed. This includes the right to speak to a solicitor on the telephone.  
If you significantly aJter your appearance between the taking of any photograph at the time of your arrest or 
after charge and any attempt to hold an identification procedure, this may be given in evidence if the case 
comes to trial. The identification officer may consider other forms of identification.
A brief description of you at this present time is ..........................................
A video or photograph may be taken of you when you attend for any identification procedure but will always 
be taken of a parade. A copy of the photograph or video shall be supplied on request to the suspect or his 
solicitor within a reasonable time.
If you change your appearance before a parade, it may not be practicable to arrange one on the day in 
question or subsequently and, because of your change of appearance, the identification officer may then 
consider alternative methods of identification.
If you refuse or, having agreed, fail to attend an identification parade or the holding of a parade is 
impracticable, arrangements will, if practicable, be made to allow the witness an opportunity of seeing you in 
a group identification, a video identification or a confrontation. A group identification may also be arranged if 
the officer in charge of the investigation considers that it is, in the circumstances, more satisfactory than a 
parade or the Identification Officer considers that by reason of your unusual appearance or other reason it 
would not be practicable to assemble sufficient suitable people to make the parade fair.
You or your solicitor will be provided with details of the description as first given by any witnesses who are to 
attend the parade, group identification, video identification or confrontation. You will also be informed whether 
a witness has been shown any photographs, photofit, identikit or similar pictures by the police.
You or your solicitor will be allowed, provided it is practicable to do so, and would not unreasonably delay the 
investigation, to view any material released to the media by the police for the purpose of recognizing or tracing 
a suspect in connection with the matters under investigation.
At the conclusion of any procedure, you may make any comments you wish and these will be recorded.
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IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Identification Parade
An identification parade may take place either in a normal room or in one equipped with a screen permitting 
witnesses to see its members without being seen. The procedures for the composition and conduct of an 
identification parade are the same whether or not a screen is used but a screen may be used only if your 
solicitor, friend or appropriate adult is present or a video recording is made.
The parade shall consist of people who so far as possible resemble the suspect in age, ;._.'ght, general 
appearance and position in life. You may choose any position in the line.
You may object to anyone else on the parade or to the arrangement made. Such objection should be directed 
to the identification officer.
The parade will be inspected by the witness. If there is more than one'witness, each witness will be brought 
in separately.
You will be allowed to change your position in the line after each witness has left. The witness will not be told 
who is the suspect.
Group Identification
A group identification should be held in a place other than a police station, but may be held in a police station 
when the identification officer considers it is not practicable to hold it elsewhere.
The arrangements for a group identification are the responsibility of the identificaticr. officer, who in this case 
need not be in uniform.
The identification officer will determine the location of a group identification and the method by which it will be 
carried out. He will consider the general appearance ^nd numbers of people likely to be present at a location 
and reasonably expect that a witness will see others who are broadly similar in appearance to you.
Video Identification
The video film must include you and at least eight other people who as far as possible resemble you in age, 
height, general appearance and position in life.
Both you and other persons shall as far as possible be filmed in the same positions or carrying out the same 
activities and under identical conditions.
You and your solicitor will be given a reasonable opportunity to view the complete film before it is shown to 
witnesses. Any reasonable objection to the film will be taken into consideration and if practicable, steps will 
be taken to remove the grounds for objection.
You and your solicitor will, if practicable, be given reasonable notification of the time and place that the film 
will be rhown to witnesses. Whilst you yourself may not be present, your solicitor or other representative may, 
and in the absence of your representative the showing of the film to   .itnesses will itself be recorded on 
video.Only one witness will see the film at a time, and the witness will not be told who is the suspect.
All copies of the video film held by the police and made under these provisions must be destroved if you are 
prosecuted for the offence and cleared or if not prosecuted (unless you admit the offence and are cautioned 
for it).You may witness this destruction if you so request within five days of being cleared or informed that 
you will not be prosecuted.
Confrontation
If neither a parade, a group identification nor a video identification procedure is arranged the suspect may be 
confronted by the witness. Such a confrontation does not require the suspectis consent, but may not take 
place unless none of the other p'-cedures are practicable.
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The identification officer is responsible for the conduct of any confrontation of a suspect by a witness. 
The suspect shall be confronted independently by each witness.
Confrontation must take place in the presence of the suspejtis solicitor, interpreter or frii..._. . -s this 
would cause unreasonable delay.
The confrontation should normally take place in the police station, either in a normal room or in one 
equipped with a screen permitting a witness to see the suspect without being seen, in both cases the 
procedures are the same except that a room equipped with a screen may be used only when the suspecti 
solicitor, friend or appropriate adult is present or the confrontation is recorded on video.
Solicitors, appropriate adults or other representatives
You will be given a reasonable opportunity to have a solicitor and an appropriate adult or friend present, 
and the Identification Officer will ask you to indicate on this Notice to Suspect whether or not you so wish.
Any procedure involving the participation of a person (whether as a suspect or witness) who is mentally 
disordered, mentally handicapped or a juvenile must take place in the presence of the appropriate adult: 
but the adult must not be allowed to prompt any identification of a suspect by a witness.
Consent
You do not have to take part in a parade, or co-operate in a group identification, or with the making of a 
video film and. if it is proposed to hold a group identification or video identification, you are entitled to a 
parade if this can practicably be arranged.
If you do not consent to take part in a parade or co-operation in a group identification or with the making of 
a video film, your refusal may be given in evidence in any subsequent trial and police may proceed covertly 
without your consent or make arrangements to test whether a witness identifies you.
You are asked to sign this form to indicate whether you are willing to take part in a parade or group 
identification or co-operate with the making of a videi. film. If you refuse to consent or co-operate you are 
not obliged to give your reasons.
Opportunity given to suspect/solicitor to view films/photographs released to media for broadcast
Suspect........................................................
Material released by the police to media for the purpose of recognising or tracing suspect: - 
Yes | | No Q (tick one box) 
If "yes" complete (I) or (ii) as appropriate;
*(i) Material shown to "suspect/solicitor on (date) .......................... by ...................................................
* (ii) Material NOT viewed by suspect/solicitor because (tick all reasons which apply and/or complete other):-
suitable facilities/equipment were not available | | 
unreasonable delay would be caused to the investigation
suspect/solicitor declined the opportunity to view material [ | 
other (describe) ....................................................... ........ |_|
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Details of first desf notion of the suspect given bv each witness 
Witness 1 ............................................
Witness 2
Witness 3
Witness 4
Witness 5
Witness 6
Witness 7
Witness 8
I am willing/not willing to take part in an 'Identification Parade/Group Identification A/id eo Identification. 
*l wish/do not wish to have a "solicitor/friend present "DELETE AS APPROPRIATE
I have been told that before this parade was arranged .............. witness(es) who are taking
part have been shown photographs, photofit, indentikit, compusketch or similar pictures by the police.
I have received a copy of this notice.
Signed ............................... Date ........................
Appropriate Adult (suspect apparently under 17 or suspected of having mental problems)
Name ................................. Status ...............
Signed ................................. Date ................
I certify that I have explained the content and served a copy of this notice.
Signed ......................... Date .................... Time
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Time parade began: Mrs
Question to Suspect:-
"Do you object to any of the persons paraded?" (A10) 
Answer ................................ ..............
State any arrangements made in consequence o.' any objection:-
Name of all police officers and other persons present during the parade showing the reason for 
their presence. (A6)
Name ......................... Reason ...................................
Name ......................... Reason ...................................
Name ......................... Reason ...................................
Name ......................... Reason ...................................
Name ......................... Reason ...................................
Question to Suspect: -
"Do you object to any of the other persons being present who are not 
on the parade or to any of the arrangements for the parade?" (A10)
Steps taken to comply with any objection:
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TO BE COMPLETED FOR EACH WITNESS VIEWING THE PARADE:
Name
Showr
of Witness .....................
i photographs/compusketch? YES | ] NO (Notes 2B)
Explain to suspect before witness appears:
"You may select any place you like among the persons paraded"
Show opposite, as if facing parade, 
the position of members of the 
parade, marking suspect as X and 
giving the other participants the 
number they have on form WC314 
Record of Persons Forming 
Identification Parade or Group 
Identification.
1 2 .3 4 5
"
6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15
Signed
IDENTIFICATION OFFICER
Time Mrs
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INSTRUCTIONS TO WITNESS BY IDENTIFICATION OFFICER MK29
How was witness ushered in ...........................................
"Mr/Mrs/Miss/Ms ..........
You have been asked here today to see if you can identify th° person you saw 
on ..................
(describe incident) ..................................................
The person you saw may or may not be on the parade: If you cannot make a postive 
identification you should say so but do not make a decision before looking at each member 
of the parade at least twice. Look at each member of the parade at least twice taking as 
much care and time as you wish." (A14)
DESCRIBE WHAT THE WITNESS DOES AND SAYS ..............................
WHEN THE IDENTIFICATION OFFICER IS SATISFIED THAT THE WITNESS HAS LOOKED 
PROPERLY AT EACH MEMBER OF THE PARADE HE SHALL ASK:
"Is the person you saw on the previous occasion on the parade?"
Reply ...................................................................
"What Number?"
Was the suspect identified? YES _ NO
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After the last witness has finished: 
Question to Suspect:
"Do you wish to make any comments on the conduct of the 
parade/group identification/video identification/confrontation." (A 18)
Answer...............................................................
Time Procedure Finished: Mrs
Remarks on any point not already covered:-
I certify that the above procedure took place in accordance with the Codes of Practice. 
I am not involved with the investigation of the case.
Signature of Identification Officer 
Name .................... Rank ................ (1.8, 1.9)
Date signed ............................ Time. Hrs
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APPENDIX F
FIGURES FROM BIRMINGHAM AND MANCHESTER IDENTIFICATION
SUITES
HIUIJJTCATIOH PXOCSDOITS.
1. Numbers of ID Procedures Booked
2. Number of ID Procedures Carried out ^~~ % 2',
3. Number of ID Procedures Collapsed: (a) Less than 2 days (I &
(b) More than 2 days g^ ' /
4. Number of Procedures Booked for Birmingham Divisions
5. Number of Procedures Booked for other Veat Midlands (Divisions "Y ~J—
6. Number of Procedures Booked for other Forces y ~)
7. Cost of West Hidlands Procedures carried out/_.^--> ^ . .— / £6^>
L "* "ti->'* /
8. Cost of Collapsed West Mid.anda Procedures A
' 'I(where co«ws vere incurred)
/ / / "? 
L/^//u. / L. -'-
9. Number of Witnesses in procedures carried out . <-.
(Primary Incidents) / f—f J< g-j
10. Number of Witnesses making Positive Identif cations ft. I/7~~\
11. Witnesses (Percentage Positive) ^j£ C-4- /^
12. Breakdown of Offencesi (a) Murder ————————t__
(b) Assault (Section M, 20 and 18) ___________
(L I V
(c) Robbery ^ ' 0
(d) Burglary ______
Income generated from ( a ) Sexual Offences 
outside forces/bodies
-P ~~1 (ff f\ r\ ^' Auto Crime
(g) Theft other 
(h) Deceptions _________ 
(1) Damage __ ' '
(J) None Crime Matters _____ *• 
(k) Other Crime (specify overleaf) _____
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IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, MONTH
1. Numbers of ID Procedures Booked j 0 '^-~^~~)
2. Number of ID Procedures Carried out
3. Number of ID Procedures Collapsed: (a) Less than 2 dayc
(b) More than 2 days
4. Number of Procedures Booked for -Birmingham Divisions I r\Q _1
5. Number of Procedures Booked for other West Midlands Divisions
6. Number of Procedures Booked for other Forces
7. Average Cost of West Midlands Procedures carried out "' "f^- / 2. A I L / \7 \
________________________________^T I J^-f /-'A.IL CcJ '/
8. Average Cost of Collapsed West Midlands Procedures 
(where costs were incurred) %ii3-|£acc)-
9. Number of Witnesses in procedures carried out
(Primary Incidents)
10. Number of Witnesses making Positive Identifcations
11. Witnesses (Percentage Positive)
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Sub - Divisional Police Headquarters
St Joseph's Building
Stockport Road
Longsight
Manchester M13 OLE
Telephone: 0161 8564107
Fax: 01618564106
1992
Combined Total-1392
Positive 475 34%
Negative 374 26%
Not Run 543 39%
1993
Combined Total 1444
Positive 457 31%
Negative 393 27%
Not Run 594 41%
1994
Combined total 1441
Positive
Negative
Not Run
442
393
606
0
30% 
27% 
42%
1995
Combined Total 1218
Positive 402 33%
Negative 292 23%
Not Run 524 43%0
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